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RESEARCH SYNOPSIS
How shall we continue to speak of God's love in a world which
continues to be flagrantly frustrated by human injustice? The quest­
ion is not so much concerned with theodicy as with the task of human 
loving. Loving justly, so that ever wider structures of justice 
are made possible in history, must be a human endeavour which corr­
elates with a divine precept, mandate, and command. Indeed, Christ­
ians are 'commanded' to love, both "one another" and the neighbour 
as oneself, in correspondence with the love revealed and exemplified 
by Christ. The 'thesis' developed in this research is given, to 
the Church and to the world, in Jesus' word to his disciples:
As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you.Dwell in my love. If you heed my commands, you will dwell in my love, as I have heeded my Father's commands and dwell in his love...
This is my commandment: love one another, as I have loved you. (John 15:9-12)
The task of loving is a problem of authentic correlation.
We must first reflect upon the ministry of Jesus, and upon the sort 
of love or loves which he exemplified among his contemporaries.
Then we must discover ways of interpreting the commanded love for 
our own day, and of putting such a love into practice. The quest 
for justice parallels and criticizes our quest for love.
New Testament scholarship and theological reflection of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries have interpreted Christian love I1
in many ways. As a convenient starting point for evaluating inter- i1pretations of Christian love, the proposition is suggested that an 
appropriate practice of love, correlating with the love of Christ, 
should lead, if ever so subtly, to the creation of justice in cont­
emporary societies of human beings, and provide foundations for great­
er justice in future societies.
A 'symposium' of selected 'speakers' on the characteristics 
of Christian love is 'convened'. From the nineteenth century we 
consider the thoughts of Ludwig Feuerbach and Soren Kierkegaard,
and briefly, of the 'young Hegel'. These thinkers set the tone for 
much of the discussion, and in their ideas are distinguished certain 
dominant themes which will continue to characterize love-talk in 
the twentieth century.
The twentieth century discussion takes the form of a 'debate* 
between 'neo-orthcdox' Protestants, Latin American 'liberation theo­
logians ', and North American 'theologians of process *. But the debate 
is complicated, because the lines of division are not always distinct­
ly drawn. We consider the most germane propositions of Anders Nygren, 
whose strict division between agape and eros has had a continuing 
impact upon Christian theology. Briefly we compare the thoughts 
of Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, John Burnaby, and Karl Barth, 
and their impact upon the discussion of Christian love which began 
with Nygren's radical definitions. We observe, for example, how 
Karl Barth moves away from the early 'neo-orthodox' concerns, answer­
ing the critics of neo-orthodoxy with a holistic interpretation of 
love which melts into action, net determined, but sustained, by the 
covenanted love of God for his creatures.
The- latter part of this ' symposium ' is an attempt to hear, 
without prejudging, two of the most prominent interpretations of 
love in contemporary thought. The Latin American theologians of 
liberation, since the late nineteen-sixties, have projected a view 
of Christian love which is thoroughly interpolated with the call 
for justice, on their continent expecially, and also throughout the 
world. Their viewpoints elevate the discussion to a new plane, in 
which theory and practice are profoundly interdependent.
Although Alfred North Whitehead wrote in the early twentieth 
century, his followers, in the United States especially, have begun 
to build upon his ideas, so that the 'process theology' of the eight­
ies is intimately related to Whitehead's work in the twenties. 
Although the literature is massive, a hearing of Whitehead himself 
seems important if his ideas about love are to be set in relation 
to the genre which he inspired.
Influenced significantly by the synthesizing method of Whitehead, 
the concluding chapter aims at no definitive conclusion. However, 
in recognition of the criterion that love should be creative of 
justice, certain related issues are distinguished which might inform 
theology's love-talk for the future. For example, recent textual 
analysis of the New Testament has demonstrated that the word agape 
has no consistent usage in the Bible as a word for love superseding 
all others. The perpetuation cf agape as a 'technical' word for 
a definite 'type' of love, is not justified by scripture, and may 
obscure the profound intimacy of love to justice. Similarly, the 
relationship of faith to Christian love has the capacity to militate 
against love's relation to justice. The idea of eros may entail 
elements of Christian love and justice not normally construed by 
interpretations of agape. Response to God's love may be inhibited 
by exclusive, elite, or essentially egocentric characterizations 
of Christian love. Other insights pertinent to love's relation to 
justice, its affiliation with feeling, and its universal quality, 
are suggested.
Although the final chapter is an attempt to provide a stepping- 
stone toward future love-talk which may be more authentically attuned 
to the justice-issues of our world, the main contribution of this 
research may be in the collation of the diverse points of view which 
the selected authors represent. There is very little that can be 
said about love which is truly novel; the idea of love has perhaps 
the longest and most profound history in literature. In the practice 
of love, however, the novelty of creative synthesis awaits and beckons 
the adventurous.
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PREFACE 
A MORATORIUM ON 'LOVE'?
The Problem Simple -
In 1969, as a first-year divinity student in Edinburgh, I was
profoundly influenced by John McIntyre's book On the Love of God.
I was being challenged then, by events in Vietnam, Northern Ireland,
Prague, and the southern United States, to discover a theology which
could make sense of those dilemmas and conflicts. The book brought
home to me a concept of God whose grace cannot be interrupted by
world historical crisis nor by human sin. McIntyre's simply written
yet profound characterization of a loving God became the 'hook'
on which I could hang my faith. As he described the Incarnation
and the Atonement I began to see that the Christ event reveals not
only the nature of God, but also the potential nature of humanity.
"For at the very heart of the Bible where we meet God in devotion
there stands the man that was called Jesus, and from that anthropos
1no proper theology can ever hope to escape." "In the person of
Jesus Christ there takes place the revelation not only of God, but 
2also of man."
I began to wonder how our love might, in some sense, resemble 
God's; how our inadequate attempts to make justice happen on this 
earth might in some way 'measure up' to God's love for all. From 
that time 'the love of God' appeared to me, more and more as the i
'bottom line' of theology, preaching, pastoral care, and politics. 
God's love and our love did not seem quite as far apart as our history, 
and much of our theology, might imply.
1. John McIntyre, On the Love of G o d , Collins, London, 1962, p. 622. ibid. p. 182.
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The second, and more recent, influence stimulating,my research 
into the idea of love comes from a seminar in which I participated 
at Duke University in 1979. The seminar was led by Frederick 
Herzog, on the subject of "History and Providence."^ At the end 
of the semester some of us were invited to 'preach' to the class,
integrating what we had learned in a relevant 'sermon'. Several 
of the sermons, mine included, attempted to resolve the apparent
conflict between history and providence with copious references 
to divine and human love. When we had finished. Professor Herzog, 
who during the course had maintained a low profile with regard 
to his own opinions, offered his own summary. To our surprise
he asserted that 'love' is an over-worked term in Christian theology. 
Love, he said, is theologically meaningless unless there is a 
corresponding emphasis upon the establishment of adequate 'justice 
structures' relating directly to the plight of the poor and the
oppressed. Further, he stressed, until European and North American
preachers and theologians are willing to involve themselves in 
direct action to establish justice, there should be a 'moratorium' 
on the use of the word 'love\ "Without these justice structures,"
2he said, "we're kidding ourselves if we think we're loving." 
For Herzog the tragedies of history cannot be attributed to any
lack of emphasis on the idea of love by the Church. What is missing 
is the establishment of justice, the condition for love's growth.
The tension between the above influential viewpoints cannot 
be easily resolved. On the one hand there is the undeniably biblical 
assertion that God's love, and ours, is the very 'centre' of Christian 
theology. As McIntyre says, the Bible is 'about' the love of
God. ^
1. cf. Langdon Gilkey, Reaping the W h i r l w i n d , Seabury Press, New York, 1976 also, Patrick 
Gardiner, e d ., Theories of H i s t o r y , Free Press, New Y o r k , 1959.
2. Verbatim quotation from Herz#g's lecture, cf. Frederick Herzog, Justice Church, Orbis 
Maryknoll, New York, 1980, esp. Chapter 5.3. McIntyre, On the Love of God, op. cit. p. 32
"Love must stand at the centre of our declaration of the Good
News and radiate outwards to exercise a controlling influence
1in the moulding of our theological affirmations." On the other
hand, the hard sayings of the prophets and of Jesus leave us with
the uneasy feeling that what Herzog says is just as biblical:
"God's love cannot be used to sublimate the misery of oppression.
We need to be utterly alert to the social dynamics of conflict
2that sublimate love." Unfortunately, the oppression of orphans,
widows, and strangers even by those who proclaim God's love has 
not greatly diminished since the days of Amos and Jesus. The 
critical point is whether our "theological affirmations" lead 
us to action. Are we doers of the word, or merely hearers and 
declarers?
This is not the place to compare and contrast the views 
of McIntyre and Herzog. Their difference, I suspect, is primarily 
one of emphasis. Despite the tension between love and justice, 
they have much in common, especially a profound interest in Christology. 
Perhaps the apparent tension, between 'the love of God' and God's 
call for justice, is endemic to the nature of their enquiry.
Both have noticed that we tend to cast Jesus in our own image, 
to make him the legitimation of our cultural mores.^ Both eschew 
a cheap and easy individual piety, thinly wrapped in the 'security 
blanket' of God's love. Both acknowledge that the words, parables, 
and ministry of Jesus are able to cut through ego-centrism and 
exclusive group identity which lead to injustice. But the tension 
between their main emphases, love and justice respectively, is
1. McIntyre, On the Love of G o d , op. cit. p. 32
2. Herzog, "Liberation and Im agination," Interpretation v. 32, Richmond, Virginia, p. 237; 
Also published in Justice C h u r c h , op. cit. p. 98.
3. cf. Herzog, Liberation T h e o l o g y , Seabury Press, New York, 1972; also John McIntyre,
The Shape of C h r i s t o l o g y , SCM, London, 1966
h. The seminal exponent of this observation is, of course, Albert Schweitzer, The Quest 
of the Historical Jesus, E.T;W. Montgomery, A. 8 C. Black, London, 1910, pp. 397-400
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probably indispensable to an understanding of Christ. Certainly
there is no simple choice to be made - love or justice - which
might make the tension disappear. The tension is in fact highlighted
if we acknowledge McIntyre's insistence that the Bible is 'about'
God ' s love. Herzog actually confirms McIntyre's emphasis on the
radical nature of the love of God, if we take seriously the implication
that we in the North have lost our privilege of speaking about
love unless and until we get our thinking about justice right.^
Ideology, for better or for worse, is reflected in hermeneutics.
'The love of God' implicit in Jesus' activity among the rich,
the poor, and the pompous demands constant reinterpretation in
the light of changing conditions. Doctrinal formulations have
a certain historical validity, but with them we import the ideologies
of their age. The impinging history of Jesus of Nazareth resists
definitive categories. As one New Testament scholar has put it,
"As soon as we get too comfortable with Jesus, I think we may
2have missed him." What was said about Jesus yesterday cannot
simply be repeated today. The love of God keeps breaking the 
old moulds. Perhaps it is right that our interpretation of God ' s 
love is always yesterday's news. Somehow our old wineskins keep 
wearing out.
1. Of various distinctions concerning global demography, I prefer the North-South desig­
nation as the least inappropriate, cf. "The Brandt R e p o r t " : North - South: A Programme 
for S u r v i v a l , Pan, London, 1980
2. Professor Hugh Anderson, New College, Edinburgh University; unpublished remark in lec­ture.
INTRODUCTION 
TO DWELL IN LOVE...
1. The Task and Thesis
The task, quite simply, is to bring our talk and action
into line with the creating, sustaining, redeeming, transforming
love of God. There is no question of proposing a 'new thesis'-
for it has already been given us :
As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you.Dwell in my love. If you heed my commands, you 
will dwell in my love, as I have heeded my Father's commands and dwell in his love.
This is my^commandment: love one another, as I have loved you.
We must not be too quick to pull out our critical, exegetical, 
and hermeneutical tools. We are dealing with a 'thesis' which 
is completely inseparable from 'method'. God's love is not dependent 
upon how we interpret it, but rather upon what has been done for 
us and how we respond to it in practice. The ' thesis ' ^  the
task. If we cannot identify the imperative in the indicative 
of God's love, then no hermeneutic will set it right for us. 
Our "theological affirmation" is precisely interpreted by our 
action. Our affirmation of the love of God is disclosed in our 
willingness to do justice (mispat) and love kindness (besed) and 
thus walk humbly with our God (cf. Micah 6:8). God's love encompasses 
us, but without our response to its task and demand, we shall 
not "dwell" in it, and talk about it is empty talk. To be sure, 
God's love and human love are not ultimately opposed; an obedient 
response to the "command" indicates that we may "dwell" in the 
same love with which we have first been loved.
1. John 15: 9-12. Although this saying has been interpreted as an exclusive logion 
meant only for an inner circle of disciples or for the Church, I am taking it as a 
universal and symbolic word to the total 'oikouraene' - the community of the wo rld.(NEB)
6
Although the task is strenuous, we are not thrown back upon 
ourselves. We are not finally faced with an 'either/or'; even as 
we fail to perform the task, despite the enabling persuasiveness 
of God's love, we are infinitely given exactly what was required: 
"Father forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34). 
Finally, God's love covers a multitude of sins.
2. The Programme's Criterion
The proposition is that the theory of the love of God is not 
to be divorced from its practice. This proposition is given us 
in a form which is not subject to rational proof. Rather, it places 
upon us the responsibility of developing an adequate programme of 
compliance: "for each tree is known by its own fruit. If it is
at all conceivable that our love might resemble God's, that our 
loves shall "dwell" in his, it is important that we constantly examine 
our practice. There must be no mistake; the practice itself is 
indispensable. Its examination may then be conducted according 
to the criterion "as I have loved you". Such an examination is 
elusive however, because the criterion is always at a different 
point than when we last 'observed' it; it always goes before us.
The programme, a 'method' for evaluation of our practice of
God's love, is thus dependent upon our interpretation of Christ's
2love for us: "Love one another, as I have loved you." But this
criterion must be construed in finite terms, whereas its real meaning 
is not really contiguous with any rational interpretation. Yet 
we are not faced with purely analogical or symbolic delimitation. 
The impact of the Incarnation, God's identification with human form, 
is. that our finite language can have infinite meaning. Of course
1. Luke 6:44
2. John 15:12 It would be erroneous to interpret this verse as encouragement toward m a rtyr­
dom, implying that Christ died to demonstrate his love. Although the idea of sacrifice 
may be present h e r e , it is only one possible expression of the wide authentic love 
demonstrated by Christ. Feeding the hungry, for e x a m p l e , might be even more authentic.
our reason is inadequate to express the ontological significance 
of "as I have loved you". But the criterion is brought to our under­
standing in the very 'fact' of love's having been expressed by Christ
in a form which identifies with us, and which we are able to recognize-
We can therefore draw our implications in faith that we need not
be speaking nonsense, even though we speak of infinite things in 
limited language.
If we are to love 'as Christ loved us' we must posit some 
interpretation of his love, given the assumptions that (a his love 
is always in creative flux, and (b) our interpretation must point 
from the phenomenological to the ontological, from the finite to 
the infinite. The critiques of McIntyre and Herzog help us to arrive 
at a programme whereby the criterion 'as Christ loved us' may be 
more adequately understood as a basis for a critique of human love 
in its attempt to 'measure up' to the love of God. The criterion
'as Christ loved us' may be construed, in our terms, as the creation 
of justice. The criterion is based upon Jesus' own interpretation 
that (1) the neighbour is to be loved as oneself, and is of equal 
worth before God, and (2) we are to behave toward others as we would 
like others to behave toward us.
Although it may be shocking to convert the infinite idea of 
the love of God into terms which we understand, this is no attenuation 
of God's love. "The glory of the Atonement, and its continuing 
mystery, is that both love and justice meet there and are fulfilled 
beyond any possibility that prophet or seer ever thought possible."^ 
So McIntyre describes how the cross of Christ resolves the antithesis 
between God's love and his moral demand upon human kind. The ultimate 
justification which occurs at the Cross might be considered the 
final retributive justice which is accomplished for humanity, as
1. McIntyre. On the Love of God. op. cit. d . 172
the ultimate effect of the love of God. The Cross is the ultimate 
creation of justice.
At the same time, the Cross heightens and enables distributive 
justice, that justice which was seen by the prophets as the purpose 
of the Law. That liberation observed by Paul, in which our justific­
ation frees us for righteousness, is distributive justice. Because 
we have no longer to worry about judgment, we are free for just 
living. As Herzog says, "We are called to liberate men and women 
from oppression, and that should suffice as an answer to the mystery 
of life."^
There is nothing we need to learn except how we can share in God’s struggle for justice.Obviously all of this does not happen without love. But God's love is first of all justice- love, the love of justice...What we are freed for is making choices in keeping with God's battle for justice.
So we interpret "Love one another as I have loved you" to 
mean, practically, "Love one another so that justice is created." 
Retributive justice, after the Cross, is transformed into God's 
justification of humanity. The impact of God's justification of 
sinful humanity is that humans are liberated, and given an example, 
in order to distribute justice in the world. The distribution of 
justice, through all the relations of human beings, becomes the 
'method' by which we may love 'as Christ has loved us'. Our love 
is criticized by its capacity to break down the barriers that separate 
human beings from each other, and humankind from all creation. 
Selfish loves are not the love of Christ, not that eminently just 
love by which we first are loved. Nevertheless, even our selfish 
loves are subject to God's purpose, and in that purpose they may 
increase in justice and creativity, perfected in their imperfection, 
so that even in evil lies the possibility of right.
1. Herzog, Liberation T h e o l o g y , op. cit. p. 41
2. Herzog, Justice Chruch, op. cit. p. 98
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If there is a defect in the criterion, it is probably attribut­
able to the diverse meanings of words like 'love' and 'justice'. 
Certainly they are not strict synonyms. Yet, in a sense, they may 
define each other. A love that is not just cannot be commensurate 
with the love of God. A justice that is not merciful, with a sense 
of passion, is not God's justice. If love continues to be defined 
merely in an egocentric emotional sense, and if justice continues 
to be defined retributively, then we have not noticed the radical 
redefinition of both terms by the Incarnation. In reinterpreting 
the criterion 'as I have loved you' to mean 'so that justice is 
created' there is no implication that we speak of logical or onto­
logical equivalents. But practically, intuitively and imaginatively 
considered, there is an intimate correlation between love and justice. 
The correlation is unquestionably biblical. But more than this, 
it is profoundly characteristic of the imperative which lies within 
the indicative of God's love for humanity. The 'thesis' is given;
if it cannot be adopted it cannot be proven. But if it can be adopted, 
its criterion may be developed in practice: "as I have loved you".
3. Other Criteria?
Every proposition must have a starting point, but a starting
point need not exclude other essential elements which may arise 
in the course of discussion. Indeed, the selection of criteria 
needs to be both broad and specific enough to facilitate meaning
without artifically limiting new relationships and criteria as they 
arise. In suggesting the criterion of justice as a starting point 
by which to examine the practice of love according to Christ's love 
for humanity, I would hope that the criterion will be able to shed 
light upon other essential elements associated with the general
concept of 'the love of God' and its relation to practical human 
loves. For example, we may see that God's justice-creating activity 
in the Atonement has a pronounced effect upon the meaning of human
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suffering; thus suffering may arise as a new criterion if we are
to love one another as Christ has loved us. Or perhaps, in some
way, the conception of beauty becomes transformed for us in an examin­
ation of , the eminently just love which is apparent in the work of 
Christ, in his words and ministry. Perhaps, indeed, our concept'
of God himself may be radically altered through the juxtaposition 
of love and justice. The relationship of love to justice is in 
no way exclusive of other relationships and criteria. 'The creation 
of justice' is no simplistic reduction of the criterion 'as I have 
loved you' . But it is offered as one way of gaining insight into 
what it means to love according to the command of Christ.
If the idea of justice, in such diverse ways, is to help us 
to understand what it means to love, we must not be too quick to 
offer a definition of the word 'justice'. At the very least, we 
may note that the word is radically transformed by the ministry 
of Christ, and that its usual legal connotation is inadequate. 
On some level, human theories of justice are beckoned to 'correspond' 
with the practical examples of justice inherent in Jesus' ministry 
on earth, and also with that ultimate justification announced at 
the Cross. God's creation of justice, where it could not otherwise 
exist, continues to criticize and inspire the practice and temporal 
attributes of justice in every successive age.
In the contingency of human existence, 'the creation of justice' 
must be open to interpretation in ways which are correlative with 
that ultimate justice. For example, it may mean, but not be limited 
to, forgiveness of others just as we are forgiven. It may mean 
protection of the rights of human beings so that an environment
is preserved or created in which love is possible. But in the light 
of God's justification of sinful human beings, the notion of justice 
as punishment is radically called in question. Even where penal 
justice is necessary, its purpose must be interpreted in distributive 
terms. Retributive justice is rendered obsolete by the Atonement.
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Only in the broad sense of distributive justice is our justice able 
to identify and facilitate the possibility of loving 'as Christ 
has loved us'. Nevertheless, an artificial limitation of the para­
meters of this distributive justice is counterproductive to its 
interpretive effect upon the idea of love. If justice is able to 
interpret love, then love also helps to interpret justice.^
God's call for justice lies in the immediate background of
2an examination of love. Its relevance to a Christian understanding 
of love should become clearer as our 'programme' is developed. 
It is the starting point for the development of the programme, the 
primary criterion which shall help us to interpret what love means. 
Nevertheless it is not the only criterion, for it should highlight 
other relationships and other criteria which also contribute to 
the practice of love 'as Christ loved us'. God's covenant culminating 
in the Cross redefines temporal justice so that it is to be conceived 
distributively, not retributively. The meaning and content of justice 
are more fully revealed as we more fully understand love.
4. The Programme (Methodical Practice)
If the criterion for love, 'as Christ loved us', may be const­
rued practically as a love which creates justice, we may now entertain 
a 'programme' for the analysis of theology which purports to talk 
about love. Since neither God's love nor God's justice are static 
entities, the programme should be able to conceive movement and 
development in human love, as well as in the human's concept of
love. The human practice of love, as well as the identification
of possibilities in love itself, must be urged toward greater corre­
lation with the model which is given in the Incarnation, and which
1. For other views on the nature of justice in light of Christian love, cf. Gene Outka, 
Agape, An Ethical A n a l y s i s , Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1972 Chapt. Ill 
(Outka documents and summarizes specific views of justice which set the discussion in 
greater perspective.)
2. cf. Lev. 19:1-37, esp. vss. 2, 18b, 33; Deut. 22:1-4; cf. also Ex. 20 and 24; D e u t . 5:1- 21; Deut. 6:1-4
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constantly goes before us. The programme must be repeated, and 
repeated again, as new relationships emerge by which God's love 
may be more practically and consciously integrated with our own. 
The programme has five parts. It implies both a 'practical method' 
for doing theology, and a 'methodical practice' for creating justice.
(1) Identify the potential options. (2) Note the contradictions.
(3) Discover and interpret the elements and criteria for justice.
(4) Search for syntheses. (5) Relate the new theory to practice.
(1) Identify options.
In any theory of love we must first make intuitive, and so
conditional, choices about the capacity of that theory to lead to
a just practice of love in our world. The necessity and contingency 
of history have influenced, and will continue to influence, interpre­
tations of the love of God and humanity's capacity to conform to
that love. As we conditionally adapt, or partially refute theories 
of love we necessarily import and export ideologies, while we simult­
aneously add our own. To a certain degree, such ideologies are 
often capable of overcoming history, and as we are able to identify 
and incorporate these in new and relevant theory, we are not ruled 
by ideology. Thus we must 'demythologize' our options, while knowing 
that we ourselves are not history's last word. What we deny today 
may well be reaffirmed tomorrow. But in a hopeful sense, what we
affirm or reaffirm today has the possibility of being reaffirmed 
tomorrow.
The authors I have chosen to consider represent only a small 
part of the wealth of thoughts about God's love. Indeed, consider­
ation of each author is limited not only by (my) time and the space 
available, but also by numerous other definitive limitations of 
which I am only too aware. A thematic examination of any writer 
must necessarily abbreviate the range of the writer's concern and 
the interrelationships which may be required for adequate appreciation. 
We must content ourselves with brief sketches, highlighting topips
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which seem important. The chosen selection for comparison is to 
a certain extent arbitrary; nevertheless, I have hoped that a general 
collage will emerge which will depict the wide inter-relationships 
which seem to characterize discussion about love from a theological 
perspective.
From the nineteenth century, I have selected Ludwig Feuerbach 
and S^ren Kierkegaard. Not only are they interesting in their devel­
opment of the idea of love, but their respective cumulative impact 
upon our century is inestimable in influence and diversification. 
The works of both have exceeded philosophical and theological applic­
ations. Their research and ideas are preserved in numerous contem­
porary forms and disciplines.^ Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard have 
had a significant impact upon theological love-talk in the twentieth 
century. Kierkegaard's influence is seen in the rise of neo-orthodoxy, 
particularly in the writings of Barth, Nygren, and Brunner. Feuerbach's 
conversion of theology into anthropology is notably apparent in 
the whole discussion of I-Thou dynamics which has spanned our century, 
particularly in relation to Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber.
In addition, the Christian - Marxist dialogue can hardly be considered 
without reference to Feuerbaclh. Latterly, the rise of 'liberation 
theology' and its connection to Marx must, in an indirect sense 
at least, be related to Feuerbach's influence. Neither Feuerbach 
nor Kierkegaard may be adequately interpreted without an acknowledge­
ment of their pre-eminent concern for justice on many levels. In 
choosing to expound Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, it is obvious that 
I have omitted numerous other writers from the nineteenth century. 
While there is some attention to Hegel, the reader may appreciate 
the necessity for representative, if somewhat arbitrary, selection.
1. For example, my local doctor's surgery has hanging on the wall a poster advising against 
obesity; "You are what you eat ! " T F è ù è r b a c h 's aphorism is indeed pervasive: "Der Mensch 
ist was er isst!" Similarly, a reference to Kierkegaard appears on page 94 of R.S. Laing's 
book on existential psychiatry, The Divided S e l f , Tavistock Publications, London, 1960. 
{Pelican, 1965)
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A discussion of love in comtemporary theology would be grossly 
deficient without mention of Anders Nygren. Nygren's separation 
of love into ' types '-significantly ' Agape ' as the love of the New 
Testament and Eros as the neo-platonic acquisitive love - has had 
a wide influence upon twentieth century love-talk. It is not limited 
to neo-orthodox theology, for the distinctions are preserved in 
diverse connections, particularly in the field of ethics.
Nygren's impact has provoked various alternative expositions 
of the idea of love, and something must be said about these. Although 
we shall not have time to discuss Nygren's critics, such as John 
Burnaby, at length, references to gmil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Karl Barth, and others may help to demonstrate the diversification 
of the theme of love in contemporary Christian theology. As we 
shall see, the criterion of 'the creation of justice' may assist 
an analysis.
The idea of love is a recurrent theme in modern Liberation 
Theology and some attempt at an assessment seems to be required. 
An assessment is particularly important, because in this instance, 
love is indeed set in the context of a demand for justice. The 
multitude of authors dealing with liberation themes renders compre­
hensive examination difficult. I have elected to concentrate upon 
the liberation theologians of South America.
North American 'process theology' has been a developing force 
in talk about God, and of God's attribute of love, since the writings 
of Alfred North Whitehead. Despite the many interpretations of 
Whitehead, I have chosen to give particular attention to Whitehead 
himself. Whitehead reminds us of certain concerns of Plato, Hegel, 
and Feuerbach, but he also adds his own 'novelty'. On the topic 
of love, his viewpoint is comprehensive and innovative. His thought 
may provide the ground for further syntheses of the diverse character­
izations of love throughout the history of theology. Like his notion
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of love, Whitehead’s connection of love with justice is intriguing 
and open-ended.
(2) Note Contradictions
In the light of the criterion that our love is to create justice, 
contradictions arise during the consideration of the 'options'.
(a) Apparent contradictions may be identified internally in a writer's 
thought. For example, in the light of the criterion of justice 
we might note that an attempt to stress worship as an essential 
element of love for God may inadvertently subjugate active and inc­
lusive love to the concerns of an individual or corporate elite. 
The criterion of justice would help to question such an elitism, 
and identify the need for a better relationship between piety and 
practice.
(b) Contradictions occur, which may or may not be substantial, in 
a comparison of different authors' thematic interests relating to 
the idea of love. Thus we observe that Feuerbach's view of ’ love 
implies the negation of faith, while Kierkegaard's concept of love 
is dependent upon faith. Although such contradictions cannot easily 
be reconciled, if at all, it may be helpful to relate contradictory 
notions of love to the requirement that love should be able to create 
justice. In a limited way, some of the apparent contradictions 
between authors may find their synthesis through consideration of, 
and relation to, the idea of justice.
(c) Other types of contradictions may appear during the course of 
examination and comparison. Particularly we must note 'intuitive' 
contradictions and 'practical' contradictions. Intuitive contradic­
tions are by nature difficult to classify. Generally, we must take 
note of a certain 'feeling' which may arise as some author's concept 
of love becomes a bit too rational, a bit too hypostatized, a bit 
too systematic. Such a feeling, correlated with one's own subjective 
sense of the justice inherent in the Incarnation, may help to identify
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gaps between logic and experience. Of course our feeling may be 
wrong; but so may any attempt to apply reason, in a definitive way, 
to an experience which demands the most transcendent rational method 
possible.
Similarly, it is not always possible to reconcile some theory 
of love with what is conceivable in practice. There has been a 
traditional tendency to see God's love in such divine terms that 
his love seems barely related to the human condition. For example, 
Reinhold Niebuhr was constrained to develop such a concept of sacrif­
icial, disinterested love, in God's sphere, that the human sphere 
must be satisfied with a pragmatism bearing little resemblance to 
the love revealed at the Cross.^ Niebuhr's view may be the logical 
application of much of the theology which has separated the theory 
of divine love from human practice. The apparent contradiction 
between God's love and ours leads us, in the light of the criterion 
of justice, to a more related theory and a better practice; not 
to the perpetuation of alienation between God and humanity, and 
certainly not to an affirmation of God at the expense of humanity.
(3) Discover and Interpret the Elements and Criteria for Justice
The 'hermeneutics' which may arise in the course of the examina­
tion of our 'options’ need not be over-elaborated. We begin with 
the criterion that love, or any other theological theory, should 
lead to justice in our world, and in the light of the creation of 
justice we may be able to identify certain other elements and criteria 
which will contribute to a better practice of love and theology 
among our own contemporaries. We should be alert to the subtle 
effect of ideology in the identification of these authentic criteria.
1. cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political P r o b l e m s , Faber & Faber, London 
1954, pp. 106-107. Niebuhr talks about an "insufferable sentim ent alit y" which should 
be replaced by "a pragmatic attitude".
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Herzog has argued that, although we cannot totally escape ideology, 
we must interpret the Bible in such a way that we are less and less 
inhibited either by our own world view or the particular and somewhat 
exclusive world view of the New Testament.^ He has seen God's call 
for justice as a 'hermeneutic' which forces us to examine all ideology 
in light of Christ's ministry among the poor and the oppressed. 
If we are to discover authentic criteria for the talk and practice 
of love we must not prejudge interpretations and relationships which 
call into question sacrosanct beliefs and ideals. Justice constantly 
requires different sets of evaluative terms in successive societies. 
The elements of justice are interpreted by our ability to put them 
into practice; a more practical interpretation is always demanded, 
but the practice is continuously beckoned toward the precepts of 
Christ.
(4) Search for Syntheses
Without suggesting that history is essentially dialectical 
in character, we should respect the subtle dialectic in examination 
and refutation, in the progress which often results from trial and 
error, and in the indispensable distinction between good and evil 
which may occur through experience in changing conditions. In analyz­
ing the thought and experience of others, we must be careful to 
avoid overarching affirmations or refutations. The latter twentieth 
century cannot be encapsulated within an earlier 'system'. But 
neither are our problems and tasks totally remote from those of 
earlier epochs. A responsible consideration of love in our day 
should neither be determined by, nor unaware of, earlier wisdom.
1, Frederick Herzog, "Liberation Hermeneutic as Ideology Critique?" Interpretation, 
Richmond, Va. Vol. 28, pp 387 ff. (This observation, of course, was also made by 
Rudolf Bultmann) (cf. Hans-Werner Bartsch ed. Kerygma and Myth, E.T. R.H. Fuller, S.P.C.K. London, 1972)
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We do not have the privilege of asserting total consistency or 'purity'
in the idea of love. We are dealing with a concept which has a
long and respectable history, despite numerous contradictions and
tragedies in its development. What love means for us must be threshed
out in each generation. The threshing-floor is our own application.
Our syntheses must be made in hope, courageous in the knowledge
that throughout existence and experience, 'the hybrid rules'.
(5) Theory Related to Practice
The final part of our 'programme' cannot be accomplished on
paper. (In a sense, it is therefore imaginary). Nevertheless,
it is an essential part of the programme of examining and correcting
our theory of love so that it correlates better with the love with
which Christ has loved us. Our theory should lead to a just practice,
in all our relations between ' I and thou', as well as between 'us
and them'. Indeed, the distinction between the individual and the
other person becomes radically challenged as we learn to love the
neighbour an oneself.
The emphasis upon ideas and concepts, coincident with a growth
in communication and education, has led to a confident interpretation
of our modern experience of the world. At the same time, however,
there has been a tendency to put so much faith in our ability to
interpret the world that we have often neglected the tools of change.
One of the most prophetic (if not completely unbiased) critiques
of the modern intellect is Karl Marx's eleventh "Thesis on Feuerbach".
"Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways;
the point is to change it.
We must have no doubt whatsoever that the theory of the love
of God is inseparable from practice. "You will dwell in my love
2if you heed my commands." "Truly I say to you, as you did it to
1. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach"; In Marx: Early W r i t i n g s , E.T. Rodney Livingstone and î
Gregor Benton, Penguin 1975, p. 423 I
2. John 15:10 i
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3one of the least of these my brothers, you did it to me." "No 
man has ever seen God; if we love one another, God abides in us
4and his love is perfected in us." "If any one says, "I love God," 
and hates his brother, he is a liar, for he who does not love his
5brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has not seen." 
"For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments."^ 
Without practice, the programme is incomplete.
5. The Problem Complex
It is evident that we cannot simply declare a 'moratorium' 
on love-talk if our theory and practice are to be correlated with 
the witness of the Incarnation and the Cross. In some way which 
we must constantly strive to understand, both love and justice meet 
at the Atonement. We have been given an example which beckons our 
practice, and the inadequacy of our loves is no excuse for a continued 
separation between the love of God and the human ability to 'measure 
up'. The complex problem, given our inadequacy in loving, is: "How
shall we talk about God's love in a world full of injustice?" And 
the onus of the question is even greater: "What shall we do about
the injustice which calls our love in question?"
Obviously, there are no simple answers. Herzog's complaint, 
that the Church's love is not ordinarily identified with the cause 
of justice, cannot simply be written off. There is indeed a crisis 
of credibility surrounding the use of the word love by modern preachers 
and theologians. Justice is an intimately related issue, particularly 
when talk about love obscures an active participation in, or the 
tacit approval of, ppèlitical and economic inequality, exploitation, 
and oppression. When the alleviation of injustice becomes the agenda
Matthew 25:40
4. I John 4:12
5. I John 4:20
6. I John 5:3
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which replaces a sentimental emphasis upon love - a kind of 'cheap 
grace ' symptomatic of our age - we are forced back into the hard 
analysis which must consider not only changing conditions, but also 
the motives and theory which will lead to practice. Thus, we must 
interpret love, 'as Christ has loved us', to mean an active search 
for just and equitable relationships between human beings, in which 
love is not only a sentiment, but a creative surge toward greater 
possibilities in an often frustrated world.
Such a love, however, is an elusive objective. The sheer 
diversity of authors who have written about love makes a balanced 
view difficult to formulate. Much of the work is somewhat biased 
and polemical. Even where there is a fair and open attempt to consider 
love from several sides, there is often an unfortunate emphasis 
upon jargon which artificially defines love to mean something else 
than what most people mean by the term.
The analysis of love in contemporary cultural usage further 
complicates the problem. Christopher Lasch, a modern cultural analyst, 
tells us that love has become a word for the projection of an individ­
ual's emotional requirements.^ Like happiness, it is different 
things to different people. It is allied to expectations of life­
style, security, and romance. Although theologians may need to 
draw their own distinctions, there appears to be a flagrant neglect 
of some correlation with the 'love' expressed in countless records, 
films, and novels. As Herzog observes, "There is just the plain
fact that there are other people living in this world besides theo- 
2logians." The need for some application of a credible, justice­
conscious theological idea of love to the popular notion of it is 
rendered particularly critical by the rampant materialism perpetuated
1. Christopher Lasch, The Culture of N a r c i s s i s m , Norton, New York, 1978 p. 13
2. Herzog, "Liberation Hermeneutic as Ideology Critique?" op. cit. p. 393
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in modern cultural usage by the mass media and commercial interests 
who have proven an ability to redirect choices based upon the exploit- 
ation of latent, psychological, love-ideals.
The biblical witness alone does not seem to be sufficient
to tell us how to speak about love. Throughout the New Testament
there is an element of tension between the 'good news' that Christians
have been released from bondage to sin, and the recurrent fact that
sin is committed. This tension can be observed in Paul's writings.
"God's love is poured into our hearts," but, as Paul himself attested,
2"I can will what is right but I cannot do it." Paul was not able 
to resolve the tension between the spirit and the flesh, the mind 
and the body. Yet he was adamant that human beings under the guiding 
influence of the Holy Spirit, raised to new life with Christ, could
3find a capacity for loving activity in the furore of this world.
Too often theologians have fallen into a description of an 
ethereal 'love of God' so remote from human character, so typified 
by sacrifice, so utterly selfless, that love in the model of the 
Sermon on the Mount or I Corinthians 13 has frankly been deemed 
incredible, or relegated to an other-wordly existence. The hypostat- 
ization of love in such divine terms appears to perpetuate a dualism 
which has done nothing to foster justice in this world, and which 
is foreign to the eminently involved love exemplified by Jesus and 
preached by Paul. The tension is there, to be sure, between God's 
love and human behaviour, between the spirit and the flesh, between 
love for friends and love for enemies, between love of self and 
love of neighbour. But throughout the New Testament and much of 
the Old, the tension seems suspended in a holistic focus. It cannot
1. cf. Wilson Brian Key, Subliminal Seduction, Ad Media's Manipulation of a Not-So- 
Innocent A m e r i c a , Prentice Hall, Inglewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973 Key ably de monst­
rates the secular abuse of love in the media.
2. Romans 5:5; 7:18
3. cf. Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics in P a u l , Abingdon, Nashville, 1978, p p . 112 
ff. "Paul's preaching of love does not stand alongside his emphasis on justification by 
faith, but is vitally related to it."
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easily be resolved either by an emphasis upon 'justification by 
faith' nor by some easy modern proclamation of a "groovy kind of 
love".^
Although the problem of love-talk in theology is concerned 
with a doctine of God, an analysis of human nature, and the relation 
between them, the crux of the matter is finally construed by individual 
and corporate freedom. Whether a response to 'the love of God' 
comes as the result of a Damascus Road encounter - some "new birth"
- or from a sober appeal through the intellect to a sensitivity 
which enables a recognition of the self dui the neighbour, is perhaps 
a minor question. When theology and anthropology have been brought 
together in Christology, we still are left with the dilemma of the 
rich young ruler. Does our affirmation lead us to action? Can 
my love be construed as justice? Finally, the question cannot be 
solved theoretically.
We must insist that the idea of love is an essential "focus"
for Christian theology - for talk about God and the human response 
2to God's love. But the diversity of love-talk, in some cases remote 
from a practical concern for justice in a frustrated world, indicates 
that there is much work to be done to bring talk about love in line
with an appropriate response to God's call for justice. As the
world becomes more populated, more technically complex, yet smaller 
due to the impact of commerce and communication, theology must put 
its love-talk into forms which are not limited by the history of 
dogma, and which do not intimate an alliance with one demographic 
system against another. Contemporary theology must be concerned 
with contrasting, yet complementary, views of love which may yet
1. Of course there are many alternatives between the extremes, some of which may be explored 
below. (The song "A Groovy Kind of Love" was a popular hit in 1966, recorded by The Mind B e n d e r s .)
2. cf. George Newlands, Theology of the Love of G o d , Collins, London 1980. Chapter 2, pp. 26 
ff. Newlands talks about "love as focus."
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become synthesized in human experience. Theology's milieu includes 
solitary individuals seeking to escape their solitude, as well as
great communities struggling to co-exist. Love, in the context 
of justice, envisages authentic relationships in wide communities,
but without eclipsing individuals.
Primary for theology is the relationship between God and human­
ity. But this relationship cannot be explored without provoking 
a discussion of numerous social and philosophical problems. A credible 
theology must be willing to examine the views of a variety of authors, 
from different persuasions. Artifical delimitation according to 
agreement and apparent consistency does the topic no service. Perhaps 
the observation may be justified that, on the topic of love, a diver­
sity of interpretation is like the colours produced by a prism.
The beauty of the single light can hardly be appreciated until it
is refracted.
The task is to bring talk and action into line with the creating, 
sustaining, redeeming, transforming love of God. The task is elusive 
because God's love is always at a different point than when we last 
'observed' it. But if our love is construed by the creation of 
justice, there is a certain 'probability' of some 'correlation' 
between divine and human love.
6. Purpose
Since our 'thesis' has already been given, taking in every 
age the form of Christ's command, that human beings are to love 
each other in correlation with his own infinitely just love, the 
'proof of the thesis lies only in the practice and not in theolog­
ical extrapolation and interpretation. We are encouraged to make 
the thesis practical in terms which we can internalize as a faith 
that works, through love and by loving. The emphasis rests upon
1. A theological adaptation of Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty, first formulated in 
1927-Definition artificially influences the defined, and can only be approximate, or 
'probable '.
«
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the work, or rather upon the 'energy' required (ehergoumene)^  not 
primarily upon the faith.
Nevertheless, there is indeed a purpose in reformulating and 
reinterpreting the subtle structures of faith, particularly emphasiz­
ing the broad range of beliefs about love which enable its practice. 
Ludwig Feuerbach has noticed that human creativity must originally 
take form in the imagination, and the imagination is constituted 
by what the human mind conceives and believes to be true, practical, 
or worth pursuing. Only by re-examining the wealth of human thoughts 
about love may we make those thoughts relevant to our activity in 
the present. Only by exposition, critical analysis, and sensible 
adaptation do ancient ideas gain contemporary persuasiveness.
As George Newlands, in his Theology of the Love of God, has 
observed, we live in a pluralistic age.^ We can hope for no easy 
syntheses between all the theories of love, nor can we even hope 
to consider them all. Yet, as philosophers from Empedocles to Tillich 
have noted, there is within the idea of love a tendency toward recon­
ciliation of opposites and an urge toward harmony. In this sense,
the love which Christ commanded "impels us" towards reconciliation. 
As love has the capacity to overcome alienation, human beings have 
the capacity to find new possibilities and form new syntheses from 
old contradictions. Toward this purpose, and to the practical develop­
ment of such possibilities and syntheses in history, this research 
is directed.
Stating this purpose more concretely, through an analytical 
survey of certain modern authors, I propose to do the following:
(1) To examine, in broad scope, the ideas of selected theological 
writers who have made significant contributions to the development
1. cf. George Newlands, Theology of The Love of G o d , o p .cit. pp. 97 ff. Newlands writes: 
"Pluralism in theology has come to stay." He argues, rightly I think, that the era of 
a "privileged starting point", resulting in an "exclusive theology", has passed.
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of a theological concept of love.
(2) To trace, within and through the limited and somewhat arbitrary 
selection of authors, some of the recurrent theoretical characteristics 
which, in various forms, have tended to interpret love since the 
beginnings of western civilization.
(3) To note particularly those characteristics of Christian love
which have shaped and informed modern Christian theology.
(4) To identify apparent contradictions in modern interpretations
of Christian love, and, where possible, to offer suggestions for 
syntheses.
(5) To offer constructive critical suggestions, where appropriate,
for the future development of the idea of love in Christian theology,
based upon the central criterion that theories of love must be related 
intimately to justice, and help to promote just relationships between 
human beings.
(6) To contribute, through the widest possible exposition, to an
increasing practical understanding of the "breadth and length and 
height and depth of the love of ^ Christ...though it is beyond knowledge"
(Eph. 3:18-19).
There is no possibility of outlining or characterizing the 
history of the idea of love, or even of the history of the Christian 
idea of love in recent times, in one comprehensive volume. However, 
as the chapter titles may intimate, I have attempted to select repres­
entative authors who, individually or in identifiable groups, may
illustrate specific stages in the development of approaches to the i
]conceptual grasp of the idea of love in Christian theology. Chapter
IOne Is concerned with the identification of love as a common 'feeling' |Iin human experience. Chapter Two represents an attempt to reconcile, i
and when necessary, discriminate between, human passions and the 
perennial intuition that the experience of love entails some kind =jof eternal quality. Chapter Three describes the vacillating attempts |Ito define this eternal quality in love, to set it apart, as it were,
1. Plato, The Banquet (or The S y m p o s i u m ), in Plato, Five D i a l o g u e s , Everyman Edition, E.T. 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, (1840), J.M.Dent 8 Sons, London, 1910. p. 40 (194)
26
from the frustration of human experience and temporality. Chapter 
Four is representative of the somewhat tragic realization that human 
nature rarely achieves the conceptual possibilities inherent in
the ideal of love, and the conviction that there must be in love
itself some redemptive capacity which can 'justify' the human failure 
to 'measure up' to the ideal set by love. Chapter Five is an assess­
ment of one contemporary corpus of literature whose contributors
have recognized that love and human justice are indispensable to 
each other, and that speculation about love is likely to be inadequate 
if lacking in correlative 'practice' or labouring under the illusion 
that worship and piety, alone, can right the wrongs of human greed 
from which love has suffered. Chapter Six represents one single 
attempt, among others, to affirm the holistic energy and vitality
of love, through and despite all the evil, frustration, and injustice 4
which is flagrantly obvious in every successive society; which rises 
to facilitate greater goals and greater achievements in a transcendent 
unity with the whole of creation, and with a shared purpose inherent 
in the individual and social purposes of every organism in the universe.
Of course, there is much overlap in the various emphases.
On the other hand, there is often an apparent exaggeration by one 
author which results from some apparent deficiency in another.
But through some principle of complementarity, it may be possible
to arrive at a conviction that all, despite their obvious disagree­
ments, are nevertheless worthy speakers in praise of love. Without 
ignoring contradictions, there may be a purpose in the praise itself.
Charging the participants (and the audience) at our 'symposium',
we may hear the 'convener' of another imaginary colloquium held
long ago:
I must see that Love is not defrauded of the praise, which it is my province to exact from each of you. Pay the God hjs due, and then reason between yourselves if you will.
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N.B. In reference to Feuerbach, I have depended primarily upon Feuerbach's 
Sâmmtliche Werke, the collection edited himself and published in co­
operation with Otto Wigand, Leipzig, 1846-1866, and upon the English 
Translation of the 2nd edition of Das Wesen des Christentums by Marian 
Edwards (George Eliot), published as The Essence of Christianity with 
an introduction by Karl Barth, by Harper, New York, 1957. Other works 
and editions will be cited as appropriate.
CHAPTER ONE 
THE FEELING OF LOVE...THE MATTER OF LOVING 
The Anthropological Foundations of ’Divine Love' in Early 
Hegelian Epistemology and the Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach
Any thinker who has the temerity to announce that "Love is
God" would deserve to attract the attention of psychological or
theological research into the nature of love. If that thinker also
sustains a place as a catalyst in thoughts of others, so that without
him many of our assumptions about the world might well be different,
a happily ignorant dismissal of his work could be a perilous oversight.
The publisher's preface to the 1957 re-edition of Feuerbach's The
Essence of Christianity lists, as "those who have felt his impact",
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Troeltsch, Scheler, Freud, Berdyaev, Heidegger,
Sartre, Buber, and Fromm.^ An introductory essay by Barth and a
foreword by Richard Niebuhr broaden the picture. Recent studies
of Feuerbach's influence upon Marx and Engels have been more observant
of the significance of that influence than was, until recently,
2stylish for Marxist treatment. Certain discussions of concepts
of God, especially in relation to human existence, have kept Feuerbach, 
if not in the limelight, at least waiting in the wings of the contem-
3porary theological theatre. To my knowledge, however, there is
no adequate exposition of Feuerbach's central and pervasive idea 
of love. Although such an exposition can hardly be attempted in 
one chapter, it may be possible to sketch some of the most germane 
allusions, and to show how these Feuerbachian concepts may be important 
for the future development of love-talk in modern Christian theology.
1. cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , Harper and Row, New York, Evanston, 
and London, 1957, trans. Marian Evans (George Eliot) of 2nd. Edition, Das Wesen des 
C h r i s t e n t u m s , (first pu blished 1841).
2. cf. Marx Wartofsky, F e u e r b a c h , Cambridge University Press, 1977; and Kostas Axelos, 
Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl M a r x , University of Texas Press, 
1976, Trans. Ronald Bruzina.
3. cf. Charles Hartshorne and William Reese, Philosophers Speak of God, University of 
Chicago Press, 1953, pp. 448 ff. also, Hans K'ling, Does God Exist?, Collins, London, 1981.
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1. Feuerbach's Era (1804-1872)
Feuerbach's thought can hardly be appreciated outwith an appreciation 
of his time and his contemporaries.^ Although such an appreciation 
cannot delay us here, Feuerbach may be characterized as a student 
of Hegel who came to oppose his master; who sat at the feet of 
Schleiermacher but discovered more in the idea of feeling than 
Schleiermacher explicated; who was intensely influenced by Descartes, 
but refused to accept any dualism between mind and matter; who describ­
ed the need and goals of revolution but refused to participate in 
it; who collaborated with the scientific materialists but remained, 
in his own terms, "a natural philosopher of the spirit". In many 
ways Feuerbach represents a historical enigma, halfway between Hegelian 
idealistic philosophy and the First International, a man with one 
foot in both epochs. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that without 
his contribution as a bridge builder, it would have been a long 
leap from Hegel to Marx.
(1) Revolutionary Ambivalence
Engels wrote that The Essence of Christianity broke the spell 
of Hegel's speculative system, that it resolved the philosophical 
opposites of mind and body, man and nature:
With one blow it pulverised the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed ma­terialism on the throne again...The contradic­tion, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of the book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians.
With the publication of this work, Feuerbach was hailed as
the (reluctant) guru of a group which came to be known as The Young
3Hegelians. After publishing more works, one of which was banned
1. c.f. inter a l i a , Wilhelm Bolin, Ludwig Feuerbach, sein Wirken und seine Z e i t g e n o s s e n , 
Stuttgart, 1891; Adolph Kohut, Ludwig Feuerbach :Sein Leben und seine W e r k e , Leipzig, 
1909; and below:
2. Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German P h i l o s o p h y . 
Martin Lawrence, London, Ed. C.P. Outt. p. 28 (1885)
3. cf. David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, MacMillan, 1969, p. 30.
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by the censors, Feuerbach was brought to Heidelberg from his country
retreat to give a course of lectures on "The Essence of Religion".
Revolution was in the air, and he was even proposed as a delegate
to the revolutionary assembly:
Noble Sir! You are one of those rare persons in 
whom the spirit of the new times began to dawn.
You must not be absent from the structure which 
is supposed to be erected for the world, and par­
ticularly for the everlasting well being of our
long-enslaved people.
But the revolution of 1848 came and went. Feuerbach sustained through­
out a critical pessimism, derived perhaps from his critique of Hegelian 
dialectic. "Time," he said, "and not the Hegelian dialectic, is
the medium of uniting opposites, contradictions, in one and the 
2same being." The leap from monarchy to republic could not be achieved 
as easily as some of the Young Hegelians seemed to suppose. Feuerbach 
called the revolution "an illegitimate child of Christian faith"*.
3"The Republicans believed in the creation of a republic out of nothing."
Feuerbach's reluctance to become involved with the revolution, 
his reclusiveness and his caution despite his firmly critical contri­
bution, seems to have militated against his continued influence. 
Karl Barth described Feuerbach as a man who, in racing to catch 
a train, discovered that the train he was racing to catch was the 
wrong one. Yet his race for the wrong train made him too late to 
catch the oncoming train, which was the right one.^ Barth's assess­
ment may have overestimated Feuerbach as a racer, when all the time 
he may have been a close watcher of trains. Nevertheless, it was 
Karl Marx who happened to be at the station at the right time, ticket
in hand: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world...the point
5is to change it."
1. Quoted by Frederick Gregory, Scientific Materialism in 19th C. G e r m a n y , Reidel, Boston, 
1977. p. 26, Note p. 220
2. Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, op. cit. p. 23
3. Feuerbach, Vorlesungen liber das Wesen dec R e l i g i o n , Otto Wigand Verlag, Leipzig, 1851; 
Vol. VIII in Feuerbach's Sammtliche W e r k e , p. vii, my trans.
4. Barth, intro, to Feuerbach, Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , p. xxvi op. cit.
5. Karl Marx,"Theses on Feuerbach", Thesis XI (MarxiEarly Writings, Penguin 1975, p. 423)
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(2) Scientific Materialism
Despite the eclipse of Feuerbach on the political horizon,
his continued research into the relationship between body and mind,
nature and spirit, the one and the many, matter and thought, and
other similar polarities has earned Feuerbach the title "Father
of German Materialism".^ His inspiration of and relation to scientists
such as Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, Ludwig Buchner, and Heinrich
Czolbe continues to be noted whenever such polarities are raised
today. In his early years he had refused to accept a strict empiricism
emptied of the 'spiritual' dynamics which constitute life. Although
he gets no credit for a final solution to the problem of the duality
between matter and consciousness, he is respected for having raised
many of the questions. "To make empiricism express itself as philoso-
2phy, and make it work, is impossible." Feuerbach retained enough 
of Hegel's influence to refuse to accept any sort of 'simple' materia­
lism, such as that of Hobbes or Locke. An explanation of matter 
must be able to comprehend human thinking, feeling, and willing. 
Although, as Marx Wartofsky notes, Feuerbach is not able to show 
that matter is capable of consciousness, Feuerbach asserted that 
consciousness could not be dissolved into matter, yet was dependent 
upon it. Feuerbach's later work. The Mystery of Sacrifice or Man 
is What He Eats (Das Geheimnis des Opfers oder Der Mensch ist, was 
er isst) has been much quoted and little understood. It is grounded 
more upon theology than upon science, and can be connected, with
3little difficulty, to an early reference from Hegel. The significance 
of Feuerbach's materialism cannot be divorced from his training 
in dialectical theology. In some sense, bread becomes thought.
1. Gregory, Scientific Materialism in 19th C. G e r m a n y , op. cit. (Ch.l)
2. Marx Wartofsky, F e u e r b a c h , o p . cit. p . 68 (from Feuerbach, History of Modern Philosophy 
(critique of Hobbes))
3. Hegel, Early Theological W r i t i n g s , "The Spirit of Christianity", (1798?) University of 
Chicago Press, 1948, Trans. T.M. Knox, p. 249; Feuerbach's Werke, Band 10. Otto Wigand 
Verlag, Leipzig, 1866 (No English translation.) Das Geheimnis des O p fers oder der Mensch ist, was er isst.
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The problem is to explain the transaction.
Feuerbach's reclusive life of study in the country was punctuat­
ed more by long walks in the forest than by the confrontation of 
immediate debate. His reflections were an interpolation of his
studies of Luther, Hegel, and Schleiermacher (among others) with
the experience of married life and pastoral observation. He was 
no scientist, but he acknowledged the critique of scientific method 
applied to human existence. When he came to speak about love, about 
feeling, about the prospects for human practice, he used language 
and concepts which applied phenomenological analysis to human possib­
ilities. Reason could no longer be for him an activity of ungrounded 
speculation, but could only be, authentically, an "instrument of 
feeling" challenged at every turn by the realities of nature. This 
connection did not go unnoticed by the scientific materialists.
The human constituted for him a "species", different from other 
species because the human species is (or can become) conscious of
itself as not only a mere individual, but also as a "species being" 
with all the rights and responsibilities related to it.
The scientific materialists found their moral standard in the new morality of Ludwig Feuerbach.They were attracted to Feuerbach because he had called for facts. As men who identified with the natural sciences they appreciated that emphasis.They were also- attracted to Feuerbach's new religion.Not only did it expose the falsehoods on which traditional religion was based, but it provided a way of preserving the ideals and ^oral values they had never intended to throw away.
Frederick Gregory's summary of Feuerbach's relation to the 
scientific materialists raises questions about Feuerbach which serve 
to further illustrate the enigma he has been for modern analysts. 
It is doubtful that Feuerbach really falls in line with modern scient­
ific materialism to the extent that Gregory assumes. At bottom.
1. Gregory, Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany, op. cit. p. 213.
32
his thoughts appear to be more related to his theological foundations 
than to his materialist emphases. If the 19th century materialists 
saw in his writings a "new morality", one wonders whether they were 
sufficiently critical of their own bourgeois mentalities to be able 
to interpret him correctly. It is doubtful too that Feuerbach can 
be associated with some "new religion" ("My philosophy is no philosophy, 
my religion is no religion."). The preservation of "the moral values 
which they had never intended to throw away" may be exactly the 
sort of ideological conservatism which Feuerbach criticized as the 
barrier to a successful revolution and a just social order. Neverthe­
less, Gregory's concluding eulogy may stand, without too much examina­
tion, as a tribute to a thinker whose thought has yet to be deciphered,
Ibut has certainly had a pervasive effect.
2. Summary Overview of Feuerbach's Thought
A study of Feuerbach's philosophical development, says Marx
2Wartofsky, is a veritable course in dialectical thinking. Feuerbach's 
aphorisms and self-contradictions have reddered him an impossible 
subject for categorization. Not only the inherent dialectic in 
his movement from idealism to "anthropologism", but also the recurrent 
irony and tactical reductionism throughout his works, leave little 
prospect for definitive interpretation. Yet some grasp of the overall 
character of his thought is crucial if we are to attempt to isolate 
what he says about any particular subject (or predicate!). Thus, 
before going on to what Feuerbach says about love, I will try to 
establish the most critical aspects in his thinking, covering the 
span of nearly half a century, insofar as such aspects are likely 
to relate to the idea of love.
t. CF. Bolin, Ludwig F e u e r b a c h , op. cit, p. 1. Shortly before his death Feuerbach was
considering writing a "key" to his life and works, "urn den Leuten die Augen zu offnen.
Denn das Gebiet, das ich eigentliçh schon seit . <iVeissig Jahren bearbeite, ist ihnen 
noch immer eine terra i n c o g n i t a '.' Feuerbach's ambiguity is probably not unintentional.
2. Wartofsky, F e u e r b a c h , op. cit. p . 7
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(1) Feuerbach's Model of Consciousness Development
How a person comes to know anything, and specifically how 
he comes to know about himself, was a continuous question for Feuerbach.
He developed his epistemology from exhaustive critiques of Descartes,
Leibniz, Hobbes, Bacon, Boehme, Hegel, and others. He differs from 
Descartes in that he refused to accept any dualism between mind 
and body. He differs from Hegel in refusing to accept any idea 
of absolute being, or idea of being. He insisted on beginning with 
"being itself" (human being, or Dasein). Feuerbach accepted no 
abstract mediation in self-consciousness dialectic. The 'other' 
must be a real other, a 'Thou', not imaginary. Information about 
the self is derived from identification of similar qualities in 
another of like species. The information is primarily interpreted 
through the senses and a developing 'feeling' (Sinnlichkeit). Reason 
is dependent upon sense and feeling, which are dependent upon matter.
Hence there can be no ultimate separation between mind and matter.
The interdependence of I and Thou constitutes an unfolding self- 
consciousness, which is at the same time a "species-consciousness". =]
Consciousness of self as member of a species is entailed in the
highest human feeling, love.
(2) Religion as "An Unself-conscious Self-consciousness"
The essence of the religious spirit is not thinking, or reason, 
but rather feeling and belief. Feuerbach makes great use of Luther:
"My belief is my being." Belief is primal activity, the work of 
the imagination, upon which any 'practice' is dependent. Belief
is of a different quality than reason, for it is grounded initially 
on images acquired through sense and feeling. "The image is the 
thing of religion." Imagination fills in the spaces of unrevealed 
data when an 'I' (subject) meets an inexplicable 'thou' (object).
Hence the qualities of the subject are attributed to any encountered 
object which is alien or not fully understood. For example, the
unpredictability of nature may be attributed to human caprice.
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characterized as 'divine'. Although such anthropomorphic description 
is a necessary function of the imagination, constituting (tentative) 
belief, it is wrong "to give reason to belief". The result leads 
to abstract theology which is remote from concrete data, hypostases 
which are no longer accountable to history. Speculative philosophy 
falls into the same trap whenever absolutes are identified which 
are not subject to actual phenomena. Religion is, for Feuerbach, 
the unconscious attempt to gain species-knowledge by projecting 
human qualities onto non-human objects, characterized as divine. 
Although the human being is mistaken about the object he takes as 
a 'thou', he is not mistaken about the qualities he attributes to 
the object. In the characterization the imagination contributes 
to the development of human self-consciousness. The qualities attri­
buted to his gods are the qualities of the human being (at any given 
epoch).
(3) Inversion of .Subject and Predicate
Since feeling is prior to reason, and since religious images 
are the objectifications of feeling, one cannot apply reason directly 
to analysis of religious objects. The truth in religious statements 
lies not in the objects they purport to describe, but in the descrip­
tion of the objects. The descriptive predicate may therefore be 
taken as substantive. Religious statements cannot yield verifiable 
information about the images of religion, but they can yield verifi­
able (or at least highly correlative) information about the nature 
of humanity. Hence theology is converted to "anthropology". Philoso­
phy grounded on an abstract absolute beyond influence of an existent 
thinking, feeling, willing being (Dasein) is "nothing but" another 
form of theology. But empirical philosophy is also inadequate if 
it cannot comprehend human Sinnlichkeit in all modes (including 
love), "The senses serve not merely as sources of inference, but 
as bearers of the existence of things beyond them."^
1. Wartofsky, F e u e r b a c h , op. cit. p. 67
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By implication, Feuerbach argues that human experience and 
the dynamics of human existence only can inform "the philosophy 
of the future". The unconscious self-unfolding of the human in 
all of the images of religion must be taken into account if philosophy 
is to understand humanity. Either a speculative imitation of theology 
or an empiricist debasement of human experience constitutes an inade­
quate and misguided field for rational analysis. By "anthropology" 
Feuerbach means a human phenomenology which takes into full account 
the physical and the spiritual attributes of human being. The latter 
are those qualities which are attributed to God in religion, but
which really belong to the 'divine' character of human nature.
(4) Love: the "Essence" of Christianity
Christianity represents the apex of the unconscious human
drive to self-knowledge. Through the development of feeling in 
encounters with real human 'thous' (reflexive objects), the imagination 
in belief unconsciously solves the problem of the particular in 
relation to the universal. The central image is the incarnation 
of God as human, as a feeling, thinking, willing, and also suffering 
and loving being. Christ is therefore the deepest expression of
human self-consciousness, and of the essential human nature of 
Sinnlichkeit (feeling). Feeling becomes love as it identifies itself 
in a real thou, and yearns for community. Love is revealed in the 
Incarnation as the highest human value, and as such is 'divine'.
But the human does not realize that he has made love into God and 
retreats to various forms of primitive religion. Faith, in dogmatic 
form, displaces natural flexible belief. Thus faith militates against 
love. Therefore, says Feuerbach, if we for the sake of love do 
not sacrifice God, then the authentic revelation of the Christian 
religion is sacrificed, leaving only a faith in which "the devils 
participate". Moral life must be grounded upon the natural, revealed, 
conscious, self-identification of the human as a species-being, 
who takes a conscious, real thou as his object for self-knowledge.
%
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Religion, after all, is an illusion. The "essence" of Christianity
is human nature; but the greatest manifestation of that nature is
the human capacity to love.
3. Feuerbach's Early Love-Interest
(l) The Dissertation
The germ of much of Feuerbach's later thought is already present
in his 1828 doctoral dissertation. In it he had tried to argue,
in Hegelian fashion, that reason constitutes the unifying principle
in human being.^ But many of the themes which are in this work
attributed to the activity of mind are later attributed to feeling.
The relation of the individual to the species, for example, is first
conceived as activity of thought as a subject takes himself as an
imaginary object. Sense perception is locked within the boundaries
of the 'I', so that one may only imagine what the 'thou' experiences.
Feeling, he thought in his dissertation, could not be shared, yet
2must be thought about in order for feelings to be differentiated.
As thoughts about one's own feelings are shared in language, reason
3serves to break the dichotomy between the I and the thou. "In
thinking, the other is ^  myself. I am at the same time I and thou
- not any determinate particular thou, however, but thou in general,
4as a species". For our purpose it is not necessary to trace Feuerbach's
argument in order to see that the categories he attempted to attribute
to reason in his doctoral dissertation might be resolved better
with the development of a comprehensive idea of love. He noted
that the human has "an insatiable desire to unite with others from
5whom he is divided by nature." What Feuerbach was striving for 
was a concept of eros conceived as the process of humanization in 
all its (platonic) forms.
1. De Ratione una, universal!, infinita, published in German as Ueber die Einheit,
Allgemeinheit und Unendlichkeit der Vernunft as Vol.IV of Feuerbach's Sâ’mmelte Werke,
Bolin and Jodi editors, 1903-1910
2. Feuerbach, Ueber die E i n h e i t . ..ibid, p. 302, trans. Wartofsky, op, cit. p . 313. ibid, p. 304, trans. Wartofsky, op. cit. p. 32
4. Feuerbach, Ueber die E i n . h e i t ...Bolin-Jodi IV, p. 305, op. cit, trans. W a r t o f s k y , o p . ci t.p . 355. ibid. p. 342, trans. Wartofsky, op. cit. p . 44
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...the individual, in the strict sense of the word is only a fiction; and whoever wants to look for a human being m  himself, i.e. one who is still un­touched and untainted by society, must look for one who was neither born, nor raised, but must have been created from nothing. For the poor human being is al- ready^tainted by his fellow men, even in his mother's womb.
There must therefore be some way in the depths of man in which the yearning for the thou can be ful­filled: where the I and the thou are no longer counter­posed, where this unity is not only a virtual one, not only a mere connection, ^ut is absolute, un­conditional, fully realized.
Any reader of Plato (and such was Feuerbach) would recognize that 
this agenda demands a greater contribution from the intellect than 
logical deduction. Already Feuerbach seemed to be aware, even as 
he hypothesized about the unifying capacity of reason, that universal 
reason could not ultimately solve his problems. Intuition, perhaps, 
was already at work.
Feuerbach's public break with the Hegelian philosophy (if 
it occurred at all) was not obvious until his publication of Zur 
Critique der Hegelschen Philosophie in 1839. But between 1833 and 
1839 a series of philosophical critiques helped to crystallize his 
conviction that an empirical philosophy which could not understand 
feeling and thinking was not good enough, nor was idealistic philoso­
phy adequate which posited reason above and beyond human experience 
and human existence.
In 1840 Feuerbach came to criticize his own thesis, saying 
that, despite the unifying tendency in reason, it could not, by 
itself, function as a philosophical principle of unity.
What is missing in my dissertation and what is charac­teristically missing in the whole approach of Absolute philosophy is that this continuity, this unbroken unity Jholds not only for thought, but also for sensation, forlife in general. The point is missed that the other thinks |in my stead only because he also senses in my stead. For Ijust as there is no sensation for man without thought, |without consciousness, the converse is also true: There 1is no consciousness without sensation. For what ig con- Jsciousness but the conscious or sensed sensation? 1
1. ibid
2. ibid, p. 344, trans. Wartofsky, op. cit. p. 45
3. Feuerbach, Ueber die E i n h e i t . . .Bolin,Jodi IV, p . 421, o p . cit. Trans. W a r t o f s k y , o p . c i t.p . 47
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As this quotation stands, it does not seem to be Feuerbach's final 
position. Here he states that there is no sensation without conscious­
ness. After The Essence of Christianity, one may argue that feeling 
is initially unconscious, only gaining consciousness through projec­
tions of the imagination. However, the difference between empirical 
sensation and the effect of that sensation upon subjective feeling
is a thorny question in Feuerbach's writings, and one which is beyond 
the scope of this enquiry. What we may note is Feuerbach's gradual 
elevation of the concept of Sinnlichkeit, entailing both empirical
and subjective stimuli, and which cannot be subjected to the activity 
of thought and reason, much less to the self-activity of matter 
alone.
(2) The Diary
Feuerbach kept a Tagebuch which discloses that during the 
years of his philosophical critiques he was already developing his 
own views which were to appear in his later writings. Between 1834 
and 1836 several entries disclose his early exploration into the 
concept of love. "What is love?", he asked himself. His first
answer to the question is "the unity between thought and being".^ 
Being is the "wife" and thought is the "man". But just as there
are good marriages and bad ones, there is a "bad" love (egoism) 
and a "good" love (love for others). At first it seems that only 
the latter is authentic, worthy to be called love. While love is 
for the "old" philosophers an illegitimate child, offspring of the 
"concubine of nature", love is the legitimate daughter of "modern" 
(i.e. Hegelian and speculative) philosophy. She is received into 
the "community of the spirit" as the "living compendium" of moral 
philosophy. As the tree rots which cannot express itself in leaves.
i. Extracts from this diary are found in Adolph Kohut, Ludwig F e u e r b a c h , op. cit. pp. 434- 
436. Kohut may have had access to the whole diary, found among Feuerbach's papers, 
explaining certain differences in extracts published by Feuerbach himself, in Werke, Band 2, 1846.
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bloom, and fruit, love "suffocates in its own blood" if it is not
allowed to express itself.^
You should believe, yes believe, but believe that there is a true love among human beings. Also believe that the human heart is capable of an infinite, all-forgiving love, and that human love can have the characteristics of divine love...Love, but authentically, an^ you in­herit all the virtues belonging to yourself.
The above extract demonstrates the already visible conviction that
human love is somehow divine.
In a similar reflection the diary gives an early glimpse of
Feuerbach's later insistence that the source of human love is largely
to be found in the common experience of suffering:
Is it not a terrible weakness to feel the sensuous lossof a loved one most painfully? No, it is a weakness to refuse to feel the source of love, the sorrows of life.Therefore I am not ashamed to have felt both the torments and the longing of love. Yet I believe myself to be in essence a philosopher, for a philosopher must not onl^ know things, but he must, above all, experience them.
Here, too, is insight into Feuerbach's conviction that the identity
of a subject is to be found in the descriptive predicate.
The following aphorism also gives a clue to the epistemological
nature of self-identification through love of others:
The love of others tells you what you are. The lover alone has the true essence of the beloved before his eyes and ^n his hands. In order to know a person, one must love him.
Further to be found in Feuerbach's diary is the seminal concept
of love as an elan vital, a life force, an eros:
No existent being (Wesen) is destined for happiness.But whatever lives, as long as it lives, is destined for life. The life of life, however, is love.
1. Kohut, Ludwig F e u e r b a c h , op. cit. p. 434 (My translation). Also, Ludwig Feuerbach,
Feuerbach's W e r k e , edited by himself and pu blished by Otto Wigand Verlag, Leipzig,
1846-1866, Band 2, 1846, Fragmente zur Characteristik tneines philosophischen curriculum v i t a e , p. 391 f f .
2. Kohut, ibid, p. 435; W e r k e , Band 2 (ibid) p. 395 (My translation.)
3. Kohut, ibid, p. 435; W e r k e , ibid, p. 396 (l am indebted to Prof. D.W.D. Shaw for 
assistance in translating this particular extract.)
4. Kohut, ibid, p. 435; W e r k e , ibid, p. 393
5. Kohut, Ludwig Feuerbach, op. cit. p. 435; Feuerbach, W e r k e , Band 2, p. 394.
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Another extract sets out the relation between faith and love 
in Feuerbach's undeveloped thought. Here he sees faith as an activity 
of an individual alone, while love is the activity of a member of 
a community:
You can believe without setting down a confession of your faith, for you have the belief only for yourself.
But you cannot love unless you confess, express, and actualize your love; for you go not have your love only for yourself, but for others.
A major point in Feuerbach's critique of religion, later develop­
ed in no less than four works, is present in his Diary of the mid­
thirties:
It is better to embrace the emptiest, most unworthy object with love, that to lock oneself, loveless, within one's self.But only the object of true love both^develops and reveals at once the true essence of humanity.
The idea of immortality interested Feuerbach throughout his
career. His first book was Thoughts on Death and Immortality (1830).
Published in 1866 was Divinity, Freedom, and Immortality, the last
volume in his Werke. (Both titles, but neither of the books, are
English translations.) A characteristically ambiguous entry in
his diary demonstrates his realistic, yet somewhat transcendent,
approach to the problem:
Is it not improper to feel a longing to see a deceasedloved one again, who would be so inhuman? But is it aproof for the reality of the beyond? Is it not the ex­pression of a love which is already satisfied and content 
here, therefore an indirect witness that our all is here?..."I love you eternally" means that my love for you ends only with my consciousness.
That is eternal whose end is my owg end...Love alone solves the riddle of immortality for you.
Although Feuerbach has probably not solved the "riddle of immortality",
there is a sense in which he leaves the question open. Later entries
in Feuerbach's diary, between 1841 and 1845, serve to illustrate
1. K o h u t , ibid; F e u e r b a c h , W e r k e , ibid.2. Kohut, ibid
3. Kohut, ibid; F e u e r b a c h , W e r k e , Band 2, pp. 394-395
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the dialectical progression which characterizes his thinking. As
he himself was aware, his thinking seemed always to be in flux.
Neither Christ nor love could be as easily explained as he had thought
in his early writings.
What good can come out of Nazareth?"...Only the good, the novel, always comes directly to the place where it is not expected^ and it is always other than it is expected to be.
The dialectical method which typified his approach to philosophy
was also applied to his study of Luther, and indeed, of the New
Testament itself. The following two extracts anticipate questions
which were to receive considerable attention in the twentieth century:
"You should love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength. That is the first commandment. And the other is equal to it: You should love your neighbour as yourself." But how then can the second commandmentbe equal to the first, if this one already lays claimto all my mind and all my strength? What remains left for human beings frog my heart, when I should love God with my whole heart?
Whoever does not love his brother whom he sees, how can he love God, whom he does not see?" So says the Bible. But I ask, "whoever loves his brother whom he 
sees, how can he love God, whom he does not see?" How can love for a sensuous, "finite" being, and love for an impassive, "infinite" being, share the same place in one and the same heart?
In a progression from his early thoughts about love, properly 
conceived as only the opposite of the "bad" egoism (cf. above p.12), 
Feuerbach began to develop a notion of appropriate self-love, contin­
gent upon any wider concept of love as a life-force, or eros.
Your first duty is to make yourself happy. If you are happy, you make others happy.^The happy person can only see happiness around him
1. Feuerbach, W e r k e , Band 2, op. cit. p. 407 (My trans.)
2. ibid. p. 406
3. ibid; Two major questions are involved in these "exegeses". The first is that of 
appropriate Christian piety, treated, among others by Karl Barth, Anders Nygren, and 
Emil Brunner. The second is the logical a r g u W n t  which has been considered by Charles 
Hartshorne, in The Logic of P e r f e c t i o n , Open Court Publishing Co., La Salle, Illinois, 
1962, p. 40 f.
4. Feuerbach, W e r k e , Band 2, p. 413
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1. Feuerbach, W e r k e , Band 2, op. cit. p. 413
If you simply condemn egoism, that is, self-love, then you must also condemn, consequently, the love 
for others. Love is good will and good behaviour |toward others, therefore, to recognize the just self-love of another. Why then will you geny for yourself what you acknowledge in others?
The diary demonstrates the many dimensions of Feuerbach's 
idea of love. Religion is an illusion, but it holds concrete knowledge 
about the nature of human beings. Love unifies being and thought, 
but love for self turns out to be a crucial aspect of a love for 
neighbour, which can disclose what human being is about. Belief 
is a necessary, if somewhat irrational, activity of rational being; 
without believing that love is possible, one does not love. Experience 
of the depths of human feeling is necessary for the philosopher 
to authentically philosophize. Love is essentially irrational, 
yet it is a key to rational knowledge, as through love for others 
knowledge about oneself is disclosed. Love is "the life of life" 
and thereby intimately related to the common human experience of 
suffering; yet each existent being is urged toward its own happiness, 
upon which the happiness of others may depend. The intensity of 
love in this world indicates that human existence is fulfilled in 
this world; yet there is a transcendence of consciousness and of 
love which appeals beyond this world. Christ is the manifestation 
of human images, but appears to disclose in some concrete way the 
idea of a feeling, suffering, loving God. Yet such a God is inconsis­
tent with the 'impassive' and 'infinite' being who demands the whole 
of human love.
Almost every extract from Feuerbach's diary is a two-sided, 
dialectical observation. Although Feuerbach himself came to doubt 
the universality of dialectic, especially when applied to history, 
the above reflections imply the inherent dialectic in his method.
The diary shows the depth of Feuerbach's conviction that love is 
the highest attribute of human being. Not evident, yet, is the
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role that the imagination plays in the synthesis of polarities with 
which love in its complexity is involved. But Feuerbach, if still 
a "Hegelian" in 1836, is already well on his way to a dialectical 
opposition, or perhaps a continuation, of Hegel's ideas. The next 
step in our enquiry is to examine, briefly, what Hegel had to say.
4. Early Hegel and Later Feuerbach
(1) Theory of the Young Hegel's Influence on Feuerbach
Hegel died in 1831. In the years immediately after his death
some of his friends and students began to collate his lectures,
unpublished manuscripts, and memorabilia. The resulting compilation
of works gave rise to a Hegelian 'school' which divided into left,
right, and centre interpretations.^ But the collected works were
edited in such a way that some of the early manuscripts of Hegel
were omitted. Copies of these early manuscripts, or at least much
of their content, were circulated among certain of Hegel's students
and followers who noted a distinct difference in the political and
religious implications of these early writings, from the speculative,
synthesizing system of Hegel's later published works. That group
which considered Hegel's early manuscripts to be of great importance
was known as "the Young Hegelians", and their name may well be directly
2associated with the 'young Hegel', who wrote before 1800. For
some very good reasons, Feuerbach was hailed as their spokesman.
1. David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, op. cit. pp. 1-4
2. Hegel first began to develop his "system" in 1801. His Early Theological Writings were 
not published in German until edited by Nohl in 1907, not in English until T.M. Knox's 
translation in 1948. My interpretation is not supported by McLellan (or anyone else 
that I know of). I assume that the Early Writings were suppressed (1) because they were 
not part of Hegel's final "system"; (2) because they gave support to a radical inter­
pretation of Hegel, which would have perhaps led to government censure* (3) because they 
disagreed, at any rate, with the theology of Hegel's editors. McLellan offers no exp­
lanation for the name "Young Hegelians". So far as I know, Feuerbach has never before 
been associated with ,the writings of "Young Hegel", certainly not to the extent that
I suggest. This section assumes that Feuerbach had before him either the manuscripts, 
or the content, of Hegel's Early Theological W r i t i n g s , cf. Herman Nohl, Hegels theolo- 
gische J u g e n d s c h r i f t e n , Tubingen, 1907; T.M. Knox (trans.) Hegel; Early Theological 
W r i t i n g s , University of Chicago Press, 1948; Pennsylvania Paperback, University of 
Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, 1971
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Feuerbach asserted (before Marx) that Hegel, found to be stand- f
1ing on his head, must be turned right side up. This suggestion
may well be a reference to Hegel's development, who in his early
years began his philosophy with a critique of Christianity, based
upon imagination and the progress (not dialectic) of human feeling
in religion. But Hegel began to subordinate the development of
basic human needs to a comprehensive idea of reason. In late 1800
Hegel wrote to Schelling:
In my scientific development which began with the more subordinate needs of man, I was compelled to proceed toward science (philosophy), and at the same time the ideal of my youth had to be transformed into the form of reflection, into a system.
This letter, in Feuerbach's view, would be the beginning of 
Hegel's self-inversion. "The ideal of my youth", in Hegel's words,
appears to be none other that the concept of love expressed through 
Christianity. Hegel's essay, written in 1798-1799, entitled (by 
Nohl?) "The Spirit of Christianity" traces the idea of love through 
the life of Christ and its abortive, tragic eclipse in the early
Church. "The Positivity of the Christian Religion", written in 
1795-6, shows how the progress of human feeling develops through 
religion, how paganism is conquered by Christianity, only to be 
objectified again in dogmatic beliefs.
There is little chance that Feuerbach can have been ignorant 
of these writings. Many of Hegel's early themes are developed by 
Feuerbach: for example, the work of the imagination in miracles,
the objectification of human and natural material in the sacraments, %
the opposition between faith and love, the self-identification of 
human nature in the act of loving. Feuerbach, in his books Das
Wesen des Christentums, Das Wesen der Religion, Das Geheimnis des
Opfers Oder der Mensch ist, was er isst, appears to be saying that
1, Louis Althusser, For Marx, p. 46 E.T. Ben'Brewsteri M i e n > U a H è ' , ’L o n d o n ,  1969 .
Althusser admirably documents the direct adaptations of Feuerbach's aphorisms by Marx. 
Included are references to Hegel standing on his head, the opium of the people, the 
transformation of religion into anthropology.
2. Quoted in T.M. Knox, Hegel: Early Theological W r i t i n g s , p. 19
A
1. T.M. Knox, Hegel: Early Theological W r i t i n g s , op. cit. Introduction, p. 16
2. ibid; "Fragment of a System", p. 309 ff.
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Hegel was on the right track in his youth. The correct continuation ,1
of philosophy, therefore, is the projection of the implicit anthro- ?
pological critique of religion, begun by Hegel, but 'forsaken' in |
Hegel's system. >:
T.M. Knox offers a characterization of Hegel's early period,
in which he tried to posit Christian love as "the ultimate goal
of life and thought", but found the project to be self-defeating.
Most of Hegel's early writings, permeated with the spirit of Storm and Stress, offer an interpretation of the Gospel and Christian dogma culminating in the idea of Love. Love overcomes all differentiations of life and thought and restores the original unity of all men. Love is wiser than understanding and reflec­tion. The soul that loves reaches God. Hegel also ref­lected on the function of spirit - a power that conquers the citadel of division by unifying the most 
tenacious of oppositions, the opposition between ob­jectivity and subjectivity. Christianity arose as the religion of spirit. But it was the fate of Christianity to call back an already defeated enemy. Spirit submits to the necessity of becoming objective itself as creed and dogma, or as codified faith in preference to the love that binds the community together. The conclusion of the essay on "The Spirit of Christianity" is there­fore gloomy and destructive. The intent of Jesus cannot be maintained in his community. Neither love nor even spirit can bring about absolute reconcilia­tion - the ultimate goal of life and thought.
Even as Hegel found Christianity to be foundered on the rocks of 
dogmatic objectification (the basis for Feuerbach's faith-love anti­
thesis) he still tried to formulate a systematic philosophy based 
upon the encompassing idea of love, which, he briefly thought, might
rise above the frustrations of its historical manifestation. The
2"Fragment of a System" demonstrates this phase in Hegel's thought.
Love, he suggested, is greater than intellect simply because it 
is essentially an aesthetically orientated representation of truth.
Hence it is not capable of adequate intellectual representation, 
and cannot be construed by conceptual methods. The intellect cannot ^
contain, or even fully understand, the vitality and immediacy of
I
46
life. Thus not the intellect, but only finite organic life alone
can rise to infinite life.^
-An adequate comparison of Hegel's early writings with Feuerbach's
later works would demand more space than is here allowed. For our
purpose, a brief outline of Hegel's early themes must suffice to
show that Feuerbach was at least aware of them by the time he wrote
2The Essence of Christianity.
(2) Love: The'"Spirit" of Christianity
Hegel demonstrates how human feeling is objectified in religion, 
even as religion slowly discloses the universality of that feeling. 
Thus, paganism with its capricious gods is superseded by a 'dependable' 
humanized God. This supersession is first visible in Judaism; but 
then the authentic feeling is made objective again. What Hegel 
says of Judaism is later construed by Feuerbach to apply to Christian­
ity.
In the spirit of the Jews...there stood an alien court of judgment. When then, they were referred to love as a bond in man between sin and reconciliation, their loveless na­ture must have been shocked, and, when their hatred took the form of a judgment, the thought of such a bond must to their minds have been the thought of a lunatic. Forthey had committed all harmony among men, all love, spirit,and life, to an alien object; they had alienated from them­selves all the genii in which men are unitgd; they had put nature in the hands of an alien being.
Here Hegel is trying to characterize what Jesus was combatting in
opposing love to objectified morality. The "spirit" of Christianity
is integrated with nature, has no feeling of alienation. "Boldness
and confidence of decision about fulness of life, about abundance
of love, arise from the feeling of the man who bears in himself
the whole of human nature... Hence the unhesitating, confident,
words of Jesus: Thy sins are forgiven thee. "^ But the alienation
1. ibid, p . 313; cf. Knox, Introduction, p . 317; Feuerbach's project to "posit the infinite
in the finite", i.e. to characterize the "divinity" of human love, appears to be strongly 
dependent upon this aborted concern of Hegel's.
2. The evidence seems to suggest that Feuerbach first became aware of Hegel's early posiition 
in 1838 or 1839, This is when Feuerbach's Critique of Hegel changed from a positive, 
Hegelian critique, to a negative, anti-Hegelian critique. What Feuerbach seemed to be 
doing was using early Hegel to assist his criticism of the Hegelian system.
3. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity", (trans. Knox) op. cit. p. 240
4. ibid.
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was not actually overcome by Jesus, for his disciples were still
subject to "the spirit of Judaism". Since love is so instinctively
integrated, it is constantly opposed by objective necessity and
contingency.^
The spirit of the Christian communion likewise saw mundane realities in every relationship of self-devel­oping and self-revealing life. But since this spirit was the feeling of love, its greatest enemy was objec­tivity, and the result was thei,t it remained as poor as the Jewish spirit, though it disdained the giches forthe sake of which the Jewish spirit served.
Hegel says that a universal love was indeed revealed in Christianity,
i.e. in the early Church, but it was not recognized as such. It
became, after the leave-taking of Jesus, the apparent bond of mutual
love. Inclusive love became identified with exclusive love.
A rather difficult, yet revealing pessage of Hegel's gives
us insight into Feuerbach's assertion that Christianity has no species-
consciousness, precisely because the mutual love of a community
is opposed to cosmic inclusiveness.
By love's extension over a whole community its char­acter changes ; it ceases to be a living union of in­dividualities and instead its enjoyment is restricted to the consciousness of their mutual love...
This love is a divine spirit, but it still falls short of religion. To become religion, it must manifest itself in an objective form. A feeling, something sub­jective, it must be fused with the universal, with some­thing represented in idea, and thereby acquire the form of a being to whom prayer is both possible and due.The need to unite subject with object, to unite feeling, and feeling's demand for objects, with the intellect, to unite them in something beautiful, in a god, by means of fancy, is the supreme need of the human spirit and the urge to religion. This urge of the Christian community its belief in God could not satisfy because in their God there could have been no more than their common feeling. In the God of the world all beings are united; in him there are no members, as members, of a community.The harmony of such members is not the harmony of the whole; otherwise they would not form a particular commu­nity, would not be linked together by love. The Godhead 
of the world is^not the manifestation of their love, of their divinity.
1. Knox translated another fragment of a MS, by Hegel, which is entitled "Love", from 1797 
or 1798. Feuerbach may or may not have known about it. cf. Knox op. cit. pp. 302-308
2. Hegel: "The Spirit of Ch rist i a n i t y "  (trans. Knox) op. cit. p . 288
3. ibid, p. 289
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Hegel is not judging, in the above extract, the authenticity of 
mutual love; what he is judging is the objectification of mutual 
love as religion, which effectually short-changes cosmic, inclusive 
love. (For Feuerbach's adaptation of this idea, of. The Essence 
of Christianity, Chapter XXVI, "The Contradiction of Faith and Love".)^
(3) The Nature of Religion as Human Nature
In the above critique, Hegel was attempting to develop a concept 
of religion which would overcome the fallacies of Christianity (in 
its practical form), a concept of religion which would not be limited 
to the objectification of mutual love at best. Religion, properly 
conceived, must be the unalieneted, inclusive projection of love
■r> -as the unification of unity and non-unity. The aanify/Hegel-’-S“ love 
was neither subject nor object, but the potential unification of 
both. For Feuerbach, love was to be the principle of unity, the 
highest form of feeling, the most divine attribute of the human. 
The difference between Hegel's and Feuerbach's conception of the 
'positive' nature of religion is nil. Both identified the 'need', 
fcr religion, the constructive work of the imagination in fulfilling 
the need, and the latent self-disclosure of human "spirit" or "essence" 
(respectively for Hegel and Feuerbach) in and through religion. 
The difference lies in the final interpretation of religion. For 
Hegel, religion must become systematic philosophy; for Feuerbach, 
it must become anthropology.
In a preface to an essay written shortly before "The Spirit 
of Christianity", called "Positivity of Christian Religion", Hegel 
wrote
A positive religion is contrasted with natural religion, and this presupposes that there is only one natural religion, since human nature is one and single, while there may be many positive religions. It is clear from this very contrast that a positive religion is a contranatural one or a supernatural one, containing con­cepts and information transcending understanding and reason and requiring feelings and actions which would not come naturally to men; the feelings are forcibly and 
mechanically stimulated, the actions are done to order or from obedience without any spontaneous interest.
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. p. 247 ff.
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It is obvious from this general explanation that before a religion or any part of it can be set down as positive, the concept of human nature, and therefore man’s relation to God, must first be defined
It is apparent, only from a quick reference to the table of contents
of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, that Feuerbach took
Hegel's early programme as his own. The 'positivity' of the Christian
religion indeed proceeds from Feuerbach's analysis of human nature
inherent within Christianity.
Feuerbach undoubtedly took the programme further than Hegel,
ending by 'negating' Hegel's own solution; speculative philosophy
is another way of doing theology. Feuerbach's method, however,
for the critique of human nature as it is revealed in religion,
was originally Hegel's ideal
The general concept of human nature admits of infinite modifications; and there is no need of the makeshift of calling experience to witness that modifications are necessary and that human nature has never been present in its purity. A strict proof of this is possible; all that is necessary is to settle the question: "What is human nature in its purity?" This expression, "human nature in its purity" should imply no more than accordance with the general concept. But the living nature of man is always other than the concept of the same, and hence what for the concept is a bare modification, a pure ac­cident, a superfluity, becomes a necessity, something living, perhaps the only thing which is natural and beautiful.
Now this gives quite a different appearance to the criterion for the positivity of religion...
In "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" we have an early 
glimpse of Hegel as an "anthropologist", beginning to observe the 
phenomena hidden in faith which m.ay disclose the nature of human 
being. Only later was the "anthropology" removed to be encompassed 
by a still greater criterion for the nature of humankind: not man 
as actor, thinker, and lover alone, but man as the embodiment of 
the greatest acting, thinking and loving possible - der Geist. 
"Human nature in its purity" was considered within the realm of
1. Hegel, "Positivity of Christian Religion", trans. Knox, op. cit. p. 167. (1795) This 
essay was indeed published during Feuerbach's life, but after The Essence of Ch ristianity 
had first appeared. Rosenkranz, Hegel's Leben Berlin, 1844, pp. 510 ff. Still there is
no reason to assume that the essay had not been circulated privately among Hegel's students,
2. Hegel, "The Positivity of the Christian Religion", (trans. Knox) op. cit. p. 169
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a different kingdom, leaving for Feuerbach the human nature with
which Hegel himself began: Dasein, being here and now. But the
young Hegel had not yet made the conceptual leap from Difesseits
to Jenseits » He spoke as if human nature, chained within the bonds
of religion, might be able to see itself for what it really is,
then free itself from bondage.
When another mood awakens, when this nature begins to have a sense of itself and thereby to demand freedom in and for itself instead of placing it in its supreme Being, then and only then can its former religion begin to appear a positive one. The universal concepts of hu­man nature are too empty to afford a criterion for the special and necessarily multiplex needs of religious feeling.
The last words, "religious feeling", lead on to yet another character­
istic of the young Hegel which Feuerbach adopted and made to serve 
his turn.
(4) Imagination and Feeling
Hegel's essay "The Spirit of Christianity" is in many respects 
a direct answer to Kant. Morality, thought Hegel, cannot be construed 
by the idea of duty. Love, not duty, is "the sole principle of 
virtue". Why? Because "a thought cannot be loved", morality must 
stem from the shared feelings of human beings. "Love for one's
nearest neighbours is philanthropy toward those with whom each of 
us comes into contact." In this sense, love cannot be commanded.
Rather love triumphs over duty and right. "'Love has conquered' 
does not mean the same as 'duty has conquered'." Rather it means
that "love has overcome hostility". "One can only say 'Thou shalt
love'. Love itself pronounces no imperative." Love is not a univer­
sal opposed to a particular, but it is a unity of spirit.
1. ibid. p. 170
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To love God is to feel one's self in the "all" of life, with no restrictions, in the infinite. In this feeling of harmony there is no universality since in a harmony the particular is not in discord but in concord, or otherwise there would be no bar- ■ mony. "Love thy neighbour as thyself" does not mean to love him as much as yourself, for self-love is a word without meaning. It means "love him as the 
man whom thou art," i.e. love is a sensing of a life similar to one's own, not a stronger or a weaker one. Only through love is the might of ob­jectivity broken, for love upsets its whole sphere.The virtues, because of their limits, always put something objective beyond them, and the variety of virtues an all the greater and insurmountable multi­plicity of objectivity. Love alone has no limits.What it has not united with itself is not objective 
to it; love has overlooked it o^ not yet developed it; it is not confronted by it.
There is much more here than can easily be summarized. Briefly, 
Hegel seems to be saying that love is greater than any imperative 
stemming from ideas of virtue, because the ideas of virtue are objec­
tive renderings of an overarching tendency toward, and sense of,
harmony, which is entailed in love; that both love for God and love 
for neighbour are derived from feeling, the ability to identify 
oneself in both the neighbour and universal 'harmony'. Because 
love is the apotheosis of this harmony, it is essentially unlimited, 
not subject to opposition. Virtues, on the other hand, always have 
their opposites.
Hegel draws an important distinction between the love that
is "a living bond of unity" (i.e. Jesus among his disciples) and
the love which is no longer present in relationship and must therefore
be imagined. "Only a unification in love, made objective by imagina-
2tion, can be the object of religious veneration." (As Feuerbach 
put it, repeatedly, "The image is the thing of religion.")
1. Hegel, "The Spirit of C h r i st ian ity, " (trans. Knox) op. cit. p. 247 of. Feuerbach, The 
Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. pp. 47-48 e.g. "What faith, creed, opinion separates, 
love unites." There is hardly any doubt that Feuerbach reflects this passage from Hegel. 
Feuerbach, however, does not accept Hegel's insistence that "self-love is a word without 
m e a n i n g ."
2. Hegel, "The Spirit of C h r ist ian ity" (trans. Knox) op. cit. p. 248. One might speculate 
that the conclusion of Albert Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus is i n tima­
tely connected with this observation of Hegel, cf. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical 
J e s u s , 3rd edition, E.T.:W. Montgomery, Adam and Charles Black, London 1954. (First 
published as Von Reimarus zu W r e d e , 1906) But Nohl's German Edition of Hegel was not 
pu blished until 1907.
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Thus arose the central image (for Hegel) of Christian faith;
the Lord's supper. Hegel demonstrates a smooth transition (in theory)
from Jesus' actual presence with his disciples at the Upper Room,
to the image of his presence bestowed upon the elements of bread
and wine. (Feuerbach: Der Mensch ist,was er isst. ) As Hegel puts
it, "To eat and drink with someone is an act of union and is itself
a felt union, not a conventional symbol.^ "In this link between
bread and persons, difference disappears, and with it the possibility
of comparison. Things heterogeneous are here most intimately connect- 
2ed." Hegel's biblical illustration is John 6: 56, "Who eats my
flesh and drinks my blood dwelleth in me and I in him." But the
very nature of the 'consubstantiation' defeats the religious possib­
ility of the event.
The spirit of Jesus in which his disciples are one has become a present object, a reality, for exter­nal feeling. Yet the lové made objective, this sub­jective element become a thing, reverts once more to its nature, becomes subjective again in the eating.This return may perhaps in this respect be compared with the thought which in the written word becomes a thing and which recaptures its subjectivity out of an object, out of something lifeless, when we read. The simile would be more striking if the writ­
ten word were read away, if by being understood it vanished as a thing, just as in the enjoyment of bread and wine not only is a feeling for these mystical ob­jects aroused, not only is the spirit made alive, but the objects vanish as objects. Thus the action seems purer, more appropriate to its end, in so far as 
it affords spirit only, feeling only, and robs the in­tellect of its own, i.e. destroys the matter, the soulless.When lovers sacrifice before the altar of the goddess of 
love and the prayerful breath of their emotion fans their emotion to a white-hot flame, the goddess herself has entered their hearts, yet the marble statue remains stand­ing in front of them. In the love-feast, on the other hand^ the corporeal vanishes and only living feeling is present.
For Hegel, the disappearance of the image, its absorption
into one's own body leaving only the feeling in its place, signaled
the eclipse of the true nature of Christianity, as love, because'
1. ibid
2. ibid p. 249
3. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity", (trans. Knox) op. cit. pp. 250-251
1. ibid, p . : 251
2. ibid, pp. 25-253
3. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. p. 48
4. Ibid, p. 57
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an image could not be cast that would incorporate this unity of 
matter and spirit. "The bread is to be eaten, the wine drunk, there­
fore they cannot be something divine."^ Love becomes visible in 
and attached to something which is to be destroyed. Love is not 
"made objective enough" for it to be able to function as a religion.
Feeling and intellect combat each other; for the community which 
follows Jesus' contemporaries, the same union that was experienced 
at the Upper Room could not be repeated, "becàuse feeling's intensity 
was separate from the intellect and both were one-sided, because
worship was incomplete, since something divine was promised and
2it melted away in the mouth." The need of religion is an image; 
feeling alone, even as love, cannot be perpetuated in religious 
forms; because of love's unification of subject and object, objective 
images are inadequate; therefore love as 'religion' is impossible.
It is only a small jump from this line of reasoning to Feuerbach's 
adaptation: "Love is God himself and apart from it there is no God,
3Love makes man God and God man...What do I love in God? Love itself,
and specifically, love of man."..."To us there remains no immediate
presence but that of love.
5. The Incarnation and the Imagination
?(1) Feuerbach's Explication and Re-interpretation of Hegel S
Hegel suggested one more Christian image which attempts to
objectify the feeling of love, but which, ultimately, results in
confusion between love and the intellect.
The image Cof a crucified God] fell short of beauty and divinity because it lacked life. What was wanting in the community's life was an image and a shape. But in the risen Jesus, lifted up heavenward, the image found life 
again, and love found the objectification of its oneness.In this remarriage of spirit and body the opposition between the living and the dead Jesus has vanished, and the two are united in a God. Love's longing has found itself, and worship of this being is now the religion of
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the group. The need for religion finds its satisfac­tion in the risen Jesus, in love thus given shape.
Because the Church demands such an image, because it cannot be content
with the "peace in a nonpersonal living beauty", "it is its fate
that church and state, worship and life, piety and virtue, spiritual
2and worldly action, can never dissolve into one." Thus Hegel ends
his essay on "The Spirit of Christianity." Thus Feuerbach begins
his book on The Essence of Christianity:
Religion is the disuniting of man from himself ; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself.God is not what man is - man is not what God is.God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal;
God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; mag the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.
What Hegel had implied, Feuerbach made explicit. The love
revealed in the Incarnation of a man as God demonstrates, not the
nature of God, but rather the "spirit" (Hegel) or the "essence"
(Feuerbach) of humanity.
In religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this anti­thesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, ig a differencing of man with his own nature.
For Hegel, the hidden agenda in the Incarnation was to be deciphered
by relating it to the activity of der Geist, spirit and/or mind,
in all the forms of being, conceived as greater than but including
human being. But for Feuerbach, the hidden meaning in the Incarnation
was interpreted as the development of human feeling, stemming from
sense experience, rising to objectification in the imagination,
and shaped by practice which is correlated with what one believes
to be true from the data of sense experience. In religion, what
one believes is indeed the manifestation of sense experience and
1. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity", (trans. Knox) op. cit. p. 292
2. ibid, p. 301
3. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. p. 334. ibid
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feeling, but the image is conceived in an alienated form, of God. 
not human being (Dasein).
Human need, characterized by Hegel as an "unhappy consciousness", 
becomes for Feuerbach the stimulus for "theogony" - the birth of 
the gods. Through the imagination, humans are able to fulfil the 
needs made conscious through sense and feeling. Whatever needs 
are incapable of satisfaction in this world by human practice are 
attributed to another object outside of this world, who is able 
to make things "out of nothing", to fulfill needs without the media­
tion of knowledge, tools, and material. In a good sense, the imagina­
tion supports human acquisition of knowledge. As old needs are 
satisfied, new ones arise; the old gods are displaced with new ones. 
Fertility cults blend into nature worship; the gods of war slowly 
become the gods of reason. Only as humanity begins to take itself 
as its own object, to become not merely conscious, but also self- 
conscious, does religion begin to assume the characteristics of 
love.
It is the consciousness of love by which man reconciles himself with God, or rather with his own nature as represented in the moral law. The consciousness of the divine love, or what is the same thing, the contempla­tion of God as human, is the mystery of the Incarnation.The Incarnation is nothing else than the practical 
material manifestation of the human nature of God. God did not become man for his own sake; the need, the want of man- a want which still exists in the religious sen­timent- was the cause of the Incarnation. God became man out of mercy: thus he was in himself already a human God before he became an actual man; for human want, human misery, went to his heart. The Incarnation was a tear of the divine compassion, and hence it was only the visible advent of a Being paving human feelings and therefore essentially human.
Although Feuerbach calls religion, "a waking dream, the opium of 
the people", one must not ignore the 'positive' force of his descrip­
tion, Religion is the sublimated objectification of human feeling, 
which through the images formulated in the need to believe, contains 
the "secret" of human nature.
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, op. cit. p. 50
■ ■^ 1
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(2) Christ aè the- Corporate Object of -Human Self-Consciousness
While religion as the manifestation of human imagination is, 
unconsciously, the fulfilment of feeling in the creation of an object, 
a "thou", by which the human can understand his own nature, theology,
Feuerbach says, is an abortive attempt to rationalize an illusion.
It is one thing to objectify Jesus as the risen Lord, but quite
another to attribute to him absolute qualities which are inflexible, 
impassible, and remote from human experience. Theology's great
fault (and by implication, the fault of Hegel's later system of 
absolutes) is that it tends to crystallize the alienated image of
religion in opposition to human experience, producing a wholly other, 
absolute, supernatural, and superhuman God.
As the images of religion are given rational form, the realiza­
tion of authentic human qualities in practice is inhibited. The 
true significance of the Incarnation, on the other hand, is the 
disclosure of God as essentially human, "brought down to earth".
Rational theology, thought Feuerbach, would prefer to leave God 
in the heavens, characterized by such terms as omniscient, omnipotent, 
Creator-out-of-nothing, and impassible. But the Incarnation contains 
the secret that God is touchable, compassionate, capable of suffering 
- "a being of the heart". Only a deity who can truly understand 
human feeling, the depths of human experience, can break the opposi­
tion between human being and divine being. The objectification 
of Jesus as God is in truth the objectification of the human capacity 
to love, made visible through the primary image of human need: the
idea of humanity become God.
The Christian religion's assertion that God has become human 
is not only the imaginative objectification of God's embodiment 
in a particular individual, but it is also the collection in that 
individual of the whole "species" of humanity. Jesus's suffering 
is the suffering of all humanity; Jesus' victory over evil and death 
is the (imagined) victory of all humankind. But the collection
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of the species in one person is essentially the work of the imagina­
tion, and it is therefore an idea which is not subject to rational 
categorization.
Only love, admiration honour, in short only affect, only feeling, raises the individual to the level of our love, we exclaim: She is Beauty, Love, Goodness itself! But reason knows nothing of the actual, absolute Incarnation of the species in a particular individual... Incarnation and history are absolutely incompatible: where the Godhead enters into history, there history ends. But if history pursues its course as before, the theory of incarnation is fact­ually refuted by history itself.
In other words, says Feuerbach, the idea of corporate humanity is 
an ahistorical notion. History is a rational enterprise which assumes 
rational cause and effect. Corporate humanity, as an idea, is supra­
national; it is not 'historical', and therefore it cannot be included 
in historical understanding. The Incarnation is of a radically 
different quality, subject only to the quality of feeling, emotion, 
and imagination.
Although Christianity does indeed posit the 'many' represented 
in the 'one' (Christ), such a representation is not subject to ration­
al categories. In history, "the god of limitation stands as guardian 
of the gate." The idea of the Incarnation represents the unlimited 
imagery of corporate humanity, and is thus beyond rational method. 
(Feuerbach is here suggesting that both Kantian ethics and Hegelian 
historical dialectic cannot cope with the idea of the Incarnation
as the representation of the human species.)
Through the imagery of the Incarnation Feuerbach suggests
that the problem of "the many and the one" has been solved unconsc-
2iously. The whole of humanity is collected into the life, death,
and 'resurrection' of one individual, in a form that is beyond the 
critique of history. The problem however, is that the reconciliation
1. Feuerbach, Zur Critik der Hegelschen P h i l o s o p h i e , Bolin-Jodl, II, op. cit. pp. 162-164; 
trans. Wartofsky in F e u e r b a c h , op. cit, p . 177
2. For a more exhaustive account of Feuerbach's "Incarnation Theory", cf. Marx Wartofsky, 
F e u e r b a c h , op. cit. pp. 226 ff.
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has been achieved unconsciously, through the imagination, and object­
ified as a religious belief which is incapable of realizing that 
the union is relevant to the individual's connection to his species, 
in this world.
(3) Feuerbach's Epistemology: The:sEhcouhter of I and Thou
For Feuerbach, feeling objectified in the imagination is the 
very basis of knowledge. What is picked up through the senses is 
projected as an image in the brain where the image becomes the matter 
of thought. For him there is no thinking without images, much less 
without the matter that affords the primary stimuli for the brain 
through sight, smell, touch, hearing, and tasting. Imagination 
is therefore the border between mind and matter. Without its contri­
bution there would indeed be a dualism between them. But through 
the work of the imagination, sensation and feeling are the conditions 
for thought. Organic, physical existence is the condition of sensa­
tion and feeling, and only an existing being can think. Imagination 
is the link, therefore, between organic physical activity and the 
activity of thought. Feuerbach's synthesis between mind and matter 
has been described as "dialectical monism", that is, a philosophical 
unity in which matter is resolved through sense imagery into the 
material of thought.^
Since it is the objectification of sensory experience, as 
feeling, which brings consciousness of the external world to human 
beings, the feeling which arises as humans encounter others of their 
species brings to consciousness information about the species. 
At its highest pitch, this feeling is love. For Feuerbach, love 
is not just a feeling, it is the goal of all feeling.
A fully realized human being has the capacity to think, to will, and to love. These are the fullest realizations, the greatest powers, the absolute essence of man as man, and are the goal or end of his existence. Man exists in
1. ibid. p. 24 9#In this sense, Feuerbach resembles the later Hegel.
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order to know, to love, to will. But what is the end of reason? Reason itself. What is the object or goal of love? Love itself. Of the Will? Freedom to will..The divine trinity in man, over and above jndividual men is the unity of Reason, Love and Will.
In Feuerbach's dialectic of sensibility, love itself thereby 
becomes material in character. It is the matter of "the heart", 
the substance in which human being's most profound essence may be
acknowledged. The understanding of reason cannot comprehend the 
sensuousness with which a human being is able to identify his neigh­
bour in himself, nor himself in his neighbour. "The understanding
knows nothing of the desires of the heart." Only by making love
impersonal and objective in a God is reason able to think that which 
is profoundly sensuous. The power of abstraction, "the impersonal
power in man", brings the mind to "a painful collision with the 
2heart". Reason posits a God who is the objectified wish of man, 
omnipotent, universal, omniscient, infinite, impassible. But love 
stipulates that "God can only exist if he is acknowledged as a being
3with human, sensuous qualities". The belief in the incarnation 
of God into the form of humanity is, for Feuerbach, the surest proof 
of love as a substantial attribute, and the essential nature, of 
human being. The Incarnation is the unconscious, yet substantive 
insistence upon a human thou; personal, finite, sensuous, and sympath­
etic to suffering, which enfolds the many in the one and realizes 
the imaginative, yet intrinsically valid, reconciliation of human 
individuals with humankind.
4. The Incarnation as the Image of Love.
In Feuerbach's epistemology every object of consciousness, 
every feeling imaginatively objectified, becomes "a mirror for man". 
The object of sense, projected in the brain,provides data not only 
about the object but also about the human himself in his interaction
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. p . 3
2. ibid, p. 34
3. ibid, p. 50
—  - --12
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with the object. In religion, the projected image of God is the 
result of man taking himself as his own object; therefore the object 
itself is the image of human nature. Feuerbach's characteristic
aphorism suggests the interrelàtëdd themes which contribute to religi­
ous imagery: "By his God you know the man, and conversely, by the |
man you know his God." '!
The object of any subject is nothing else than the subject's own nature taken objectively. Such as are a man's thoughts and dispositions, such is his God; so much worth as a man has, so much and no more has his God. Consciousness of God is self-knowledge. By his God thou knowest the man, and by the man his God; the two are identical. Whatever is God to a man, that is his heart and soul; and conversely, God is the inward manifested nature, the expressed self of a man,- religion the solemn unveiling of man's hidden treasures, the revelation of his intjmate thoughts, the open confes­sion of his love-secrets.
In the above quotation, Marian Evans' rendering of der Mensch 
as "a man" does not contain the double significance implied by 
Feuerbach. A better term might be "the human being", or "humanity".
Although Feuerbach is indeed talking about an individual person, 
he is also referring to human nature in general.
Religion, as a social expression, is the imagination of a 
corporate 'mind', as well as the expression of individual piety.
Only with the double meaning can Feuerbach's understanding of love
as a material element in epistemology be appreciated. In the Incarna­
tion, it is not merely "a man" that is objectified in the image
of God become  man; it is all men and women, all humanity. In
Christianity the image of God (originally) is the image of the human 
individual in reconciliation with the human species. For Feuerbach, 
the image is valid because God is no longer characterized as brute 
force or capricious will, but rather as a 'human' being, able to 
suffer, consistently loving, and limited in space and time.
Thus, in the Incarnation, the imagination plays its finest 
role. Not only is "man" exalted into a God, but love is exalted
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. p.12
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into a substance. Feeling, which is experienced in every human 
encounter of I and thou, disclosed in the image of Christ, is the 
potential bond between the individual and the species. In the thou, 
the individual 'senses' himself, learns about himself, and projects 
his own possibilities in correlation with the 'sensible' data received 
from another like himself.
But the possibilities revealed through love are ultimately 
inexplicable to reason. In the Incarnation an image of love is 
cast which asserts the divinity, the infinity, of human love despite 
its oppositions and frustrations. For Feuerbach, "feeling is the 
substance of sensuous life." The difference in quality between 
feelings which arise from empirical objects and those which arise 
from other feeling objects implies the difference between sensation 
and love. Only love can give real information to a human being 
about himself; only in loving does a person become truly self-conscious.
The Incarnation is Christianity's sublimated way of acknowledg­
ing that love is the substance of human, sensuous life. Feuerbach 
was greatly influenced by Jacob Boehme, who noted that feeling is 
"the source of all suffering and joy". Boehme is quoted by Feuerbach: 
"Why do you seek God in the depths or beyond the stars? You shall 
not find him there. Seek him in your heart, in the center of your 
life's origin. There you shall find him.
But Feuerbach was not content to characterize God as the anthro­
pomorphic projection of an individual piety. For him, true feeling 
could only be disclosed in the actual encounter with another feeling 
object; and the encounter itself, between I and thou, finds form 
in the image of a suffering, loving, human God. Just as there must 
be a real object which can only give rise to empirical sense experi­
ence, there must be a real (i.e. appropriate) object for the develop­
ment of feeling: a human object, a thou. For Hegel, in his later
1. Feuerbach, Die Geschichte der fteueren Philosophie, Bolin-Jodl, III op. cit. p. 173; 
quoted and translated in Wartofsky, F e u e r b a c h , op. cit. p. 75
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works, the subject need only take himself as an imaginary object 
for the development of self-consciousness to arise.^ Feuerbach 
insisted upon a reflexive, authentic thou; otherwise feeling does 
not attain consciousness, and the individual only projects his own 
ego upon an imaginary 'essence'. But with the dialectical movement 
between a real I and a real thou, feeling may break into consciousness 
as a consciousness of actualized, or at least humanly potential, 
love. The first stone upon which the pride of egohood is broken is the Thou, the other I...My fellowman is the bond bet­ween myself and the world. I am and I feel myself to be dependent on the world because I first feel myself to be dependent on other men. If I didn't need other men, I wouldn't need the world either. I reconcile myself with the world, befriend it only through my fellowman. With­out these others, the world wduld be not only dead and empty for me, but also meaningless and incomprehensible.Only in his fellowman does man become clear^to himself and self-conscious...Man's first object is man.
Only as human encounters human, only as a feeling object is 
apprehended by a feeling subject, can love as the greatest manifesta­
tion of feeling arise into consciousness. Neither rational deduction 
nor egotistical piety can express the character of love. But love, 
as a substance, as the bond between the individual and the species, 
as the goal of feeling itself, is disclosed in the Incarnation. 
The imagery suggests that love itself is divine in nature, and that 
the human which loves has something of the infinite about him.
Feuerbach's assertion that love entails "the exaltation of 
man into God" is the viewpoint by which he is most often cast in 
the guise of the arch-heretic, the p^iginal atheist. Yet he said 
that "A real atheist...is one for whom the predicates of divine being
are nothing, but not one for whom only the subject of these predicates 
3is nothing." Love is the predicate of God, revealed
1. G.W.F. Hegel, Ph enomenology of H i n d , trans. J.B. Baillie, London 1910, Vol. I, p. 176f,
2. Feuerbach, Das Wesen des C h r i s t e n t u m s , Bolin-Jodl VI, pp. 99-100, (trans, Wartofsky in 
F e u e r b a c h , op. cit. p. 311)
3. ibid. p. 306
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in the Incarnation, as the imagination's authentic synthesis between
the divine and the human. Love becomes not only the substance of
God, but also the essential substance of humanity. Perhaps the
exaltation of love in the Incarnation, as the substantive bond between 
the individual and the species, the divine and the human, could
be as enlightening for theology as Feuerbach's "exaltation of man" 
is threatening.
6. Imagination: Theory and Practice
In his book The Understanding of Faith, Edward Schillebeeckx
observes that it is very difficult to draw distinct lines between
theory and practice, or between 'interpretation' and 'change'.
In an interview on German television, I recently heard the old philosopher Martin Heidegger say that Marx, in the first part of his well-known statement, "philosophers interpret the world, the point is to change it", denies what is implicitly presupposed in the second half. Certain­ly, to assert that the world has to be changed implies a certain interpretation of reality and is itself already an interpretation.
Karl Marx considered both Hegel and Feuerbach too abstract
in their interpretations of the world. What Feuerbach lacked, Marx
thought, was a concept of human activity which is related to actual
2production as well as self-consciousness and essential creativity.
Marx's criticism of Feuerbach was, however, somewhat one-sided, 
without proper attention to the complexity of Feuerbach's analysis 
of the work of the imagination.
Louis Althusser aptly summarizes the enigma Feuerbach was 1;i
for Marx: "Feuerbach was always thinking about politics, but hardly 5|
3  Iever talked about it." Feuerbach's programme for overcoming human J
self-alienation in religion was intended to develop practically 
into a "freedom in community" grounded upon the "divinity" in human 
love. But, as D.W.D. Shaw comments, "How that community is to be
1. Edward Schillebeeckx, The Understanding of F a i t h , Sheed and Ward, London, 1974, (E.T.: 
N.D. Smith) cf. especially Chapter 4. Sc hillebeeckx envisages hermeneutics as 'praxis' 
in embryo, conditioned by a critical theory which is sensitive not only to scholarship 
but also to the world so cial-political context.
2. cf. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", op. cit. (Thesis I )
3. Louis Althusser, For Marx, London, 1970, p. 45
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realized is not really Feuerbach's question, even though he did
1say that 'politics must become our religion'." In contrast, Marx
"in exposing the fallacy of religion was therefore intensely practical.
It only arose insofar as it was relevant or necessary to understand
it and explain it as it contributed to, or much more likely thwarted,
2the progress of society to a freer, juster condition."
As Althusser has shown, much of Marx's critique of religion
is adopted directly from Feuerbach. The following is an example:
Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the senti­ment of a heartless world, the soul of soulless conditions.It is the opium of the people.The abolition of religion, as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for their real happiness. The call to aban­don their illusions about their condition is a call to aban­don a condition which requires illusions... Thus the criti­cism of heaven transforms itself into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, gnd the 
criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.
Marx's implication that religion is primarily and essentially a 
function of social conditions does not allow for the integrity of 
the human need to believe. Nor can the human capacity to transform 
nature through practical productivity completely remove it.
If Feuerbach's writings have retained their challenge to philo­
sophy as well as to the practical implications of religion and theo­
logy (cf. below, Chapter Five), we need not be intimidated by Marx's 
"Theses on Feuerbach". In Thesis VIII he wrote: "All social life
is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mystic­
ism find their rational solution in human practice and in the compre­
hension of this practice." As Iring Fetscher has remarked, "Das
ist sicher allés ganz richtig, aber doch nicht die ganze Wahrheit."^ 
The dynamics of social life may yet contain some 'mysteries' that
demand more creative interpretation and theory before such dynamics 
become comprehensible and capable of practical integration with
1. D.W.D. Shaw, The D i s s u a d e r a , SCM Press, London, 1978, p. 33
2. ibid. p. 34
3. Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right; I n t r o d u c t i o n , in M a r x zEarly W r i t i n g s , 
Penguin, Middlesex, 1975.
4. Iring Fetscher, "Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx", H e g e l s t u d i e n , Bonn, 1963 p. 376 ("That is 
certainly all quite correct, but not quite the whole truth.")
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modem needs. Resolution of social mysteries cannot be achieved 
by practice, unless practice itself contains the dynamics of theory 
and interpretation. (Marx's idea of practice does indeed assume 
such.)
In a sense, the perennial condemnation of Feuerbach by Marxists 
is a one-sided argument for the chicken at the expense of the egg. 
The origins of the theory-practice relation hail neither from Marx 
nor Hegel, but rather from the Lycaeum in Athens. As Aristotle obser­
ved, one can hardly do without either. Whereas Feuerbach has proposed 
a theory which he hoped would lead to practice, Marx proposed a prac­
tice which constantly discovers new theory. If Marx's idea of pract­
ice is understood as he intended, one certainly might prefer his 
version over Feuerbach's. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to 
write Feuerbach off too quickly.
As I have already observed, Feuerbach's 'dialectic of sensib­
ility' depends upon the 'material' character of love, and upon the 
'practice' which is latent in human imagination. Feeling and love 
constitute "the matter of the heart" by which humanity has access 
to its true nature.
The conception of the morally perfect being is no merely theoretical, inert conception, but a practical one, call­ing me to action, to imitation, throwing me into strife, into disunion with myself; for while it proclaims to me what I ought to be, it also tellg me to my face, with­out any flattery, what I am not.
There is in the religious imagination a practical tendency, which, 
even though it represents the alienation of humanity from itself, 
is nevertheless an indication of the 'practice' in the human imagina­
tion.
Adopting literally Luther's remark: "Belief is my being",
Feuerbach sees belief, dependent upon religious imagination, as the 
potential capacity for the fulfilment of human needs in every respect.
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, op. cit. p. 47
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Worship is closely associated with the primary character of belief, 
as a practice in embryo. Disclosed in the symbolic imagery of the 
sacraments and prayer, the practice in belief reveals 'infinite' 
capacities of human beings for utilizing and transforming their envir­
onment. The eucharist, for example, provides the link between human 
creativity and dependence upon nature; "Nature gives the material, 
mind gives the form." But beyond this 'materialist' interpretation,
Feuerbach also recognizes in the eucharist the 'practice' which Marx 
fails to acknowledge. There is in human nature a profound capacity 
for turning evil into good, suffering into love, the ego into commun­
ity.
It is the infinite capacity of the imagination to create without 
recourse to matter (symbolized by prayer) which inspires human pract­
ice. Construction in the imagination is indispensable and prior 
to the act of making. Imagination, in fact, is the essence of making, 
according to Feuerbach.
This distinction between the divine and human activity is 'nothing'. God makes, - he makes something external to himself, as man does. Making is a genuine human idea.Nature gives birth to, brings forth; man makes. Making is an act which I can omit, a designed, premeditated, exter­nal act; an act in which my inmost being is not concern­ed, in which while active, I am not at the same time passive, carried away by an internal impulse. On the contrary, an activity which is identical with my being is not indifferent, is necessary to me, as, for example, intellectual production, which is an inward necessity to ^me, and for that reason lays a deep hold on me, affectsme pathologically. Intellectual works are not made, - 4making is only the external activity applied to them; ithey arise in us. To make is an indifferent, therefore a |free, i.e. optional activity. iIIn the above extract, we can see that for Feuerbach, the activ- 3Jity of making is secondary to the activity of feeling and thinking.
What happens in the imagination is more attuned to human being, as
Isuch, than the effort in making the image real, which may be 
frustrated.
However, Feuerbach does not totally enfold his concept of
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, op. cit. p. 220
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practice within the imagination, for despite its priority, there
is an indispensable human quality in the joy of creation. Compare:
The idea of activity, of making, of creation, is in itselfa divine idea; it is therefore unhesitatingly applied toGod. In activity, man feels himself free, unlimited, happy; in passivity, limited, oppressed, unhappy. Activity is the positive sense of one's personality. That is positive which in man is accompanied with joy...We succeed only in what we like to do; joyful effort conquers all things. But that is joyful ! activity which is in accordance with our nature, 
which we do not feel as a limitation, and consequently not as a constraint. And the happiest^ the most blissful acti­vity is that which is productive.
I am not sure that the two extracts above may be reconciled, and
to this degree, Marx's critique of Feuerbach's idea of practice may
be justified. However, the repeated assertion by Marxists that
Feuerbach has no notion of 'praxis', or practice, is inadmissible,
unless they simply mean that Marx disagreed with it.
Interpreting the idea of 'praxis' in Marxist terms, Wartofsky
says :
...Feuerbach trembles on the brink of a notion of praxis.For "to make nature practically compliant in the service of human needs" by actual means derived from nature seems , to describe the actual work process itself, the transforma­tion of nature by purposive, need-satisfying labor. The terms Feuerbach uses for this capacity to meet needs remain, however, Bildung and Kultur, but never Arbeit. Thus the union of nature and human nature is formulated by him in terms of conceptions of both nature and the human that remain abstract, somewhat romantic, prescientific, and prepolitical.
Wartofsky, it seems, has ignored the reference quoted penultimately 
above: "And the happiest, the most blissful activity is that which
is productive." Nevertheless, it is unfair to force Feuerbach's 
concept of essential human creativity too quickly into the mould 
of actual productivity. Although the creativity arising from the 
'work' of the imagination, and belief resulting from it, have an 
implicit function in the transformation of nature, as well as in 
the formation of a genuinely human community, Feuerbach stresses
1. ibid. p. 217
2. Wartofsky, F e u e r b a c h , op. cit. pp. 393-394,397.
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that the latent activity in belief, expressed through religious cons­
ciousness or otherwise, is closer to the source of the human ability 
to change the world than the actual work involved in the transforma­
tion. Without imagination, there can hardly be any "purposive, need- 
satisfying labor". Without beliefs about the world, and interpreta­
tions of the characteristics of nature, there can hardly be any 
transformation of it.
It is only a short conceptual leap from the activity of making 
things to the activity of building communities. But the 'tools' 
required, and the frustrations encountered, may be somewhat incommen­
surable. For this reason, perhaps, Feuerbach hesitated to associate 
his idea of human activity too closely with actual matter, tools, 
and economic or productive forces. Perhaps he retained some of the 
theologian's fear that as soon as the kingdom of God is objectified, 
removed from the 'infinite' possibilities in the imagination, it 
may be lost. In any case, I do not think Feuerbach can be accused 
of having ignored the material and social conditions which limit 
but also make possible human production, nor to have remained wholly 
within a theoretical framework. The imagination is the catalyst 
for human making, human creativity, and human community. Its object­
ification or artificial delimitation would be antithetical to his 
whole philosophy.
7, Feuerbach's Implicit Critique of Theology
(1) Feuerbach as Theologian?
Properly speaking, Ludwig Feuerbach's writings cannot be taken 
as theological in character or intention. His project, as he repeat­
edly asserted, was to convert theology into "anthropology". What 
theology purportedly says about God is invalid because it is an attempt 
to make rational the images of religion. Similarly, philosophy 
conceived as the formulation of absolute concepts is no better than 
theology, because rational method alone cannot understand the feeling 
nature of humanity. "The philosophy of the future", he suggested,
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must be an attempt to understand the whole of human being, on this
earth, grounded upon an analysis of the 'head, heart, and stomach'
of actual persons existing in a community of others like them.^
Nevertheless, talk about the exaltation of man into God, about
love being "divine", "infinite", and "God himself", is tantamount
to throwing down the gauntlet in the theological arena; or perhaps
even more aptly, it is like nailing one's theses to the door of the
church. Thus it may not be surprising that Feuerbach has been called
2the "thorn in the flesh" of modern theologians. Karl Barth took 
Feuerbach's theological contribution seriously, describing him as
3"more theological than many theologians." Much of Barth's critique 
of Schleiermacher, Rttschl and Harnack, and of the central issues 
of nineteenth century liberal theology, is encapsulated in Barth's 
introduction to the re-edition of The Essence of Christianity, (1957),
4which gave rise to a major theological debate. Although Barth appre­
ciated Feuerbach's acute analysis of Luther, his contribution to the 
19th century struggle for liberation in Germany, and his revelation 
of the inherent anthropocentrism of Schleiermacherian liberal theology, 
Barth concluded that talk about "God in man" must be excised at the 
roots. Feuerbach's concept of anthropology could never take the place 
of a theology which is based: on God's supreme creativity and grace. 
Nevertheless, Barth suggested, God cannot be 'defined' in rational 
"hypostases" remote from the human condition and human responsibility. 
"The Church will recover from the sting of Feuerbach's question only 
when her ethics is fundamentally separated from the worship of old 
and new hypostases and ideologies. Only then will people again accept
1. Feuerbach, Grundsatze der Philosophie der Z u k u n f t , Bolin-Jodl II, (1843).
2. Karl Barth, Introduction to The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. 
(cf. Karl Barth, Theology and C h u r c h , Shorter writings 1920-1928, E.T. L.P. Smith, Intro, 
by T.F. Torrance, SCM Press, London 1962, Chapter VII.)3. ibid
4. cf. John Glasse, "Barth on Feuerbach", Harvard Theological R e v i e w , Vol. 57, pp. 69 ff.; 
Manfred Vogel, "The Barth-Feuerbach Confrontation" Harvard Theological R e v i e w , Vol. 59, 
pp. 27 ff.; Hans Frei, "Feuerbach and Theology", Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, Vol. 35, pp 250 ff.
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the^^urch's word that her God is not merely an illusion."^
The theology which Feuerbach considered and criticized had yet
to be conditioned by many of the anthropological interests which he
himself helped to arouse. (His own era witnessed, for example, the
increasing popularity of Schleiermacher, the beginnings of modern
biblical criticism in Bruno Bauer and D.F. Strauss, the publications
of Kierkegaard, and the first works of Ritschl.) Talk about God was
divine; as such it presupposed the doctrines of God's immutability,
omnipotence, omniscience, and impassibility. The Summa Theologica
of St. Thomas Aquinas had set an example for thinking about God which
was followed not only in Catholic, but also in Protestant theology.
God must be above and beyond human feeling because human passions
are capricious; God must not suffer because he must not be subject
to evil; God must be omnipotent and omniscient, transcending time
and space. As Manfred Vogel said in assessing the effect of Feuerbach
upon Barth, "Feuerbach is the great anti-theologian only if we equate
2theology generally with the neo-platonic idealist formulation."
Feuerbach himself said, "What today is atheism tomorrow will
3be religion." Due to an increasing tendency to understand God's 
relatedness to his creatures and to the human condition, theology 
has often been 'corrected' in light of Feuerbach's criticisms and 
his influence. Today, despite Barth's hope for the excision of "talk 
about God in man", anthropological theology is not necessarily const­
rued as atheism. But on the other hand, after Barth's critique of 
Feuerbach, it is not so easy to be vaguely 'liberal' without taking 
account of the inadequacies of human nature.
Yet, anyone who has insight into the dialectical pattern of 
Feuerbach's writings might find it difficult to accept at face value If
the judgment of Manfred Vogel: "Either start with man and end up with
1. Karl Barth, Introduction to Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit.
2. Manfnèd Vogel, "The Barth-Feuerbach Confrontation*' HTR 59, (op. cit. p. 27)
3. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. p. 32
71
Feuerbach, or turn to Barth and stay with God. . .Either Barth or 
Feuerbach."^ Even if Feuerbach himself must be taken as a theologian 
'on the fringe' if a theologian at all, his theological contribution 
has been considerable. Perhaps a theology which views love as a con­
cept implying both divine and human qualities will not find it neces­
sary to draw the distinct line that Vogel has drawn. In honour of 
both Feuerbach's and Barth's interest in "the heart and stomach" of 
humanity, Father Robert Farrar Capon's practical advice might be
applied: "No wise man will look for any more divisions in life than
2there already are." The difference between Barth and Feuerbach, 
or between 'neo-orthodoxy' and 'liberalism', does not necessarily
3entail an 'either/or'.
(2) Summary of Feuerbach's Idea of Love as Agenda for_Theology
An attempt to characterize Feuerbach's idea of love is very
like trying to reduce Hegel's idea of spirit, or Barth's idea of grace,
to a concise statement. The inherent pervasiveness of the concept 
prohibits particular description. So many ideas overlap, even appar­
ently conflicting with each other, that only a very general summary 
is conceivable. First, let us consider the broadest summary of Feuer­
bach himself:
'iNow, by what means does man deliver himself from this state of disunion between himself and the perfect being, 
from the painful consciousness of sin, from the distres­sing sense of his own nothingness? How does he blunt the fatal sting of sin? Only by this; that he is conscious of love as the highest, the absolute power and truth, that he 
regards the Divine Being not only as a law, as a moral be­ing, as a being of the understanding; but also as a ten­der, loving, even subjective human being (that is, as hav­ing sympathy with individual man).
1. Vogel, "The Barth-Feuerbach Confrontation", HTR Vol. 59, op. cit. p. 30
2. Robert Farrar Capon, The Supper of the L a m b , Doubleday, New York!, 1969, p. 143.
Appropriately enough. Capon's book is a theological cookbook.
3. Barth himself moved away from the strict distinction (without, however, equating humanity
and God) cf. The Humanity of God, John Knox Press, Atlanta, 1960.
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The understanding judges only according to the strin­
gency of law; the heart accommodates itself, is consid­erate, lenient, relenting, kat' anthropon. No man is suf­ficient for the law which moral perfection sets before 
us; but for that reason, neither is the law sufficient for man, for the heart. The law condemns; the heart has compassion even on the sinner. The law affirms me only as an abstract being, - love, as a real being. Love gives me 
the consciousness that I am a man; the law only the con­sciousness that I am a sinner, that I am worthless. The law holds man in bondage ; love makes him free.Love is the middle term, the substantial bond, the principle of reconciliation between the perfect and the imperfect, the sinless and sinful being, the universal and the individual, the divine and the human. Love is God himself, and apart from it there is no God. Love makes man God and God man. Love strengthens the weak and weakens the strong, abases the high and raises the lowly, idealises matter and materialises spirit. Love is the true unity of God and man, of spirit and nature. In love common nature is spirit, and the pre-eminent spirit is nature. Love is to deny spirit from the point of view of spirit, to deny matter from the point of view of matter. Love is material­ism; immaterial love is a chirnaera. In the longing of love after the distant object, the abstract idealist involunt­arily confirms the truth of sensuousness. But love is also the idealism of nature - love is also spirit, esprit. Lovealone makes the nightingale a songstress; love alone givesthe plant its corolla. And what wonders does not love work in our social life! What faith creed, opinion sep­arates, love unites. Love even, humorously enough, ident­
ifies the high noblesse with the people. What the old mystics said about God, that he is the highest and yet the commonest of beings, applies in truth to love, and that not a visionary, imaginary love - no! A real love which has flesh and bloody which vibrates as an almighty force through all living.
There is no doubt that Feuerbach conceives this many-sided idea 
of love as the "secret" (Geheimnis) of the Incarnation, and the auth­
entic agenda of theology. "While I do reduce theology to anthropology
I exalt anthropology to theology, very much as Christianity, while
2lowering God into man, made man into God." But such a notion of
love, Feuerbach maintains, cannot be entailed in an idea of God
conceived as (a) a being or principle of moral perfection; (b) an
absolute creator or prime mover unrelated to creation; (c) an impass-
3ible yet illogically 'compassionate' deity; (d) a sexless and
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. pp 47-48
2. ibid, p. XV (quoted by Barth)
3. ibid, p. 53: Feuerbach quotes St. Bernard's pun to show that love cannot be divorced
from suffering: "Impassibilis est Deus, sed non i n c o m p a s s i b i l i s , oui proprium est
misereri semper et parcere." - and adds: "Als ware nicht Mitleiden Leiden, freilich 
Leiden der Liebe, Leiden des Herzens." The pun is lost in Evans' English: "As if com­
passion were not su ffering..." A better translation might be: "As if sympathy were not 
p a t h o s . .."
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therefore impotent deity unconnected with species procreation; or
(e) the projection of individual egotism in personal or group piety. 
Least of all can God be construed as (f) a "demonic being" who man­
ipulates his creatures at the expense of human freedom, who demands 
faith for himself at the expense of love for human beings.
As Barth notes, Feuerbach was an excellenct Lutheran scholar; 
much of Feuerbach's emphasis upon the vitality of belief, and upon
2the deep relationship between love and suffering, comes from Luther. 
But where Luther went wrong, Feuerbach suspected, was in the subjug­
ation of love to faith. Luther could not have his cake and eat
it; either the intense feeling represented in the Incarnation is 
proclaimed as the essence of a belief in love, or else one must 
cling to the obsolete forms of God as a despotic lawgiver. Barth 
says Feuerbach was correct in judging that Luther's emphasis upon 
faith edged out his emphasis upon love. "One may no longer repeat 
these things from Luther without some caution," said Barth. Feuerbach's 
ultimate reply to Luther was "the contradiction between faith and 
love" as demonstrated in the tragic history of doctrinal faith.
(As we have seen, Hegel preceded Feuerbach in this observation,)
The Incarnation shows that "in God love is absorbed in itself 
as its own ultimate truth."
Love remains, but the Incarnation upon the earth passes away. But the essence is eternal and universal. We can no longer believe in the manifestation for its own sake, 
but only for the sake of the thing manifested; for to^us there remains no immediate presence but that of love.
Thus the rational speculation about the person of Christ is superfl­
uous; and, as Hegel had shown, the image only perpetuates the object­
ification of love, making religion possible, but contradictory to
love itself. Therefore, said Feuerbach, "love conquers God". Love
1. cf. Luther, Treatise on Christian Li berty in Three T r e a t i s e s , Muhlenberg Press, Phil­adelphia, 1943. cf .i;Ffiuerbach, The.Essence of Faith According to Luther trans. M. , C h e r n o ,H a r p e r ,/
2. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. p. 5 7 ; . . .«(New Y o r k , 1967) 
Compare Hegel, "The Spirit of Ch rist ian ity, " trans. Knox, op. cit. pp. 248-251
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is a higher power and truth than deity. "As God has renounced himself 
out of love, so we, out of love should renounce God; for if we do 
not sacrifice God to love, we sacrifice love to God, and in spite 
of the predicates of love, we have the God - the evil being - of 
religious fanaticism."^ In other words, Feuerbach takes Hegel's 
implication as gospel. Since concepts of God are inadequate for
a description of love (at least in Feuerbach's view), since an object­
ification of love in the image of Christ serves to perpetuate an 
objective faith which is contradicted by subjective love and the 
species nature of human beings, and since, in any cease, God is an 
image above and beyond the analysis of reason, love must be exalted 
into a substance and theology must be renounced as the rationalization 
of an illusion. "So long as love is not exalted into a substance,
into an essence, there lurks in the background the phantom of relig- 
2ious fanaticism."
But once humanity throws off its theological disguise to find 
itself underneath, just what sort of love is revealed? Many of 
Feuerbach's 'anthropological' characterizations have already been 
mentioned above, but to conclude our summary we can now try to list 
the forms of love which characterize the essence of humanity for 
Feuerbach.
(a) Love is a life-force, an eros, which operates through
3all living. "The life of life is love." (Feuerbach uses the idea 
of eros, but not the word.)
(b) Love is a principle of reconciliation and unity, between 
nature and spirit, between the one and the many, between I and thou. 
As such it is the creative force in the formation of species. It
1. ibid. p. 53; cf. Hegel, "The Spirit of Ch rist ianity" (trans. Knox) op. cit. p . 281 
"Equally alien is every spirit of cooperation for something other than the dissemination 
of faith, every spirit which reveals and enjoys itself in other modes and restricted 
forms of life. In such a spirit the community would not recognize itself; to have done 
so would have been to renounce its own spirit and be untrue to its God." (Thus Hegel 
typically characterizes the opposition between faith and love.)
2. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. p. 52
3. cf. Feuerbach's diary, above
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is dependent upon matter, perceived through the senses, projected 
in the imagination as feeling, by which subject is reconciled with 
object, spirit reconciled with nature.
(c) Love is 'divine', the revelation of a higher nature for
man, containing the quality of the infinite. Just what "infinite"
means for Feuerbach is not clear; in any case, reason cannot be 
applied to it. Nevertheless, the objectification of love in religion, 
especially the Incarnation of Jesus as God reveals love as the most 
'divine' experience of the human. "Thou believest in love as a
divine attribute because thou thyself lovest."^
(d) Love is key to self-consciousness and self-knowledge.
It plays a vital role in Feuerbach's notion of epistemology: "only
the love of others tells you what you are." The love between human 
beings in a human community is not merely a feeling, but it is also 
the basis of knowledge about the individual among his species. 
Thus the knowledge may be used to build greater communities through 
education, culture and work. Thus love is also the foundation for 
Feuerbach's idea of practice, based upon the imagination.
(e) Love is an ethical principle. The imperative of love 
is infinitely greater than the power of despotism. Law is not adequ­
ate to tell human beings what to do. Only with a consciousness 
of love is ethical behaviour possible. The "imperative" stems from 
the identification of the 'I' in the 'thou'. The human being recogn­
izes in his neighbour a 'heart' like his own; and in identification 
with the neighbour's 'feeling' behaves toward him humanly, as a 
co-member of a 'species'.
(f) Love is the means of self-reconciliation from sin. Feuerbach 
quotes Luther: "God is not really angry, even when we think he is
1. It would be hazardous to attempt to say what Feuerbach implies in his use of the word 
'divine'. A predicate of God, such as 'benevolence' or 'justice', he says, is divine 
itself, but implies no attempt to project an object containing all the perfections of 
the predicate, so far as he is concerned, cf. The Essence of Christianity, op. cit. p . 21.
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angry and punishes." Humanity demands a merciful God, even while 
hypostatising a God of judgment,. Hence the Incarnation of Christ, 
the religious tradition surrounding Mary, Jesus' mother, and even 
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit signify that humanity demands tender­
ness from its God, full of love which redeems the guilty. "Mercy 
is the justice of sensuous life."
(g) Love is a genetic principle. Mysticism is sublimated 
sexuality; chastity in religion misguided fidelity to an objective 
image. "If God is not polluted by nature, neither is he polluted 
by being associated with the idea of sex...The 'thou' between man 
and woman has quite another sound than the monotonous 'thou' between 
friends."^ (Love as a genetic principle is of course related to 
Feuerbach's idea of love as a life force.)
(h) Love is creative energy. "The imperative of love works
with electromagnetic power; that of despotism with the mechanical
2power of a wooden telegraph." "The divine love is the joy of life, 
establishing itself, affirming itself...Bliss lies in the act of
3imparting, and only joy, only love, imparts."
(i) The source of love is the common human experience of suffer­
ing. "Kein Leid, kein Mitleid." Without the sharing of human 
suffering in feeling, in the imagination, as the 'I' encounters 
the 'thou', there can be no compassion. The representation of corpor­
ate suffering is contained in the image of Christ. "To suffer evil 
is better than to do good." Good works stimulated from an ethical 3; iimperative cannot replace spontaneous love which stems from identifie- j
"Îation of the self in the neighbour's condition. For Feuerbach, j
as for Hegel, love is not 'commendable'. j
(j) Love for self is requisite for love for others. (of. 3
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (trans. Marian Evans) op. cit. p. 92
2. ibid, p. 125
3. ibid. p. Ill
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The diary, above) "That which exists has necessarily a pleasure, 
a joy in itself, loves itself, and loves itself justly; to blame 
it because it loves itself is to reproach it because it exists."^
(In this important regard, Feuerbach deviates from both Luther and 
early Hegel.) This view of self-love, in its proper context, appears 
to be a prerequisite for the conception of love as a creative, sust­
aining, principle of living. However, while affirming a healthy
self-love, Feuerbach was consistent in condemning the individualistic
2egoism of, for example, Max Stirner. For Feuerbach a self is only 
constituted as a self through reflection by other humans. In criticism 
of Stirner's egoism, Feuerbach wrote:
To have no religion is to think only of oneself. To have religion is to think of others. And this is the only religion that will persist, at least as long as there is not only one "singular" individual in the world; for as soon as there are two people, where there 
are man and wife, we already have religion. Difference is the origin of religion-the Thou is the God of the I, for there ig no me without you. I depend on you: No Thou- no I.
Self-love is no less a problem for anthropology than it is for theol­
ogy. In his emphasis upon species, Feuerbach goes to the length 
of denying the concept of individual personality and individual 
sin, while attempting to maintain a notion of self-love.^ His appar­
ent confusion, or, at least, lack of clarity, on the relation between 
self-love and species-consciousness remains. ,
In attempting to change religion into a developing species- 
consciousness, and theology into anthropology, Feuerbach nevertheless 
retains some idea of both religion and theology. As hiis; ceitrnqqe /of 
Stirner demonstrates, the inherent creativity, epistemology, and 
community ideals represented in the encounter between I and thou
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (trans. Marian Evans, op. cit. p. 63
2. cf. Max Stirner, The Ego and His O w n , (Trans. Stephen T. Byington) in Marshall S. Shatz, 
editor: The Essential Works of A n a r c h i s m , 1971 (Bantam P.B.)
3. Feuerbach, Ueber das Wesen des C h r i s t e n t u m s , (trans. Wartofsky) in Feuerbach op. c i t.p . 431
4. Feuerbach attempts to resolve individual sin in community complementarity. What is im­
perfect in the individual is perfected in the species. Marx was not impressed, cf. Thesis VI,"Theses on F e u e r b a , c h o p .  cit.
I
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are religious concepts. Similarly, the implicit morality entailed 3
in the image of love as represented in the anthropology of the Incarn- ^
ation, despite Feuerbach's reductionist simplifications, continues
to be a theological understanding of ethics. Feuerbach's 'materialism' %
is one which insists on a comprehension of the Christian sacraments. "1
His interpretation of humanity revealed in the Incarnation is stated
as an attempt "to posit the infinite in the finite". His idea of
love is certainly not limited to the natural phenomena of species i
origins, but is alleged to be "divine". Whether or not Feuerbach Î
can be characterized as an "absolut Unglaubiger" his agenda is
theological in character, with religious implications.
(3) Feuerbach's "Anthropology" as a Preliminary Critique of Modern 
Theology.
Karl Barth spoke of Feuerbach and his generation as a Menne-Tekel -i
for the Church, "in the face of which she should not become pharisai-
2cally indignant but should do penance." After appreciating Feuerbach's
contribution toward a critique of modern theology, Barth concluded
that finally, one must be able to "laugh in his face". God's love '
is different from human love; God and man are not the same; Feuerbach's
reductions are crude and his aphorisms are "logic chopping"; Feuerbach
was "a true child of his century, a "Nichtkenner" of death and a
3"Verkenner" of evil." While Barth's assessment of Feuerbach is 
perceptive and acute, a slightly different interpretation may be 
possible for a theological understanding of Feuerbach. I
(a) The difference between theology conceived as "anthropology" 
and that conceived as "The Word of God" or "The Manifestation of 
Spirit" (Barth and Hegel, respectively) is more likely a difference
1. Feuerbach, Vorlesungen 'uber das Wesen der R e l i g i o n , Band 8, Otto Wigand, p. VIII.
1851 (Feuerbach's W e r k e ) Leipzig; Feuerbach uses the term ironically in reverence to 
himself. Generally, Feuerbach is taken as an atheist by theologians and as a theologian 
or philosopher by Marxists.
2. Barth, Introduction to The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. p. XXVII.
3. ibid, p. XXVIII; That is, Barth thinks Feuerbach did not 'know' death and Misunderstood' e v i l .
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of starting points than necessary conclusions. Feuerbach's stated
intention was to begin with "being itself, not the idea of being",
"to posit the infinite in the finite." In his early writings Hegel
had said that "love intuits the infinite", but the infinite cannot
be carried in the vessel of objective faith.^ There is a logical
consistency in Feuerbach's refusal to apply reason to that which
is primarily intuitive. In other words, a phenomenological approach
to the 'feeling' of love in human experience is possible, and may
imply 'infinite' characteristics of love itself, but rational analysis
is necessarily limited to the characteristics which are observable
2in time and space, not in 'infinity'. Thus, for Feuerbach, an analysis 
of the Incarnation as the bearer of corporate human intuition is 
as close as it is possible to get to rational discussion about 'the 
divine predicate'. However, Feuerbach was far too well-grounded
in theology not to be aware of the transcendent ideas inherent in 
words like 'spirit', 'divinity', 'the infinite', 'immortality', 
and of course, 'love'. Although he attempted to reduce these qualities 
to human phenomenological attributes, he did not do so consistently 
or successfully enough to allay suspicion that he was a Hegelian 
theologian merely continuing Hegel in dialectical opposition to
3him. Karl Marx, for example, sensed that Feuerbach might be a
theologian in an atheist's disguise, especially since Feuerbach
talked "too much about nature and not enough about politics".^ As 
we have noted, Karl Barth was convinced that Feuerbach was the theolo­
gian who "let the cat out of the bag", urbi et orbi, about the anthro-
5pological implications of theology after Schleiermacher.
1. Hegel; Early Theological Writings (trans. Knox) op. cit. p. 2532. In critique of Hegel, Feuerbach said, "Ohne Leib, kein Geist". Reason applied to spirit 
or mind alone is speculative fantasy.
3. "One doesn't continue Hegel except in opposing him". Henri Arvon, Ludwig Feuerbach ou la 
Transformation du S a c r e , Paris, P.U.F. 1947, p. 24,Quoted by Wartofsky in F e u e r b a c h ,
op. cit. p. 142
4. Marx in a letter to Arnold Ruge, Quoted by Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political 
Thought of Karl M a r x , p. 10. cf. Theses VIII, XI "Theses on Feuerbach", original in 
Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassisschen deutschen P h i l o s o p h i e , 
Stuttgart, 1895.
5. Karl Barth in Introduction to The Essence of Christianity, op. cit. p. XXI
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images, human sacraments, human loves, and perhaps even human actions,^ 
then that nature cannot be implied or made relevant apart from refer­
ence to human feelings and human experience. Such anthropocentrism 
or "anthropology" does not, per se, entail the negation of God.
(b) If love is the hidden but authentic content in the Incarna­
tion of God into a man and representative of all humanity, what 
the image of the Incarnation says about humanity is nevertheless 
a dialectical way of speaking about God, Feuerbach's inversion 
of subject and predicate may be the negation of objective quantity, 
but it is the affirmation of substantive quality. The inversion
1. Wartofsky thinks Feuerbach's notion of 'praxis' rests entirely within the imagination, 
a function of belief. I think the best clue, which I don't have space to follow, is 
Feuerbach's aphorism: "Work is worship."
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For better or worse, legitimately or illegitimately, Feuerbach 
has demonstrated that talk about humanity is one way to answer ques- |
tions about God. The 'answer' may say less than we would like about 
the nature of God, but at least it acknowledges the limitations 
of human reason. Although 'intimations of immortality' may be gleaned 
from the images of religion, the image, qua image, is still an object­
ification of something subjective, something living. The quantific­
ation of the quality in the image, in terms of fixed attributes, 
must be recognized as inadequate. Although reason may help to clarify 
human feeling, feeling cannot be contained in rational categories.
The images of religion, like the loves of humam beings, are always 
greater than the sum of their parts. However, rational descriptions 
of this "greater" which are alienated from human experience and 
absolutized outside space and time do no service either to God or 
to humanity. Although many of us would consider Feuerbach's reduc­
tions inappropriate (the essence of religion is "nothing but" the 
essence of mankind), we should admit the inappropriateness of the 
other extremes. (God is a verifiable object or an explicable subject).
If the nature of God is present somehow in human religion, human %
8 1
of the Johannine statement "God is love", to become "love is God", 
is no threat to deity if the quality of love can be conceived as 
genuinely divine. The Incarnation, as an object of faith, an image 
created in the imagination, is not subject to rational quantification, 
but may be spoken of in terms of flexible attributes. The energy
and relatedness of the image of God - become - man derives from 
a capacity for relation to all generations. If the image is quantifi­
ed, once for all, in the ideology of, e.g. fourth-century North
Africa or thirteenth-century Europe, the quality of the image suffers. 
But if the quality can be made substantive, with a built-in relation­
ship to a developing human self-conseioasness the image retains 
its vitality through history. The classical ideas of omnipotence 
and omniscience, for example, are quantitative attributes resting 
upon the concepts of infinite, hence inhuman, power and knowledge. 
But the ideas of love and suffering, represented in the Incarnation, 
are qualitative attributes which retain their relatedness to forms 
of human love and suffering succeeding in different generations.
'Untouchable' quantifications of God elevate God above the criteria 
of historical criticism, but they sacrifice the intimate connection 
between the divine and the human which is present in the gospels.
Thus, the doctrine of the impassibility of God is called into 
question by the Incarnation itself. The very relatedness of God 
to humanity is dependent upon Ghrist's integration of human suffering. 
Similarly, the idea of love as a Christian ethical principle is 
dependent upon the intimacy of divine and human loves. In respect
to both suffering and love, the Incarnation proclaims the good news 
that there is no qualitative difference. God's suffering human
suffering; God's love is not essentially different from human love.
(c) The impact of (a) and (b) above on Christian theology, 
particularly in reference to Christology, suggests a view of the 
Incarnation which reveals both the nature of God and the potential,
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1or highest, nature of humanity. In order for the predicate of 
love to make sense as a genuine substantive quality of God, we must 
be able to conceive of a God whose programme of revelation is as 
concerned with the disclosure of human possibilities as with the 
unveiling of his own true nature. Or perhaps more characteristically, 
we must be able to conceive of a God who discloses his own nature 
as an integral, implicit, and intimate function of the human being's 
capacity to understand and actualize himself in a greater community, 
Jesus' reference to "those who have ears to hear" may be a reminder 
that the love of God is most often revealed to lovers of people.
Perhaps just as "one cannot continue Hegel except in opposing 
him", neither can one continue Feuerbach's substantive predicates 
of humanity except by applying them, dialectically, to God. "The 
divinity of the attribute" is Feuerbach's way of speaking about 
the divine quality of humanity. But once we realize that the Incarna­
tion really does overcome the opposition between the divine and 
the human, really does posit the infinite in the finite, really 
does demonstrate a God who is "a being of the heart", of suffering, 
of love, then such a being need not remain in the limited guise 
of human imagination. If we do understand divine love because we 
ourselves love, and comprehend the meaning of the Cross because 
we ourselves suffer, we can 'intuit' the identification of God with 
humanity. Of course, the identification is of quality, not of quanti­
ty, but "love intuits the infinite." And, just perhaps, there need 
be no contradiction between faith and love.
1. John McIntyre, On the Love of G o d , op. cit. p. 182: "In the person of Jesus Christ 
there takes place the revelation, not only of God, but also of man." Karl Barth, also, has made this point repeatedly.
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1. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, op. cit. p. 21
8. Summary and Implications
Despite Feuerbach's historical association with 'atheism'
(not the least of which is the 'Death of God' movement of the nineteen- I
sixties), he has left a legacy to theology which calls it to justify
itself before the world.
Thus what theology and philosophy have held to be God, the Absolute, the Infinite, is not God; but that which they have held not to be God is God: namely, the attr­ibute, the quality, whatever has reality. Hence he alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of the divine being, - for example, love, wisdom, justice, - are noth­ing; not he to whom merely the subject of these predi­cates is nothing...
The idea of God is dependent on the idea of justice, of benevolence; a God who is not benevolent, not just, not wise, is no God; but the converse does not hold. The fact is not that a quality is divine because God has it, but that God has it because it is in itself divine: 
because without it God would be a defective being. Just­ice, wisdom, in general every quality which constitutes the divinity of God, is determined and known by itself independently, but the idea of God is determined by the qualities which have thus been previously judged to be worthy of the divine nature; only in the case in which I identify God and justice, in which I think of God immediately as the reality of thg idea of justice, is the idea of God self-determined.
The quality of justice, which, with the quality of love, is stressed
in the above extract, is no mere example. Belief in God is not
what Feuerbach wishes to combat; atheism is not what he wishes to
affirm. Deeper is the issue of the inherent quality in human love
and human justice. More pressing is the feeling in common human
experience which declares that love and justice are worth pursuing
on earth, not to be subordinated to speculative doctrines of God,
professions of faith, and systems of theology. The concept of divin- J
ity, he has suggested, is not approachable by the rational intellect,
but only in terms of human experience and human value. Justice
and love are two of these values, which, if not pursued on earth,
hardly have relevance to heaven.
  ' I
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One must be cautious in assessing what the concept of divinity- 
meant for Feuerbach. There are numerous possibilities, deriving 
from his conflicting emphases and aphorisms. At the end of the
day, I would suggest, he saw divine quality human feeling and
love, which prevented him from making that quality lesser by objectif­
ying it, as so many others had done before him. Keeping the 'image', ii
perhaps he salvaged it from objective obsolescence. He did say 
that one's presumption in identifying the objective characteristics 
of God in fact elevates one above the object described. What he 
never said was that any individual human being, nor the human species 
in its present form, could be responsible for all the love, wisdom, 
and beauty in the universe. He began with Dasein, being here and 
now, not with the idea or speculation of being in its ontological 
mode. Hegel had already tried that, and his system, for Feuerbach, 
was less than satisfactory. But to begin with being here and now
is not a negation of absolute being; it is only to admit that one
does not have the appropriate data for meaningful inquiry. Perhaps,
after all, to suggest that there is something 'infinite' and 'divine' 
about human experience is as much ontology as human beings have 
a right to deduce. Revelation, of course, would be a completely 
different subject, and it was not Feuerbach's.
A simpler, if not quite satisfactory, interpretation of 
Feuerbach's concept of divinity, also supportable from his writings, 
is that whether God exists or not is neither discernible nor important 
for human existence and human community. At any rate there is enough 
of the 'divine' in human feeling, human love, and human justice 
to be getting on with, and wasting time worshipping is time lost 
for the real job of the human species: fashioning a more equitable
and just community. This second interpretation may complement the
first. No interpretation of Feuerbach should be too simple.
Of many Feuerbachian and Hegelian ideas we must carry forward,
I will try to list the most important as they relate to the concept
  _         .________________________
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of love. Both the "spirit" (Geist) and "essence" (Wesen) of Christ­
ianity are constituted by human love. The "feeling" (Sinnlichkeit) 
of human experience is indispensable to the more mature and 'infinite' 
love which occurs when one 'I' encounters and identifies itself 
in another, a 'thou'. In this encounter and in the sharing of feeling 
there is a developing self-consciousness, which goes on to meet 
other 'I's and form community with them. There is depth in the 
encounter which human reason cannot deduce, but the feeling, the 
love, has been projected in the images of religion. The Christian 
image of a human, suffering God is the manifestation of a certain 
'divinity' in the feeling and the love when one person genuinely 
encounters and identifies with another. This love cannot be commanded; 
it is spontaneous, even though it commanded. It may not be cons­
cious, for it begins wherever two persons meet. But when it does
become a part of consciousness, it has the capacity to create greater 
community on many levels and in many forms.
Objectifications in religious consciousness, however, militate 
against this 'infinite' love, this 'divine' attribute of human nature, 
preventing genuine community. For this reason, there may arise 
a contradiction between faith and love insofar as loyalty to an 
imagined objective God takes precedence over genuine love and justice- 
creating activity on the human level. For example, belief in an 
impassible deity or an omnipotent being becomes a counterfeit expres­
sion of the truth in religion, making humans prefer an illusion, 
which is incapable of suffering, incapable of temporal limitation, 
to the genuine attributes of human being and human ideals.
The implication from the early Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach 
is that, when conceiving love in authentic terms for Christian theology, 
we must be careful not to divorce it from humanity. Love entails 
a depth which may even be material in quality. It contains a breadth 
which lends infinity to human feeling and it implies a height of 
divinity in all genuine benevolent passion. Thus, a God of love
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cannot be remote from the human condition, from the predicates by 
which humans describe their feelings of love. If God loves, he 
also suffers; if he is infinite, he must also be related intimately 
to temporal existence.
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Appendix to part I: FEUERBACH AND KIERKEGAARD
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As a fitting companion for Feuerbach, one could hardly suggest 
a more important writer on the subject of love than Soren Kierkegaard. 
Often stereotyped and misunderstood, both have exerted a diverse 
and extensive influence upon twentieth century thought. Contemporar­
ies in an era of European upheaval and ferment, they both were constr­
ained to analyze and comment upon the Christendom of their day. 
Supporting each rests a thorough study of Plato, Luther, Descartes, 
Leibniz, Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel. Both were particularly 
dissatisfied with the rational approach to religion (a la Kant), 
and by design or by coincidence, paralleled the early Hegel's attempt
to extricate Christianity's implicit ethic from Kant's categorical 
1imperative. Neither Feuerbach nor Kierkegaard was willing to accept 
Hegel's dialectical system, although each was a master of dialectic. 
Human feeling (Feuerbach) and human passions (Kierkegaard) could 
not be contained or adequately described in a speculative assessment 
of the activity of absolute Geist. Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard 
maintained a critical distance from the institutions of their day, 
and both died in penury.
The previous chapter noted Ludwig Feuerbach's assertion that 
there is a contradiction between faith and love. Soren Kierkegaard 
has tried to show not only that there is no contradiction, but also 
that love can only be authentic in intimacy with faith. This chapter 
will briefly outline Kierkegaard's concept of love in the context 
of faith.
1. Four books outlining much of the transition from Kant to Kierkegaard might instruc­
tively be studied in chronological order; Immanuel Kant, Metaphysic of Ethics (1796) 
E.T. J.W. Semple, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1869; G.W.F. Hegel, Early Theological Writings 
(1796-1800) E.T. T.H. Knox, University of Chicago Press, 1948; Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , (1841) E.T. Marian Evans, Harper, New Yord, 1957; Soren 
Kierkegaard, E i t h e r / O r , (1843) E.T. Vol. I. David Swenson; Vol. II, Walter Lowrie, 
Princeton University Press, 1944.
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I. Kierkegaard's Synthesis of Faith and Love
1. Background
Kierkegaard was born in 1813 and spent most of his life in 
his native Denmark. It is well known that much of his career is 
related in some way with his romance and engagement with a woman 
called Regine Olsen. For reasons known only to himself, but probably 
concerned with a conflict between Kierkegaard's conceptions of divine 
and human loves, he broke his engagement. Immediately thereafter 
he journeyed to Berlin, arriving coincidentally in 1841 (the year 
of the publication of Feuerbach's Das Wesen des Christentums). 
We can only surmise the impact of the Berlin academic climate, coupled 
with the intensity of the feeling arising from the loss of Regine, 
from the topics considered in Kierkegaard's first works. In 1843 
appeared three books demonstrating Kierkegaard's tremendous energy 
and creativity. They also demonstrated a certain capacity for the 
sublimation of his erotic love as theology. Either/Or, Repetition, 
and Fear and Trembling all contain a hidden agenda revealing 
Kierkegaard's attempt to come to terms with his renunciation of 
romance. They are also a significant attempt to come to terms with 
Kantian ethics, Hegel's system, and the apparent contradiction between 
faith and love, particularly in relation to marriage.^
For a time Kierkegaard hoped for some rapprochement with Regine. 
When she herself became engaged, and eventually married, to a man 
named Schlegel, Kierkegaard's writings took a different tone. Although 
he set himself to a more mature development of many of his early 
themes, his memory of his earthly beloved continued to haunt his 
writings, and he searched for a way in which the giddiness of romantic 
love might be transformed, with or without the beloved, into a love
1. cf. E i t h e r / O r , Vol. II, "The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage." op. cit. cf. also. Fear and T r e m b l i n g , trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press 1941,1954, which, in 
addition to the ambivalent story of Abraham and Isaac, also contains references to 
Agamemnon and Iphigenia, Agnes and the Merman, and Tobias and Sarah.
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that is "eternal”.
In addition to the works just cited, Kierkegaard's idea of 
love is primarily revealed in two other writings. The first is
Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy, which was written 
during 1844, and Works of Love which was published in 1847. The 
first, like his ealier books, is pseudonymous, and the second is 
autographed. It is a hazardous task to unravel the 'real' Kierkegaard 
from his pseudonyms, but insofar as there is a consistency between
those he signed and those he signed in the names of others, we have
at least the basis of analysis. Nevertheless, it must be remembered 
that Kierkegaard was far from systematic, that his ideas underwent
subtle (and not-so-subtle) changes during the course of his career, 
and that, like Feuerbach, he is often intentionally deceptive.
One other historical event in Kierkegaard's life may or may 
not be important for an assessment of his ideas of faith and love. 
On Easter in 1848 he had a religious experience which appeared to 
change the tone of his serious writings from that which "calls atten­
tion" to that which is intentionally persuasive.^ Notwithstanding 
such an experience, it is Kierkegaard's works before 1848 that provide 
the ground for assessment of his concept of love. Of course, for
such as the genius of Kierkegaard, "the moving finger writes, and
2having writ, moves on..." For better or for worse, what Kierkegaard 
said at the age of thirty cannot be totally reconciled with what 
he said at the age of thirty-seven. Nevertheless, what he said 
in the intensity of his earthly melancholy, his human struggles 
with human love, and his search for an eternal passion, is what, 
most of all, has commended him to history.
1. The later Kierkegaard is perhaps revealed in the final part of Sickness Unto D e a t h ,
. part of which was written before his Easter experience, and part after. Kierkegaard, 
Sickness Unto Death (first published 1849), trans. Walter Lowrie, published together with 
Fear and T r e m b l i n g , Princeton University Press, 1941,1954. p. 133.
2. cf. Kierkegaard's "Epilogue" to Fear and T r e m b l i n g . "He who reached faith...does not 
remain standing at faith, yea, he would be offended if anyone were to say this of him, 
just as the lover would be indignant if one said that he remained standing at love,
for he would reply, "I do not remain standing, by any means, my whole life is in this," 
p. 131.
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2. God the Absolute
Soren Kierkegaard's concept of God, simply stated, is absolute 
love. Such a deity is "incommensurable with the whole of reality", 
completely beyond the attempts of reasonable description and defini­
tion. In Kierkegaard's preface to Works of Love, he makes the careful 
distinction between the absolute character of love, and expressions 
of love which are capable of human mediation. "That which in its 
vast abundance is essentially inexhaustible is also essentially 
indescribable in its smallest act, simply because essentially it 
is everywhere wholly present and essentially cannot be described."^ 
For Kierkegaard, the recognition of God as love can be an observation 
of a person who has not yet experienced faith, nor known what it 
is to love in the context of faith. In Fear and Trembling, the 
'author', Johannes de Silentio, is able to recognize "the love of 
God", but he is not able to believe completely.
I am unable to make the movements of faith, I cannot shut my eyes and plunge confidently into the absurd, for methat is an impossibility...but I do not boast of it. I amconvinced that God is love, this thought has for me a primitive lyrical validity. When it is present to me, I am unspeakably blissful, when it is absent, I long for it more vehemently than does the lover for his object; but I do not believe, this courage I lack. For me the love of God is, both in a direct and in an igverse sense, incomm­ensurable with the whole of reality.
The author proceeds to examine the faith of Abraham in willing 
to sacrifice his son Isaac. Abraham is the "knight of faith" who 
is able to live "by virtue of the absurd", to make "the movement
3of infinity" without losing the finite. The absurdity of giving
oneself away, in assurance that only by doing so may the self be 
retained, is the mark of the "paradox". Such discloses that only
through faith is it possible to comprehend the nature of an absolute, 
loving deity who makes an absolute demand on the individual. The
1. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , (1847) trans. Howard and Edna Hong, Harper New York, 1962 
p. 19
2. Fear and T r e m b l i n g , op. cit. p . 44
3. ibid, p. 46; Note that S.K.'s "movement of infinity" is remarkably dialectical in view 
of Hegel's and Feuerbach's "infinite in the finite", (cf. chapter 1, above)
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"absolute relation of the individual to the Absolute" is that which 
posits the universal in subjection to the particular. That is, 
the individual who has faith is placed in such a wholly unique rela­
tion to God that the 'sin' which is disclosed through ethics (the 
individual's subjection to the universal, the community.), may be 
exactly what God demands. In the background of this fs Kierkegaard's 
own 'sin' of jilting Regine. On another level, the story of Abraham's 
sacrifice of Isaac is the story of Kierkegaard's sacrifice of Regine, 
his most pricely treasure. The nature of the demand of the Absolute
is thus placed in another context than the sphere of the humanly 
1ethical.
In response to the demand of the Absolute, Kierkegaard develops
something called "a teleological suspension of the ethical". Abraham's
'ethic' "is not melerly the most paradoxical that can be thought,
2but so paradoxical that it cannot be thought at all". Where thinking 
stops, faith begins. Kant's attempt to speak of ethics in terms
of duty is valid only from the assumption that "the universal is 
higher than the particular". But if the individual, in relation 
to God, the Absolute, becomes thereby "higher than the universal", 
ethics based on the rational idea of duty is completely inapplicable. 
Otherwise, 'duty' determined rationally becomes the tautology which 
defines God. Since this duty is derived from rational metaphysics, 
it is not absolute. Only a duty conceived as "the precise expression
3for God's will", which is able to include paradox, the elevation 
of the particular above the universal, is appropriate to faith. 
Thinking is done in terms of universels, and "the ethical is the 
universal." By being ethical one comes into contact with other 
humans, but not into relation with God. The 'divine' is not another 
word for 'the universal'. A difficult passage in Fear and Trembling
1. S.K. was at this time a "knight of infinite resignation", not able to claim the 'finite' Regine in faith. He saw his duty to God as contrary to his duty to Regine, and could not 
marry her without the fear that his love for God would be in jeopardy. Later, he repented 
his action.2. Fear and T r e m b l i n g , op. cit, p. 67
3. ibid, p. 70
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gives us insight into Kierkegaard's conception of an absolute duty
which is beyond ethics, corresponding to absolute deity.
Duty becomes duty by being referred to God, but in duty itself I do not come into relation with God. Thus it is a duty to love one's neighbour but in performing this duty I do not come into relation with God but with the neighbour whom I love. If I say then in this connection 
that it is my duty to love God, I am really uttering only a tautology, inasmuch as "God" is in this instance used in an entirely abstract sense as the divine, i.e. the universal, i.e. duty. So the whole human race is rounded off completely like a sphere, and the ethical is at once its limit and its content. God becomes an invisible vanishing point, a powerless thought, his power being only in the ethical which is the content of existence. If in any other way it might occur to anyman to want to love God in any other sense than thathere indicated, he is romantic, he loves a phantom which, if it merely had the power of being able tospeak, would say to him^ "I do not require your love.Stay where you belong."
The interpretation of this passage is of the utmost importance in 
discovering what Kierkegaard means by the Absolute, and what is 
really his view of ethics. From the passage itself, Kierkegaard 
is so ambivalent that it is difficult to decide whether he is critici­
zing or defending Kant. The clue, I believe, is the remark that
2duty is "precisely the expression for God's will". From this quota­
tion, and Kierkegaard's use of the idea of duty in Works of Love, 
one must conclude that in the above passage, "duty itself" is not 
the real duty which only "becomes duty be being referred to God". 
His idea of duty is completely contained in the first sentence. 
The rest of the passage is a facetious rendering of Kant, emphasizing 
a sort of 'hermeneutic circle' in the sphere of the ethical. The 
result of this 'sphere' is that God cannot be loved. Thus the ethical 
sphere is inadequate. One cannot come into relation with the Absolute 
by being ethical. God does require the love of humanity, but this 
cannot be implied from ethics "in the sense of morality".
1. Kierkegaard, Fear and T r e m b l i n g , p. 78
2. ibid. p. 70
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An ethic grounded upon the idea of universals is sufficient 
for itself, with the universal good equated with 'the divine'. 
But since such an ethic is dependent upon thinking, the idea of 
an absolute is limited to the field of thought. Abraham's faith,
however, was so paradoxical that it could not be thought, and requires
another "impossible" conception of an absolute. From the bounds 
of reason alone, either an absolute is the greatest thing that can
be thought, or else it is a mere "phantom" which, if it existed,
could not come into relation with an individual in any case. Such 
a 'God' would not require the human's love, and would be like the 
capricious gods of the Greeks (Kierkegaard adapts from Plato here), 
so absolute that they have everything they need, thus have no need 
of human love. But Kierkegaard's "Absolute" is supremely relational.
The complexity of Kierkegaard's thought and language is now
beginning to emerge. When he refers to "the Absolute" he means
something beyond the essentially rational absolute of Hegel. When
he talks about "duty", he is referring to a sort of duty which can
only be construed in connection with "the will of God". By ethics,
he means a mode of behavious which is not ultimately conditioned
1by universal principles. By faith, he is talking about a relation 
of the individual which places the particular higher than the univer­
sal, an absolute relation to the Absolute. And when Kierkegaard 
speaks of love, he means an absolute essence which is essentially 
unthinkable and indescribable.
1. Kierkegaard does indeed use the idea of ethics most often "in the sense of morality".
(cf. Fear and Trembling p. 70) But it is clear from his argument that true ethics is 
only derived from the sense in which the individual is related to God by faith, not 
the sense in which the individual is related to a community (the universal). This 
whole argument resembles in many respects Hegel's early attempt to go beyond Kant in 
"The Spirit of Christianity", although it is not obvious that Kierkegaard knew the work. The problem of faith in relation to ethics is probably mediated for S.K. by Strauss, 
Feuerbach, and Lessing.
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3. The Incarnation
The starting point for an understanding of Kierkegaard's idea 
of love, 'indescribable' though it may be, is intimately connected 
with his concept of God. We have seen above that Kierkegaard insists 
on an idea of deity which is absolute, capable of making supra-ethical 
demands of an absolute nature, but who still needs human love. 
The idea of an 'Absolute' must somehow be conceived in such a way 
that both absoluteness and relatedness are preserved in God. Reason 
cannot do this; only through "the eyes of faith" is such a conception 
'possible'.
(1) The Context of Revelation
The concept of revelation is explored in Kierkegaard's book 
Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy. The question 
he asks is, "Can an absolute deity be revealed through human inter­
course, human teaching?" In this book Kierkegaard's Master's thesis, 
"The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates", becomes 
resource material. Through a dialectical critique, Kierkegaard 
takes as his opponents all the Hegelians - left, right, and centre 
(particularly Feuerbach, cf. below.)  ^ Kierkegaard adapts (in a 
certain sense) Plato's argument that learning is latent in the human
intellect and the 'teacher' does not really teach, but merely acts
2as a midwife of truth which is already present. But learning itself 
must come from another source than the human teacher. Between humans, 
says Kierkegaard, the maieutic relationship is the highest possible 
relation. If the project is to discover Truth (the absolute sort), 
it cannot be implanted by a human teacher. "Begetting is reserved
1. Kierkegaard's mention of his opponents is indirect, ironic, and often sarcastic. For 
example, "It has never yet been known to fail that one fool when he goes astray, takes 
several others with him." Philosophical Fragments, page 14. Generally he criticizes 
everyone who claims to un derstand "The System" and "go beyond it". Specifically, Strauss, 
Feuerbach, and Martinsen, at least, receive his veiled criticism.
2. Plato, the M e n o , demonstrates that a slave boy has geometry latent within. Kierkegaard, 
Philosophical Fragments, p. 11.
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for the God a l o n e " I f  the learner is to acquire the Truth, the
Teacher must bring it to him; and not only so, but he must also
2give him the condition necessary for understanding it." That is, 
what is not 'there' cannot be 'delivered'. If there is such a thing
as absolute Truth, it is not limited to time; thus for it to become
conscious in the knower, there must be a point at which the eternal
enters into time, while at once making itself discernible. It is
not enough for the infinite to be posited in the finite; it must 
also be able to provide the condition in the subject by which it 
may be understood. "The temporal point of departure is nothing, 
for as soon as I discover that I have known the Truth from eternity 
without being aware of it, the same instant this moment of occasion 
is hidden in the Eternal, and so incorporated with it that I cannot 
even find it so to speak, even if I sought it; because in my eternal 
consciousness there is neither here nor there, but only an ubique
3et nusquam." For Kierkegaard the point at which the eternal enters 
into time is of utmost significance. This point he calls the Moment.^ 
If God is to create Truth which is available to human underst­
anding, it must be through a direct revelation of himself. But 
this is, apparently, impossible since God is infinitely greater 
than humankind. A direct encounter cannot be achieved through human 
efforts, because human mediation is operative only within the bounds 
of the rational; at best it is the Socratic midwifery. Thus if 
any 'learning' about God, the radically supra-rational Absolute, 
is to occur, it must be at God's initiative, not from the human 
side. Sin has brought a radical disjunction between the human and
1. Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 13
2. ibid p. 17
3. Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 15-16; This quotation may be a critique of Feuerbach's
attempt to posit the infinite in the finite through the unconscious image of the Inc­
arnation. Kierkegaard seems to be saying that even if love is revealed via the Incar­
nation as eternal, this is "nothing" if it cannot be immediately known. (The "nothing" 
may be an ironic use of Feuerbach's "nothing but".) cf. also, Feuerbach, The Essence
 Christianity, p. 5 0 ; "ex nihilo nihil fit."
4. Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 16 "The Moment" is a concept which cannot be briefly ex p­
lained, and which would demand greater space for exposition than is here available.
It d-®ncerns three things; the appearance of the eternal in time; the Incarnation as an 
event; and the appropriation of this event, in faith, by the individual.
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the divine, so that the human no longer has the capacity to understand 
even that Truth which is inherent in the fact of creation.^ The 
human must be recreated before he can be 'taught', and this is some­
thing that no human being can do for another. This recreation of
the human by God is essentially a "coming into existence" from an
2antecedent state which is tantamount to non-being. How this recrea­
tion, this "new birth" occurs, is the revelation of the 'character' 
of the Absolute.
(2) God the Servant
If God is to appear as a "Teacher" who imparts "Truth", while 
at the same time providing the condition for understanding it, he 
must do so in a manner which is "creative". God can only reveal 
the Truth, himself in fact, to humankind by becoming one among them. 
In a famous analogy, (which to be appreciated must be duplicated 
in full), Kierkegaard gives us the basic ingredients of his concept 
of God, the manner of God's revelation, and the ground of his idea 
of ethics, combined. Or, in other words, he gives us the nature 
of divine love and the precept for human love made visible to the 
eyes of faith in an absolute deity who "must therefore appear in 
the form of a servant".
Suppose then a king who loved a humble maiden. The heart of the king was not polluted by the wisdom that is loudly enough proclaimed; he knew nothing of the difficulties that the understanding discovers in order to ensnare the heart, which keep the poets so busy, and make their magic formulas necessary. It was easy to realize his purpose. Every states­man feared his wrath and dared not breathe a word of displ­easure; every foreign state trembled before his power and dared not omit sending ambassadors with congratulations for the nuptials; no courtier grovelling in the dust dared wound him, lest his own head be crushed. Then let the harp be tuned, let the songs of the poets begin to sound, and let all be festive while love celebrates its triumph. For
1. Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 18.
2. "Coming into existence" is an ambivalent and dialectical term for Kierkegaard. Not
only does the individual come into existence through the Moment, but for the individual, 
the eternal comes into existence through faith. Compare Feuerbach : . .man comes into 
being, he is not created. Only once he has come into being, can he create himself, does 
he become a product of human knowledge." (Posthumous A p h o r i s m s )
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love is exultant when it unites equals, but it is triumphant when it makes that which was unequal equal in love. - Then there awoke in the heart of the king an anxious thought; who but a king who thinks kingly thoughts would have dreamed of it! He spoke to no one about his anxiety; for if he had, each courtier would doubtless have said: "Your majesty is about to confer a favor upon the maiden, for which she can never be sufficiently grateful her whole life long." This speech would have moved the king to wrath, so that he would have commanded the execution of the courtier for high trea­son against the beloved, and thus he would in still another way have found his grief increased. So he wrestled with his troubled thoughts alone. Would she be happy in the life at his side? Would she be able to summon confidence enough never to remember what the king wished only to forget, that he was king and she had been a humble maiden? For if this memory were to waken in her soul, and like a favored lover sometimes steal her thoughts away from the king, luring her reflections into the seclusion of a secret grief; or if this memory sometimes passed through her soul like the shadow of death over the grave : where would then be the glory of their love? Then she would have been happier had she re­mained in her obscurity, loved by an equal, content in her humble cottage; but confident in her love, and cheerful early and late. What a rich abundance of grief is here laid bare, like ripened grain bent under the weight of its fruit­fulness, merely waiting the time of the harvest, when the thought of the king will thresh out all its seed of sorrow!For even if the maiden would be content to become as nothing, this could not satisfy the king, precisely because he loved her, and because it was harder for him to be her benefactor than to lose her. And suppose she could not even understandhim? For while we are thus speaking foôlishly of human rel­ationships, we may suppose a difference of mind between them such as to render an understanding impossible. What a depth of grief slumbers not in this unhappy love, who dares to rouse it! However no human being is destined to suffer such a grief; him we may refer to Socrates, or to that whicÿ in a still more beautiful sense can make the unequal equal.
The analogy demonstrates the 'anxiety' of God as the Absolute,
the Eternal, which steeps him in a "kingly grief" that his love
for his beloved might be resented. The love of an infinite for
the finite could only cause offence, could only seem patronizing.
Love's greatest triumph is the transcendence of like's attraction
2for like, so that even unequals may be united. But while, it may
1. Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , pp. 32-34 Of course, Kierkegaard is here describing his own 
struggle to love God, as well as God's struggle to love him. We note his alter ego,
"loved by an equal, content in 'her' humble cottage; but confident in 'her' love, and 
cheerful early and late." The "maiden" is not Regine, but himself, as well as all hu m­
anity, Kierkegaard is still a "knight of infinite resignation", on the way to becoming 
a "knight of faith". But he is definitely not "speaking foolishly of human relationships". 
The whole point is that the beloved cannot "understand" the lover, who is God.
2. The attraction of 'like for like' is an idea of Plato's, revised by Hegel and Feuerbach 
to yield the theory of se lf-c ons ciou sne ss developing in the encounter between I and Thou. 
Kierkegaard obviously wants to "go beyond" this to an attraction between unequals. Love 
would thus be not merely "exultant", but "triumphant".
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be possible for the infinite to love the finite, the finite does
not necessarily find it easy to love the infinite. The alienation
stems from the finite, the human, but it must be overcome by the
infinite, the divine, if a real love is to be possible.
In the argument which follows the analogy, Kierkegaard dismisses
Feuerbach's solution to the dilemma: "The union might be brought
about by an elevation of the learner."^ But "the divine love is
that unfathomable love which cannot rest content with that which
2the beloved might in his folly prize as happiness." If the "misund­
erstanding" between the king and the maiden is merely covered over 
with the joy the maiden finds in being raised to the status of the 
king, it would be a "nothing" in terms of actual reconciliation. 
The beloved might be made happy, but the happiness would be a decep-
3tion of her own heart. (Feuerbach, of course, had asserted that 
"God is a being of the heart", and Kierkegaard facetiously replies 
that God could not let the human heart be involved in vanity, "nothing", 
and self-deception, even if such deception might satisfy the "maiden".)
Kierkegaard also dismisses the solution offered by pietism: 
"The union might be brought about by the God's showing himself to 
the learner and receiving his worship, causing him to forget himself 
over the divine apparition. Thus the king might have shown himself 
to the maiden in all the pomp of his power...making her forget herself 
in worshipful admiration."^ This might satisfy the maiden, but 
"it could not satisfy the king, who desired not his own glorification,
5but hers."
1. Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 35. Feuerbach, indeed, suggested the King-subject analogy, 
(of. below), and The Essence of Christianity, p. 50 (op. cit.)
2. ibid.
3. ibid, p. 36 S.K. has Feuerbach in mind, but it is also a judgment on eros generally.
4. ibid; Kierkegaard criticizes not only left Hegelianism, but right Hegelians, too.5. ibid.
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The solution to the king's dilemma implies, of course, the 
Incarnation. God must actually become human, sharing the human 
situation, encountering the maiden in a form which she recognizes -S
■ 'j
and by which she will not be "offended". Or, in other words, there 
must be a way by which the eternal can enter into and exist in time,
"In order that the union may be brought about, the God must therefore 
become the equal of such a one, and so he will appear in the likeness 
of the humblest... the God will therefore appear in the form of a 
servant."^ If God is "the Absolute", his love must be capable of 
overcoming the alienation (sin in fact) by which the maiden is render­
ed incapable of 'understanding' her lover. Therefore Kierkegaard 
posits an 'omnipotent love' which is able to reveal itself to humanity 
in a form by which "the condition" for its apprehension is also 
established. "For this is the unfathomable nature of love, that 
it desires equality with the beloved, not in jest merely, but in 
earnest and truth. And it is the omnipotence of the love which
2is so resolved that it is able to accomplish its purpose..." In
order to overcome the "offence" the king must be able to actually
be as the maiden. He cannot simply assume the disguise of an equal,
as a human king might. The identification must be total. Only
a love which is 'omnipotent' could accomplish such a task, achieving
complete identity with the human condition.
Therefore the God must suffer all things, endure all things...He must suffer hunger in the desert, he must thirst in the time of his agony, he must be forsakenin death, absolutely like the humblest - behold theman! His suffering is not that of his death, but this entire life is a story of suffering; and it is love that guffers, the love which gives all is itself in want.
We note in the above quotation that Kierkegaard keeps the 
word "absolutely" even as he is describing the passibility of God.
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 39
2. ibid
3. ibid, p. 40
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This is consistent with his radical idea of "the Absolute", made 
available to human understanding only through an absolute, "omnipotent" 
love. The concept is a dialectical rendering of absolute deity 
in the form used by St. Bernard, which Feuerbach had criticized:
"Impassibilis est Deus, sed non incompassibilis, cui proprium est 
misereri semper et parcere." (God cannot suffer but he is not incom- 
passionate, for his character is always to have mercy and pardon. 
Kierkegaard realized, like Feuerbach, that such a God could not
identify with the human condition. Whereas Feuerbach dispensed 
with the notion of God as an absolute deity, Kierkegaard attempts 
to show that he can be, indeed must be, absolutely omnipotent in 
love (paradoxical though this may seem). God must be able to suffer, 
he must be able to completely identify himself with the human condi­
tion, if the alienation between the Absolute and the conditional, 
the infinite and the finite, the eternal and time, the divine and
the human, is to be overcome. But the "offence" is not overcome 
by God's sheer power; Kierkegaard suggests another kind of omnipotence, 
only by which "the condition" for the apprehension of Truth is estab­
lished. The unequal is rendered equal. Love between the infinite 
and the finite becomes possible; a reciprocal, I-thou relationship 
replaces the subject-king relationship. For Kierkegaard there is 
no doubt: "...it is love that suffers, the love which gives all is 
itself in want." Only by means of an omnipotent love which "absolut­
ely" identifies with the human condition is God able to break the
alienation which has resulted from sin. Indeed, God's absoluteness, 
his "unfathomable" character, his eternal being which enters and 
exists in time, cannot be separated from his quality of omnipotent,
1. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sup. Cant. Serino 2 6 , quoted by Feuerbach in The Essence of I
C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. p. 54; (comment above, Ch. l) j
2. It is not obvious in S.K. 's analogy of the king and the maiden that the "offence" might j
be caused by sin. The necessity for sin to play a significant role in S.K. 's idea of |
the Incarnation and Atonement highlights an emphasis upon The Fall. cf. Philosophical I
F r a g m e n t s , pp 18-19: "The learner has himself forfeited the c o n d i t i o n " . . .for un derst­
anding the Truth.
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supremely relational, love.
Thus the Incarnation reveals the only "Teacher" who is able 
to create both "Truth" and "the condition "for its understanding.
Whereas human teachers are only able to 'deliver' learning in a
maieutic sense, God's love "goes beyond" the Socratic ideal. The
particular is place in absolute relation to the Absolute; the aliena­
tion between the Teacher and learner is broken, and a "new birth" 
is made possible as the individual encounters a God who not only 
is love but who also may ^  loved. But Kierkegaard's dialectical 
interpretation of the Moment in which the eternal comes to rest
in time goes even further. God is not only revealed as love, breaking 
the barriers which prevent the human's love for God in return, but 
the Moment also discloses the 'how' of the human's love for his 
fellows.
The Incarnation reveals a God who is the eminent ground of 
all love, and who requires a "like for like" response from human 
beings. The inherent principle of the love disclosed, according 
to Kierkegaard, is that "love does not alter the beloved, it alters 
itself." Just as this kind of love is shown to the world by God, 
it is also a just requirement of the human's love for his neighbour. 
Omnipotence is consummated precisely in God's omnipotent desire 
to love his creatures, while at the same time preserving the creatures' 
freedom. In response to the love shown by God in Christ, the human 
selfish loves must be subjected to the "royal law" - that the neigh­
bour shall be loved.
4. The Absolute Relational God
Before going on to see how Kierkegaard develops his idea of 
love in the context of faith, let us summarize the central concepts 
which appear so far in connection to 'God the Absolute' and 'God 
the Servant'.
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(1) God's 'absoluteness' is not in question. As the story 
of Abraham and Isaac demonstrates, God may make absolute demands 
on the individual which are not to be construed in terms of rational 
ethics, universal duty, or any system which purports to distinguish 
between right and wrong according to universal or community ideals. 
Kierkegaard acknowledges that God's "omnipotent word" sustains the 
heavens and the earth "by fiat".^ God is beyond all attempts of 
reason and dogmatic formulae; he is essentially "indescribable", 
unfathomable" in his absoluteness.
(2) God's love is an absolute quality derived from, and equated
with, the nature of his absoluteness. It is not enough for him
to merely demand obedience, as he did from Abraham. His creative
capacity is able to create the conditions in which such obedience
is possible; indeed, the obedience is transformed into something
else, so that obedience loses its character as such for one who
becomes a "knight of faith". How this occurs is not subject to
rational analysis, but may only be 'understood' as God relates himself
directly to the learner. At some point, a Moment, the eternal enters
into existence "in virtue of the absurd"; the Truth of this entry,
both as an event and as an event which is of utmost importance for
the individual, can only be 'learned' through "the absolute relation
of the individual to the Absolute". The juxtaposition of the terms
"absolute" and "relation" gives us important insight into Kierkegaard's
concept of God. Thus God's absoluteness is an absolute relation
to humanity; God's love is 'omnipotent love' which is able to achieve
his purpose without coercion, through creating the conditions for 
2its understanding.
1. Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 40
2. There is a distinction here in S.K.'s understanding which may prevent a consistent absol­
uteness of deity from being conceived in relation to God's omnipotence. For S.K. the
'offence' remains, from the human side; but God relates himself absolutely to the human situation. Perhaps if God were absolutely relational there would be no offence; but
from S.K.'s point of view there would also be no freedom.
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(3) In and through the aspects of God's absolute being and
his absolute love, revealed in the Incarnation, Kierkegaard accents
the supremely relational character of the Christian God. "Only
through placing God in particular relationship to the individual
did our project go beyond Socrates."^ By implication, the project
also 'goes beyond' Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and doxological credal
formulae of classical theology.
To sustain the heavens and the earth by the fiat of his omnipotent word, so that if this word were withdrawn for the fraction of a second the universe would be plunged 
into chaos - how light a task compared with bearing the burden that mankind might take offence when one^has been constrained by love to become its saviour!
Classical theology which stresses God's power to the exclusion 
of his love, Kierkegaard implies, is misdirected. Christianity 
portrays a God who so relates himself to humankind that he must 
"make experience of all things" - including the depths of human 
suffering. For Kierkegaard, a God who suffers is not a 'weak' deity; 
rather the suffering aa, in identity with, a human, demonstrates 
God's omnipotent love, and it is the credibility which overcomes 
alienation, the "offence", making "that which was unequal equal 
in love". The suffering is the "triumph" of divine love.
"Love does not alter the beloved, it alters itself." With 
this reinterpretation of the Incarnation Kierkegaard recalled the 
near-forgotten origins of a "Christendom" so entangled with doctrine 
that the validity of its demand upon human action had become eclipsed. 
Kierkegaard's supremely relational, yet unquestionably absolute 
concept of deity thus precedes certain themes of what in our century 
has become known as 'process theology'. Despite Kierkegaard's
1. Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , op. cit. p. 127
2. Kierkegaard, Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 40
3. cf. Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of G o d , op. cit.
(introduction). Of course there are marked differences in Kierkegaard's idea of a re­
lative absolute which do not necessarily complement, for example, Hartshorne's inter­
pretation. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's God a relational deity, far removed from the 
Absolute of conception generally. For the difference between the Absolute of Kierkegaard 
and that of Hegel, cf. Philosophical Fragments, op. cit. pp. 96-97 (note).
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emphatic assertions about the absolute character of God and his
absolute demand upon human behaviour, the absoluteness is revealed 
as a love which is 'absolutely' relational. It produces the condi­
tions for faith in the individual, and entices it forth by overcoming 
all alienation. Thus "the omnipotence of love" becomes the essential 
unifying concept which underlies Kierkegaard's 'understanding' of 
God, faith, and ethics.
5. Faith and God's Love
The incarnation of God as a completely human being is called 
by Kierkegaard the "absolute paradox". Through this movement by
God towards humankind, and indeed towards the particular individual, 
the "absolute unlikeness" between human beings and God is abolished.
At God's initiative a relationship of "absolute likeness" now exists. 
But "the eyes of faith" are required for appreciation.^ The "condi­
tion" for faith is provided by God himself; and faith, says Kierkegaard, 
is the only appropriate response to the infinite movement of God
toward humankind. In what appears to be a related paradox, Kierkegaard
2tells us that "the highest passion is faith". To speak of faith 
as a passion, although far from doctrinal rationalism, is yet cons­
istent with Luther’s point of view:
For the inward man, who by faith is created in thelikeness of God, is both joyful and happy because of Christ in whom so many benefits are conferred upon him, and therefore it is his one occupation to serve God joyfully^and for naught, in love that is not constrained.
Although Luther detects no "paradox" in faith, the Reformer 
does identify an intimate relationship between faith and love.
In various interpretations, this relationship has been asserted'in
1. Reference to "the eyes of faith" appear frequently in Philosophical Fragments (cf.p p .80,87)
2. Fear and T r e m b l i n g , p. 131
3. Martin Luther, "Treatise on Christian Liberty" Classics of Protestantism, p. 53
Philosophical Library, ed. Ferm, New York, 1959. j
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our century by, for example, Anders Nygren and Emil Brunner. The 
essential point stressed in Kierkegaard's thought is that faith, f
per se, is not a rational matter. Like love, it is on a different )
plane from reason. It is a "passion" in fact, not subject to rational 
categories. Similarly, with regard to the concept of feeling, Feuer­
bach had stressed that it is improper to apply logical categories 
to what is irrational. To the end of setting faith apart, a passion 
comparable to love but not to reason, Kierkegaard applied a dialecti­
cal interpretation to the 'feeling' of Schleiermacher and Feuerbach.
Faith is not opposed to love, as Feuerbach was forced to assert.
But neither is it subject to Kant's categories or to Hegel's rational 
system. As we observed in Chapter I, feeling (Sinnlichkeit) was 
Ludwig Feuerbach's "principle of unity". Kierkegaard t’ranslLafbes
feeling as passion. "That in which all human life is unified is
1passion, and faith is a passion." "Faith begins precisely where
2thinking leaves off." "Faith is a miracle and yet no man is excluded
3from it." For Kierkegaard faith is the feeling, indeed the love, 
that the beloved has for the primal lover. It is possible because 
the lover loves first, making possible the response of love in return.
Throughout Kierkegaard's writings it is evident that, even 
when he speaks most emphatically about faith, there is an implicit 
link with his concept of love. Both faith and love appear profoundly 
influenced by the mundane affection, its frustrations and ambivalence, 
of Soren for Regine. Upon breaking his engagement with her, he 
wrote about the "double movement of infinity" whereby a person is 
constrained to sacrifice worldly assurances, affections, and hopes 
in favour of a radically loyal relationship with God^ For him, 
the price of his love for "the eternal" meant the initial sacrifice
1. Kierkegaard, Fear and T r e m b l i n g , p. 76
2. ibid, p. 64
3. ibid p. 76
4. cf. Kierkegaard, Repetition.
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of his love for the temporal.
In Fear and Trembling he repeatedly illustrated the radical 
nature of faith in connection to the ordinary loves of humanity. 
Authentic love must be different from the temporal passion of romance, 
so fraught with frustration, so self-absorbing, so changeable. 
In one illustration, he shows how authentic love and authentic faith 
require a similar irrational courage. In the story of Tobias and 
Sarah, from The Book of Tobit, he attempts to demonstrate that only 
with faith can human love be deemed victorious over death and temp­
orality.^ For Kierkegaard, the interplay between faith and love 
requires that all human love be set in the context of "the eternal". 
That is, God, who is love, who has demonstrated ultimate love in 
the Incarnation, who provides and sustains the conditions for faith, 
demands (or from a "knight of faith" elicits) a response of love 
from the beloved which is appropriate to the eternal nature of absol­
ute, divine love. In Kierkegaard's terms, this means that God becomes 
the (consciously understood) "third person" in any relation between 
human beings which purports to call itself "love".
However beautiful the love-relationship has been between two or more people, however complete all their enjoyment and all their bliss in mutual devotion and affection have been for them, even if all men have praised this relation­ship - if God and the relationship to God have been left out,then, Christianly understood, this has got been love but amutual and enchanting illusion of love.
This quotation illustrates Kierkegaard's critique of romantic 
love and mutual love, indeed even the "species love" of Feuerbach.
For him it is faith, and the eyes of faith alone, which are able
to set love in an eternal context. Although Kierkegaard states, 
as does Feuerbach, that "love is God", for Kierkegaard this love 
is radically different from what is ordinarily called love in human 
relationships. Kierkegaard is no universalist, despite his idea
1. Kierkegaard, Fear and T r e m b l i n g , p.Ill; The Book of T o b i t , (A p o c r y p h a ) Chapters 7-10 esp.
2. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , trans. Howard 6 Edna Hong, Harper 1962, p. 113
3. ibid p. 124; of. also Sickness Unto Death p. 258 - Human and divine love are different
in q u a l i t y .
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of a relational deity. Unless God is 'seen' to constitute the truth 
of human relationships, then that truth is still alienated from 
human lovers. Although one cannot love God unless one loves his 
brother, one cannot love his brother, "Christianly understood", 
unless one loves God. Brotherly love is dependent first of all 
upon the recognition that God first loves humanity, first loved 
'me'.
The paradigm for valid human love is contained in Kierkegaard's 
analogy of the king who loved the humble maiden. The king does 
not really require love from his beloved; he first of all determines 
to change himself so that his offering of love may be received and
acceptable without causing offence. In the image of the Incarnation
(the Moment), Kierkegaard finds not only the symbols for the character 
of God and of God's love, but also for the type of human love which 
is demonstrated as a model. The love disclosed is asked from all 
humanity in all relationships, and it cannot be understood adequately 
without reference to the Incarnation. The human being who would 
love his neighbour must be willing to make himself equal with his 
neighbour, in order that his love may be genuine. A patronizing
love, 'from above', is not the love which is disclosed in the incarna­
tion of God as a man. Neither is it the pseudo-love of the greater 
for the lesser, the rich for the poor, the powerful for the helpless. 
Here, perhaps, is the germ of Kierkegaard's often overlooked social 
consciousness, the inherent justice which accrues to a love in the 
light of the love of God. But only when faith begins to be understood 
ethically, for example in Works of Love, is this justice really 
apparent.
For Kierkegaard faith is a miracle, an absolute relation to 
the Absolute, a supremely subjective requisite for the understanding 
of love. In faith, properly, the language of subject-object dis­
appears. The "Truth" cannot be discovered by positing objective 
criteria by which one may apprehend God. The difficulty of this
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would make talk about faith impossible if it were not possible to 
use the language of analogy and paradox in such a way that reason 
points beyond the logical. Thus one cannot really say that faith 
is "a subjective relation to something objective" except insofar 
as the relation is understood analogically, the inadequacy of such 
language being acknowledged.
Faith is not properly construed by, or subject to, historical 
fact. Nevertheless, says Kierkegaard, faith must maintain certain 
objective beliefs. "When faith resolves to believe it runs the 
risk of committing itself to an error, but it nevertheless believes.
There is no other road to faith. Here we must entertain both
a difference of, and a relation between, subjective faith, and objec­
tive belief. "Faith is not an act of will; for all human volition 
has its capacity within the scope of an underlying condition."
This "condition" is God's gift; but "belief" (in the subject-object
sense) is often an act of will. One must will to believe in love,
2even if one is not "a knight of faith". Without such beliefs, 
one involves oneself in despair, closing oneself off from the possib­
ility of faith.
Kierkegaard exegetes St. Paul's assertion that "love believes
all things" (I Cor. 13:7) to stress the infinite hopefulness of
IChristianity over against nihilism, scepticism, and empiricism. I
"Love...can take upon itself the work of faith and hope and make
3them even more perfect." This is possible precisely because love, 
like faith, is not founded upon any assured knowledge, but 'finds 
itself in its vulnerability. In its intimate relation to faith,
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , op. cit. p . 103
2. This is Kierkegaard as the theologians' enigma, a nightmare for proper interpretation. 
Subjects and objects, in the context of faith, become something else, but must still
be described in terms of subjects and objects. "The knight of infinite resignation"
believes things in an objective sense, which may lead him to believe things in a sub­
jective sense, so that he becomes a "knight of faith" in which subject and object dis­
appear. cf. Fear and Trembling p. 44 f.
3. Works of Love, p. 213
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"love believes all things and yet is never deceived" as it opens
itself to deception and constantly involves itself in risk. Only 3
by being vulnerable, says Kierkegaard in the language of paradox,
is it possible "to assure oneself infinitely against every decep- 
1tion". More terrible is "faith with reservations (a clear contrad- 
2iction)". Similarly, a love which is founded upon the supposed
worth of the beloved, is a counterfeit love, for love is not condit­
ioned by the values of the marketplace. Kierkegaard notes that 
a person might be so "knowledgeable" that he might believe and love 
"nothing" at all.^
God’s love revealed in the Incarnation calls forth "an eternal 
like for like". As "the king" has made himself equal with "the 
maiden" he has overcome the inequality and the possible offence 
which could prohibit a reciprocal love. Thus God (the "king") esta­
blishes "the condition" for the human's love for God. But a like
love is called forth from the beloved, which takes form not only 
as love for God, equivalent to faith, but also as a love for the 
neighbour which resembles the love shown by God. Such a love "does 
not alter the beloved, it alters itself."
Through God's love for humanity, humanity's love for God is 
rendered possible. If the human does not take offence at God's
attempt to become its lover, then the human's love for God, in return, 
is the passion of faith. The transformation which results by virtue 
of faith appropriates (in some "indescribable" way) the divine love 
for the human's relations with his fellows. Optimally, such a love 
of the human for other humans resembles the character of the self-
effacing love shown in God's love for humanity. The precept of
love demonstrated by "God the servant" is thus both the establishment
1. ibid, p. 221
2. ibid, p. 219
3. Note the ironic "nothing" - Ki erkegaard's critique of Feuerbach's "love". Works of Love, 
pp. 219-222
..J
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of the condition for faith in "God the Absolute", and at the same 
time the revelation of the type of love by which the faithful human 
is to love other human beings.
Love revealed by faith is devoid of objective criteria in 
the form of knowledge. It finds its strength precisely in an ability 
to give itself away, to involve itself in risk, letting God who 
is love be the acknowledged "third person" in every human relationship. 
The indispensable principle in the divine revelation of love is 
love's altering of itself without changing the beloved, establishing 
the inherent grounds of justice which make love possible between 
equals. Divine love is not patronizing, but conforms itself in 
equality with the beloved; human love in the context of faith imitates 
the divine love in establishing the context of justice, equality, 
and reconciliation. Such a love is incarnated in the lives of human 
beings through no categorical imperative or ethical system, but 
only through the Moment of faith, the human's ‘irrational^ love for 
God, "the highest passion".
I l l
II. Self-love, Romantic Love, and Friendship
1. The Paradox of Self-love
Kierkegaard states that "man lives an undisturbed and self-
centred life, until there awakens in him the paradox of self-love,
1in the form of love for another, the object of his longing." For
Kierkegaard, self-love, erotic love, and friendship are essentially
the same until they are all transformed in the light of faith, and
reinterpreted in the context of the "royal law"...the commandment
to love God and the neighbour as oneself. Kierkegaard attributes
a significant place to innate self-love, the development of which
can result in an ethic appropriate to faith.
Self-love lies as the ground for all love or else is the ground in which all love perishes; therefore if we con­
ceive a religion of love, the religion need make but  ^one assertion...the condition that man loves himself.
We may note that Kierkegaard is interested in "a religion of love".
Kierkegaard, however, does not find it necessary to dispense with
faith in order to conceive such a religion. Neither must self-love
necessarily result in an egocentric pietism or in the elevation
3of the individual to the status of the divine.
It is clear from Luther's "Treatise on Christian Liberty" 
that the Reformer will not entertain the idea of a faithful love 
of self.
We conclude, therefore, that a Christian man lives not in himself, but in Christ and in his neighbour. Otherwise he is not a Christian. He lives in Christ through faith, in his neighbour through love; by faith he is caught up beyond himself into God, by l^ve he sinks down beneath himself into his neighbour...
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 48 Note the comparison with Feuerbach's I-Thou 
theory; "paradox" is S.K.'s additional element.
2. ibid.
3. A comparison of Kierkegaard's view of self-love with Augustine, Luther, Hegel, and 
Feuerbach would indeed be interesting, but such is beyond the scope of this essay. Each 
contributes in some way to S.K.'s formulation, but his dialectical view of the self 
renders his view unique. Particularly, despite some similarities, his view differs dec­
idedly from Augustine, due to S.K.'s emphasis upon the duty to love the neighbour. For 
Hegel self-love was "a word without meaning^ cf. Hegel, Early W r i t i n g s , o p .cit. p . 247
4. Luther, "Treatise on Christian Liberty", Classics of Protestantism, ed. Perm, Philos­
ophical Library, New YorU, 1959, p. 62
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Kierkegaard, however, observes that self-love is a necessary condition
for the love of neighbour, because the neighbour must be recognized
as a self before he or she may be loved as oneself.
Kierkegaard seems to take the command to love the neighbour
as the self (Mark 12:28-34) quite literally. The command to love
God is prior, but love for God is not different from the "passion"
of faith. Love for the neighbour depends upon the proper concept
of self, in relation to God, so that, by faith both self and neighbour
are loved in reference to God's prior love for humanity. Therefore,
the self cannot simply be deleted, either in deference to God or
to the neighbour. The neighbour is a "duplication" of oneself.
There is, as Augustine held, no qualitative difference between the
self and the neighbour. Under the authority of the royal law, they
are equal: "As far as thought is concerned, the neighbour need not
even exist."  ^ Proper love for oneself is the same as proper love
for one's neighbour. Just as God has demonstrated his identity
with the human condition, the faithful is commanded to identify
himself with his neighbour. Both justice and the nature of divine
love hang in the balance.
With this concept of a "paradoxical" self-love we must notice
that Kierkegaard's dialectic is once again at work. - He conceives
of an innate self-love which is either the ground of a "religion
of love" or the ground by which all love perishes. The connection
between self-love 'A' and self-love ' B ' (to continue his distinction
of Either/Or) is either positive or negative; there may or may not
be a transition from one to the other. This connection is best
represented in his own words:
Self-love lies as the ground of love; but the paradoxical passion of self-love when at its highest pitch wills prec­isely its own downfall. This is also what love desires, so that these two are linked in mutual understanding in the passion of the moment, and this passion is love. Why should not the lover find this conceivable? But he who in self-love
1. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 37
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 59
2. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto D e a t h , op. cit. p. 262, inter alia
3. Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 34
4. ibid p . 35
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shrinks from the touch of love can neither understand it nor summon the courage to venture it, since it means his downfall. Such is then the passion of love; self- love is indeed submerged but not annihilated;...this is love's temptation.
In the above quotation, we observe that Kierkegaard's idea 
of self-love is not bad in itself. "At its highest pitch it wills
its own downfall." In other words, selfhood understood through 
faith loses its absorption in itself. It becomes a passion which 
is equivalent to "the passion of love" - focussed not on itself, 
but on the eternal. Only by this release from bondage to itself 
does the self actually become a self, in the eternal sense. But 
without the 'courage' to make this movement of infinity, the self 
remains "in despair", absorbed in the finite, the temporal conception 
of itself, and thereby losing the infinite, eternal relation to 
itself, which can only be ©onsummated through faith in God. 
Kierkegaard's "definition of faith", which appears at the end of 
his book Sickness Unto Death, is concerned precisely with the paradox­
ical search for the self: "By relating itself to its (true) self
and by willing to be its (true) self, the self is grounded transparen-
2tly in the Power which constituted it."
The proper love of self is interpreted by the command to love 
the neighbour. "The command, like a pick, wrenches open the lock
3of self-love and thereby wrests it away from men." Just as Jacob 
limped from struggling with God, self-love is broken by struggling 
with the command to love the neighbour. The "as yourself" in the 
command to love the neighbour presupposes that people love themselves, 
but also teaches proper self-love, which "is the difference of the
4eternal". A person should love oneself "in the right way", that 
is, in faithful self-renunciation. "If anyone, therefore, refuses
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to learn from Christianity how to love himself in the right way,
he cannot love his neighbour either."^ "The neighbour" becomes
the reflexive 'tutor' for proper self-love. "You shall love yourself
in the same way as you love your neighbour when you love him as 
2yourself." The key to this dialectic of self-love is Kierkegaard's 
assertion that one cannot love the neighbour, nor oneself, if an 
"exception" is made of either. Under the precept of the Incarnation, 
God's love effects its omnipotence by humbling itself, not by elevat­
ing the beloved. One 'neighbour' must not be elevated over others; 
oneè'elf must not be elevated over the neighbour. The neighbour, 
according to the command of Christ, is 'identical' with the self. 
"To love oneself in the right way and to love one ' s neighbour corres­
pond perfectly to one another; fundamentally they are one and the
3same thing."
It is important that Kierkegaard's view of a self-effacing 
self-love be not understood as the negation of self or self-love.
He was too aware of the I-thou epistemology of Hegel and Feuerbach 
to ignore the necessity for an adequate understanding of selfhood 
by "Christianity". Although he undoubtedly depended, to a great 
extent, upon Luther and Augustine for his concept of self, Kierkegaard's 
view is a dialectical one. He attempts to preserve the ideal of 
humility which is present in the Gospels and in the writings of 
Paul, while refusing to allow the resolution of the self to evolve 
into mysticism. In addition, his own search for selfhood in his 
struggles with earthly love, ambition, and his own genius, played 
no small part in the theological concept of self which is portrayed 
especially in Works of Love and Sickness Unto Death. His own melanch­
olia and tendency toward martyrdom provided poignant insight into
1. ibid p. 39 By 'loving oneself in the right way' Kierkegaard means that proper love of 
self can only arise through loving one's neighbour as a self, and by loving God as the 
'third person' in the relationship, who is, in fact, the love with which the neighbour 
is loved.
2. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , p. 39 (This, however, appears tautological.)
3. ibid.
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the nihilistic and destructive effects of inadequate self-love.
Whoever has any knowledge of men will certainly admit that whenever he has desired the capacity of moving others to relinquish self-love, he has also frequently been con­strained to wish that it were possible to teach them to love themselves. When the activist wastes his time and powers in the service of vain, inconsequential accomplishments, iS it not because he has not rightly learned how to love himself?When the frivolous person throws himself, almost like a nonentity, into the folly of the moment, is it not because he does not understand how to love himself rightly? When the melancholic dejectedly desires to be rid of life, of himself, is this not because he will not learn earnestly and rigorously to love himself? When a man surrenders him­self to despair because the world or some person has left him faithlessly betrayed, what then is his fault (his innocent suffering is not referred to here) except that he does not love himself in the right way? When a man in self torment thinks to do God a service by martyring himself, what is his sin except not willing to love himself in the right way? Alas, and when a man lays violent hands on him­self, is not his sin just this that he does not rightly love himself in genuine understanding of how a man ought to love himself? There is a lot of talk in the world about treachery and faithlessness - and God help us, it is all too true - but still let us never because of this forget that every man has in himself the most dangerous traitor of all...But is it not therefore all the more important that the teaching of Christianity should be brought to mind again and again, the teaching that a man should love his neighbour as himself, that is, as he ought to love himself.
The depth and relevance of this passage speaks for itself. Any
minister or public servant who has been involved in the tragedies
of human suffering should acknowledge the need for an understanding
of proper self-love. Christianity, says Kierkegaard, is the antidote
2for the ancient deadly sin of accidie...despair.
In summation, Kierkegaard's concept of self-love rests upon 
the "ultimate paradox" of Luke 14:26. "Whoever comes to me cannot 
be my disciple unless he hates his Father and his mother, his wife 
and his children, his brothers and his sisters, and himself as well." 
Only by denying oneself and 'selfish' loves is it possible to
1. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 39
2. Normally translated, wrongly, as 'sloth', this 'sin' has received massive treatment
in twentieth century ego psychology, and related theologies. In this regard, one might 
view Bernard Loomer, Paul Tillich, and Seward Hiltner as S.K.'s 'heirs'. The various 
interpretations of "self" in our century are too diverse and numerous for attention 
here. Nevertheless the concept of self-love is still an often refuted characteristic in many modern theologies. For one treatment of accidie cf. Seward Hiltner, Theological 
Dynamics, Abingdon, Nashville, 1972, p. 96 ff.
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overcome the despair of self-seeking self-love, in learning to live 
dependently upon God in whom the 'true' self is constituted. Self- 
love in its proper or true relationship to itself is discovered 
by obeying the command to love the neighbour as oneself. By denying 
oneself in deference to the neighbour one finds the self again. 
The neighbour is therefore the 'other' in an epistemological sense, 
in and through whom the true self is identified. Finally, precisely 
because self-love is equivalent with love for the neighbour, the 
movement from inadequate self-love to proper self-love is a "paradox", 
a "passion" in the same sense that faith and love are passions. 
Thus the capacity "to love oneself in the right way" is not a charac­
teristic which is subject to rational explanation, but it nevertheless 
requires the will to believe that despair may be overcome. For 
his assertion that self-love is part of the credible agenda of theology, 
Kierkegaard deserves much credit.^
2. Romantic Love and Friendship
Kierkegaard's concept of self-love is applicable to his whole 
critique of "Christendom" and not merely to his attempt to discover 
a faithful concept of self. For him, most of what has gone by the 
name of love has been various forms of self-love disguised in the 
"poetry" of culture. What Kierkegaard means in his frequent referenc­
es to "the poet" is too complex to detain us here; generally he 
is referring to the attempts of historians, philosophers, theologians, 
and indeed "poets" (such as Shakespeare) to clothe self-seeking
ideologies in the garb of morality and Christian virtue. As he
2tells us, "the virtues of paganism are glittering vices". Romantic
1. For the difference between Kierkegaard's concept of self-love, and certain views of 
St. Augustine, upon which it is dependent, c.f. Oliver 0 'Donovan, The Problem of Self- 
Love in St. A u g u s t i n e , Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1980.
2. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 251 (Plato is a constant reference for S.K.) 
Kierkegaard also refers to himself, especially in his early works, as "a poet". Later 
he becomes an "apostle", cf. Works of Love, p. 337
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love and friendship have been so praised by "the poet" that they 
appear to pass for the love of Christianity. But these ideals, 
"beautiful" though they may be, are infected with possessiveness, 
jealousy, egocentrism, and exclusiveness. As such, even in their 
'passionate' forms, they constitute forms of despairing self-love.
In the passionate love of a romantic couple, the third member 
is excluded. Not only does their love become the heightened unity 
of their individual self-loves, but God is also excluded in the 
completion of their mutual bonding. Kierkegaard expressly criticizes 
cultural marriage ceremonies in which the priest assumes the tacit 
role of "the poet". He becomes a conspirator in praising a counter­
feit and temporal mutual self-love, far removed from the love of 
the eternal.^ Such marriages, in the beginning at least, are grounded 
upon a coincidence of good fortune, a love which "happens to" the 
persons involved. Only time (and their faith) will tell whether 
their love can grow into an eternal relationship. If it is to do 
so, it must become grounded upon the strenuous "thou shalt" of the 
commandment to love God, and the neighbour as oneself. But the 
intensity of the passion which stimulates romance in the beginning 
can be a boon as well as a bane. The passion can grow to correspond 
with the passion of faith; or it can deteriorate into the worst 
expressions of vanity and selfishness.
Only when self-love, informed by faith, is able "to will its
own downfall" is it transformed into the proper love of self which
acknowledges both God and the neighbour in an inclusive orientation
toward others. In this transformation, self-love is "taken captive"
and recognizes its "duty" incorporated in the commandment to love
the neighbour as the self. The "thou shalt" of the commandment
2entails the virtual abolition of previous exclusive loves. Under
1. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , pp. 45-46 (Compare Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity", 
trans. Knox, op. cit. pp. 250-251.
2. Not totally abolished, however; self-love constantly remains as a "temptation", cf. 
Philosophical Fragments, p. 59
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the new priority of relationship to God, a lover must be willing 
to sacrifice his own love for the beloved if the love is threatening 
to his own God-relationship. The God-relationship is threatened
if the beloved is placed 'above' the neighbour. Such a threat, 
no doubt, had something to do with Kierkegaard's sacrifice of Regine. 
Kierkegaard is assertive in stressing that one must not allow oneself 
to love another person more than God; nor must one allow oneself 
to be loved by another person more than the other person loves God; 
nor must one allow oneself to elevate one's beloved above the inclu­
sive love which is commanded: to love the neighbour as oneself.^
In his later works more consistently 'love for God', the passion 
of faith, was construed for Kierkegaard as the capacity to love 
one's neighbour as oneself. If particular love's passion is placed 
in such a relationship to a person, then the passion of faith is 
in jeopardy. In other words, love for God cannot be sustained unless 
one is able to love the neighbour. The neighbour cannot be loved 
consistently if a "passionate preference" raises a special beloved 
to a love which is no different from "the other I", the other "myself". 
By implication, romantic love cuts out the neighbour just as it 
cuts out God. It is a love in which "two I's come together to form
one I". And the more united the two become, the more they constitute
2a united self which cuts itself off from all others. So strenuous 
is "the royal law" that even love for enemies is required. Kierkegaard 
asserts that a person must be able to love the neighbour who is 
near by, as well as the neighbour who may not be seen. But "in 
love and friendship one's neighbour is not loved, but one's other
3self; the first I once again, but more intensely."
1. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 113. Kierkegaard's emphasis upon love of ne igh­
bour in Works of Love is difficult to reconcile completely with his emphasis upon love 
for God in earlier works. The latter writings may constitute a more mature in terp re­
tation of the Paradox.
2. ibid. p. 68
3. ibid. p. 69
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As Kierkegaard stressed that there is an absolute, supra-ethical 
duty to God, possibly entailing behavious which could not be deemed 
rationally ethical, there is also an absolute duty to the neighbour. 
The duty to the neighbour derives from the duty to God. Thus the 
ethical priority of faith the love of neighbour. Kierkegaard's 
radical interpretation of this idea indicates that neither family 
nor friends nor a romantic lover should be allowed to come between 
the duty to the neighbour. Who is my neighbour? He is the person 
toward whom I have duty, as commanded in the royal law. "By rec­
ognizing your duty, you easily discover who is your neighbour...He
toward whom I have a duty is my neighbour and when I fulfil my duty
1I prove that I am a neighbour." If romantic love and friendship
sustain priority over the duty to the neighbour, implied in faith's
command, then, for Kierkegaard, it is not love which is concerned
2at all, but rather a projected egocentric love of self. If, on 
the other hand, a person who, having been given the condition for 
faith, wills in obedience to love his neighbour to the exclusion
3of egocentric loves, that person, paradoxically, loves himself rightly.
Despite Kierkegaard's strenuous language about Christian love, 
contrasting with the "passion of preference" characteristic of roman­
tic love and friendship, he retains an appreciation for the "aesthetic" 
quality of temporal affections. As self-love involves itself with 
another, even if it is an extension of the self, there may be the 
kernel of an eventual maturity in love. Childish loves may be trans­
formed through a developing faith into loves which are eternal, 
by being related to God, and by acknowledgement of the duty to love 
the neighbour.
1. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. pp. 37-38
2. ibid. p. 113
3. Faith is not a matter of will; but love of neighbour is, at least initially, a matter
of "obedience". Works of Love, p. 36
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The Christian may well marry, may well love his wife, especially in the way he ought to love her, may well have a friend and love his native land; but in all this there ought to be a fundamental understanding between him agd God in the Christian sense - this is Christianity.
"Christianity," says Kierkegaard, "is that which will thus
2make everything new, while nevertheless everything is old." Only Si
when both parties in a relationship (e.g. a marriage) acknowledge 
their dependence upon God, does human love become "like sterling 
silver", not subject to change, dependably lasting. Such a mature 
relationship is open to persons outside the marriage; but if it 
becomes again possessive, it suffers from "an illusion of love".
To be sure, says Kierkegaard, a man does not love his wife or his 
friend in exactly the same way as he loves his neighbour, but this 
is not an essential difference.
The person who does not pay attention to the fact that his wife is for him the neighbour and only then his wife never comes to love his neighbour, no matter how many people he loves, for he has made exception of his wife.This exception he will love all too intensely throughout his who^e life or all too passionately, and then all too coolly.
We notice here a profound sense of justice acknowledged by 
Kierkegaard in every human relationship. Only as the neighbour 
is loved, an the self, is the context of justice possible in which 
love may grow and last. The erotic, or the familiar, cannot replace 
the requirement for equality, the sense of justice, that makes love 
possible. Passionate preference is no substitute for treating even 
the most familiar person with the same sense of respect which one 
ought to have for oneself. But at the same time, says Kierkegaard,
"to love without passion is an impossibility". The passion of
1. ibid. p. 145 For Kierkegaard, romantic love and friendship are spontaneous, changeable, 
temporal passions of preference, unless viewed through faith. Thus they are ordinarily 
forms of disguised êgocentrism.
2. ibid.
3.Kierkegaard, Works of Love, op. cit. p. 145.
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preference may stimulate romantic love and friendship, but it cannot 
sustain them.^ A greater passion is required, the "highest passion", 
by which one is capable of loving the neighbour as oneself. The 
love of neighbour is a governing ethic which is influenced by the 
passion of faith, but becomes, in virtue of it, the mature passion
of love. First it is commanded and obeyed; later it may become
"spontaneous".
To summarize these brief remarks on Kierkegaard's transformation 
of romantic love and friendship, we note that preferential passion 
is self-love in disguise; but like egocentric self-love it may grow 
to an eternal and transformed passion, which relates the self to 
itself in the context of divine love. Love, like faith, is indeed 
a passion. All passion is essentially divine, the unifying common 
'e^ehieaee .of liiuraahity. But there are authentic passions and passions 
which time discloses as temporal illusions. Each must be transformed 
in the light of the eternal. Love has both an aesthetic quality 
and an eternal quality, and there may be a connection between the 
two; the aesthetic may even prepare the way for the eternal. "No 
one has escaped from love or ever will so long as there be beauty II2 Iand eyes to see with." .J
Certainly love cannot be reduced by the criteria of reason. 
The passion of love must be preserved, even as it becomes the mature, 
just^e.quiltâb!le love of neighbour, even as it is realized through 
the perceptions of duty and obedience. Christianity, says Kierkegaard, 
has abolished all the distinctions between the many different kinds 
of love, and indeed knows only one kind. Christian love is the 
essential love, indeed, "love is God". As such it lies at the root 
of every love. Faith is the highest passion; but in another sense
1. For S.K. there is little substantial difference between romantic love and friendship. 
Both are passionate preferences which tend to militate against proper love for God and 
the neighbour unless they are changed into the love of the Eternal, as God becomes the 
third member of the relationship. If they are not so changed, then both are merely ego­
centric self-love in disguise,
2. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 112
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faith is the return of the lover's love to the lover, yet made visible 
again in love for the neighbour.
In the stress upon love for the neighbour, Kierkegaard preserves 
the idea of justice which is originally disclosed in the Incarnation. 
"Love does not alter the beloved, it alters itself". Christian 
love is not conditional, not dependent upon the virtue present or 
not present in the beloved. It is love which is not manipulative, 
making no 'demands'.  ^ If love becomes dependent upon virtue in 
the beloved, it ceases to be love, and becomes self-projection. 
Kierkegaard believes that any preference in loving leads to injustice; 
the wife, the family, or the comrade is elevated under preferential 
passion to an exclusive status which shuts out the neighbour. If 
the wife, the family, or the comrade is to be loved in the Christian 
sense, it must be with a love that acknowledges a triangular relation­
ship between the two persons and God. God is the third party, the 
invisible bond, indeed, the very bonding love which combines loves, 
properly conceived, into a tri-unity superseding mutuality. God's 
love then stipulates that there must be no exclusiveness in the
relationship. Love for God expressed and made visible as love
2for the neighbour, in equality with oneself.
3. Summary: True and False Self-Love
From the above references to Kierkegaard's remarks about roman­
tic love and friendship, we may now note several points in relation 
to self-love.
1. cf. Kierkegaard, Works;, of ILoveylbp. cit. p. 38. God loves, apparently, without demanding 
that his love be returned. He does, however, command that one's neighbour shall be loved. 
In Works of Love Kierkegaard seems to ignore the command to love God in any other sense 
than by loving one's neighbour, a possible departure from earlier views:"Truly a p r o ­
fession of faith is not enough." (p. 344)
2. Kierkegaard rarely mentions the inherent justice which is entailed in his idea of love 
of neighbour. His criteria of equality, lack of possessiveness, refusal to manipulate, 
and inclusiveness are all implicit principles of justice which lend credibility to his 
idea of love's 'w o r k s '.
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(1) Kierkegaard recognizes and to some extent develops the need
for a proper self-love in Christian theology. Although he does 
distinguish between the inadequate self-love that leads to despair 
and the mature self-love which arises through faith, he detects
the possibility that the 'positive' type of self-love may develop
from the 'negative' type.
(2) His idea of a proper love of self in relation to God and the
neighbour entails the "paradox" of self-renunciation and devotion 
to the neighbour. The command to love the neighbour is an 'imperative' 
which becomes the 'indicative' of faith. Only through love of neigh­
bour is the true self "grounded transparently in the Power which 
constituted it."
(3) Romantic love and friendship conceived by "the poet" are forms 
of inauthentic self-love. They are temporal loves, subject to change. 
They may be transformed into "eternal" loves through recognition 
of the duty to love the neighbour which overcomes "the passion of 
preference". Faith is a greater "passion" which does not allow 
the elevation of self and selfish loves above the love due to the
neighbour.
(4) Proper love for spouse, friends, comrades, etc., is the recogni­
tion that they are first of all "the neighbour", to be loved a^
oneself, and not to the exclusion of others. The concept of "neigh­
bour" implies a context of justice for every love. All jealousy, 
possessiveness, coercion, and inequality of preference and treatment 
are excluded.
(5) Even though the commandment to love the neighbour must be obeyed, 
love without passion is not love. Through faith there may be a 
conversion of duty into spontaneous love, by which, love for the 
neighbour becomes more than dry obedience. The preferential passions 
of romantic love and friendship must be transformed into passions 
which are correlative with the love of God, disclosed in the Incarna­
tion. But passion itself must be preserved, for the human's love
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for God, faith, is the greatest passion of all. We turn now to 
look at Kierkegaard's attempt to show how obedience may be changed 
into spontaneous, passionate love for the neighbour.
Ill. The Duty of Love
1. Love and Will
In distinction from the spontaneous, romantic, aesthetic concep­
tion of love described in poetry and song, Kierkegaard stresses 
the notion of a love which is different because it is intimately
related to faith. "Although a man cannot give himself the condition
1for faith, he must will to love." The idea of a love which can 
be willed, says Kierkegaard, is essentially different from the happy 
fortune of romance. In prescribing the "royal law" that the neighbour 
shall be loved, Jesus does not even ask the question whether love 
can be willed. Set in the form of a command, there is no doubt 
for Kierkegaard that the love of the New Testament is initially 
an imperative which demands unquestioning obedience. But the imperat­
ive is also a paradox which discloses the indicative of a person's 
love for God. The subtle movement from duty to spontaneity is char­
acteristic of Kierkegaard's concept of the Christian ethic, supersed­
ing duty conceived rationally. This movement is a general theme 
in Works of Love. How Kierkegaard attempts to unite duty and love 
in the context of faith may be seen in his interpretation of I John 
5:3, "to love God is to keep his commands."
It is as if the apostle said, "Dear me, what is all this which would hinder you from loving; what is all this which you can win by self-love; the commandment is that you shall love, but when you understand life and yourself, then it is 
as if you should not need to be commanded, because to love human beings is still the only thing worth living for; with­out this love you really do not live; to love human beings is also the only salutary consolation for both time and eternity, and to love humgn beings is the only true sign that you are a Christian.
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , op. cit. p. 134 2..Kierkegaard, Works of Love, op. cit. p . 344
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In other words, Kierkegaard states explicitly, "a profession of 
faith is not enough."^ Faith that is grounded upon an impression 
of "the omnipotent wonder worker" and not the God who became a servant 
is not really faith. If faith is to be preserved in action it is 
made functional through the strenuous commandment to love the neigh­
bour as the self. God himself provides the conditions for obedience 
to the divine command, by becoming human and in his humanity removing 
the offence, the alienating factor in human inequality with God.
Because the commandment to love is so antithetical to love 
conceived as spontaneous inclination by "the poet", and thereby
capricious, Kierkegaard claims that such a command "cannot have 
been conceived in any human heart". Yet, there is a sense in which 
love must become once more spontaneous precisely through its character 
of duty. (Kierkegaard's dialectic is at work again.) Love must
be able to retain "its ardor, its joy, its desire, its originative
2power, its living freshness". True spontaneity in loving occurs 
in virtue of love's capacity to be willed. Only conceived, and 
obeyed, as primary duty motivated by absolute duty to God (and so 
to the neighbour) can love make the leap from the realm of the temporal, 
changeable, and capricious to the realm of the eternal. But implicit 
within the obedience to the divine command is an assumption that 
such obedience attains, through practice and devotion, the character 
of developing spontaneity. "Only when it is a duty to love, only Î
then is love eternally secured against every change, eternally made 4
\free in blessed independence eternally and happily secured against
3 idespair." .
"1But because egocentric self-love is never entirely annihilated, 4
love can never be assumed to be spontaneous in the ordinary sense.
1. ibid.
2. ibid. p. 50
3. ibid. p. 44
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Spontaneity in loving is only something which develops as a person, 
in faith, learns more and more what love is like, and then "should 
not need to be commanded". Kierkegaard implies that "a knight of 
faith" might be able to love, as he ought to love, spontaneously. 
But human sin is so persistent that virtue in the Christian sense 
must be determined by the command to love the neighbour as oneself; 
it can never be taken for granted. Love must be believed and it 
must be willed. "The 'how' of (human) love is not the 'how' of 
f a i t h . B u t  faith, one's love for God, informs one's love for 
human beings, making the will to love the neighbour possible, in 
the context of obedience to the "royal law".
2. Justice Inherent in the Royal Law
Kierkegaard's individualism has often made him appear to be 
a kind of 'Christian' Max Stirner. An "absolute relation of the 
individual to the Absolute" does indeed highlight an emphasis upon 
the individual which might undermine social responsibility. However, 
it is apparent from Kierkegaard's attempt to set the faithful indivi­
dual in a context of God's own transformation of equality and justice, 
viewed in the light of the paradox of the Incarnation, that his 
idea of ethics, of a wider justice applicable to all human relations, 
is intimately related to his idea of love.
The commandment to love is applicable both to neighbours "seen" 
and "unseen". He criticizes equally those who declare that love 
is possible only for those whom their lives touch, and those who 
reserve their love for folk far away. Love for those whom we see 
is a demanding task, which demands "the closed eye" of gentleness
2and forbearance, which does not see defects and imperfections.
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (trans. David F. Swenson and Walter 
Lowrie), Princeton University Press, i94l p. 302. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 159
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Love loves without altering the beloved, continues to love if the 
beloved is changed for the worse, even if the beloved comes to hate 
the lover. Love is ready with forgiveness before the beloved is 
ready to ask it, consummates a 'spiritual' reconciliation even though 
the beloved mpy continue to be estranged. Kierkegaard holds Christ's 
love for Peter, the disciple who denied him, as the paradigm for 
love between friends. In proper relation to God, love "covers a 
multitude of sins" Love is called "the duty to be in debt to
the neighbour". The debt is one of action, or response to the 
neighbour's need, wherever or whomever he may be.
Kierkegaard notes especially the Christian's responsibility 
to and for the poor. Material charity is only a small part of what 
is required in "works" of humility, equality, and shared suffering. 
The precept is Christ's ministry among the poor:
If one did not have money, but understood how to speakof mercifulness in a way encouraging and inspiring to 
the poor, the wretched, I wonder if he would not have done just as much as he who tossed the poor some money ^ or preached benevolence out of the pockets of the rich!
Mercy, says Kierkegaard, is prior to benevolence. "Have mercy,
3and then giving money takes care of itself." He also distinguishes 
an inherent sense of justice in the neighbour's sense of self, in
light of one's own proper selfhood appreciated in dependence upon 
God.
To have individuality is to believe in the individuality of every other person; for individuality is not mine, but ^ God's gift by which he gives me being and gives being to all.
In light of Christ's love, transforming self-love into love
of neighbour, Kierkegaard says that the concept of possession is
radically altered in definition.
1. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. pp. 165 ff.
2. ibid. p. 293
3. ibid. p. 297 Compare Feuerbach: "Mercy is the justice of sensuous life." (Das
Rechtsgefuhl der S i n n l i c h k e i t , )
4. ibid. p. 253 Compare Feuerbach : "Love is...to recognize the just self-love of another." 
The Diary, W e r k e , Band 2, The Essence of Christianity, op. cit. p . 49
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The category mine disappears completely only for self- renouncing love, and the distinction mine and yours ceases entirely...Only spiritual love has the courage to will to have no mine at all, the courage to abolish completely the distinction between mine and yours, and^therefore it wins God...The true lover seeks not his own.
In the duty to love the neighbour, it is the Christian's duty
to inspire love, in the proper relation to God, but without coercion.
2Love, says Kierkegaard, can only be "loved forth". The duty the 
Christian owes to God is owed simultaneously to the neighbour, in 
light of the strenuous commandment to love. Implicit in the command­
ment is that authentic love, like that shown in the Incarnation, 
cannot be achieved 'from above'. The Christian must be willing 
to make himself equal with the neighbour. "Love is exultant when
it unites equals, but it is triumphant when it makes that which
«was unequal equal in love."
What is possible for God because of the "omnipotence of love" 
is not so easy for human beings. Our love in light of God's demonst­
rated love must be a constant effort of will; the duty of the royal 
law is, or should be, "a slave who reminds you daily" that Christian 
love is a difficult task. The "you shall" of the commandment preserv­
es and protects the passion of love so that habit cannot be substitut-
3ed for it. The "you shall" is the element which denies jealousy, 
possessiveness, egotism, and a kind of piety which becomes divorced 
from love's task and demand in this world. Only with the retention 
of the duty can love be maintained in accord with the ideal of equality, 
in rxenunciation of egocentrism, against the constant threat of in­
authentic self-love in various forms, and in fulfilment of selfhood.^ 
Kierkegaard's closing statement in Works of Love demonstrates
1. ibid. pp. 250-251
2. This appears to be an Augustinian reference to the way in which God inspires human amor 
D e i . Kierkegaard applies it also to human love for other humans, cf. Works of L o v e , op. 
cit. p. 206
3. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 51
4. The strict equality of self and neighbour before God is derived directly from Augustine, 
cf. Oliver 0 'Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. A u g u s t i n e , op. cit. Chapter 5, 
pp. 113 ff. The 'as y o u r s e l f  is régula a m o r i s , 'the measure of l o v e ' for Augustine.
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the constant challenge presented in the commandment to love the 
neighbour as the self, the inherent justice in that "law", and the 
hope of a grace which will compensate for human inadequacy in measur­
ing up to the precept of Christ.
Just as the well-brought-up child has an unforgettable conception of rigour, so also must the human being who relates himself to God's love, if he is not "foolishly"(I Tim. 4:7) or light-mindedly to take it in vain, have
an unforgettable fear and trembling, even though he rests in God's love. Such a person will certainly avoid speaking to God about the wrongs of others toward him, about the speck in his brother's eye, for such a person will rather speak to God only about grace, lest this fateful word 
justice lose everything for him through what ÿe himself has called forth, the rigorous like-for-like.
"The rigorous like-for-like", it may be remembered, is the point
of departure in Kierkegaard's analogy of the king who loved a humble
maiden. The commandment to love, obeyed in faith until the love
shown by faith becomes in part "spontaneous", is Kierkegaard's attempt
at a correction of Christian ethics. The love of humans for God,
the passion of faith, brings upon the head of the believer the task
and demand of love in a rigorous Christian sense ; we must love because
God first loved us; and we are called to love as God loved us.
The onus of the Incarnation is brought to bear upon the loves of
humanity; love does not alter the beloved, it alters itself. Love
wills to break the barriers that alienate authentic relationships
between human beings - specifically egotism and the "preferential
passions" which characterize romantic love and friendship in the
terms of "the poet". Just love is love of neighbour, in which the
self is identified as the neighbour, and God is identified in, and
2as authentic love for the neighbour. Kierkegaard has attempted
to preserve the inherent passion and justice of the Moment of the 
Incarnation, visible only to "the eyes of faith".
1. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 353
2. ibid. p. 247 "...the only true object of a human being's love is love which is God, 
who thereby in a deeper sense is not an object at all, since he is himself love." i.e. 
in loving the love in just love for one's neighbour, by loving the neighbour as oneself 
and in equality with h i m , one loves God.
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IV. Short Assessment and Critique
Without doubt Kierkegaard has offered modern theology a unique 
and far-reaching approach to the retention of the idea of love in 
an intimate connection with faith. The numerous interpretations 
of Kierkegaard are witnesses to his effectiveness at stimulating 
reflection upon faith and love together, as well as many other concerns. 
The idea of the self, the uniqueness of the individual, the supra- 
ethical character of Christianity, and the inadequacy of rational 
theology are allied issues upon which no definitive statement has 
yet been produced. Particularly, he has asserted, as perhaps no 
other theologian has been able, that Christianity requires a different 
context of thought relative to the totally unique foundations of 
faith: "Faith begins precisely where thinking leaves off." In addi­
tion, a thorough reading of Kierkegaard shows how "unthinkable" 
is the love of God, how demanding is the "rigorous" work in loving 
one's neighbour, and how conditional and inadequate are our ordinary 
human passions.
Although Kierkegaard rarely uses the term 'justice', it is 
in the background of his strenuous characterization of Christian 
works of love, opposed to and overcoming the injustices of Christendom. 
His criteria for authentic expressions of love are, in fact, principles 
of justice. Love is not manipulative; it causes people to alter 
themselves instead of making demands on the beloved. Love is not 
possessive or jealous; it loves even when it is not reciprocated. 
Love, as forgiveness, covers a multitude of wrongs. Love assumes 
the equality of all persons; genuine love for oneself is realized 
only as the self is recognized in one's neighbour, in respect of 
the neighbour's God-given selfhood. Passionate preference, for 
friends, family, and country, leads to inequality between human 
beings; therefore love requires inclusiveness. On this last point, 
however, Kierkegaard may have overstated his case. Balanced and 
appropriate loyalties for certain 'friends', passionate and joyful
13 1
preferences for some humans over others, may not necessarily lead 
to injustice. Jesus, we remember, had at least twelve special friends, 
and "he loved them to the end". "Greater love hath no man than
this, that he lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13).
Although Kierkegaard undoubtedly has some understanding of
God's grace, I wonder whether it is adequate. For him, at least
prior to his Easter experience of 1848, grace is incapable of finally
cutting through the alienation between the divine and the human. 
The "offence" always remains as the stumbling-block which prevents
the conscious appropriation of God's saving love. The individual,
at some point, is always 'thrown back upon himself and must make 
his own "leap of faith". Personally, I find it difficult to believe 
that faith can ultimately actuate God's saving love, although I
think Kierkegaard is right in his assessment of faith's work in
identifying the supra-rational ethic of love of neighbour a^ oneself 
in identification and equality with one's fellow human being. One 
might wish for more emphasis upon God's enabling grace in the transi­
tion of the individual from the love of the temporal to the love
1of the eternal. Removal of the "offence" may not be enough.
The Christian might recall that Paul was able to speak of
God's kingdom being born willy-nilly in our midst, in the process 
of which, somehow, "all things work together" (Romans 8:28 ff). 
Paul's allusions to God's supportive, creative, enabling love must 
be set alongside his "strenuous" emphasis upon faith. Perhaps 
Kierkegaard, in his zeal to set love in the context of faith, has 
forgotten to allow God a continuous, effective role in history,
in the innumerable 'descrete leaps of decision' which succeed each 
other in producing a climate for greater love, greater justice, 
and even greater faith.
1. cf. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, E.T. G.W. Bromiley, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1958. 
p. 747: "If only the final impression left by this book were not that of the detective 
skill with which non-Christian love is tracked down to its last hiding place, e x a m i n e d , 
shown to be worthless, and haled before the judge!" Barth sees little grace in Works 
of Love, although Kierkegaard profoundly influenced Barth (particularly in his early theology).
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Kierkegaard may be right to assert that "no generation has 
yet learned to love from another" just as faith cannot be taught.
But he has nevertheless identified a primal generative possibility 
in all human passion, which may become "the highest passion". Passion, 
he says, is "man’s perdition as well as his exaltation". "He who 
is lost through passion has not lost so much as he who has lost
passion, for the former had the possibility."^ Despite Kierkegaard's
radical separation between inauthentic passions and the passion
of faith, one may detect in the movement between them a subtle provid­
ence, the evidence of God's love which supports and sustains human 
beings even in despair. God's creativity, based upon the "possibility" 
inherent in passions, seems to be already at work even before it 
becomes conscious for the individual. But this Kierkegaard, who
really does detect a providential movement between religiosity 'A' 
and religiosity 'B', is too often eclipsed by his insistent dualism 
between them. Of course Kierkegaard might answer that we have here 
a paradox; God's grace is undoubtedly active all along, but it only 
becomes active for the individual in the Moment.
Nevertheless, the paradox has often been misinterpreted by 
persons less able than himself to "understand" it. For example, 
our century has witnessed an extensive discussion of one of Kierkegaard's 
dualistic characterizations of the idea of love:
"In the whole of the New Testament there is not found a word about love in the segse in which the poet sings of it and paganism defined it.
As Iring Fetscher criticized Karl Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, the
words may apply to Kierkegaard: "Das ist sicher allés ganz richtig,
3aber doch nicht die ganze Wahrheit." We must examine further the 
alleged dualism between the love of the New Testament, and love 
in culture's understanding.
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific P o s t s c r i p t , op. cit. p. 29 Kierkegaard's emphasis 
on passion in faith recalls the 'divine m a d n e s s ' of Plato, cf. The P h a e d r u s , 244 ff.
2. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , p. 59
3. Iring Fetscher, "Hegel, F W e r b a c h , Marx", H e q e l s t u d i e n . Bonn, 1953 p. 376. ("That is 
certainly all quite c o r r e c t , but it is still not the whole truth.")
APPENDIX TO PART ONE 
Feuerbach and Kierkegaard
It would be unfair to either Feuerbach or Kierkegaard to over­
stress their similarity. It is for some very good reasons that 
Feuerbach is today remembered for his atheism, while Kierkegaard 
gets credit for asserting an idea of God completely unaccountable 
to human ideology. Yet, Feuerbach's answer of "anthropology" and 
Kierkegaard's answer of "paradox" are replies to a similar question 
posed in different ways and by different authors throughout the 
Enlightenment: "What is religion, specifically the Christian religion?" 
Entailed in the analysis that led to the question were so many contra­
dictions of human experience and human reason that one might no 
longer assume a simple, intrinsic correlation between faith and 
reason. The creeds of the Church presented an anomaly to people
who were beginning to attain a scientific outlook. The relationship 
of matter to thought, of scientific and empirical data to rational 
analysis began to be examined; the affirmations of faith were tried 
and found wanting. Not only did the medieval doctrines of God begin 
to be questioned, but the correspondence of belief to action also 
came under examination. How was it that Christianity had become 
so much an accepted and established religion that it could hardly 
be distinguished from the idea of the state? How could the ethical 
ideals of the New Testament be reconciled with either the wars and 
pettiness of temporal Christendom, or the pompous pretence of
ecclesiastical spokesmen? How could the ideal of equality and justice 
for all persons under God be reconciled with the tacit support and 
approval of church and state for feudal class hierarchies?
The short answer of both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard was, "It 
couldn't." For both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, the 'truth' of 
Christianity lay elsewhere than in the cultural assumptions which
bound church and state together, bound faith to credal formulae.
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bound Christian ethics to the law of the land, bound human love 
to national identity. In a very real sense, the most deliberate,
underlying concern, shared and cherished by both Feuerbach and 
Kierkegaard, was concern for human justice and human liberation.
Of course, how such a community of liberation was to arise practically 
was a question to be left to others. Their contribution was to 
the principles by which "Christianity" might be liberated from 
"Christendom". Only a crude analysis of each thinker could attribute 
to Feuerbach and Kierkegaard a self-seeking individualism, unconcerned 
for social justice. In their very different ways, each identified 
the enslaving bonds of Christendom as the inhibition of "divine" 
love, expressed potentially in the "essence" of Christianity.
Of course, "divine love" and Christianity's "essence" meant
Iradically different things to Feuerbach and Kierkegaard. If their i
common assertion was that love is held in bondage to Christendom, iitheir most pronounced difference is the interpretation of this love. 41Whereas Feuerbach could use the term "divine" with abandon, implying 4
Iusually the transcendent characteristics of the human's love for i
his species, the word for Kierkegaard could hardly be deemed adequate ,J|
3to express the absolute, radically other, "omnipotence of love" |
as the very quality of God himself. J
iIn light of the intrinsic similarities, as well as the ultimate tIopposition between Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, there is a sense in
.2 iwhich Kierkegaard may be seen as a dialectical 'student' of Feuerbach. if
During his visits to Berlin, Kierkegaard was immersed in the debates '1of left, right, and center Hegelianism. We know, for example, that ■1
he attended the inaugural lecture of Schelling on "The Philosophy I
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , op. cit. p. 40: "This is the God as he stands 
upon the earth, like unto the humblest by the power of his omnipotent love." "Omnipotent 
love" is constituent to the "paradox."
2. Similarly, S.K. is a "dialectical student" of Kant, H e g e l , and Socrates!
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of Revelation" in November, 1841, in the company of Bakunin and
Engels.^ It is not known whether Feuerbach's influence was felt
directly by Kierkegaard at this time. However, Feuerbach's book.
The Essence of Christianity was published in 1841, and Engels wrote
later that its influence was pervasive. "Enthusiasm was general,"
he wrote, "we all became at once Feuerbachians. " Berlin was the
centre of the Young Hegelian group, and Schelling's lectures were
a part of the general expectation and ferment affecting the academic
community in the early days of the growing fervour which culminated
in the revolution of 1848. If Engel's statement is true, that
"enthusiasm was general", Feuerbach could hardly have escaped
Kierkegaard's notice.
Kierkegaard's book Fear and Trembling, published in 1843,
appears to be an 'answer' to the left-Hegelian critique of religion,
notably apparent in the works of D.F. Strauss, as well as in Feuerbach,
2Bruno Bauer, and other radical interpreters of Hegel. It may be 
no more than coincidence, but Feuerbach himself noted the depth
of feeling contained in the story of Abraham and Isaac, which is “i
]Kierkegaard's point of departure in Fear and Trembling. Feuerbach #
i|noted that Gregory of Nyssa "could never look at an image which
3 irepresented the sacrifice of Isaac without being moved to tears..." =|IAnd whether it is intentional or not, Kierkegaard's "paradox", devel- 1
oped throughout his early writings, seems to be a restatement and 
correction of Feuerbach's climactic chapter in The Essence of Christ-
4ianity, entitled "The Contradiction of Faith and Love".
1. cf. David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl M a r x , op. cit. p. 27. McLellan doesn't 
give his source, but S.K.'s Journal tells us he was in Berlin at the time.
2. McLellan notes that Strauss merely accentuated a critique which was already present 
among certain of Hegel's students. Strauss himself observed the "left, right, and 
centre" distinctions among Hegelians.
3. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. p. 76
4. ibid. Chapter XXVI, and Appendix, Section 20.
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Kierkegaard's book Philosophical Fragments or A Fragment of 
Philosophy is a deliberate attempt at a refutation of left-Hegelianism, 
pietism, and rationalism. It is clear that Kierkegaard attempts 
in this book to refute Feuerbach, yet taking seriously Feuerbach's 
critique of religion, rational theology, and doctrinal belief.^ 
Kierkegaard's Journal notes that he purchased The Essence of Christ­
ianity in the second edition, and studied it while writing Philosoph-
2ical Fragments during 1844. An internal comparison of the two 
books reveals that many of Feuerbach's themes are adapted and re­
interpreted by Kierkegaard. In one significant instance, what 
Feuerbach uses as an illustration is transformed by Kierkegaard 
into a central "analogy". This is Feuerbach:
A king who has not the welfare of his subjects at heart, who, while seated on his throne, does not mentally live with them in their dwellings, who, in feeling, is not, as the people say, "a common man", such a king will not des­cend bodily from his throne to make his people happy by 
his personal appearance. Thus, has not the subject risen to be a king before the king descends to be a subject?And if the subject feels himself honoured and made happy by the personal presence of his king, does this feeling refer merely to the bodily presence, and not rather to the manifestation of the disposition, of the philanthro­pic nature which is the cause of the appearance? But that which in the truth of religion is the cause, takes in the consciousness of religion the form of a consequence; and so here the raising of man to God is made a consequence of the humiliation or descent of God to man. God, says ^religion, made himself human that he might make man divine.
Feuerbach's illustration of king and subject is part of his interpre­
tation of the "secret" (Geheimnis) of the Incarnation. It is just 
such a secret which concerns Kierkegaard as he develops his analogy 
of "the king who loved a humble maiden".
Suppose then a king who loved a humble maiden. The heart of the king was not polluted by the wisdom that is loudly 
enough proclaimed; he knew nothing of the difficulties that the understanding discovers in order to ensnare the heart, which keeps Jhe poets so busy, and make their magic formulas necessary...
1. In addition to Feuerbach, S.K. juxtaposes themes and arguments from various writers, 
including Strauss, MaBdümRant, Hegel, and Plato.2. S.K. bought Feuerbach's book on March 20, 1844. Pa p i r e r , V.A. 14; cf. Thulstrup's 
commentary in Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , op. cit. p. 204
3. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. p. 50
4. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, op. cit. pp. 32-34
%
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Kierkegaard's reference to the poets' "magic formulas" may well
Jbe a satirical critique of Feuerbach's interpretation of the Incarna- *>j
tion. In the same context Kierkegaard seems to note Feuerbach's
emphasis upon matter and nutrition: "Would it not be desirable if
I could confine the terms of my argument to meat and drink and did
1not need to bring in kings...?" For Kierkegaard, the king-subject 
analogy must begin with a real love of the king for the subject, 
and not merely a condescending urge to be among "the people". The 
"subject" becomes a "maiden" with whom the king is in love. The 
king cannot merely "elevate" the maiden because of the resentment, 
the "offence", which would be incurred. Kierkegaard restates 
Feuerbach's illustration of the Incarnation, but adds the ingredients 
of a kingly love, and a "kingly grief", that he might cause offence 
by his condescension. An "appearance" of likeness is not enough; 
the king must actually become like the maiden.
Kierkegaard's version of the king-subject analogy/illustration 
recognizes a God, who, because of the depth of his love, cannot 
permit himself to "make himself human" simply in order to make human­
ity "happy". Condescension alone would be resented. An "appearance" 
of God as man could not break down the alienation by which God and 
humanity are separated. Therefore, God did not "make himself human 
that he might make man divine", as Feuerbach interprets the Incarna­
tion. Rather, for Kierkegaard, the Incarnation is purely a function 
of God's "unfathomable", "omnipotent" love, motivated by his "kingly .1
grief" that the union of love might be only partial.
Kierkegaard's analogy of "the king who loved a humble maiden" 
might be called a characterization of an 'existential' problem of 
the divine. For Feuerbach, "the divine" has existence only in terms 
of the human. For Kierkegaard, the divine is "eternal" but has 
an overwhelming need to become .an existent within time, within
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, op. cit. p. 32
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'the finite'. Thus we may see one way in which Kierkegaard takes
a Feuerbachian idea, and transforms it dialectically to serve his
purpose. It is a subtle method, illustrating the effect of dialectic 
upon dialectic. (As we may remember, Feuerbach himself had used
the same method in his critique of Hegel.) Although the dynamics 
between Kierkegaard and Feuerbach are far too complex to describe 
fully, I will try to list the main comparisons.
(1) For Feuerbach faith and love are contradictions. Kierkegaard 
attempts to overcome the contradiction but without recourse to the 
doctrinal rationalism of Christendom, which had forced Feuerbach 
into the necessity of denying the conjunction of love of neighbour 
with credal faith. Kierkegaard develops the idea of "paradox" to 
avoid Feuerbach's criticism that reason cannot be applied to belief, 
which is not rational.
(2) Feeling, Sinnlichkeit, is Feuerbach's principle of unity for 
human existence and human species-consciousness. Kierkegaard develops 
the idea of feeling into the notion of "passion". "That in which
all human life is unified is passion and faith is a passion." Indeed, 
"the highest passion is faith." For Feuerbach, feeling at its highest 
point is species-love. Kierkegaard's dialectical transformation 
of feeling/love is passion/love for God (i.e. faith). But both 
Feuerbach and Kierkegaard come together again in stressing practical 
ethics as love of neighbour.
(3) Feuerbach, following Hegel, attempts to "posit the infinite 
in the finite" through the "image" of the Incarnation. For Kierkegaard 
the Incarnation is a "paradox", not merely an image, and still not 
subject to rational criticism nor to historical documentation. 
It is the "Moment" in which "the eternal" enters time, both as an 
event, and as an event particularly appropriate for the finite 
individual. The idea of "the infinite in the finite" (Feuerbach) 
is dialectically related to "the eternal in time" (Kierkegaard).
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(4) Feuerbach elevates the human to the divine in the Incarnation; 
Kierkegaard lowers the divine to the human in a movement which is 
the revelation of "the omnipotence of love", Feuerbach's interpreta­
tion presupposes a latend "divinity" in human love; Kierkegaard 
presupposes an infinite "difference in quality" between human love 
and divine love. For Kierkegaard, the human is not "elavated" at 
all; God becomes like the human; the human is loved by God, but 
is never like God.
(5) Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard say that "love is God", but they 
mean different things. Feuerbach means that love, qua human species- 
love, is the most divine attribute of the human, and thus transcends 
the individual in a creative movement toward species and community.
For Kierkegaard, love is only truly love if it is revealed through 
"the eyes of faith". God is love, and love is God; but human love 
outside of faith is tantamount to egotism, even if it presumes to 
be selfless in motive. Faith, for Kierkegaard, is the only authentic­
ation of love as God, as according to the divine command, the neigh­
bour is loved as the self.
(6) Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard insist that one must "believe 
in love". For Feuerbach, it is the only thing worthy to be believed 
in which transcends individual experience. For Kierkegaard a belief 
in love as "a knight of infinite resignation" preserves the "possibil­
ity" of authentic love. For "a knight of faith", a belief in love
preserves the relationship with the eternal and facilitates obedience 
to the divine command that the neighbour shall be loved.
(7) For both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, love is a principle of self-
identification. For Feuerbach human love enables a growing species-
consciousness: "The love of others tells you who you are." For
Kierkegaard, the love of neighbour informs authentic selfhood, in
that only through self-renunciation is true selfhood possible: "Like 
1is known by like." ______________
1. Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard may be dependent upon Hegel's notion of I-thou e p i s t e m o l o g y . 
In describing Jesus' encounter with the woman who touched his garment, Hegel said, "Jesus 
recognized in her a heart like his own, read in her faith her heart's elevation above law 
and fate, and declared to her the forgiveness of her sins." Hegel, The Spirit of Christ-
ianity, trans. T.M. Knox, op. cit. p. 239
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The capacity for community in the encounter between I and thou is 
not essentially different for Feuerbach and Kierkegaard. The differ­
ence is rather in the ultimate significance of the encounter. For 
Feuerbach the I-thou relationship facilitates greater community 
between persons; for Kierkegaard it also facilitates community between 
God and the faithful individual.
(8) Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard acknowledge that exclusive love 
is inadequate. For Feuerbach, corporate self-love is identified 
in nationalism. Kierkegaard agrees, but develops the idea farther.
"Whoever comes to me cannot be my disciple unless he hates his father 
and his mother, his wife, and his children, and himself as well."
This is the "ultimate paradox" which totally prohibits exclusive 
loves. Neighbour-love is absolutely equitable, allowing for no 
"passionate preference".
(9) For Feuerbach the individual is only an individual in reference 
to his species, and cannot be conceived outside his fellow-creatures.
Kierkegaard departs from this idea radically. Faith is the paradox 
that the individual is a "particular that is higher than the universal".
The individual has his ultimate responsibility to "the Absolute".
This relation may supersede responsibility to the community.
(10) Feuerbach's idea of ethics is grounded upon love as the human's 
greatest, most "divine" attribute. It stems from, and further enables,
4the identification of the I with the thou, making possible an unalien- 
ated expression of love in a greater community, as the love becomes 
increasingly actualized through developing "species consciousness". 
Kierkegaard's view of ethics is accountable only, ultimately, to 
the individual's relation to the Absolute, because through faith, 
the individual is higher than the universal. But practically, 
Kierkegaard's idea of ethics is grounded upon the "duty" to love 
the neighbour as oneself, enabled through the transformation of 
human self-love in all its forms into a love which is not self-seeking
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and is thus "eternal" as it wills to love the neighbour.
(11) Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard demonstrate the inadequacy of 
conceptions of a God who is not, in some sense, relational. Both
insist that God must be able to feel exactly what humans feel, suffer 
as humans suffer, and experience the limitations of time and space. 
This critique of rational and hypostatized concepts of God is perhaps 
their greatest commonality. But at the same time, the implications 
they draw from the critique is their greatest difference. For
Feuerbach, the need for God to be able to identify with the human 
condition implies that the human himself is "divine". For Kierkegaard, 
it means that God has not been properly 'understood' as "omnipotent 
love", who is constrained to identify with the human condition, 
to become "absolutely relative" to the individual human being. 
Thus they both argue, in different ways, against a rationalized 
absolute deity who is impassible, or incapable of experiencing human
deficiencies. In their own ways they both posit a God of love who
is "absolutely relative" to the human condition. For Feuerbach 
it implies the divinity in the human; for Kierkegaard it implies 
the humanity in the divine.
Summary
Kierkegaard's point of departure in many of his works is a 
critique of Feuerbach's "contradiction of faith and love". This 
"contradiction" stems from the rationalism of the Enlightenment, 
reaching a climax in the writings of Immanuel Kant. Although Feuerbach 
brought the "contradiction" to the suface during the pre-revolutionary 
ferment in Germany, the contradiction is derived from Hegel. In 
Hegel's own attempt to resolve the contradiction he tried to hold 
faith, love, and reason together in a universal "system". The system 
lies in the immediate background of both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, 
and both tried to find ways to resolve the contradiction which would
not place love in subjection to reason, as both Kant and Hegel had 
attempted to do. Reason was found to be inadequate for an explanation 
of love by both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard; for Feuerbach because 
it could not make sense of human feeling, and because love was found 
to be different, in essence, from reason; for Kierkegaard, because 
it could not admit the "paradox" of a relationship in which the 
particular individual is related absolutely to the Absolute. "The 
contradiction of faith and love" was a central concern of the left- 
Hegelian school, given form in Feuerbach's book The Essence of 
Christianity. But in a dialectical reinterpretation of the contradic­
tion, Kierkegaard reinterpreted many of the Hegelian themes to attempt 
a 'paradoxical synthesis' (if such an idea is conceivable) between 
faith and love. The debates of the Hegelian schools, particularly
as given form by Feuerbach, thus constitute a major catalyst in
1the works of Kierkegaard.
In a wider sense, the connection between Feuerbach and 
Kierkegaard has profoundly affected our era. To a considerable 
extent it represents the argument for a relational deity who is 
not a hypostasis of reason nor of power, but rather a God who expe­
riences the human condition, who suffers, and who love. The
practical and ethical import of the debate between Feuerbach and 
Kierkegaard is also representative of a different debate in our 
era. It represents the difference, if not the synthesis, between 
theology that starts with humanity, and theology that starts with 
God. As I have tried to demonstrate, the interpretation of 'love 
in the context of faith' is no small part of that difference.
1. This is no new observation, but it seems to be often forgotten, cf. Niels Thulstrup's 
commentary to Philosophical Fragments, op. cit. p. 1 vii
PART II
TWENTIETH CENTURY DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN LOVE THEOLOGY
CHAPTER THREE 
LOVES IN CONFLICT - LOVE'S INTEGRITY
The Influence of Anders Nygren upon Twentieth Century Love-Talk, 
and the Characteristic Response of Some of his Critics.
«
CHAPTER THREE 
LOVES IN CONFLICT - LOVE'S INTEGRITY 
The Influence of Anders Nygren upon Twentieth Century Love-Talk, 
and the Characteristic Response of Some of his Critics.
Topical Survey
Introduction
I. The Influence of anders Nygren upon the Concept
of Love in Christian Theology Pg. 144
1. Motif Analysis Pg. 144
2. The Method at Work Pg. 146
3. Agape ; "Expression of a Life-force"? Pg. 149
4. Agape ; Omnibus Dubitandum? Pg. 157
5. The Creation of Value by Agape and the Problem of the
Fall Pg. 160
6. The Problem of Fellowship with God Pg. 167
7. The Problem of Agape as a Synonym for Grace Pg. 173
II. John Burnaby on St. Augustine's Concept of Caritas
1. The Summum Bonum: a Bonum Commune Pg. 179
2. Self-Love and Love for the Neighbour Pg. 183
III. Toward Love's Integrity in Christian Theology
1. "Some Kind of Unity" Pg. 189
2. Love's Historical Integrity Pg. 192
3. Love's Biblical Integrity Pg. 197
Summary and Implications Pg. 202
Appendix: M.C. D'Arcy's Synthesis: "The Lion and the Unicorn"
CHAPTER THREE
LOVES IN CONFLICT - LOVE'S INTEGRITY
The Influence of Anders Nygren upon Twentieth Century Theological Love-talk, and the Characteristic Response of Some of his Critics.
As we begin a study of the twentieth century distinctions
between eros, agape, caritas, and philein, seeking some pre-eminent 
ground of commonality between them, it may be important to recall 
the point at which we left Kierkegaard. In Kierkegaard's critique 
of romantic love and friendship he asserted that "in the whole of
the New Testament there is not found a word about love in the sense
in which the poet sings of it and paganism defined it. No one,
perhaps not even Kierkegaard himself, has taken this assertion as 
literally as has Anders Nygren. Nygren's distinction between agape 
and eros has had a great influence in twentieth century theology. 
Although his book Agape and Eros has not often been acclaimed without 
qualification by contemporary theologians, its distinctions have 
often been uncritically and even unconsciously accepted. The word
agape has crept into modern usage in a variety of contexts, often 
in connotations which do not necessarily agree with the specific 
definition attributed to it by Nygren. The word eros also has a 
variety of interpretations in modern thought, even more diverse
than in the days of Plato. A critical analysis of both words and
of the history of their development indicates the difficulty of 
arriving at a 'definition' of love. At the same time, the richness 
of love-talk, and of love as an unlimited idea, beckons us toward 
a more holistic grasp of its many facets, and toward its greater 
application.
This chapter will offer a brief exposition of Nygren's view
of love, essentially divided into the 'types' of agape and eros, 
followed by my own critique. We shall then consider John Burnaby's
1. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 59 - John 15:13 possibly calls Kierkegaard's 
assertion in question: "There is no greater love than this, that a man should lay down 
his life for his friends." The meaning of 'friendship' is a common topic both to the 
New Testament and classical literature.
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re-appraisal of St. Augustine's view of caritas. A few contemporary 
perspectives will be noted which have arisen in response to Nygren's 
seminal work. The chapter will conclude with some preliminary found­
ations for keeping love in holistic focus, based upon modern research.
I.The Influence of Anders Nygren upon the Concept of Love in Christian Theology
1. Motif Analysis
Before the publication of Agape and Eros, Nygren had concerned 
himself with the problem of theological method. In several works 
appearing during the early twenties, Nygren tried to establish a 
'scientific' basis for theological study. Theology, he asserted, 
must have its own criteria for meaning and research, independent 
of other disciplines.  ^ According to Nygren, religion purports to
deal with the category of 'the eternal' and 'the life of the spirit'.
Logical hypotheses associated with religion may not be empirically 
verifiable, so scientific method, stated in terms of verifiable 
hypotheses, is inappropriate. Religion cannot be reduced to an 
ethical casuistry either. Despite Nygren's considerable use of 
Kant, he could not accept Kant's reduction of religion to reason 
alone. Least of all could religion be broached in terms of aesthetics. 
Beauty and feeling, Nygren thought, are subjective criteria applicable 
to art, but not to faith. Religion demands its own 'science' and 
to this end, Nygren developed the method of motif-research.
Motif research is a technique for discovering the fund­amental idea or category of a religion. It seeks to setaside what is unique to individual interpreters of a religion and fasten on the elements which are essential and formative. Its procedure is to examine the historical evidence at hand for the understanding of a religion, form a
1. Pet Bestaende i k r i s t e n d o m e n , Stockholm, 1922; trans. in English as Essence of C h r i s t ­
ianity in 1960 (London). Also, Die Gu ltig kei t der religiosen E r f a h r u n g , Gutersloh,
1922; More recently, cf. Meaning and Method, Prolegomena to a Scientific Philosophy of 
Religion and a Scientific Theology, E.T. Philip S. Watson, Epworth Press, London, 1972.
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hypothesis as to the fundamental element amid all the diverse expositions, and then test the hypothesis by checking it against the evidence. If the facts are not accounted for adequately, the hypothesis must be refined or reformulated. If the hypothesis does stand up to the facts, the indications are that it expresses the fundamental character of the religion being studied and not merely peripheral matters.
Although there have been a few theologians besides Nygren who
have attempted to use his method, Nygren himself admits that, after
2fifty years, motif research is "still in its infancy". The reasons 
for its slow acceptance seem to hinge on 'the a priori question'. The 
theologian doing the analysis tends to form his hypotheses on the 
basis of his own starting point. Although this need not be bad in 
itself, Nygren's transparent Lutheran assumptions have not helped to 
convince other theologians that motif research could do the 
'scientific' work he has set for it.
E.P. Sanders, in his comprehensive study of Paul and Palestinian 
Judaism, remarks that motif research ends up necessarily biased in any 
comparison of religious literature because one corpus of writings is
3almost always given pp;e-eminence over a comparative corpus. For 
Sanders, the outstanding example is the comparison of Paul's writings 
with Rabbinic literature. Among other characteristics, Paul's 
writings are shorter and less diverse, more 'available' to scholar­
ship. For Lutherans especially, there tends to be an unbalanced 
emphasis upon the motif or 'justification by faith' in Paul, which has 
only occasionally been compared adequately with the motif of ethics 
and that of Jesus' messianism.^ When the justification by faith motif 
lies uppermost in the mind of the researcher, it becomes the
1., Wartfen Quanbeck, "Anders Nygren", in Handbook of Modern T h e o l o g i a n s , ed. Martin Marty 
and Dean Peerman, World Publishing Co, Nfriy Ybck, 1959.
2. Nygren, Meaning and M e t h o d , op. cit. p. 386
3. E.P. Sanders, Paul and Rabbinic J u d a i s m , SCM, London, 1977, pp. 11 ff.
4. cf. Gunther Bornkamm, P a u l , trans. D.M.G. Stalker, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1969; 
p. 236: "In the Pauline gospel man is not simply conceived as a moral leper..."
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determinative motif by which others are judged. In many forms which 
have preceded Nygren's declaration of the term, 'motif research' has 
informed and refuted theological hypotheses. As a method it has cert­
ainly not outlived its usefulness. As a 'scientific' method, it is 
doubtful that it could ever be considered such.
2. The method at Work
Bearing in mind that motif analysis has its intrinsic limita­
tions, the way that Nygren puts the method to work is nevertheless 
admirable. Taking the idea of love as the motif he wants to trace 
in the Christian religion, Nygren divided his research between the 
two motifs indicated by the title Agape and Eros.  ^ The first part 
searches out the roots of the general concept of love as it is used 
by the early Church. He notes immediately that love as it is inter­
preted by Paul is not only a different word (agape) but also a differ­
ent idea from the concept (eros) used by Plato and the Greek philoso­
phers. He observes that agape is hardly found as a noun and seldom 
as a verb outside the New Testament, while the word eros does not app­
ear at all in the New Testament. The implication from this disparity, 
thinks Nygren, is that for the New Testament writers love as agape 
meant something different from love as eros. The motif is thus separ­
ated into two ' types ' . The word eros represents the ' type ' of love
propounded by Paul, essentially "theocentric" in character, which
2becomes obscured or compromised in early Christian "syncretism".
The second part of Agape and Eros introduces the concept of 
nomos which is a motif allied with the Old Testament, recurring in 
various forms, especially in the writings of the apostolic fathers 
and the apologists. Christian theology is thus characterized as a
3struggle for primacy between the three 'types', eros, agape, and nomos. 
Nomos cannot properly be called love, but since the Jewish literature
1. Anders Nygren, Agape and E r o s , E.T. Philip S. Watson, Westminster Press, Philadelphia; 
Part I: "The Christian Idea of Love," 1932; Part II: "The History of the Christian Idea 
of Love", 1938, 1939; Parts I & II Published in one volume, 1953.
2. ibid. pp. 27 - 41
3. ibid. p. 254
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was "the sacred document of Christianity before the New existed" the
'law' of the Old Testament both obscures and helps to interpret the
idea of agape.  ^ Nygren shows how the three 'types' are assimilated
and mixed as the influence of Paul in the church fades and successive
thinkers are highlighted. Agape is stressed by Marcion, to the
2exclusion of the nomos and eros motifs. But the need for order and 
a philosophical frame of reference in the Church contributed to the 
climate in which a syncretism of Greek, Jewish, and Christian motifs 
might flourish. Nygren considers such fathers as Tertullian and 
Origen to be particularly important for the developing synthesis of
3motifs which were originally quite distinct from each other.
The tendency toward syncretism reached its early apex in the 
writings of Augustine, as caritas became yet another 'word' for love, 
involving subtle interpolations of Greek, Jewish, and Christian 
thought. The idea of caritas was sustained throughout the medieval 
period, until Martin Luther was able to 'destroy' the synthesis, and 
re-assert the primacy of the agape motif. Luther was only able to 
do this, Nygren thinks, by concentrating upon the original Pauline 
idea of justification by faith. Hence, at the Reformation, the taint 
of Greek eros and Jewish nomos was removed, and the originally dist­
inct notion of Christian love in the form of agape was reclaimed in 
its 'purity'.
4Nygren's work has been much criticized, but for the following 
reasons the impact of his work can hardly be over-estimated.
(1) The precedent of identifying love as the central motif in Christ­
ian theology has been implicitly or explicitly followed by many of
1. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op. cit. p. 255
2. Nygren notes that Marcion was more consistent in excluding nomos than e r o s . cf. Agape 
and E r o s , op. cit. p. 331
3. ibid. pp. 313, 336 ff.
4. Critiques of Nygren have been formulated on methodological, historical, theological 
and philosophical grounds. Concise and comprehensive is Gustaf Wingren's Theology in 
C o n f l i c t , Muhlenberg Press, 1958 E.T. Eric Wahlstrom, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and 
London, cf. also Charles W. Kegley, ed., The Philosophy and Theology of. Anders N y g r e n , 
London and Amsterdam 1970.
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this century's theologians. The attempt to identify some special 
character in Christian love is not limited to a 'neoorthodox' 
theology, such as Nygren has represented, but it also informs the 
agenda of diverse points of view.
(2)' Nygren's unambiguous association of God's love with grace is of 
such a radical nature that a tacit identity of the two is connoted in 
his usage of agape. The term has thereby attained a certain 
'technical' meaning with wider applications outside the field of 
theology. For example, in moral philosophy, the term agape has come 
to mean a type of love which is completely altruistic, sacrificial, 
and disinterested.^ The idea of agape has thus facilitated a way of 
talking about love as an ideal, even when it is not manifestly 
associated with the idea of God.
(3) The sheer volume of Nygren's research into the idea of love 
indicates that his work will remain a major resource for the history 
of love in Christian thought. His comprehensive second part to Agape 
and Eros, detailing the love-emphasis of many of the church fathers as 
well as many relatively forgotten thinkers (such as Proclus, Johannes 
Climacus, and Erigena) makes available many antecedents of lovetalk 
which are largely inaccessible to modern students unskilled in ancient 
languages. Despite a certain bias in his interpretation, his 
historical documentation is indispensable to an informed discussion of 
the development of the idea of love in Christian theology.
(4) Certainly not least in importance is the significance of Nygren's 
assertive audacity in proposing definitive motifs by 'which love in 
Christian thought should be interpreted. Such declarations as, "Agape 
is the love which wants to give, Eros is the love which wants to get" 
and "Eros ascends, Agape descends" are the stuff of a rich and
1. Although the notion of agape has certainly had its greatest influence in Christian ethics, 
it may be true that any moral ph ilosophy has something of religion in its sphere. C e rt­
ainly wherever Kant has anything to do with moral philosophy and its background, the 
idea of love is not remote. For uses of agape which are ethical in context, yet not
necessarily religious, cf. Gene Outka, Agape, An Ethical A n a l y s i s , op. cit. and Joseph
Fletcher, Moral Responsibility, SCM, 1967, p. 57
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extended debate. Theologians who have wished to criticize Nygren have
been forced to work out their own references to love in the light of
his uncompromising assertions. Theology does not operate in a vacuum
of equivocations, and Nygren's courage in providing a charged
atmosphere for discussion and scholorship should not go unappreciated.
3. Agape ; "Expression of a Life-force"?
In sympathy with Nygren's method, Ulrich Mack has asserted that
"Das Grundmotiv ist ja nicht nur heuristiches Princip, sondern
Ausdruck einer Lebensmacht. As Nygren has interpreted the idea of
agape it represents a radical transformation of love in and through
Christian faith. Although Nygren is hesitant to confirm his
relationship to Kierkegaard in this respect, there is little doubt
that Kierkegaard's writings have influenced Nygren's view of Christian 
2love. Nygren is fond of repeating Nietzsche's assertion that
3Christianity represents "the transvaluation of all ancient values".
The change in religious emphasis from an acquisitive, egocentric love 
to a selfgiving, theocentric love in Christianity represents for 
Nygren a radical principle enfolding both faith and ethics. For him 
there is no doubt that Paul the Apostle set himself the task of 
changing the emphasis in religion from eros and nomos to agape, the 
love which is revealed in the creative, spontaneous love of Christ.
Agape becomes the foundational motif of Christian religion. It not 
only informs the way in which a Christian should worship, but also the I
way in which a believer should act. "Faith active in love" becomes |
Ithe new principle of religion. J
!.. Ulrich Mack, Tendenzen der Theologie in Zwanzigsten Jahrhundert p, 328 ("The ground- 
motif is not only a heuristic principle, but also the expression of a life-force.") 
cf. "Motivforschung als theologische Methods" in Neue Zeitschrift fur systematische 
Theologie und R e l i g i o n s p h i l o s o p h i e , 1965, pp. 2744296 The article is based upon 
Mack's unpublished dissertation (Heidelberg) by the same title.
2. But probably only to the extent that Kierkegaard agrees with Luther. S.K. is too 
much an 'existentialist' for Nygren's liking. There is too much Kierkegaard in 
Nygren to ignore, but the relationship is often strained and cannot easily be 
characterized.
3. Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit. p. 29 inter alia.
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The ' eros. .pië:jcÿ ' of hellenistic religion is characterized by 
Nygren as an essentially egocentric ethical system. The Platonic and 
Aristotelian idea of 'the good' is orientated, he thinks towards the 
happiness of the individual. Nygren interprets the idea of 'the good' 
as intrinsically selfish. "Eudaemonia" is, in Greek thought, a search 
for whatever constitutes highest happiness for the individual. Love 
for God, according to this precept, becomes a means to the end of 
one's own greater happiness; hence its motivation is selflove. In
Christianity, however, this egocentrism is transformed into "theocent- 
rism". God is the subject of agape, not the human individual. God's 
love is "spontaneous" and is not conditioned by any quality in the 
beloved, nor does it seek its own happiness. In faith the overflowing 
love of God fills the heart of the believer and proceeds outward to 
the neighbour. Because it is essentially spontaneous, unconditioned 
by virtue in the beloved. If love is in any sense 'motivated' it
cannot be agape.
For Nygren, "agape is the answer to both the religious and
ethical question".^ The Christian's behaviour, insofar as it is 
'Christian', is transformed into unmotivated, spontaneous love of his 
neighbour with no consideration of his own reward. Insofar as the 
Christian's love conforms to this precept it is the love of God which 
is active in him. If his love is in any sense dependent upon the 
qualities of the beloved then the love is "the love of man", not the 
love of God; eros, not agape.
The extent to which Christian love may be "spontaneous"
constitutes a significant difference between Nygren and Kierkegaard.
As we have observed, Kierkegaard stressed that love in the Christian
2sense is never something to be taken for granted. Self love always
1. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op. cit. p. 48
2. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, op. cit. pp. 40-41
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remains, for Kierkegaard, something which must be overcome and activ­
ely transformed. Hence love of the neighbour is something which must 
be willed; it must be enshrined in "duty to love". Only through 
performing the duty, can love ever become in any sense 'spontaneous', 
and then, for Kierkegaard, only partially. Nygren, on the other hand, 
assumes a direct transfer of God's spontaneous love through the 
believer. If love is not overflowing and spontaneous, according to 
Nygren, it is not agape.
The difference between Nygren and Kierkegaard on the point of 
love's spontaneity raises huge questions about an identification of 
love with the concerns of human justice. Although Kierkegaard's idea 
of love as a "duty" has something of the Kantian imperative about it, 
and thereby seems to denigrate the spontaneity of love, love-as-duty 
in Kierkegaard's sense takes account of the theoretical idealism which 
historically has rendered Christian love ineffective. Even Kant had 
acknowledged that "love cannot be commanded" and Hegel had followed 
in announcing that "love itself pronounces no imperative."^ 
Kierkegaard's assertion that love is indeed commanded by 'the royal 
law' is an attempt to hold love for the neighbour as oneself. Nygren, 
however, insists that human agape must always be "spontaneous", and 
can never be subject to "duty", since God's love is "unmotivated" and 
"unconditioned" by value.
The impact of Nygren's view is first of all a problem of theo­
dicy. If it is God's love which is conducted through the believer's 
spontaneous love for the neighbour, why is Christian love so ineffec­
tive at reducing evil and facilitating justice? Secondly, the pure 
spontaneity of agape raises, and dees not solve, as Nygren thinks, 
many ethical questions. The assumption that our (Christian)
1. cf. Hegel, Early Theological W r i t i n g s , trans. T.M. Knox, op. cit. p. 247. Hegel says: 
"Of course love cannot be commanded."
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love is spontaneous takes away the imperative to love those whom we
may not 'spontaneously' love. Of course, Nygren might say that if we
do not 'spontaneously' love our enemies, then we are still under the
influence of eros. But the history of Christian attempts to love is
so chequered that such an assumed spontaneity of loving is, at best,
a hazardous assumption. If love, in this world, is to be interpreted
by its capacity to create justice, Kierkegaard's cautious approach to
spontaneous love seems to have much to recommend it.^
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which love, if it is to be
construed in the sense of Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan, must
2be 'spontaneous' compassion if justice is to come of it. This 
question must be considered further; for the moment we can only 
observe the difficulty of the problem.
Nygren is careful to disclaim any connection between 'vulgar 
eros' and Christian agape. He claims that Plato "did all in his power" 
to separate the philosophical idea of eros from that which was in the 
purvey of the mystery religions. Nygren cites' The Phaedrus as 
Plato's attempt to give the soul 'wings', to take it back to its
3divine source. Eros as a spiritual (or intellectual) attribute was 
to be divorced from all connections with bodily appetites. Plato's 
separation of 'vulgar eros' from the 'heavenly eros' is seen by Nygren 
as the powerful philosophical departure which would make Platonic eros 
a fit adversary for Christian agape. The idea that a person could be 
in possession of a 'divine' power if it could only be separated from 
carnal impulses is, in Nygren's view, the root of all mysticism.
1. For Kierkegaard's view of the limitations of spontaneous love cf. Works of Love, 
op. cit. pp. 46-50. Spontaneous love is not 'eternal' because it can be changed 
into 'hate', or 'jealousy', or merely changed.
2. According to Luke, Jesus says that the Samaritan's 'heart melted' with compassion. 
His service to his 'neighbour' did not occur from the motive of duty or obedience to the law. (Luke 10:25-37).
3. Plato, The Phaedrus 253; Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit. p. 172
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Through the notion of a spirituality opposed to the flesh, Plato's
idea of eros was seen as close enough to similar emphases in Paul's
writings to invite many other incursions of Platonism and neoplatonism
into the corpus of Christian theology. This 'spiritual' syncretistic
tendency Nygren attempts to understand, while disallowing any
synthesis of mystery religions, fertility cults, gnosticism, and anti-
nomianism with Christianity. "Between vulgar eros and Christian
agape," says Nygren, "there is no connection."^
Thus for Nygren, agape and eros come from two entirely different
spirtual 'worlds'. They represent two opposite ideas; they are
different not in degree, but rather in kind. Nevertheless the history
of theology is largely the history of the blending of the two motifs.
The confusion of the two was perpetuated in the writings of the early
fathers as they were influenced by Alexandrian philosophy, such as the
neoplatonic doctrinces of Plotinus. In Origen, Nygren claims to see
the two motifs consciously blended, so that Origen, in his commentary
2on The Song of Songs says that "God is eros" and also "God is agape".
The blending of neoplatonism with Christianity resulted in the
Augustinian and Thomist syntheses of agape and eros. Caritas, then, 
according to Nygren, is preserved in the Roman Catholic idea of grace
as a mixture of the two original motifs, so synthesized as to obscure
its origins.
We shall not have occasion here to fully explore Nygren's
assessment of caritas, important though it is for the Christian idea
of love.
In Augustine a new view of love emerges. The meeting of the Eros and Agape motifs produces a characteristic thirdwhich is neither Eros nor Agape, but Caritas. Both Erosand Agape have contributed substantially to it, but it is itself new and unique. It is neither the primitiveChristian love-motif expressed in terms of a Hellenisticflavour, nor is it the common Eros theory barely concealedunder phraseology from the Christian tradition. Caritas
1. Nygren, ibid. p. 3032. ibid. pp. 50-51, 198,443
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is, if we may say so, both and neither of these. It is either Eros and Agape, but the synthesis of them; and it is a genuine synthesis, because while it contains elements of both motifs, it is not^ merely the sum of these, but forms a new, independent 
unity.
Nygren interprets Augustine, in characterizing the idea of Christian
2love, to be thinking primarily of love of God. God reveals his love 
to us so that we may learn to love him rightly. Even love for the 
neighbour is ultimately referred not to the neighbour, but to God 
himself. God is "the highest and only good". As Nygren interprets 
Augustine, "the replacement of the Old Covenant by the New does not 
mean a radical change in the character of fellowship with God. Man's
3love to God is still the main thing." For Nygren, the "great and 
fatal contradiction in Augustine's view of love" was that he tried to 
maintain both agape and eros at the same time, not realizing that they 
are mutually opposed to each other.^ Augustine"never knew Agape in
5its Christian fulness". Although Nygren has been criticized severely 
for his interpretation of Augustine,^ his documentation of Augustine's 
idea of love merits attention from any student of the Christian 
concept of love.
The reclamation of the agape motif and the 'destruction' of the 
caritas synthesis occurred only at Martin Luther's "copernican 
revolution" in the rediscovery of Paul's writings. According to 
Nygren, all religion of the eros type is essentially egocentric, 
characterized by the human's reach 'upwards' toward God. "Luther," 
says Nygren, "insists, in opposition to all egocentric forms of
7religion, upon a purely theocentric relation to God". Catholic piety 
is regarded as the perversion of the deepest meaning of religion.
1. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op. cit. p. 451
2. ibid. p. 453
3. ibid. p. 454
4. ibid. p. 470
5. ibid.
6. cf. the exposition of John Burnaby, below, and the excellent recent work by Oliver
0 'Donovan; The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, Yale University Press, New
Haven and London, 1980. (Published too late for adequate inclusion in this chapter)
7. Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit. p. 681
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because it discloses human interest as the motive for piety, worship, '4
and even service. The idea of 'merit' in good works is conditioned by
the 'profit' which it yields for the believer. God comprises all the
desirable things the human can wish for himself. Nygren says that
"Luther's main objection to Catholic piety is always this, that it
puts man's own self in God's place.
Against the conception of a love which is acquisitive in nature,
egocentric in attitude, Luther asserts a love which is naturally
giving and theocentric. The idea of a "theocentric" love suggests a
conception of the love of God which is not for God, but from God,
especially as revealed in Christ. Any fellowship of humanity with God
occurs at God's initiative, ironically on the basis of sin, not of 
2holiness. "If I have no sin, then I need not Christ." "God has
3nothing to do with holy men. A holy man is a fiction..." Nygren
thus draws the distinction between Catholicism, a caritas blend, and
Luther, a conception of agape :
1. ibid. p. 682
2. ibid. pp. 684, 687
3. ibid. (quoting Luther) p. 686
4. ibid. p. 690 It appears that Nygren stresses the egocentrism of Roman Catholic 
piety to a degree which may be considerably over-simplified, in a reduction which 
may even be an over-simplification of Luther.
5. Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit 692
-r
I
The deepest difference between Catholicism and Luther can Jbe expressed by the following formulae; in Catholicism: fellowship with God on God's own level, on the basis of holiness; in Luther: fellowship with God on our level, on the basis of sin. In Catholicism, it is a question of a fellowship with God motivated by some worth, - produced by the infusion of caritas - to be found in man; in Luther, fellowship with God rests exclusively on God's ‘Iunmotivated love, jutification is the justification ^ of the sinner, the Christian is simul iustus et peccator.
Although Nygren has outlined the blend of eros and agape motifs 
in Roman Catholic thought, as caritas, his characterization of 
Luther's struggle tacitly identifies caritas as a highly sophisticated 
form of egocentric eros. Luther himself, says Nygren, had personally 
followed "the Eros Way of salvation in the form of Caritas!*^ "Man is
\\9'
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justified not by ascending to God in Caritas, but solely by receiving 
in faith God's love, which has descended to us in Christ. With this, 
the Caritas-synthesis has fallen to pieces, vanquished by God's 
Agape.
Having formulated his method and his 'thesis', Nygren is net 
timid in declaring how Luther's 'destruction of the synthesis' trans­
forms the concept of Christian love. In view of Nygren's interpreta­
tion of Luther, and Luther's interpretation of Paul, we are offered
some very specific 'contrasts' between Christian agape and acquisitive,
2non-Christian eros. Nygren asserts that "we have thus two ultimate
.3standards of value confronting one another." 
contrast between them:
In summary of the
Eros'is .acquisitive Eros goes upEros is man's way to God Eros is man's effort Eros is egocentric Eros seeks divine life Eros is empty and needs to get Eros is the love of man Eros is motivated by quality in the belovedEros recognizes and loves value in its object
Agape is sacrificial 
Agape comes down Agape is God's way to man Agape is Godis'grace Agape is unselfish Agape dares to lose its life Agape is full and flows over Agape is the love of God Agape is unconditioned by qua­
lity and spontaneous Agape loves, creating value in its object.
These specific antitheses leave us little doubt about the 
inherent dualism in Nygren's idea of love. At no point is it suggest­
ed that there may be "a way from eros to agape". The two things 
are "diametrically opposed". We must now ask whether such a divisive 
"expression of a life-force" is able to facilitate justice and 
portray God adequately.
1. ibid. p. 695
2. Could these contrasts be patterned after Aristotle's list of virtues and vices? cf. 
Aristotle, E t h i c s , 1107b 18-20.
3. Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit. p. 210
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4. Agape : Omnibus Dubitandum ?
In his first letter to the church at Corinth, Paul was able to 
affirm that "love (agape)...believes all things."^ But Nygren's 
antitheses between agape and the other 'types' of love demonstrate a 
disjunction which prevents a hopeful belief in many related loves.
Nygren's dualism inhibits a conviction that throughout the error and
frustration of human attempts to love, God's purpose is yet active to
make many different varieties of love work together. For Nygren there 
is no conception of greater and lesser loves, but rather only of those 
which are true and false. The exclusive Christian love (agape) is 
counterposed to all that has passed for love which is not defined in 
the terms 'spontaneous', 'sacrificial', 'value-creating', and 
'unmotivated'. There is no way from eros, (acquisitive love) to
agape, just as there is no way from the human to God.
Although Nygren may be right in asserting that it is by God's
own initiative that human love "is perfected", there does not seem to
be a clear case for the opposition between divine and human loving.
Even if God's love is made manifest at the Cross, there seems to be no
reason to doubt that God's love is already creative in other, or even
lesser, loves. As Kierkegaard said, (quoting Augustine) "love must
always be loved forth". Of course Nygren's doubt about loves which
are less than the love shown by Christ is somewhat justified. But
wheriever doubt is as integral to method as in the extreme fashion
demonstrated by Nygren, there may be unmanageable repercussions. As
Descartes put it:
He is no more learned who has doubts on many matters than the man who has never thought of them; nay he appears to be less learned if he has formed wrong opinions on any particulars. Hence it were better not to study at all than to occupy one's self with objects of such difficulty that |owing to our inability to distinguish true from false we are forced to regard the doubtful as certain...
1. I Corinthians 13:7
2. Descartes, "Rules for the Direction of the Mind" in The Essential D e s c a r t e s , New 
American Library, New York, 1969, p. 37
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As Descartes realized, once we begin to make radical distinctions, 
it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish the true from the 
false. Although we would not be wise to adopt Descartes' solution,
"to trust only what is completely known and incapable of being doubted",
we might notice that if we begin with scepticism, it is hard to be 
able to stop being sceptical. If Christian love is as remote from 
"vulgar eros" as Nygren has asserted, it occurs to us that a love
which only operates 'from above' is also a bit incredible. The agape- 
eros dualism is essentially a sceptical approach to the idea of love; 
if the approach is taken to its logical extreme, one might doubt
whether there would be anything left of the 'positive' side of God's 
love. On the other hand, if we are able to stop with Nygren's strict 
definition of agape, a static concept dependent upon an interpretation 
from Luther (and through Luther, Paul), it seems that we should be 
"forced to regard the doubtful as certain".
Of course we must make distinctions, and what love has meant 
for others must be distilled and adapted to fit our time. Yet, incon­
gruous as it may seem, Paul's assertion that 'love hopes all things 
and believes all things' seems to be a better starting point for talk 
about love than deciding beforehand what we shall doubt. Otherwise, 
perhaps, we must "doubt everything, and believe nothing".^
As we shall see, even Paul's idea of agape is itself a synthesis. 
The notion of a 'pure' or 'original' concept of Christian love is a 
reduction which does not take sufficient account of either the rich­
ness of love-talk within the New Testament, or of the positive contri­
butions of Rabbinic thought to New Testament theology. Insofar as 
human beings have attempted to characterize the idea of love in
1. cf. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. pp. 213-230; Despite S.K.'s own radical 
distinctions, there is a significant difference between his approach and Nygren's. 
For S.K. only as love "believes all things" does it protect against every deception.
S.K. claims that Christian love overcomes the distinctions of various loves, instead 
of highlighting them.
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successive epochs there has indeed been much innovation from creative 
thinkers. But at the same time, it would appear, ex nihilo nihil fit; 
there is no 'pure' concept of love.
My criticism of Nygren thus begins with the endemic scepticism 
in Nygren's approach. Such a criticism must be a careful one, 
however, for we cannot escape the necessity to make choices. We 
certainly cannot condone all that has passed for love, and criteria 
for assessment of different love-ideals are required. But the method 
of Marcion (significantly acclaimed in many respects by Nygren) is 
negative and short-sighted.^ Even in view of the inadequate interpret­
ations of prior generations, we may need to affirm that the character 
of love is 'one, infinite, and universal'. Preliminary doubts and 
distinctions must not obscure the essential universality and 
pervasiveness of the love of God. We need not affirm any particular 
interpretation as authentic for all time, but neither must we 
artificââlrly limit new and relevant syntheses. Against Nygren's 
dualistic scepticism, we may quote both Paul and Luther (interpreted 
rather too systematically and one-sidedly by Nygren). As we have 
already noted, Paul asserted that "love...believes all things." His
notion of the love of God is one of "breadth and length and height and
2depth...which surpasses knowledge." For Paul the love of Christ 
appears more as a universalizing energy than a model for making
3distinctions. For Luther (who, like Paul, was far from a 'systematic 
theologian), "Spiritus Sanctus non est scepticus."^
In the light of the above general criticism of Nygren's 
essentially sceptical, dualistic, and artificially exclusive view of 
love, we may now examine some specific problems which are raised in 
the distinction of agape from eros.
1. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op. cit. pp. 317 f f .
2. Ephesians 3: 18-19 (Assuming Pauline authorship.)
3. e.g. Romans 8: 28-37
4. Quoted by Helmut Gollwitzer, The Rich Christians and Poor L a z a r u s , p. 94 (trans, 
David Cairns, MacMillan, New York. 1968)
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5. The Creation of Value by Agape and the Problem of the Fall
The characteristics of agape according to Nygren demand a faith-
alone concept of salvation, and an image of humanity which assumes a
doctrine of 'the Fall'. Nygren's interpretation of Luther seems to
hinge on Luther's statement that the human has no worth in himself,
and only "by faith is created in the image of God. God's love must
therefore be totally "unmotivated" and "unconditioned by value" since
Christ as "the second Adam" was revealed to sinful humanity, having no
value in itself which could possibly 'merit' God's love. Agape must
be, therefore, unconditioned by the qualities which humanity might
deem valuable. It.must, foe "unmotivated" by any value inhering In
humanity, but instead bestows value. Only as humanity is loved by God
2does any value accrue to humanity. Thus agape is a "creative 
principle", not dependent upon value, but creates value in the person 
whom loves God.
But the creative principle of agape is still dependent upon 
faith. Humanity is created in the image of God "by faith". Without
3faith, apparently, humanity is valueless. Nygren will not accept 
Harnack's idea that God loves humanity because of "the infinite value 
in the human soul." Harnack L-bas-es-- his assertiontxw upon the 
conviction that humanity is created in the image of God; "all who bear
4a human face are of more value than the whole world." But Nygren says 
that "if this interpretation of Divine forgiveness and love were 
correct, God's love would not in the last resort be spontaneous and 
unmotivated but would have an adequate motive in the infinite value
5inherent in human nature." For Nygren the forgiveness of sins must be
1. Luther, Treatise on Christian L i b e r t y , op. cit. p. 53
2. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , pp. cit. pp. 754783. Luther, Treatise on Christian L i b e r t y , op. cit. p. 43 "Faith alone justifies."
Nygren is not clear about the extent to which he adopts, Luther's sola fide 
doctrine, but it seems to be implicit in Nygren's assertion of a valueless humanity. 
Nevertheless a "universalist tendency" has been noted in N y g r e n ’s work. of. Gene 
Outka, A g a p e , op. cit. p. 212
4. Adolf von Harnack, What is C h r i s t i a n i t y , p . 43, quoted in Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op.
cit. P.79E.T. T.B. Saunders (3rd Edition) Williams & Norgate, London, 1904. G.P. Putnarm,
5. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , p,79 ( New York, 1901.
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"a creative work of divine power".^ Nygren does not elaborate upon 
his conception of the Fall, but without it his notion of the lack of 
value in the creature hardly makes sense, and it is hard to see why 
he should object so strongly to Harnack's conviction that there is 
an infinite value in human life as such. The problem centres upon 
the effectiveness of God's love in the act of creation. There is a 
problem here which is certainly not limited to Nygren, but which we 
must try to understand in the whole context of Reformed theology.
In the light of God's work in creation, it is hard to conceive 
of a creature being completely valueless. Although we may not be able 
to answer the question, we must ask it: to what extent does sin separ­
ate us from the love of God? If God ' s love, or Nygren ' s idea of 
agape, is at all involved in the act of creation, if indeed it is a 
"creative principle", then it seems that we must cling to some notion 
of an imago dei. This is not to suggest that alienation between the 
divine and the human has not occurred, but neither must we too readily 
assert an abyss into which humanity has fallen. In recognition of
this problem Karl Barth has noted that, in the light of God's grace,
2"every abyss" has a "bottom somewhere". 'jJBut; Nygrén has - r eç.Qg ^ - 
nized the problem; or at least he' bars notr limltedethe abyss. . .
I will try to state this problem in terms which may be over­
simplified in order to highlight the dilemma it causes for a broad 
concept of the love of God.
If agape is a "creative principle" which creates value, then 
created beings are valuable in the light of God's 'good' creation. 
The effect of creation indicates a value which announces God's good­
ness, and the creative energy in God's love. So far God's love may 
be spontaneous, unmotivated, and creative.
But if creatures are ever to be conceived as ' valueless ' and 
if only God's agape bestows value, then God must have stopped loving his
1. ibid. p. 80
2. cf. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics lV/2, T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1958, p. 741
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creatures. If this happens, then God's love would not be spontaneous 
and unmotivated, because his love would be negatively conditioned 
by something the creatures had become or were doing. If God's love 
bestows value, and creatures have no value, then God must not love 
his creatures; if he loved them before, then his love is either capri­
cious, or it is somehow negatively conditioned.
Thus, either God's agape is unmotivate^ by value in the
creature, and continues to create value, and humanity has always 
had value, or God's love is conditioned by human actions, and was 
thus interrupted at some time (the Fall) by which humanity became 
worthless.
In summation, Nygren cannot have it both ways. If agape is 
creative and bestows value, then the very act of creation must bestow 
some value in humanity. If humanity is ever valueless, God's power 
to create value is called in question. If God's love is truly 
"unconditioned by value" then nothing can separate us from the love 
of God. If his love is truly creative, and unconditioned by value, 
neither sin nor faith could be conditions which limit or increase
the inherent value in the status of being created by a loving God.
The Atonement may be conceived as an extension of creative love with­
out implying the lack of a value already present in human life in 
effect from the original creativity of love. sin may be an alienat­
ing factor, but not necessarily an ultimate alienation destructive
of created 'value'. The negative aspect of sin, and the positive 
aspect of faith, are both 'conditions' which might inhibit or increase 
the effectiveness of God's love. But if human sin is allowed to 
render creatures 'valueless', then the essential bestowal of 'value' 
in the act and continuation of creation is called in question.
In any talk about love there is danger in ascribing too many 
definitive attributes to either the love of humanity or to the love
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of God. Such words as 'spontaneous' and 'unmotivated' are finally
limiting qualifications which may be subtle inhibitions of the idea
of love. 'Spontaneous' is not far from 'capricious'; 'unmotivated'
is too near 'uncaused'. These words have diverse and incommensurable
meanings when applied to both the love of God and the conceivable
relations of humanity. If agape is to be a type of love common to
God and (faithful) humans, it is doubtful that the words
'spontaneous' and 'unmotivated' can be definitive for either. God's
love may be spontaneous and unmotivated, but it is not clear that
it must necessarily be so.^ For human loves, even under the influence
of faith, such modifiers raise more questions than they answer.
Nygren has left implicit and intact Luther's conviction that
2humanity is created by faith in the image of God. Only by faith 
does God's grace ^  God's agape, becomes available to humankind. By 
faith, God's love is incarnated in the lives of human beings, making 
valuable that which had become valueless. Such a conception of the 
love of God indeed stresses the redemptive capacity of God's love, 
but apparently at the expense of God's creative, sustaining nurture. 
Perhaps, after all, God's love conditioned by a value in the
object of his love - a value which he himself had originally bestow­
ed, and which not even sin could destroy.
And God said, "let us make man in our image, after our likeness;..." So God created man in his own image, in the image^of God he created him; male and female he created them.
And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good.
The Lord said to Cain, "Why are you angry, and why has your countenance fallen? If you do well, will you not be accepted? And if you do not do well, sin is couching at the
1. cf. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, op. cit p. 766. Barth says that God)lovesI'for his own m o t i v e .. .unconditionally". |
2. cf. Martin L u t h e r , A Treatise on Christian L i b e r t y , in Classics of Protestantism iop. cit. p . 53 -1
3. Genesis 1:26-27 t]
4. Genesis 1:31 Ia
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1door; its desire is for you but you (may) master it."
The mark of Cain is the mark of mercy; it is the hopeful climax 
in a tragic story, a second chance to overcome evil. Even as Cain 
is banished from the land he goes with the Lord's protection and 
the hope that he may overcome his sin, as a wanderer and a fugitive 
on the earth. Neither the fall of Adam nor the fall of Cain destroys 
the Lord's nurture, despite the seriousness of their sin. Justice 
is not achieved in Cain's death as a murderer, but rather his respons- 
bility is laid fully upon him: Cain must learn that he his
brother's keeper. Cain does not become the father of nomads, but 
rather the first builder of a city. In the city of Cain, there 
is much work to be done, but there is no sign that God's creative 
and nurturing love has ceased. And in the word of God to Cain is 
the hope of Cain's city: you may (timeshel) master your sin.
And God saw everything that he had made, and behold,2it was very good.
Greater than the fall of Adam was the fall of Cain; but in the nurture
of God's creative nurturing love, every abyss has its bottom.
In the light of the original and constantly creative love 
of God Christian theology cannot easily perpetuate the idea of the
Fall without a correlative emphasis upon the sustaining, unfolding 
elements of redemption. Of course-we emphasize the climactic nature 
of the Atonement, but the Atonement can hardly be conceived outside
the context of an evolving revelation of the love of God. An un­
balanced emphasis upon faith in Christ may militate against a
1. Genesis 4:6-7 (John Steinbeck's novel East of Eden was based upon the possibility in 
the verse. Hebrew scholars disagree about its exact meaning. The hope in the 
possibility was Steinbeck's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , superseding the ones of an imperative alone.) 
t f . Steinbeck, East of E d e n , Viking Press, New York, 1952.
2. Genesis. 15:31
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pervasive concept of God's constantly creative love, particularly 
evident in the history of the Covenant. Agape revealed at the Cross 
must be reconciled with agape throughout creation; unless we can 
see God's love at the cross as a climax, we may never see it as 
a beginning.
If we are to keep the notion of the Fall as the recognition 
that humanity is not all that it could have been, nor yet what it 
may become, I would argue that we should opt for the fall of Cain 
as a better demonstration of the horror of human sin and God's nurt­
uring grace than the fall of Adam. In the story also is the provid­
ential aspect of God's justice as Cain is required to go and find 
out what it means to be his brother's keeper. Justice for Cain 
is not retributively accomplished by his death, but distributed 
in his protection and nurture as he seeks the face of God, a wanderer, 
a fugitive and a builder of cities. In Cain's founding of the first 
city (Enoch), and in his fathering of men of craft and culture, 
there is hope that in the intimacy of human community, his descend­
ants may overcome sin. In the search for the face of God which 
begins symbolically with the murder of Abel, there is indeed an 
eros, an attempt to re-establish a lost relationship: "...and from 
thy face I shall be hidden." But the words are Cain's not God's; 
in this sense it is Cain's own remorse and not God's hiding of himself 
which causes the relentless search. The 'Mark of Cain' is the mark 
of God's mercy and nurture, in the hope that through Cain's wandering, 
and through the city which he founds, sin may be overcome. In 
Christian terms, the climax to the story is the Cross. He who seeks, 
finds; Cain would not be seeking God if he had not, in some sense, 
already found him. Cain's fall could not separate him from the 
love of God, but his own remorse hid him from God's face and forced 
a relentless search for acceptance. Cain’s 'eros', or acquisitive 
search for the face of God, perhaps, was his judgement upon himself.
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But God's judgment upon Cain was that Cain was to do better. "If 
you do well, will you not be accepted?" His own life, and not his 
sacrifice, was amiss. Even his murder of his brother brought God's 
promised protection and not God's condemnation, despite its serious 
consequences. Cain's self-condemnation is rejected by God. "Not 
so!" is God's word to fallen humanity as it despairs in its fall­
enness. Terminal judgment is not God's justice; God protects Cain 
from the condemnation of others and from self-condemnation.
Perhaps God's word to Cain must be repeated, in different 
forms, in every generation.
...sin is couching at ^he door; its desire is for you,but you may master it.
Has no one condemned you?...Neither do I condemn you;go and do not sin again.
There is a value in human life which is not to be corrupted either 
by fallenness or by the consciousness of fallenness. God's love 
does not merely begin at the Cross. God's justice is nc>t entailed 
in punishment, but always lies in the hope of a nurtured second 
chance.
Agape and Eros, as defined by Nygren, perpetuate a dualism 
in the love of God which implies that there is no hope for the child­
ren of Cain unless and until they find the capacity to believe. 
On the contrary, the love of God which is revealed, not only at 
the Cross, but also in the story of creation and the history of 
the Covenant, is a nurturing love, continuing to create value even 
when humans are not aware of it and cannot believe in it. God's 
nurture of human life, even in the throes of human sin, is one re­
demptive aspect of divine love which cannot be totally subjected 
to a requirement for faith. The possibility that sin may yet be
1. Genesis 4:7 (The Hebrew word t i m s h i e l is here interpreted as a possibility, not as a 
, command or a prophecy.)
2. John 8:11
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overcome, that relationships of justice are accessible to humanity, 
remains an indispensable dynamifc' of God's sustaining, creative 
love. Through it there is the constant search for God, beckoned
perhaps by God himself. Such a search, even if it be called eros, 
must not too quickly be dismissed or condemned. Cain may only 
discover what it means to be his brother's keeper if he is protected 
and nurtured on the way. And in the discovery of his relationship 
to his brother, he may find the face of God.
6. The Problem of Fellowship with God
An important characteristic of agape, according to Nygren, 
is its capacity to initiate fellowship with God. Eros on the other 
hand is characterized by eudaemonism, a search for one's highest 
good, or highest happiness. Eros is a futile endeavour because 
{ as Nygren interprets one view of Plato) "the gods have everything 
they need" and do not need the fellowship of mortals. Eros is the 
human's hopeless attempt to climb "the heavenly ladder", in search 
of divine fellowship. But since there is no way for humans to reach 
God through their own attempts, fellowship with God is dependent 
upon a God who comes to humanity. "Agape is the initiator of fellow­
ship with God." ^
For Nygren, fellowship with God also implies fellowship with 
other human beings. The spontaneous love iJbf- God for humanity is 
directed through the believer to the neighbour. Neighbourly love 
is therefore dependent upon the prior fellowship of God with faithful 
humanity. Nygren stresses that love of neighbour is a movement 
towards the neighbour and not towards God. Agape towards the neighbour 
is not a way of reaching God, but rather it is the effect of being 
loved by God. Love for God is for Nygren a suspicious idea because
1. Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit. p. 80
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it is very close to the character of eros, the human's endeavour 
to reach God in his own interest. A love for God "in the neighbour" 
is an inadmissible kind of piety, of the eros type. For Christians, 
love for God should be redefined as faith.
In a novel, and perhaps dubious, interpretation of the command­
ment to love the neighbour, Nygren asserts thati. an understanding 
of the nature of agape enables an understanding of the commandment.
Only in acknowledging oneself as being loved by God is it possible 
to "love" God. And in the recognition, love of neighbour is enabled. 
"We could never discover the nature of Agape, love in the Christian 
sense, if we had nothing to guide us but the double command...it 
is not the commandment that explains the idea of Agape but insight 
into the Christian conception of Agape which enables us to grasp
the Christian meaning of the commandment."  ^ The "basis" of the 
Christian idea of love, by which the commandment to love is to be
understood, is the broad identification of the neighbour as an object
of God's love. "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good; "
2that is why we are told "love your enemies." In other words, we 
should love our neighbour not because of a prior conception of self 
or self-love, but rather simply because God loves all persons. 
As we are loved by God, our love proceeds outward, indiscriminately 
and spontaneously toward the neighbour.
Nygren notes that Paul does not use the word agape for the 
human love for God. "When Paul speaks of Agape he always means
3the Divine love, never a merely human love." Nygren thinks Paul 
recognized that human love cannot be "spontaneous and unmotivated" 
to the same extent as God's love. Thus Paul's notion of ethics, 
according to Nygren, is of "the love of Christ which constrains
1. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op..cit. p. 63
2. ibid. p. 66
3. Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit. p. 129
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us" (II Cor. 5:14). Love is a kind of "pneumatic fluid" which 
operates directly through Christians, but the direction is outward 
toward the neighbour and not back towards God himself. For Nygren, 
God's love for himself is nonsense. But as God's love is shed abroad 
in faithful hearts, the holy spirit forms the substance of Christian 
life, and God's love is directed through the Christian to the neigh­
bour. "The Christian has nothing of his own to give; the love which 
he shows to his neighbour is the love which God has infused into him." ^
The extent to which agape as God's love is to be conceived
as "infused" into humanity has been a much debated issue. For Nygren,
it is an attempt to link, or rather identify, God's grace with
Christian ethics. It is faith which enables the direct flow of
2God's love through humanity. The flow is downward and outward,
from God, not toward God. Such a view of grace and ethics is
implicitly critical of any pietism which places too much emphasis 
on human love for God, to the extent that love, as an ethical force 
from the believer toward the neighbour, is eclipsed. Such pietism 
would be typed as eros in Nygren's terminology, an essentially ego­
centric, self-interested love. In an attempt to correct such mis­
guided piety, mysticism, and worship, Nygren has stressed that faith 
in God is the appropriate relationship from the human to the divine,
while only God's love in its over-flowing, downward, and outward
character is consistent with the agape preached by Paul.
The critique of pietism demonstrated by Nygren has much to
recommend it. Nevertheless, it is a tenuous proposition to suggest 
that love for God be distilled until only faith is the admissible
1. ibid. cf. Luther, Treatise on Christian L i b e r t y , op. cit. p. 48. Luther assumes a direct 
assumption of the character of Christ in the character of the believer.
2. Emil Brunner, different in some respects, also represents the neo-orthodox view of 
ethics in the context of faith, cf. B r u n n e r , The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , trans. Olive Wyon, 
Westminster P r e s s , Philadelphia, 1937 pp. 77-79.
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response of humanity to God's love.^ Even if Paul did not use the
2word agape for the human's love for God, John did. Although Nygren 
asserts that John was affected by Gnosticism, it is not clear that 
all of John's talk about love for God must be attributed to encroach-
3ment by an early eros-motif. We must also remember that the command
to love God is "the first and greatest commandment" in the synoptic
gospels. Finally, over against Nygren's caution about love for
God we must set the apparent relationship of Jesus' disciples to
Jesus himself. Peter's declaration of his love for the Lord was
not denounced, but rather it was truned back upon the disciple as
4a motive for service: If you love me, "feed my sheep." Throughout
the New Testament there is constant evidence that Jesus was able 
to inspire love, and elicit action from those who loved him. It 
is doubtful that such love can be replaced by faith alone, although 
an active response must certainly be stressed if any love for God 
is to express itself as action and justice. (Or is love for Jesus 
to be held distinct from love for God?)
Implicit in Jesus' command to love God and the neighbour (Mark 
12:29 ff.) may be a Rabbinic controversy concerning the correct 
motive for obeying the law. The Shammaites taught that God should 
be "feared" and the fear of the Lord was the correct motive for 
obedience to the Torah. The followers of Hillel, a more 'liberal' 
school, thought that obedience to the Torah should stem from love 
for God. Rabbi Eleazor ben Zadok said, "All that you do, do only
5from love." Was God to be feared and therefore obeyed due to his 
capacity to punish? Or was God to be loved and obeyed in response 
to his life-giving mercy (hesed)? Jesus seems to have opted for
1. cf. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op. cit. p. 127
2. I John 2:5; Typically cautious, but without denouncing love for God, the apostle states,
"...whoever keeps his word, in him truly love for God is perfected." cf. also 4:20-21
3. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op. cit. pp. 158-159.
4. John 21:15-17
5. E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian J u d a i s m , op. cit. p. 121 cf. Psalm 103:17; God loves 
those who fear him ; compare Deut. 7:6-10 God requires that his people love him and keep 
his commandments.
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the latter, as witnessed by his repeated reference to God as Abba,
;a loving father. The double nature of the command, to love God f
and the neighbour, implies a balance which in fact prohibits the
purely acquisitive piety of eros. Nygren hastens to prevent any 
selfish piety, and so overqualifies the first commandment.
As Jesus answers the question put to him by the lawyer, he
may be saying that obedience to the law does not stem from fear, 
but rather from love for God. In the light of love for God, the
whole law is tranformed to demand and at the same time enable love 
for the neighbour. Love for God is love for a 'heavenly father', 
a paternal figure who would not give a stone when asked for bread, 
who counts as important the smallest sparrow, and will certainly
provide for his creatures. Jesus' whole preaching represents a 
God who not only shall be loved, but indeed may be loved. Jesus' 
theology (if we may speak of such) asserts over against the Rabbinic
school which proclaimed a fearful lawgiver, a loving father who
2surely deserves human love.
We must insist that the nurturing, creative love of God is 
actually preached by Jesus, and does not begin with the crucifixion.
In fact, the danger of eros-piety dees not appear to be a threat
in the context of the community in which Jesus himself lived and 
preached. National exclusivism and legalism were destructive elements, 
however, and to these Jesus addressed himself. Such questions as 
'Who is my neighbour?' and 'Why do your disciples pick grain on 
the Sabbath?' were the important ones in Jewish society. But in 
the Roman dispersion, when the disciples were scattered, it is likely
that the problem of eros-piety indeed demanded a continuous inter­
pretation of the love of God. Nevertheless, the eclipse of the 
command to love God, 'the first and greatest commandment', cannot
1. Mark 12:28 and parallels; cf. also Leviticus 19:18; Deut 6:5.
2. Luther agrees, cf. Treatise on Christian L i b e r t y , op. c i t . p. 54, inter alia.
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be asserted without an implicit denial of a God who in his nurturing
fatherhood is worthy of human love. The replacement of love by
faith offers no defense against the Shammaite doctrine that God
was to be feared, and legalistically obeyed. If God is to be loved,
we may assert a compassionate deity worthy of our love, and 'omnipot-
1ent' in his capacity for loving. Like the disciples of Jesus, it 
seems that we must be able to love him if we are to keep his command­
ments .
Kierkegaard stressed that God must be obeyed, and he must
2be loved. "Truly a profession of faith is not enough." Perhaps 
only a faith conceived as a "passion", the highest expression of 
human love, can understand what it means to 'obey' a command to 
love. Faith,in the sense which Nygren implies, is more an assumption 
than a passion. In faith, he suggests, we become vessels into which 
God's love is poured, and the command to love the neighbour is more 
or less taken for granted, losing its character as "command". God's 
agape enables directly the spontaneous love of neighbour and enemies; 
will is no longer required. Nygren's concept of faith seems rather 
sterile. In a sense it reminds us of the "faith" of the Pharisees 
and Sadducees wh.o came to be baptized by John the Baptist. "Don't 
think you can excuse yourselves," the Baptist preached, "by saying 
'Abraham is our ancestor' . I tell you that God can take these rocks
3and make descendants for Abraham!" Do the things that will show 
you have turned from your sins. Faith can easily be construed
as ideology. Perhaps we might say "Christ is our ancestor", but 
the command would still be the same. The fruits of repentance and 
the work of faith are still required; justice requires committed 
action, perhaps even in recognition of 'duty'.
1. Omnipotent, that is, in his capacity to break down the barriers which prevent human beings 
from loving, . cf. Kierkegaard, Philosophical F r a g m e n t s , op. cit. p. 39
2. Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 344
3. Matthew 3:9 (Good News for Modern Man)
4. Matthew 3:8 (ibid).
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Nygren is undoubtedly right to question the assumption that 
'fellowship with God' may be achieved by mysticism, merit, and other 
modes of piety which are interpreted as love for God. However, 
by adopting Luther's rather mechanistic notion of faith, he has 
posited yet another artificial, or at least, in itself inadequate, 
proposition. It is naive to suppose that 'faith alone' can provide 
the realistic basis for the love of one's neighbour as oneself, 
and the authentic alternative to the commanded love for God. Faith, 
as Nygren has interpreted it, becomes a 'guarantee' of appropriate 
human love (agape) corresponding to the commands of Christ. Unfortun­
ately, history is consistent in recording that the faithful have 
not always loved their neighbours. The idea of 'fellowship with 
God' cannot, therefore, be divorced from the task eind 'duty' entailed 
in the commandment to love God simultaneously in accord with a persis­
tent effort to love one's fellows justly. There can be no 'magic' 
in fulfilment of the task.
(7) The Problem of Agape as a Synonym for Grace
In his conclusion to Agape and Eros, Nygren offers us a manifes­
tly Lutheran concept of love and grace.
Everything in creation obeys the law of love. There is no tree that bears fruit for its own use; the sun does not shine for itself. It is only man and the dev­il who in everything seek their own. So far from self- love being a natural ordinance of God in nature, it is a devilish perversion. That which in all things 
only seeks its own, is thereby closed against God.But when through faith man becomes open to God, the love from on high obtains a free course to and through him. He becomes a "tube," which by faith receives everything from God's love and then allows the De- vine love to stream out over the world. God's love has made a new way for itself down to lost humanity.Once for all, and in a decisive manner, this has come to pass through Christ.
There are so many problems in this passage that it is difficult
to believe that Nygren can really be serious, or that all of his
1. Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit. pp. 740-741
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excellent scholarship has come to such a conclusion.
As Nygren himself alludes, creation is indeed ünaonsisiterit 
in 'obeying' the law of love; to subject all acquisitive love to 
an exclusively 'Christian' concept of self-giving may be a denial 
of the 'goodness' in creation and in all natural life. To say that 
the tree does not bear fruit for its own use is to ignore eros in 
the pips ; procreation and self-maintenance are the proviso of exist­
ence. The alliance of "man and the devil" seems to be an unsubtle 
denial that creation is good. The "develish perversion" of self- 
love may be appropriate to the extremes of hubris, but we must rememb­
er Augustine's and Kierkegaard's insistence that it is possible 
to love oneself "in the right way". If things which "seek their 
own" are "thereby closed against God", we must forget a God of the
Covenant who nurtures and protects his people even in their sin.
In Nygren's concern to deny eros he has also denied God's role as 
a continuous creator and sustainer. Humanity is thrown back upon 
its own devices, until the miraculous button of faith is found,
and God springs to life. The "up" and "down" language, like refer­
ences to "the devil", and man as a "tube", while certainly colourful, 
do not contribute very much to an understanding cf the meaning of 
love in the Christian sense. Of course much of this language comes 
directly from Luther. The passage demonstrates, as Barth has noted 
in a different context, that "we can no longer repeat these things
from Luther without some caution".^
Regarding Nygren's conception of man as a "tube" through which
2God's love is funnelled to the neighbour, there are many difficulties. 
The first problem of what we might call 'tubular grace' is the ques­
tion of freedom. Even if "service is perfect freedom" as Luther 
contended, we must ask about the extent to which Gcd's love can
1. Karl Barth, Introduction to Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , Harper, 1957, pp. 
x x i i - x x i i i .
2. Nygren, Agape and E r o s , p. 129 ; Man is a "tube" through which God's agape is "infused." 
This is different from the Roman Catholic concept of infused grace, but the contrast is 
too complex to explore here.
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inhabit human will. Paul's ambivalence to the problem is ignored 
by Nygren. Paul found, despite the outpouring love of the spirit, 
that the good he would do he did not, and the evil he would not 
do, he did.^ In Paul's writings there is always this tension, and 
exactly because of it one must be justified by grace. For Paul 
the spirit helps in human weakness, but there never seems to be 
a total identification of the human will with the will of God. 
Nygren, on the other hand, holds to a rather mechanistic idea of 
grace, "infused" into the believer as God's own agape. God's love 
is allowed, through faith, "a free course" by which "to stream out 
over the world" through the conforming will of the Christian. Theor­
etically one might appreciate the ideal; practically one must acknow­
ledge a tragic, historically obvious distinction between the divine 
and the human. Faith has never been a guarantee of love and justice
2in this world. As Karl Barth has drily noted, "Man is not a pipe..." 
If God's love is at all "infused" into human beings, it must not 
be in such a way as to identify God's will with tragic human actions. 
If faith were able to join human action with divine agape to the 
extent that Nygren suggests, then we should end with a determinism 
in human loving, which, even if it were consistently creative of 
justice (and there is no evidence that it could be), would be the 
tacit denial of human responsibility and freedom once faith has 
been acquired.
Notwithstanding the loaded terms Nygren has adopted from Luther,
I will attempt a fair appraisal of Nygren's notion of agape as another 
term for grace. God's downstreaming love (agape) is received by 
the person who is able (somehow) to acknowledge it. The reception 
of agape is transformed into faith in the believer, which initiates
1. cf. Romans 5:5; 7:18 A comparison of these two passages illustrates the tension in Paul 
Paul was not so naive as Nygren seems to suggest.
2. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV 2, p. 776
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fellowship with God. This faith, properly, is not to be called 
love, for God's love need not be returned to him. But through faith 
in God a 'valve' is opened by which the love of God which has filled 
the believer is able to flow outward to the neighbour. The believer's 
love for his neighbour becomes thus 'spontaneous' and 'unmotivated' 
exactly like God's overflowing love. The love is not conditioned 
by any quality in the neighbour, but rather creates value insofar 
as it is God's agape which fills the believer and which is directed 
outwards. Human self-love vanishes, and it is only in the background 
as a prior condition, as the believer realizes that he himself has 
nothing to give to the neighbour that is not already God's gift 
to him. The agape shown to the neighbour is thus "the sacrificial, 
self-giving majesty of love" which is bestowed on the believer by 
Christ.
The following deficiencies may now be listed as a summary 
critique of Nygren's notion of agape.
(1) Human freedom and responsibility are so essential to existence 
that they may never be dissolved in this world. God's love may 
inform human decisions, but some distinction between human will 
and divine love must be preserved. If God's love is equated with 
Christian love in such a way that there is a direct "tubular" connec­
tion, then Christians must be perfect in their love, or else God's 
love is conditioned by the tragic decisions of Christians. A better 
correlation of human loves with God's is required, but "God cannot 
ravish, he can only woo.
(2) There does not seem to be a manifestly evident need to assert 
that either God's love or the human's must be without motive and 
spontaneous. Some motives are certainly better than others; some 
loves may be spontaneous, but perhaps others must be willed. Such
1. C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, MacMillan, New York, 1961, p. 38
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qualifiers are presumptious in attempting to describe or define
God's love, and they do not necessarily correlate with human exper­
ience of loving. Love as it is known by humans may never resemble 
(much less be equated with) the totally sacrificial and selfless 
love which Nygren calls agape. God may have motives and interests 
of which we may not be aware. Thus even to speak of God ' s agape 
as always spontaneous, unmotivated and sacrificial may indicate 
ignorance that God may actually enjoy his creatures. Perhaps there 
is an eros in God's own love which is missed in our talk about his 
selflessness and sacrifice.^
(3) Grace which occurs 'once for all' at the crucifixion, and which
is activated by 'faith alone' appears to be an inadequate 'type' 
of grace. God's nurturing, covenanted love is preached by Jesus,
and it is certainly a continuous theme in Judaeo-Christian thought. 
The human search for God cannot summarily be dismissed as egocentric, 
although it has often assumed egocentric forms. Eros and agape, 
if distinguished at all, must come together in the Atonement, a 
climax to the often frustrated search for God, consummated by God's 
revelation of himself. The Cross is not a denial of God's nurture 
but rather a confirmation of it. God's grace, the Cross proclaims, 
is not to be interrupted by human sin. Rather, through grace, we 
are led to the spot where God comes to meet us at the Cross. Faith 
cannot be the button we press to activate God's love.
(4) Given the proclamation of a God covenanted to his creation, 
who continuously creates and nurtures his creatures, the request 
for a choice between agape and eros is a wrongly stated question. 
Nygren has 'loaded the dice' in favour of a certain, limited idea 
of grace. Agape according to Nygren excludes the creative influence 
of God through most of the experiences which human beings call love.
1. cf. below, chapter six; and Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit.
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God's love conceived as always a "downward" movement militates against 
the possibility of a teleology through love's gradual perfection 
as humans come to understand more about love. Love's practice, 
in the terms Nygren has defined it, is not a human practice at all. 
It is directly the practice of God, set over against the practice 
of humanity. It is an ideal which is incredible, and because it 
is incredible it perpetuates alienation between possible human love 
and the love of God. An adequate view of grace based upon the love 
of God must see it as able to support and sustain humanity, enabling 
the practical improvement of inadequate loves. If love may be 
'perfected' so that justice is constantly in progress, a strict 
division between human love (eros) and divine love (agape) prejudges 
every attempt to bring a slightly greater justice to a world steeped 
in frustration. Justice arises through persistent endeavour, and 
not through the 'magic' of faith, or an imaginary concept of divine 
love. Only if our imperfect loves are undergirded by God's nurturing, 
supportive love, and beckoned by the precept of Christ, may we avoid 
sinking into despair. If reconciliation between human beings with 
each other, and between humanity and God, is to be possible even 
on a minimal level, then eros and agape must not remain in conflict. 
The creation of justice depends not only on the love of God, but 
upon the human capacity to put inadequate loves to work with tools 
at hand. Through a creative and nurturing grace, enabling increasing 
justice in a frustrated world - a 'better' if not a 'perfect' love 
- the distinction between eros and agape essentially dissolves.
God's word to Cain is his word to an unjust world. "Sin couches 
at the door...but you may master it." The mark of Cain is our protec­
tion and our hope. Fallenness is no excuse. By the sweat of our 
brow we must learn to be our brother's keeper. Nothing can separate 
us from the love of God, but neither can God's love alone perform 
our task.
1 7 9
II. John Burnaby on St. Augustine's Concept of Caritas
1. The Summum Bonum: a Bonum Commune
In driving a wedge between agape and eros Nygren may have
over-estimated the originality of Martin Luther and underestimated
the contribution of Augustine to Luther's thought. In criticism
of Nygren, John Burnaby says, "Augustine, whom Luther esteemed next
to Holy Writ," is not so easily categorized as Nygren has assumed.
"Nygren's work," says Burnaby, "suffers from its unnecessary and
quite unjustified claim to historical objectivity."^ As Burnaby
illustrates, Augustine's changing ideas provided Luther with many
of the essential elements of reformed theology. Luther was often
able to state directly what Augustine seems to have been saying
indirectly. He was also able to identify gaps in Augustine's thinking
as any good Augustinian scholar should be able to do. In Burnaby's
interpretation, the difference between Luther and Augustine may
be somewhat over-simplified. Nevertheless a brief look at Burnaby's
Augustine may highlight the reductionism in Nygren's interpretation.
For our purposes, we may notice that no one concept of love is ever
free from the influence of others.
Burnaby is concerned that the neo-orthodox fervour against
private piety may undermine worship. Since for Nygren love for
God is to be construed as faith, Burnaby expresses dismay that the
whole tradition of Christian mystical contemplation is endangered.
2"Why," he asks, "cannot life be both from and towards God?" Nygren 
assumes that any love for God expressed as such has a "private good" 
(bonum privatum) as its ground. But Burnaby shows that in Augustine's 
works self-love is not necessarily egocentric. Proper self-love 
proceeds from a conception of the "highest good" (summum bonum) 
in terms of a "communal good" (bonum commune). The highest good 
is symbolized in the community which is the Church. For Augustine,
1. John Burnaby, Amor D e i , Hodder and Stoughton, 1938, p. 15
2. ibid.
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contemplation was always to be undertaken within such a body. "When
joy is felt with many, the joy in each individual is the fuller."^
Such a 'value', Burnaby says, is indeed appropriate for humans to
pursue, not egocentric as Nygren asserts. This view of a communal
'good' seems a valid criticism of Nygren. Already in Plato and
Aristotle the idea of the good is often interpreted within the context
of a community. Eudaemonism may be so conceived as to be possible
only in the context of the happiness of others. As Augustine says,
2"no salvation is without others."
If human love for God may be conceived so that it includes
God's felt and active presence in a community, Burnaby asserts that
there need be no opposition between agape and eros.
It does not follow that eros and agape are by naturecompletely antithetic, that they are "two opposite attitudes to life," or that "an enquiry which seeks to define the essential difference between eros and agape is compelled to view them primarily as rivals or enemies." On the contrary, one who believes that God's providence has never ceased to guide and govern the world he created would naturally draw the infer­ence that if God has given himself to men in Christ,it is because men need him, and that consciousness of the need, so far from being an obstacle ^o acceptance of the gift, is its necessary condition.
Burnaby suggests that the true conception of New Testament love
is better disclosed in the word philia, despite its association
with Aristotle, because "it is strange neither to the Old Testament
nor to the New." Reciprocal love between Christ and the Father,
and between the Father and his creatures, through Christ, seems,
to Burnaby, to be a better declaration of the Old Testament covenant's
4fulfilment than either a one-way eros or a one-way agape. For
Burnaby the goal of philia is John 18:23: "...that they may be one,
even as we are one,...that the love wherewith thou lovedst me may
1. Burnaby, Amor D e i , op. cit. 128; Augustine, Confessions VIII 9
2. Augustine, Sermones ad p o p u l u m , 17:2 (cf. Verbraken, Etudes Critiques)
3. Burnaby, Amor D e i , op. cit. p. 16
4. ibid. p. 17; In light of modern research, an emphasis upon philia in a biblical context 
is probably incorrect, without due attention to the conceptual and linguistic development 
of the term. The word philia only occurs once in the NT, (James 4:4). To ascribe an Aristotelian or Philonic interpretation to ph i l o s /philein is inadequate for Koine Greek. 
Both agape and philos are capable of variant meanings in the NT. (cf. below pp. 58-59)
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be in them, and I in them." The 'love' in this quotation is literally 
agape, but the idea is mutual love. John McIntyre has corroborated 
the assertion that this quotation seriously calls Nygren's whole 
interpretation of love in question.  ^ If God loves the Son, and 
the Son the Father, then God also loves the disciples and would
expect to be loved by the disciples, also as they love each other. 
Though Nygren suspects that John was influenced by Gnosticism, the 
ideal of mutual love cannot be distilled to eros. Nor can the mutual 
agape between the Father and the Son be construed to mean the Father's 
love, but the Son's faith. Nygren has left no room for perfected 
mutual love, the hope of the Old Testament covenant, as Burnaby
has observed.
Although Burnaby thinks that philia is the better term for 
the ideal love of the New Testament, he maintains that Augustine's 
idea of caritas contains Christian values which cannot be sustained 
by the agape/eros dualism. Neither eros nor agape nor the two 
together will account for caritas without remainder.'^ Augustine's 
idea of caritas is generally, but not always, equivalent to his
idea of amor Dei. Generally the two terms represent in A&gustine ' s 
thought the communal "mystery of the divine Being - the Holy Spirit
3of unity".
Burnaby tells us that caritas is grounded upon Augustine's 
principle of divine immutability. The concept of a changeless deity 
was maintained throughout Augustine's career. In his own intense 
mystical experience, he "saw" God as "eternal truth, true love,
beloved eternity".^ Augustine's influence by neo-platonism and
Manichaeanism seems to have affected his interpretation of this
5experience. He forsook his earthly female lover for the love of
1. John McIntyre, On the Love of G o d , op. cit. p. 30
2. Burnaby, Amor D e i , op. cit. p. 20 (quoting Berdyaev)
3. ibid. p. 21
4. ibid. p. 31; Augustine, C o n f e s s i o n s , VII, 1
5. We cannot put Augustine on the ps ychi atr ist' s couch, but neither must we accept his spirit- 
flesh dualism on the evidence of his 'vision'. For more extensive analyses of Augustine's 
idea of love, cf. works by Austin Farrer, Paul Ramsey, Daniel Day Williams, John Hick,
and Oliver 0 'D onov an, inter alia.
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God, who could not change. Love for fleshly beings was deemed incom­
patible with love for an eternal Being.
Burnaby notes that for Augustine, amor Dei normally means 
our love for God, not God's direct love for humanity. In his confron­
tation with Pelagianism, Augustine took as his chief scriptural 
argument Romans 5:5 "...the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts 
through the Holy Spirit which is given to us." But by this he takes 
St. Paul to mean that our love for God is the effect of the holy 
spirit. It is not "the love wherewith God loves us, but that by 
which he makes us his lovers."^ Burnaby admits that Augustine is
exegetically mistaken, yet "in the last analysis, in the deepest
2sense, it ^  God's own love which is ours by his gift." This is 
the hinge of Augustine's idea of grace. Through our human loves 
we learn that the only proper, (i.e. changeless) object for love 
is God himself. In our love for God, God's own love is returned 
to him; he loves himself through our love for him. The capacity 
for our love of God is love itself, called the holy spirit. The 
holy spirit is that love whereby the Father loves the Son, and the 
son the Father, in the unity of the Trinity. Thus love is the very 
being of God, "shed abroad in our hearts through the holy spirit", 
and returned to him as our love for God.
God's love for himself does not make sense for Nygren, and 
perhaps it is a difficult concept. The circular love in the Trinity 
may illustrate a divine mutual love, but in a sense somewhat removed 
from human experience. Perhaps we can say these things better today 
if we speak not of God's self-love, but rather of God's enjoyment
3of his creatures' love. It seems appropriate for God's love to
be reciprocated, but not that he should 'use' his creatures as a 
means to love himself. In this sense, Nygren may be right to object.
1. Burnaby, Amor Dei, op. cit. p. 99; Augustine, De Spin. et. Litt. 562. ibid.
3. Of course, this might have a serious impact upon Trinitarian doctrine, the nature of which 
cannot be explored here.
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On the other hand, if worship is to be retained, if we are to be
inspired to keep God's commands, then we must be able to sense some
purpose in loving God. God's love for himself does not seem to
be an authentic purpose in human love for God, but the reciprocation
of his love may be the completion of a mutuality which we may
'understand'. If we ourselves find loving most enjoyable when it
is returned to us, should not God's enjoyment of his loving grace
be a component of worship? Yet neither God's sheer 'sacrificial'
love (after Luther), nor his love returned to himself (after Augustine),
1can properly express God's enjoyment in our love for him. But
according to our 'thesis' we only love God properly as we love one 
another. This is the point at which our work for justice becomes 
God's enjoyment of his love.
2. Self-love and Love for the Neighbour
Nygren maintains, with Luther, that self-love is a perversion 
of natural order. Augustine asserts a concept of self-love, but 
essentially, it turns out to be self-negation, until the self 'finds 
its rest in God'. Augustine's idea of self-love begins with love 
for God.
Love God, love your neighbour: God as God, your neighbour as yourself. There is no other equal to God, so that you might be bidden to love God as you love that other. But for your neighbour, you are shown a rulej^since you your­self are shown as your neighbour's equal.
Knowing how to love oneself is the key to Augustine's notion of
love for the neighbour. If one cannot love oneself properly, then
the self and the neighbour are deceived. One must love God first.
"Every man loves his neighbour as himself if he loves God; for if
3he does not love God he does not love himself." Augustine is 
ambiguous on the topic of self-love, for it is initially self-negation
1. Augustine speaks of our enjoyment (f r u i ) of God, perhaps of God's enjoyment of humanity, 
but ambiguously: "Thou hast made us for thyself." For further exposition of this 'divine 
enjoyment', cf. Charles Hartshorne, The Divine R e l a t i v i t y , Yale University Press, 1948
2. Augustine, De Di scip lin a Ch rist ian a 3 (Burnaby, op. cit. p. 116)3. Augustine Jo. Ev. Tr. 87. 1. (Burnaby, op. cit. p. 117)
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in love for God. Similarly he equates love of neighbour with self- 
love, in a sense which may mean either love for the neighbour (in 
the usual meaning) or the negation of the neighbour in deference
to God.
Burnaby criticizes Nygren's assessment of Augustine's idea s
of amor, construed by Nygren as a desire to possess. Augustine
regards the desire to possess something for oneself as the perversion 
of self-love. Burnaby says that what Nygren is really talking about 
is cupiditas, which is a false self-love, the result of pride.
Real self-love, according to Augustine, acknowledges the priority 
of God, and in loving God in fact loves the self through amor Dei. j
Thus ■ Nygren has misinterpreted Augustine, Burnaby suggests, to 
show that love for God is always egocentric. Burnaby identifies 
three meanings of self-love in use by Augustine. j
(1) Augustine acknowledges an innate self-preservation instinct, 
the Stoic prima vox naturae. "It is the primitive expression of 
the principle of individuality, the reflection in the creature of 
the absolute unity of God upon whom the being of the individual 
is dependent."^ The moral value of this "first natural voice" is 
neutral; it is requisite for existence. (This view of self-love ■'
may be roughly identified with Plato's concept of vulgar eros.)
(2) But as the natural instinct for preservation becomes a will
to power ( amor suae potestatis) the sin of pride and "the Fall"
result. The desire for preservation becomes a "love of personal
pre-eminence" (amor excellentiae propriae). Burnaby notes an
acute distinction here between ignorant selfishness and "blasphemous
rebellion". "The love of self that runs to the contempt of God
2is neither egoism nor egocentrism, but 'egotheism'."
(3) Through conversion the individual is constrained to direct his 
love away from himself to the supreme good ( summum bonum) in a
1. Burnaby, Amor D e i , op. cit. p. 118
2. ibid. p. 121
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community of believers, which is the only proper love of self, "which 
must needs bring him to what is lower and poorer". The self, like 
the neighbour, is to be loved only in relation to God. The more 
we love God, negating ourselves, the more we love ourselves.^
Burnaby asserts that Augustine's formulation of true self-
love contradicts Nygren's assumption that love for God is essentially
egocentric. The convert must choose to be God's rather than his
own; only thus is true self-love possible. Otherwise, self-love
is merely cupiditas. Amor sui is properly to be distinguished from
cupiditas in the "sacrament" or "sacrifice" of oneself. "By giving
2yourself to God you will be made good."
I do not think this answer will solve the problem of self- 
love. We may agree that if the self is negated in deference to 
God, such a 'sacrifice' cannot simply be refuted as a piety which 
is only egocentric. Certainly the history of Christian mysticism 
is filled with examples of justice-creating love for others as well 
as for God. Jesuits, Carmelites, and Franciscans, for example, 
have often demonstrated that mysticism and work among the poor are 
not opposed. On the other hand, if the neighbour is 'negated' in 
the attempt to deny oneself while struggling to love God, then mystic­
ism may be forced to answer for sins of omission as the poor are 
not sheltered, fed, clothed, and attended. The charge of 'private 
piety' may have many variations. In the self-indulgence of an attempt 
to master self-love (cupiditas) by first loving God, thereby arriving 
at true self-love (amor sui), the opportunity (and risk!) in loving 
one's neighbour may be missed. An obsession to avoid self-love 
(cupiditas) ironically may prevent proper love for God, which accord­
ing to the 'thesis' of John 15:9-12 'depends' upon the active love 
of others. One may doubt whether the total self-renunciation of
1. ibid. p. 122; Augustine, De T r i n . XII 16, VIII 12
2. Burnaby, Amor Dei ; op. cit. p. 123; Augustine, Serm 127.3
.
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which both Augustine and Luther speak is possible or actually required.
If it is, there may be something perverted and masochistic about
it. Nevertheless both Luther and Augustine assert with Jesus that
1God may and must be loved. The motive for loving God is not, as
Nygren maintains, always and necessarily grounded upon a private
good. On the other hand, a negation of self in love for God does
2not guarantee that God will be loved properly.
Burnaby notes that Augustine's idea of grace underwent a life­
long transition which was probably never completed. Perhaps this 
is also one reason why Augustine's emphasis upon the love of neighbour 
"in reference to God" appears inconsistent. At times love for the 
neighbour seems to be a requisite for amor Dei, and at times all 
human loves seem to be detrimental to the love one must have for 
God. In De Moribus Ecclasiae, Burnaby observes, Augustine's amor 
Dei is "almost pure eros" from the mould of neo-platonism. But 
by the time he wrote The City of God, amor Dei had attained an ethical 
character quite foreign to the thought of Plotinus. If some 
'synthesis' of agape and eros is represented here, perhaps we need 
not be afraid of it:
As charity (caritas) grows in you, working upon you and recalling you to the likeness of God, it extends even to enemies... The measure of your growth in charity is the measure of your growth toward the likenesg, and in that measure you begin to be conscious of God.
Of course in any conception of an imago Dei there are many difficul­
ties, and we may not raise them here. The point that we must observe, 
however, is that such an 'image' (or 'likeness') may be conceived 
as relative to the human capacity to love rightly, which "extends
1. cf. Luther, Treatise on Christian L i b e r t y , op. cit. p. 54: "For since by faith the soul 
is cleansed and made a lover of God, it desires that all things, and especially its own 
body, shall be as pure as itself so that all things may join with it in loving and praising 
God." This quote from Luther, which might have been written by Augustine, may be enough
to wreck Nygren's case against love for God.
2. Of course, self-negation is intended to result in eminent self-fulfilment, or amor s u i .
The problem of various senses in which Augustine uses the term, and the idea of self-love 
which it raises for theology, cannot be further explored here. For a much moreceQijOP‘C-e- 
hensive examination of Augustine's 'concept' of self-love, cf. Oliver 0 'Donovan, The 
Problem of Self-Love in St. A u g u s t i n e , op. cit. 0 'Donovan concludes that it is difficult 
to speak of one concept of self-love for Augustine. But the idea has had a wide discussion 
in theology, and hence is likely to be perpetuated.
3. Burnaby, Amor Dei op. cit. p. 81; Augustine, En. in Ps. XCIX. 5
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even to enemies". Augustine has noticed, even if he has not consist­
ently maintained, a nurturing element in God's love which enables 
and influences appropriate human loving. The measure of growth 
in love becomes the measure of the imago Dei in humanity. But such 
growth may not be taken for granted.
God's grace, for Augustine, was never a certainty, though 
it was certainly an influence. To Pelagius he wrote, "Make neither 
of your own righteousness a safe conduct to heaven, nor of God's 
mercy a safe conduct to sin." Our 'perfection', he said, is related 
to our humility. Augustine's emphasis upon the humility of Christ 
is "the pith and sinew of his theology".^ "Because you could not 
go to him, he comes to you."
Nevertheless, Augustine's emphasis upon God's immutability
2prevents any consistent doctrine that God is related to his creation. 
Yet there is indeed a relational aspect in "the power of love to 
call forth love". The very purpose of the Incarnation is "to show
the love of God". Such an idea of grace probably cannot be reconcil­
ed with Augustine's emphasis upon God's retributive justice and 
punishment, despite his remark that "God's justice is not our justice." 
For Augustine God remains impassible, unhurt by human sin; his idea 
of Christ's passion does not abolish punishment, for God "must" 
punish evil. (Augustine's theodicy is a huge discussion, which 
may not detain us.)
In summary, Augustine is inconsistent in many respects; but 
his idea of love and grace is capable of rich and varied interpret-
3ation. Burnaby, I think, has proven his case that Nygren has not 
done justice to Augustine. He has also demonstrated that agape
1. Burnaby, ibid. p_i ( q u p t i n § ; H a r n a c k )
2. That is, if God cannot change or suffer, in spite of a declaration that he loves, his 
relatedness is limited.
3. Augustine's idea of c a r i t a s , and the concept of grace to which it is intimately related, 
is preserved in many varieties of modern Roman Catholic theology. Especially significant
is the interpretation of charity (c a r i t a s , c a r i d a d ) in co ntemporary Latin American theology 
of liberation, cf. below. Chapter 5.
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and eros need not be opposed to each other Self-love is not always 
a vitiosus amor. God may be loved without injustice to the neighbour. 
Christian piety need not be egocentric. Ideal love is, if not con- 
n®t'ed by the Greek term philia, at least capable of some form of 
mutuality. (Nygren's view obscures the possibility of a proper 
reciprocity in Christian love.)
The appeal of St. Augustine to the Christian centuries is 
more attributable to the passion in his expression than to the system 
in his thought. Obviously we must not adopt all his assertions, 
for to a certain extent he was a product of the battles he had to
fight, the opponents he had to face, and the philosophies of his
era. His struggle for the survival of the Church is not the same 
as our struggle for a better and more equal justice for all, in 
places where the Church has been, as well as in places where it
has yet to find vitality. We must leave St. Augustine via a quotation
which, despite the difference of his world, transports the intimacy 
of love and justice across the centuries, "from generation to gener­
ation" .
There should be not only the kindness of a giver, but the humility of a server. Brethren, I know not how it is, but when the hand of him who has is laid in the hand of him who has not, the soul of him who gives to the poor feels as it were the touch of common humanity and infirmity. The one gives and the other receives, the server and the served are joined together. It is not misfortune but humility that truly joins us.
Throughout Augustine's thought on love is the assumption that 
the neighbour is equal to the self. "The love of neighbour desires 
equals, not unfortunates as recipients." A paternalistic love is 
not just in the sight of God. Augustine may not be clear whether
3love for the neighbour is part of amor Dei or consequent to it. 
It may not matter. In the idea of the equality before God of the 
self and the neighbour, is the stuff of community, of ecclgsia, 
of justice, and thus of hope for human love.
1. In Burnaby's view, " eros is the creation of a g a p e ." Burnaby, op. cit. p. 261 j
2. Augustine, S e r m . 259.5 (Burnaby, op. cit. p. 132) |
3. cf. Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian E t h i c s , Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1952. p. 123 i , j
(re Augustine) "The neighbour too often seems lost in God, love for neighbour is love for God."
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III. Toward Love's Integrity in Christian Theology
Comparison of Nygren's love-motifs with Burnaby's attempt
to reinterpret Augustine's idea of caritas implies that while love
may not be as fragmented as Nygren has suggested, we must be cautious
in re-asserting old syntheses or formulating new ones. Neither
a revision of Luther nor of Augustine is likely to tell us what
it means to love today. On the other hand, the wealth of modern
concepts which have arisen in the twentieth century, purporting
to characterize the meaning of love in relation to pschological
1theory, do not necessarily enlighten theology either.
1. "Some Kind of Unity"
Gustaf Wingren, in his critique of Nygren, has insisted that 
Nygren's method for analysis of the Christian idea of love is limited 
in historical and theological insight, because "what the Christian 
faith means now, in the present, cannot be solved by materials gather­
ed from Luther's writings." "Motif research," he says, "prevents
2this problem from being properly represented." Biblical interpret­
ation must be contemporary if it is to be good, and no study of 
the writings of the sixteenth century, nor of the Christian fathers, 
can alone solve historical or systematic problems. "The question 
of the significance of the Bible for our time remains unsolved even
3after the historical problem has been solved." Not only Nygren's 
method, but any method which artificially limits results and innova­
tive application of the idea of love is likely to prove inadequate. 
As Wingren says, "It is easy to find ' a method' which enables us 
to produce a lot of books, but which is so easily workable just 
because it helps us to skip over the really difficult problems
1. The attempts to synthesize Christian love with, e.g. Freudian eg o-psychology and Jungian 
'archetypes' have been less than satisfactory, cf. Denis de Rougemont, Passion and 
S o c i e t y , E.T. Montgomery Belgian, Faber Ê Faber, London, 1956. M.C. D'Arcy, The Mind and 
Heart of L o v e , Faber & Faber, London, 1945, and Appendix , below.
2. Gustaf Wingren, Theology in C o n f l i c t , op. cit. p. 1543. ibid. p. 155
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instead of solving them."  ^ In order for theology to remain truly
interpretive of the contemporary world, it must be willing to enter
into discussion with philosophy and "other sciences".
It then becomes impossible for theology to shut itself up in its own room and engage in descriptions of religious propositions. It is the peculiar feature of Nygren's con­ception of theology that the relationship between philosophy and theology is at an end after philosophy has given theology 
"a scientific foundation". No Christian statement can be dis­cussed because it is non-theoretical. But if the Christian assertion is an address to people in the present, a com­munication intended to collide at certain points with the estimate the hearer makes of himself, then the testing of this interpretation will force theology to consider a number of factors.
Wingren concludes that any theological method must be able to include 
and consider all relevant material. For the topic of love, we cert­
ainly must be careful not to prejudge or exclude a greater revelation 
before it occurs. Our definitions must always be provisional; our 
categories must be conceived within the widest possible framework.
Hans Kung has argued for an interpretation of Christian love 
which he calls "a concrete practical universalism".^  Kung argues 
that Christianity must not get bogged down in textual or historical 
studies to the extent that a technical or exclusive definition becomes 
the norm for love's interpretation. Jesus' idea of love, Kung thinks, 
cannot be reduced to a division between selfish and self-giving 
love. "The distinction between selfish love and true love is not
identical with the distinction between eros and agape." The poss­
ibility must be considered in which a person might desire another
person (i.e. "selfishly") and also be able to give himself. Also,
a person who unselfishly loves another might be permitted to desire |
Ïthat other person's love. Kung also objects to Nygren's assertion |
,jthat love (agape) is not concerned with value. "Is there to be
Ïnothing lovable, nothing worth loving, in either lover or beloved?" iI1 4 4he asks. if
1. ibid. p. 163
2. Gustaf Wingren, Theology in C o n f l i c t , op. cit. p. 166
3. Hans Kung, On Being a C h r i s t i a n , E.T. Edward Quinn, Collins; London, 1978 p. 259
4. ibid. p. 261
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In Matt 5:43 an agape form (agapeseis>) distinguishes an in­
adequate kind of love which is exclusive of enemies: "You have learned 
that they were told, "Love your neighbour and hate your enemy." 
According to Nygren's view, this inadequate kind of love should 
call for a form of philein, since it characterizes the love which 
may be present within a distinct community (cf. Lev. 19:18). But 
the evangelist (if not Jesus) finds no reason to avoid the use of 
an agape form in this negative context. Similarly, cf. Matt. 5:46: 
"If you love only those who love you, what reward can you expect?" 
The verbs here are "agapesete" and "agapontas". The love referred 
to is specifically an inadequate form of exclusive mutuality. The 
inference is that Matthew, at least, accepts agape/agapan as the 
standard term for love, which requires further contextual interpret­
ation in the light of the Sermon on the Mount, Kung says:
Jesus in the gospels appears as wholly and entirely human, cuddling children, allowing women to annoint him, aware of a bond of "love" between himself and 
Lazarus and his sisters: evidently this love does not exclude eros. Jesus calls his disciples "friends".Obviously neither the Old nor the New Testament is interested in the ^ifference between a "heavenly" and an "earthly" love.
Kung has argued briefly but convincingly that Nygren has "over-
valuated" agape. Christian love certainly includes love of enemies,
but it must also be able to 'understand' the whole human existence
of Jesus. Nygren has interjected a false distinction between 'earthly'
and 'heavenly' love for which there is no convincing basis in the
gospels. Of course, Kung's Roman Catholic background may be partially
responsible for his critique of Nygren, but Kûng's criticism is
quite consistent with the critique of many Protestants. As John
McIntyre agrees, "Nygren's rather over-tidy, over-doctrinaire distinc-
2tion misrepresents the Gospel." Daniel Day Williams, in a similar 
vein, has argued that Nygren's assessment of agape is so exclusive
1. ibid.
2. John McIntyre, On the Love of God, op. cit. p. 30
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that there is no provision for relating Christian love to the other 
"forms" of love which cannot be completely defined either by agape 
or by eros (such as the Franciscan form of 'service'.)^
Seward Hiltner has criticized Nygren for excluding sexuality 
from agape, as 'vulgar eros' is opposed in every respect to Christian­
ity. "The agape dimension of love should deepen the meaning of 
sexual relationships, make friendship more significant, and guide
us in our aspirations, and thus make our loves into some kind of 
2unity."
Perhaps Hiltner's "some kind of unity" is an expression of 
a deep intuition about love which many theologians in their various 
ways have attempted to affirm. Nygren's strict divisions seem to 
be antithetical to this intuition. Although we must struggle with 
the various meanings attached to the idea of love in history, in 
philosophy, in the bible, and now is psychology, there may be some­
thing profoundly common in all the diversity. As Feuerbach put it,
"love is one, infinite, and universal". To make ontological 
distinctions out of something which appears universal in nature,
3though diverse in form, seems an affront to love's integrity. No 
matter how we dissect it, it must still be more than the sum of 
its parts.
2. Love's Historical Integrity
The 'theological' usage of the idea of love did not begin 
with Plato, Plotinus, Paul, or Augustine. In some sense, how we 
speak of love today has been conditioned by religious love-motifs 
since the dawn of history. Paul Friedrich, in his book The Meaning
1. Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of L o v e , Harper and Row, New York, 1968.
2. Seward Hiltner, Theological D y n a m i c s , Abingdon, Nashville, 1972, p. 142
3. Kierkegaard said that Ch rist ian ity knows "only one kind of love", but even for Kierkegaard 
there seemed to be a universal aura about it; "That which in its vast abundance is 
essentially inexhaustible is also essentially indescribable in its smallest act, simply 
because essentially it is everywhere wholly present and essentially cannot be described." 
Works of Love, op. cit. (Foreword)
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of Aphrodite, traces the religious idea of love back to the Sumerian 
poetry of c. 3000 B.C., reflecting even earlier religious usage.
He believes there are links between the fertility goddesses of ancient 
European culture and the more formal cults of the Mediterranean 
which both Plato and Paul were forced to combat. Herodotus thought 
Aphrodite was brought by the Phoenicians to the island of Cythera. 
If Herodotus was right, then the love-goddess would have originated 
among oriental peoples. Modern archaeological evidence reveals 
a close similarity between Astarte and Asherah of the Canaanite- 
Phoenician culture with Aphrodite and Venus of western civilization.^ 
Although we are not able to determine precisely when, where, and 
how the religious adaptation of love began, there is a historical
integrity in love's conceptual development which prohibits some 
arbitrary 'starting point'. So far as archaeology and history lend 
support to love's theological origins, we must assume that the idea
has had profound religious significance since the beginnings of 
history. It has roots in more than one culture as a cultic expression, 
and in the beginning, we can only assume that humankind noticed 
something essentially 'divine' about human relationships. The exper­
ience of love may well be the very origin of religion.
When Plato began his attempt to elevate the idea of love (for
which the common term was eros in Attic Greek) he had to confront
a wide array of myth and cultic usage, not to mention the peculiar
sensual approach to aesthetics common in his time. Plato was preceded
in philosophical love-talk by Empedocles, an early fifth-century
student of Parmenides. Empedocles had asserted that love played
2a part in the motivation of matter." Love was opposed to strife;
love brought order to the elements of earth, air, fire, and water,
while strife provoked imbalance and disharmony between them. Love
1. Paul Friedrich, The Meaning of A p h r o d i t e , Chicago University Press, 1978, Chapter 1.
2^ . (cfi' M . R . Wright f Empedocles: The Extant F r a g m e n t s , Yale University press. New Haven and 
London, 1981, Chapter 2.
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and strife battled each other for ascendancy. When love had the 
upper hand, order appeared to be dominant. When strife was in control, 
there was chaos. Despite his simplistic cosmology, Empedocles' 
use of the idea of love is important. Love was seen philosophically 
as an explanation for potential order in the universe - the creative, 
benevolent force set opposite chaos. Also, it was a 'scientific' 
usage because love was seen as the positive force for the integration 
of matter (earth, air, fire, and water). Love was explained as 
exercising a physical, material attraction and repulsion. Strife 
influenced like things in their attraction to other similar things, 
so that an integration of unlike things could not occur. Love, 
on the other hand, was the influence of combination, causing things 
to mix with opposites in the production of greater harmony. In 
the cosmos the two forces were seen as the dynamics of what has
1been called "an almost D,a_r)winian theory of natural selection". 
Nor was the application of love and strife ignored to the phenomena 
of war and peace, to moral good and evil, and to social progress. 
Both love and strife were "equal in length and breadth to the cosmos". 
For Empedocles, the material influence of love in nature was suffic­
ient to displace the need for a creator-God and a moral dictator. 
Love, therefore, has ancient roots not only in primitive religion, 
but also in the origins of science and philosophy.
With the rise of the schools of Plato and Aristotle the idea 
of love received different interpretations indicating the richness 
of the discussions which must have occurred at the Lycaeum. We 
must not assume too quickly a particular 'Greek' or 'platonic' idea 
of love. Plato himself gives us at least seven different interpret­
ations of eros and its nature. Six of these are found in The Sym­
posium, the last of which (Diotima's discourse) is apparently 
Socrates' (or Plato's) recantation of an earlier position he had
1. W.K.C. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers, Methuen, London, 1950, p. 53
196
maintained in The Phaedrus. Plato seemed to be undecided whether 
love was or was not 'divine'. Love's relation to beauty and to
sexuality had to be considered. Scholars still disagree as to whether 
Socrates' speech relating the "science of things relating to love" 
was Plato's last word.^ Diotima's discourse (told by Socrates) 
must be compared with Plato's love poems in The Greek Anthology 
before any pronouncement on the contents of 'platonic love'; and 
there are many contradictions. Nygren's use of Plato demonstrates 
no awareness of Plato's use of irony, satire, and paradox. Plato 
was o.ften inconsistent in talking about eros and Nygren has tried 
to make him systematic.
In Plato's day especially, the idea of love (eros) was very
much in flux. Eros cannot be construed simply by the adjective
"egocentric" in light of the concern of both Plato and Aristotle
for a community in which the highest good for oneself is also the
2highest good for one's fellow. Quite probably Plato never arrived 
at a concept of eros which was totally satisfactory, much less 
completely consistent with what he had written previously. But 
to the "madness" (or "passion" if we acknowledge Kierkegaard's "trans- 
lation" ) of love he devoted his greatest talents, not the least 
of which was his skill in irony: "such a madness as this is given
3by God to man for his highest possible happiness." Perhaps as 
a posthumous critique of his would-be interpreters, Plato said: 
"the poetry of sense fades into obscurity before the poetry of madness."^ 
Love was Plato's "madness". Perhaps only as a madness, a "passion" 
which transcends historical and logical consistency, can love ever 
be attributed the historical integrity which is its due. Nygren's
1. cf. Plato, The Sy mposium 201 ff.
2. cf. Plato, The R e p u b l i c ; Aristotle, Ethics
3. Plato, The P h a e d r u s , 245. Note "given by God". For Nygren eros is always directed toward 
God. The irony is in the question, "for whose happiness?"
4. ibid. Nygren's interpretation of eros is more appropriate in correlation with Plotinus %
and neo-platonism.
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concept of eros is a reductive interpretation of Plato.^
A truly historical conception of love must not be limited 
to ideas arising in western civilization. Eastern thought is pervaded 
with rich and diverse love-motifs. Although an assessment of the 
love-talk of other cultures is beyond our scope, we must not assume 
that love was 'invented' by Europeans, Greeks, or even Semitic peoples. i
Although the Cross may well be a climactic summation of love's history, 
it is not love's beginning. Eros and agape are two words for love 
which have deeply affected Christian theology, but these two words 
must be set in the context of countless other terms in many languages 
and cultures, representing a common intuition, and 'experience' 
for humanity across the centuries. The meaning of love has always 
been developing, and in the development there must be continuous 
interpretation and correction. But no correction of a previous 
idea of love should ever be taken as completely unique or unrelated 
to the total development of the history of love's interpretation.
3. Love's Biblical Integrity
Nygren's emphasis upon agape as the foremost love-motif in
the Bible does not give due recognition to the variety of love-talk
in the biblical tradition. Of course we may not spend much time
here in examination of the idea of love in the Bible, and only a 
few points may be outlined. Despite the tension between various
ideas of love in the Old Testament, and between the Old Testament 
and the New, a_ 'Marcionite' solution (such as Nygren's) is liable
to raise more hermeneutic and practical problems than it solves. , i
1The richness and diversity of love-talk in the Bible is a legacy ‘i1with which we cannot easily dispense. The idea of the Covenant
1. The Symposium ends with no conclusion. Aristodemus reports that "Aristophanes, Agathon, 
and Socrates had alone stood it out, and were still drinking out of a great goblet which 
they passed round and round." (223). Aristophanes represented love as sexuality; Agathon 
represented beauty and wisdom; Socrates, the medium between them.
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is great enough to sustain the many facets of love which the Bible
contains, bringing them together with the prophetic call for justice
when, at the Cross, the law is fulfilled by love.^
Rather than divorcing nomos from agape, James Moffat attempted
to keep the two together.
Love to God means keeping his commands (I John 5:3).This is one of the most characteristic truths in the religious ethic of the Johannine writings. It is never driven home by OT quotations, and yet it sounds likean echo of the OT phrase 'to love God and keep hiscommandments,' a phrase hardly ever used by the prophets ...but common ig the psalter and in the Law, especially in Deuteronomy.
Moffat was also willing to give due credit to the Rabbinic background 
of the New Testament, upon which much of the use of agape is dependent. 
Moffatt noted the saying attributed to Rabbi Akiba, "God the Father 
of both rich and poor, would have the one help the other, and thus
3make the world a household of love." Despite the frequent tendency 
toward Jewish exclusivism in the Old Testament, the exceptions do 
not allow a convenient reduction of Jewish piety to illustrate the 
universal-nature of agape over against a closed society of the Law. 
The books of Leviticus, Deuteronomy, Ruth, Jonah, Isaiah, and much 
of the Psalms demonstrate the formative background of the New Test­
ament's idea of love. The Rabbinic debates also shed much light 
on the formation of the Christian love-motif, without which it is 
doubtful that either Jesus or the New Testament writers could have 
made Old Testament views relevant.^ The idea of love was in full 
ferment in Rabbinic theology when Jesus, Paul, and John began to 
offer their interpretations.
Paul Ramsey has remarked that Nygren's interpretation of Christ­
ian love "cannot be refuted by linguistic or merely textual studies
1. N.H.G. Robinson, (with Wingren) has severely criticized Nygren for reducing the idea of 
nomos to a Jewish legalistic framework, cf. The Groundwork of Christian E t h i c s , Collins, 
London, 1971, pp. 295-296. Robinson remarks that Nygren has forgotten that love is the 
fulfilment, not the replacement of the law.
2. James Moffatt, Love in the New T e s t a m e n t , Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1929, p. 270 
(As Nygren attempted to demonstrate, however, nomos and agape may not be reconcilable).
3. Moffatt, Love in the New T e s t a m e n t , op. cit. p. 271
4. cf. above, p.l^o ; E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, op. cit. p. 121
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of the New Testament".^ Ramsey may well be correct; however it 
is fairly certain that Nygren's argument is seriously defective 
on linguistic grounds, and certainly will not support the perpetuation 
of a limited definition of agape in exclusion of other meanings
used by Christian writers.
In other words, it appears that Nygren has ignored the develop­
ment of the Greek language to the extent that by Matthew ' s time
at least, the common word for love was agape. Paul's usage of the 
word probably depends upon its appearance in the Septuagint, but 
also Paul may have been offering his own interpretation of the Hebrew 
hesed (mercy, compassion). There is little evidence that the word
eros does not appear in the New Testament for any other reason than
2that the word had simply passed from common usage. Certain literary
and philosophical usages for eros may well have survived in alliance
with neo-platonism, but the New Testament's use of agape is probably
more related to the common (koine) term for love than to any avoidance
of neo-platonism.
The New Testament idea of love is distributed primarily between
the two words agape and philos. The verb agapan occurs 141 times,
and the noun agape 116 times. The verb philein occurs 25 times,
the noun philos occurs 29 times. The noun philia (friendship) occurs
only once (James 4:4) and its verb philiazein does not occur at
all. The verb agapan does not occur at all in Acts, Ephesians,
I Timothy, Titus, and Philemon. The noun agape is not used in Luke-
3Acts or in James. Significantly, Acts incorporates neither agape
nor agapan, but it makes considerable use of the philos/philein 
%form. ' The impact of linguistic studies of the idea of love implies
1. Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian E t h i c s , op. cit. p. 115
2. Victor Paul Furnish, The Love Command in the New T e s t a m e n t , Abingdon, Nashville, 1972; 
SCM Press, 1973 p. 222; "Already by the time the LXX was produced, agape had begun to 
be used as an ordinary word for love."
3. R. M o r g e n t h a l e r , Statistik des Neutestamentlichen W o r t s c h a t z e s , Gotthelf Verlag, Zurich, 
1958 p . 67; cf. also Ceslaus Spicq, Agape: Prolegomenes a une Etude de Théologie Neo- T e s t a m e n t a i r e , Studia Hellenistica, 10, E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 1955.
4. Victor Paul Furnish, The Love Command in the New Testament, op. cit. p. 223
2 0 0
that both language and conception were very much in flux in the 
New Testament era. There are many instances in which the words
are used synonymously. ^  We may speak of a Christian conception 
of love if we do so with caution; we may not, however, apply to
such a conception a technical term derived from the New Testament
if the term is attributed a consistent definitional capacity. The 
Bible knows many terms for love, but each term has always been some­
what open to interpretation.
Paul may have been the most consistent of New Testament writers 
in using the term agape for Christian love, a love which contains 
no self-seeking nor demand for mutuality. But the root of Paul's
use of agape may well lie in the Hebrew concept of hesed, the coven­
anted love of God for his people, and required of them. More cos­
mopolitan, Luke preferred the idea of philos/philein, while John 
mixed the two, often in such a way that it is difficult to distinguish 
the difference between agapan and philein (John 21:15-17). Although 
generally the New Testament shows agape to be self-giving love as 
Paul has described it (e.g. I Cor. 13, inter alia) and philos/philein 
to entail some idea of mutuality, the exceptions are so pronounced
that one may neither say that agape is always selfless, nor philein
2always a mutual love.
The idea of love in the Bible cannot be reduced to a closely 
defined "Christian" concept. It is worth remembering that in the 
Septuagint, the word agape often has specifically sexual connotation 
(cf. Song of Songs) . We have already noticed that there is indeed 
a sense in which humanity must 'seek' God, like Cain, learning hew 
to love his fellows in the search. Only by doing so may the evil 
be vanquished which lurks at the door of the descendants of Cain.
1. ibid. pp. 224-226; cf. especially John 21:15-17; Luke 11:43; I John 2:15, James 2:23; 
Titus 3:15; III John 15; Rev. 3:19.
2. ibid. pp. 230-231; Furnish notes that for Luke the verb agapan sometimes means nothing 
more than 'to prefer' (Luke 11:43).
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But the search for God need not be totally selfish, it is not nec- 
essarily egocentric. Indeed, it is correlative with a continuous |
quest after justice, in "the city of Cain". The covenanted love 
of God for his creatures is the hopeful thread which runs through 
the Bible preserving humanity in its search and in its sin, connecting
the Old Covenant to the New. God's love is not divorced from humanity |
%in human fallenness, but it sustains and continues to create poss- IIibilities for the 'perfection' of human loves through interhuman 7
justice. The Bible indeed declares that God is worthy of human ?
love, but at the same time it stresses in many diverse ways what
it means to love God properly.  ^ 4
Although the linguistic difficulties remain indecipherable,
there may be no better summation of the biblical concept of love j
than Simon Peter's final conversation with Jesus. 4
When they had finished breakfast, Jesus said to Simon %Peter, "Simon, son of John, do you love (agapas) me morethan these?" He said to him, "Yes, Lord; you know that ■I love (philo) you." He said to him, "Feed my lambs."A second time he said to him, "Simon, son of John, do , /you love (agapas) me?" He said to him, "Yes, Lord; you 4know that I love (philo) you," He said to him, "Tend my sheep." He said to him the third time, "Simon, son of
John, do you love (phileis) me?" Peter was grieved be­cause he said to him the third time, "Do you love (phileis) me?" And he said to him, "Lord, you know everything; you know that ^ love (philo) you. "Jesus said to him, "Feedmy sheep." i
Perhaps, after all, it is not the term that is important, s
but the active response. If there is a confrontation of love-motifs
in the Bible, it is not between agape and eros, but between agape
and philein. The hope of the Covenant is the hope of mutual 'friendly' i
love between God and humanity; but the hope is only realized as
the antipathy between Cain and Abel, between each person and his '
neighbour, is resolved by a love that persistently creates justice
between them. •
1. John 21:15-17 The differences in the terms for love in this passage have been much 
discussed; (Bultmann's solution to the problem was that the whole final chapter was a 
late addition.) Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of John, Westminster, Philadelphia, 1971 
p. 700
 ^
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Summary and Implications
In this chapter I have tried to affirm the view of Victor 
Paul Furnish (and many other contemporary exegetes) who concludes, 
in the light of various methods of historical and textual research, 
that "in the New Testament... study of the love ethic cannot be tied 
exclusively to the passages where the term agape and its cognates 
appear." One of the main reasons why this is so is because the 
Bible, as a vital record of numerous points of view, cannot be divorc­
ed from 'secular' norms and ideas, some of which have passed from 
immediate contemporary relevance, and some of which continue to 
be sustained in new forms of modern usage.
Although we may have many good reasons to question the synthesis
of St. Augustine, the sheer fact that his view of caritas is a synth­
esis has inadvertently, as it were, underlined the difficulty and 
apparent impossibility of conceiving 'love' in its 'purity'. St. 
Paul, no less than Plato himself, was forced to grapple with the 
problem of applying authentic definitive modifiers to the idea of 
love so that it might be related intimately to changing concepts
of God and human 'goodness'. But their task of redefining love, 
like 'the mantel of Elijah' , had been passed to them by others;
and to others they too have left it.
In the history of love's development there has been a continuous 
inclination of its interpreters to conceive love in universal terms. 
Even Nygren, despite his strict definitions, is a witness to this 
tendency in many respects. If, however, the intuition of love's 
universality is to be rationally expounded, then definitions and 
modifiers which are too 'definitive' may militate against continuing 
interpretation of love in correspondence with a universal ideal. 
Thus, with regard to Nygren's modifiers, we must exercise caution. 
Words like 'spontaneous', 'unconditional', and 'unmotivated' seem 
only partially able to qualify a type of love which is allegedly
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common to God and to faithful humanity. Similarly, when faith becomes 
a strict determination of human love, we must ask whether love's
universality can legitimately be construed "by faith alone".
The intuition that love is creative of value is, in itself,
a critique of any limitation or corruption of value in human life 
which may have occurred through sin. Thus, if the conception cf 
the Atonement is construed so that, prior to it, or without its 
appropriation 'by faith', humanity is 'valueless', then there is 
also an implicit denial of goodness in creation itself and in the 
capacity of human beings, through the continued creative influence 
of love, to 'better* themselves. Remediation must not totally be
subordinated to redemption in conceiving the creative love of God 
effective through the Incarnation and the Atonement. Remediation 
of inadequate behaviour and selfish loves may be enshrined within 
love's creativity, enabled and influenced through a nurturing element 
in God's grace. The Gross is certainly not remote from the call 
for remediation, even though, as Luther and Nygren have attested, 
it cannot be reduced to a 'theology of merit' or salvation by works.
Neither can the Cross be conceived consistently as the total replace­
ment of the patient nurture and creativity evident in the history
of the Covenant. In ways which may not simply be described, the 
Cross may represent a comprehensive fulfilment of the Old Testament 
law; even though nomos and agape appear to be two different emphases 
in the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition, they are not absolutely 
antithetical. John McIntyre has possibly identified, if not totally 
explained, their connection: both love and justice meet at the
Atonement. The history of the Covenant, and the tradition of the 4
1Torah, after all, have their roots in a call for justice. J
The Christian emphasis upon 'love of one's neighbour as oneself 
is profoundly expressive of this Old Testament call for justice 
(cf. Lev. 19:18, 33). Nygren, however, has attempted to affirm
the principle without affirming its roots. He has, indeed, expressly
2 0 4
asserted that love and justice are opposed, according to his inter­
pretation of 'The Workers in the Vineyard' (Matt. 20:1-16). Neverthe­
less, by stringently affirming the radical nature of agape as a 
type of love which is self-giving, inclined toward others, creative 
of value, characterized by service, and inclusive of aliens, he 
has, in another way, affirmed the call for justice which was origin­
ally expressed in the Jewish law. Nygren's assertion that agape 
must be 'unmotivated' also expresses a concern for interhuman justice 
which may be obscured by religious emphasis upon 'love for God.'
Certainly the history of 'vertical' piety has called such a piety 
in question. Certainly one's love for God cannot be pursued according 
to a neo-platonic eros at the expense of one's fellows and in ignor­
ance of their needs. To this extent, Nygren's demand that love
for the neighbour must have no selfish motives is consistent with
the call for justice. In the twentieth century, his emphasis has
been further extrapolated throughout the writings of 'neo-orthodox' 
theologians, and in gratitude to them, theology can no longer speak 
of 'the love of God' in terms which connote a private, exclusive, 
and selfish love for God. The expression of 'the love of God' must 
now have its 'horizontal' effectiveness, and the cause of justice
may be served in the process (cf. Chapter Four, following).
But, on the other hand, as our brief look at John Burnaby's
reinterpretation of Augustine might demonstrate, there is a place 
for amor Dei, human love for God, if worship is to continue in a 1
proper balance, if people are to find a capacity for prayer, and |1if human beings are to discover even in the depths of sin some poss- ;|
ibility for a more 'perfect' love and a greater justice on earth. 
Jesus' disciples loved him, and were asked to demonstrate their 
love by loving others, by serving them, by behaving towards them 
as they themselves would like others to treat them, and generally, 
by following the precepts of Christ and 'obeying' his commands. 
There was no intimation that the love 'commanded' was to be easy
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or 'spontaneous'; there was an intimation that the disciples might 
show their love for Jesus by doing justice to their brothers, their 
neighbour, and their enemies. By loving their neighbours, the discip­
les might 'dwell' in the same love which, by keeping his father's 
commands, Jesus had shared with God. (John 17:21-23).
1
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APPENDIX I, PART TWO 
M.C. D'ARCY: "THE LION AND THE UNICORN"
The critique of Nygren by the Jesuit, M.C. D'Arcy is a very
different type of criticism from John Burnaby's reinterpretation
of Augustine. D'Arcy attempts to mix mythical, theological, and
psychological motifs in such a way as to show that eros and agape
are mutually dependent upon each other. Although D'Arcy's work
as a critique of Nygren is less that satisfactory, it is worth our 
attention because it may illustrate the dangers of an over-enthusiast­
ic or overly-complex synthesis of love-images.
Written in 1945, D'Arcy's book The Mind and Heart of Love
begins with a discussion of the characterization of love by Anders
Nygren and Denis de Rougemont.^ Nygren essentially dismisses "vulgar
eros" as completely antithetical to Christianity, but de Rougemont
portrays eros as an ambivalent, dualistic theme pervading the liter-
2ature of western civilization. For de Rougemont, eros is essent­
ially dualistic in character, and may become either a glorious self- 
assertion, an elan vital obvious in romance, or it may become a 
"dark passion" which is tragic and self-destructive. Both themes 
at once are surveyed in the legends of Apollo and Dionysius, Tristram 
and Isolde, Arthur and Lancelot, and in the tragedies of Shakespeare.
The "dark side of eros" must be allayed by the activity of agape.
Eros is self-destructive; only agape can reconcile it with itself. 
For de Rougemont, the prevention of the "Gnostic solution" which 
is the denial of human life, takes place only as the neighbour is 
loved in obedience to God. Agape thus corrects by reason the negat­
ive side cf eros.
D'Arcy thinks de Rougemont has not fully explained how agape 
can correct such a powerful and potentially destructive eros. D'Arcy
1. M.C. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of L o v e , Faber and Faber, London, 1945
2. Denis de Rougemont, Passion and Society, E.T. Montgomery Belgion, Faber and Faber, 1956.
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suggests that there must be something between "pagan psssion" and
"supernatural love" which sustains creation. "There must in fact
have been a quiet ordered love in all civilizations; one which lacked
the specific and supernatural character of Christian agape and yet
preserved a balance and discipline."^ No civilization could be
sustained in such a "wild frenzy" as de Rougemont describes pagan
eros, and D'Arcy stresses that agape, the "mind" of love must already
be at work before it is ever consummated in Christianity.
D'Arcy himself, however, has a sinister notion of natural
romantic love, which seems to suggest a warped idea of creation.
Without correction by agape, romantic love (eros) tends toward a
death wish, a gnostic or manichaean denial of physical existence.
The essence of passionate love, he thinks, is to seek the infinite
and despise the forms of earthly communion, feeding on its own image 
2like Narcissus. Such an eros finds pleasure "only in the anguish 
of its absence from the beloved" until its finite longings are reward­
ed by death and by absorption into the infinite.
It is difficult to see why D'Arcy has such a nihilistic view
of eros in its 'natural' form, but he attempts to conflate nihilistic 
passion with Nygren's idea of eros as a rational search for divinity.
"If Nygren be right, once eros is espoused by Plato and platonism, 
a remarkable metamorphosis takes place. The mythes becomes a logos; 
what was essentially a wild and irrational passion is converted
3into an excessively rational religion." With this mixture of the 
eros of de Rougemont and Nygren, D'Arcy arrives at an 'archetypal' 
form of eros which is itself essentially dualistic. Conflating 
passionate eros with spiritual eros, and combining this with certain 
concepts from Jungian psychology, D'Arcy develops an interpretation 
of agape and eros as representing the interdependence of essence 
and existence. For D'Arcy eros has two modes which are contingent 
upon influence by agape if they are to be guided in a positive direction.
1. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of L o v e , op. cit. p. 49
2. ibid. p. 55 3. ibid. p. 67
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(1) Eros is the "dark passion" of the tragic myths which is really 
only happy in its own death. It msiy also be the tacit denial of 
physical existence as a "gnostic solution" which excludes the individ­
ual from community. This instinct is primitive and powerful, essen­
tially nihilistic, and requires intervention from agape if it is 
not to lead to destruction.
(2) Eros is also the egocentric presumption of rational control 
and self-sufficiency. This 'survival instinct* preserves life, 
yet it may prevent the formation of mutual relationships. Thus 
unless agape acts upon the survival instinct to create community, 
survival itself may be forfeited.
D'Arcy thus identifies a 'sensual' and a 'rational' side of
eros. The sensual side is 'feminine', associated with the Jungian
notion of the anima; the rational side is 'masculine,' associated
with Jung's idea of the animus.^  Each side of eros may be either
positive or negative, creative or destructive. The sensual side
accounts for the human ability to sympathize with others, to aspire
2towards God, to experience joy, and to pro-create. The rational 
side of eros maintains survival, establishes the pre-requisites 
for security, discerns between good and evil, and accumulates know­
ledge. But neither the sensual side nor the rational side is suffic­
ient on its own. The interdependence of anima and animus is, for 
D'Arcy, the measure of human personality upon which any further 
activity of love as agape, in Nygren's sense, depends.
It is difficult to ascertain the point at which D'Arcy thinks 
eros stops and agape begins. D'Arcy's criticism of both Nygren 
and de Rougemont alludes to their attempt to keep agape in opposition
1. cf. C.G. Jung, Collected W o r k s , ed. H . Read, M. Fordhara, and G. Adler, Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1953-1978; especially Vols. 7-9. I doubt whether D'Arcy's adaption of Jung 
re anima and animus is legitimate.
2. D'Arcy certainly avoids elaborating upon eros which might be allied with joy in sexuality. 
His concern seems to be unbalanced toward sex as a "dark passion." It seems that there 
might be somewhat more to say about the natural aspects of sexuality in a hopeful sense.
The writings of Proust and D.H. Lawrence are for him "strange literary outpourings." He 
tells us that "sensation left to itself tends to get monopolized by the dominant current
of sex..." leading apparently, to "Aztec blood sacrifices, mystical and savage abandonments 
of the self, abstract sex-rage, and the intoxicating embrace of mother earth when man 
returns to it as to the womb." ibid. p. 142
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to. human nature. D'Arcy tries to put natural human loves together 
with a sort of divine, maintaining love, such that agape should 
undergird the natural loves to keep them from becoming self-destruct­
ive. For D'Arcy, Nygren's notion of agape is a kind of gnosticism
which 'boomerangs' against him.^ In eliminating eros from faith, 
human nature is tacitly eliminated also. Only with a concept of 
self is humanity able to maintain the pre-requisites for the perform­
ance of agape. "If the agape be an act which proceeds from man 
and at the same time has nothing human or free in it, how can that 
act, which is expressly declared to be divine, by anything less? 
And if man is literally divine, then we are back at the monism of 
the ancient gnostic cult."
Nevertheless, D'Arcy does retain the division between agape 
and eros. Agape remains for him divine love, but given his different 
concept of grace (i.e. Catholic), it is intimately related to human 
nature, an 'essence' which informs human 'existence.'
Our own being, essence and existence, is the school ofdivine love, and so we must not think of our own beingas something of our own which is met by God and then loved. This idea would be quite inadequate and give rise to a host of misunderstandings and false expectations.It would suggest that God is like a finite lover, now loving and new indifferent, now storming his way into our hearts and now lying hidden. All such language must be understood in the context of infinite and creative love, which produced us and keeps us alive. Net new favours, nor new external happenings, nor rapturous ex­periences are so much a ^estimony of God's love as our nature and being itself.
Criticizing de Rougemont, D'Arcy says that if eros is equated with
the "dark passions" alone and if agape is the rational balance to
the destructiveness in these passions, then agape cannot overcome
the force of nihilistic passion. The agape of de Rougemont is too
rational, too sterile; in fact it resembles the survival mechanism
of eros. On the other hand, Nygren's agape is too 'spontaneous',
1. D.Arcy; The Mind and Heart of L o v e , op. cit., p. 68
2. ibid. p. 80
3. ibid. 341
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divorced from human will and freedom; if it is to be 'creative' 
it must be more closely related to human existence. "Human nature 
is impoverished at the expense of grace. Eros must include the 
best in man, which is his reason and will and all the ideal possessive 
love of which it is capable. To right the balance, therefore, eros 
should stand for both the ecstatic, irrational, and self-effacing 
mood of love and the rational self-assertive and possessive love 
as they are found in human experience; and agape for God's special
1love and man's response to it as inspirited and energized by it."
D'Arcy argues that the passionate eros rejected by de Rougemont, 
and the acquisitive, spiritual eros rejected by Nygren are both 
pre-requisites of and influenced by agape. Agape is neither the 
rational, forming love of de Rougemont, nor the supra-rational "infu­
sion from above" proposed by Nygren. For D'Arcy, agape represents 
the divine influence, both 'from below' and 'from above' which works 
toward the realization of philia, mutual love between humans and 
between humane and God. Agape does net remove freedom, it is not
the eclipse of the ego. "The energy of love, which is God's own,
is communicated, and an essentially inferior energy starts repeating 
the rhythm of the superior one in its own fashion, as when a log
thrown into a stream takes on the motion of the stream or a rider
2on horseback sways up and down to the movement of the horse."
In preserving eros for influence by agape, D'Arcy wants to 
tell us that it is the "unicorn" - the passionate self, sensual,
'feminine,' and somewhat inclined toward self-sacrifice ~ which 
alone can recognize agape and return it. The "lion" - the rational, 
survival -oriented and practical self- cannot put away its intellect 
long enough to sense the love of God. If, through the influence
of agape the "unicorn" is able to avoid the pitfalls of self-
1. D'Arcy, The Hind and Heart of L o v e , op. cit. p. 325
2. ibid. p. 341 D'Arcy follows Burnaby in stressing philia as the ideal love of the NT, 
and perpetuates the linguistic error.
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destruction, it may be able to affirm God as its essence, without 
denying its existence, loving God who loved it first. Then, says 
D'Arcy, "God is all in all, and there is no trace of that kind of 
self-love which interferes with perfect love. But self is there, 
the self and the intellect, for it is God who loves them and gives , 
them both increase."^ In final illustration, D'Arcy concludes with 
the Spiritual Canticle of St. John of the Cross, in which the sould 
is empowered to love God even as itself is loved. The memory of 
St. Augustine is here enshrined; "Our heart is uneasy until it shall 
find rest in Thee." In such a movement of the soul, influenced
2by agape all along, D'Arcy says, "All that Nygren demanded is present."
Summary and Critique
In his mystical conclusion, D'Arcy has certainly not demonst­
rated that "all that Nygren demanded is present." D'Arcy is to 
be commended for integrating both passion and reason in an eros 
which is influenced by agape, and which is not opposed to it. Never­
theless, D'Arcy's attempt to show that agape and eros are resolved 
in philia, especially in a mutual love between God and the (contempl­
ative) human, seems to be flagrantly unconcerned with the demand 
for justice, and so falls right into Nygren's critique of private 
piety. Mutual love may certainly be an ideal of the New Testament, 
but despite God's influence through all eros, the culmination of 
philia does not find its perfection in love between God and human­
kind unless there is a correlative just love between human beings. 
Although D'Arcy has certainly asserted a requisite concept of self 
which must concern God, an integrated concept of self is still "noth­
ing worth" if it cannot overcome the detriment to love of neighbour 
which inheres in pride and self-love.
1. ibid. 344
2. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love, op. cit. p. 344
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D'Arcy gives very little attention to sin, and even discounting 
the fact that he operates from a much different view of grace from 
Nygren, the incidence of human failure which sabotages idealistic 
notions of imago Dei must realistically be considered. The problem 
of self-lcve of destructive eros, is not finally and directly concern­
ed with whether human beings shall love God, but rather with their 
capacity to love and serve each other.
The myriad illustrations from myths, phychology, existentialist 
philosophy, and theology which D'Arcy uses to demonstrate his argument 
seem to make things too complex. The relation between anima and 
animus, with their 'feminine' and 'masculine' characteristics, is 
somewhat offensive in sexual connotation. In any event it is pred­
icated upon a psychological view-point which may have little in 
common with Christianity, and which is not totally credible in its 
own sphere. D'Arcy offers us so many concepts of such a diverse 
nature, that it is often difficult to know whet he is talking about. 
Although we must necessarily make syntheses in talking about love, 
D'Arcy's mixed metaphors, contrasting threads, mythical, symbolic, 
technical, and artistic language leaves me, on the hole, more confused 
than enlightened. The following passage msiy illustrate the diverse 
concepts which we must try to cope with:
As we know, anima is always restless when under too severe duress of the intellect, for it has another love. This other love is the love which a human person as a person has for God, from whom he has his existence, and for others as persons. It is not egocentric because a person always spells 
a relation, and in that personal relation the centrifugal love finds vent.
The two kinds of love, therefore, which we distinguished as taking and giving, masculine and feminine, centripetal and centrifugal, which are contained in Eros and Agape and expressed in part by animus and anima, are now seen in the new distinction of nature and gerson, or better still in that of essence and existence.
To complicate the problem, D'Arcy's "lion," which is to be 
reconciled with the "unicorn," relates to de Rougemont's book Passion 
and Society, but not to Nygren's book Agape and Eros. In other
1. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love, op. cit. p. 334
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words, between D'Arcy, Rougemont, and Nygren we have three different 
interpretations of the word agape. De Rougemont sees agape as the 
rational, ordered love which can stem, the impulsive, negative, passion 
of romantic love. Nygren views agape as the love which God bestows, 
unconnected with reason and human will. D'Arcy retranslates de 
Rougemont's agape to mean another kind of eros, and he reinterprets 
agape from Nygren to mean divine love which properly informs and 
corrects eros. D ’Arcy seems not to realize how far his concept 
of agape is from Nygren's. The difference between their ncitions 
of grace, combined with the difference between their concepts of 
the appropriate response to God's love, makes nonsense of any assump­
tion that agape has a specific definition for all time. For Nygren, 
the response to God's agape is faith in God and love toward the 
neighbour. For D'Arcy, the apparent motive for God's influence 
upon eros is the eventual mystical reunion with God, à la St. John 
of the Cross. D'Arcy hardly mentions love for the neighbour as 
a demand or function of agape. Rather, it appears that the impact 
of agape upon eros is hardly different from the Augustinian notion 
that Gcd loves himself through his inspiration of our love for him. 
Rather than correcting Nygren, D'Arcy is subject to Nygren's own 
criticism. Despite the influence of agape on eros, or even the 
creation of eros by agape, D'Arcy does not escape from the charge 
cf private piety. In talking about love he has used many different 
words and concepts, but the matter is only interpreted in a plethora 
of modern terms without substantial novelty. Neither the "lion" 
nor the "unicorn", nor the two conceived together, are likely to 
bring a greater justice to our world.
On the positive side, D'Arcy has asserted that love cannot 
be held theologically in opposition to itself. Perhaps if he had 
refused to accept the initial terminology of de Rougemont and Nygren, 
his attempt to "form a bond" between "the lion and the unicorn"
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would seem more successful. He has stressed the undergirding, creat­
ive effect of God's love, which must have the capacity to inform 
and influence eros if alienation between Creator and creation is 
not to be perpetuated by inadequate human loves. But without an 
equal stress upon reconciling human beings with one another, his 
ideal of philia remains a fantasy.
Perhaps the conclusive impact of D'Arcy's book constitutes 
a reminder that there are many ways and words for talking about 
love. But any hasty combination of old philosophical models with 
new psychological theories may result in a tangle of meanings, perhaps 
impossible to unwind.
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Human Nature and Love's Ideal
With the increasing interest in the idea of agape following 
the first world was, and a corresponding emphasis upon biblical 
scholarship, it seemed for a time that * neo-orthodox' Protestant 
theologians might arrive at some agreement about the character of 
Christian love. The initial emphasis was reactionary, inspired 
in part by Karl Barth's call to arms against an overly optimistic, 
dangerously anthropocentric, and ethically reductive 'liberal theology', 
unleashed in his Epistle to the Romans. ^  Love, however, did not 
find its definitive interpretation in the neo-orthodox movement. 
Although Anders Nygren, Emil Brunner, and Karl Barth (for example) 
had many views in common, some of their greatest arguments have 
arisen around the interpretation of Christian love.
From a slightly different orientation. Reinhold Niebuhr contr­
ibuted to the discussion, partially in agreement with the neo-orthodox 
ethos, and partially divergent. With a certain provisional licence 
the four above-mentioned theologians generally represent an important 
approach to the interpretation of Christian love which, despite 
marked diversity, has a common essential character. That character 
is broadly recognized as 'neo-orthodox' but the term does not give 
due credit to the range and novelty of the ideas involved. As a 
theological movement, 'neo-orthodoxy' is probably on the verge of
eclipse, just as early 'liberal theology' was somewhat eclipsed 
2by it. But many of its ideas survive, to be blended and synthesized 
with the ideas of new generations. Its legacy asserts that agape 
is God's own love - far removed from the capricious and contingent 
loves of the natural human being - always giving, sacrificing, and
1. Karl Barth, Epistle to the R o m a n s , (1919) ET Edwin Hoskins, London, 1933 cf. John McIntyre's 
short assessment of the idea of love in liberal theology, called into question by the neo- 
orthodox movement. On the Love of G o d , op. cit. pp. 23-27 "..history had proved to be too 
much for it"...but "the emphasis had been right."2. Of course this is a subjective assessment. Despite the longevity of the ideas and issues, 
the movement itself had probably run its course long before Barth's death, cf. Alasdair 
Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology, Lutterworth Press, London, 1980, pp. 81-86.
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creating. It asserts that God's love and the Christian's ( qua 
'Christians') is (or are) qualitatively different from the 'love' 
which is innate in humanity. Its agape-love is sacrificial, self­
giving, and unmotivated by self-interest. It proceeds from a context 
of faith which radically reshapes behaviour (in theory if not in 
fact) so that love for one's neighbour may occur spontaneously. 
It supersedes all ethical casuistry in the form of legalism and 
obligation. It is sharply critical of any 'egocentric' piety, and 
sets worship primarily in the context of a serving community. It 
stresses the incapacitating and alienating character of human sin, 
the solution of which can only be God's grace, made freely available 
through Christian faith. Above all, the very idea of love is to 
be interpreted by no human act or emotion, but rather by the act 
of God, in and through the incarnation and atonement of his son 
Jesus Christ.
In this chapter I want to look more closely at this general 
concept of love as it is represented in the works of Emil Brunner, 
Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Barth. Much of the discussion has already 
been presented in Chapter  ^.37 when attention was paid to Anders 
Nygren. The other three theologians, while diverging from and occas­
ionally sharply criticizing Nygren, nevertheless fall within the 
broad general spectrum, which, for want of a better term, shall 
continue to be inadequately represented as neo-orthodoxy. In the 
background of this discussion, without which it could not have taken 
place, are the thoughts of Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard. 
As Barth noted (in a different context), "We have not spun these
statements out of the void."  ^ But to paraphrase Kierkegaard, one
2mistake often leads to another.
1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I V / 2 , The Doctrine of R e c o n c i l i a t i o n , E.T. G.W. Bromiley, 
T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1958 (Zurich 1955) p. 825
2. cf. above. Chapter T2, p.94, note 1. Philosophical Fragments, op. cit. p. 14
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I. Emil Brunner: The Divine Imperative
The similarities between Nygren and Emil Brunner are striking. 
Although neither was dependent upon the other, Nygren's book Agape 
and Eros and Brunner ' s book The Divine Imperative are in such general 
agreement on the doctrine of love that some collaboration might 
have been supposed. Their common emphasis upon the role of faith, 
the nature of love as essentially God's, not that of humanity, and 
the infinite chasm between the character of God and human nature 
are hallmarks of neo-orthodoxy. The fact that these elements were 
so completely integrated into their works demonstrates the force 
of the movement against the anthropocentrism of 19th-century liberal 
theology. Brunner's concern, however, is with the ethical implica­
tions deriving from a context of faith.
1. The Imperative: "Believe!"
Like Nygren, Brunner criticizes ethical systems based upon 
a casuistry of values, Brunner labels those which attempt to define 
"the Good" as "synthetic ethics". In them, he concludes, "the ethic­
ally decisive element lies in the law of the scale of values, not 
in the values themselves."  ^ Brunner does not think that ethical 
systems following Kant's model can be satisfactory for Christianity, 
because the source of ethical discernment is a "divine substance" 
and not reason. Kant lacks the conception of a "personality" who 
is self-revealing, who confronts the 'I' as a 'thou'. The command 
of Christ, "Thou shalt," implies for Brunner more than obedience; 
it entails the acknowledgement of such a confronting personality, 
greater than an aesthetic sense of "the Good" or the rational sense 
of ought. The ethics commanded in Christianity cannot be based 
upon reason, but must depend upon the self-revelation of God who 
is above reason. The question is occupied not with "What is the
1. Lmil Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , We stminster Press, Philadelphia, E.T. Olive Wyon 
1937 (Zurich, 1932) p. 42
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Good?" Rather, "Who is the Good?" is the primary question of Christ­
ian morality. The "bad" can only be removed by the action of God, 
since human attempts to "be good" are doomed to failure. If humans 
cannot be "good" in this world (and according to Brunner even the 
attempt to do so is a sin) , then "the answer of faith to the ethical 
problem is the word of sin and grace." ^
Faith, therefore, is the threshold of love, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that it is the act of step­ping into the divine love. In faith, man, since he takes his life from the hands of God, does not desire anything more of his own, but only that which God wills. But the will of God is love. Love is the meaning of the revelation of Christ; therefore love is the content of the existence of the believer. Love is therefore 'greater' than faith be­cause God is love, ^ut is not faith. Faith is saying 'Yes' to the divine love.
Humankind, according to Brunner, cannot realize the Good. 
The attempt to do so is "dominated by the principle of self-seeking
3and self-reverence." Faith in Christ must precede love; the ethical
life is actually based upon faith primarily; only bj faith is love
made possible. Yet Brunner seems hesitant to admit that love is
at all a human possibility.
Love in the sense in which the New Testament uses the word, is not a human possibility at all, but it is exclusively pos­sible to God. Love is an "ultimate" eschatological possibil­ity; for it will be the last thing when everything else, even faith, has vanished. Hence "living in love" is not something which msin can achieve by his own efforts and in his own strength,but it is something which happens to man in faith, from God.The decisive element in this life in lo^e is therefore always to allow ourselves to be loved by God."
The above quotation illustrates a common inconsistency or paradox
in Brunner's idea of love, which may be merely illogical. Repeatedly
he tells us that humans are incapable of love, yet we are enabled
by faith to love our neighbours. The person without faith cannot
5love his fellow-human being because he does not know God. A mother's 
love is the nearest "natural" form to the love of the New Testament, 
but it is "only a fore-shadowing of absolute love. " ^  Yet, "if we
1. Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p. 52
2. Emil Brunner, Man in R e v o l t , E.T. Olive Wyon, Lutterworth Press, London, 1939 (Zurich 1937) pp. 487-488
3. Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p. 69
4. ibid. p. 164 5. ibid. p. 304 6. ibid. p. 332
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do not hate our brother, we love him, for we are always either loving
or hating people."^
What Brunner seems to be saying is that faith authenticates
an innate or natural urge toward love. But the different ways he
tries to say this do not always seem consistent. His style is almost
too straight-forward to express adequately what Kierkegaard might
have more capably described as a paradox. In Brunner, the effect
is often the appearance of logical contradiction. Somehow he wants
to say that authentic love follows from faith, but again and again
he is forced to return to descriptions of "natural" love in order
to describe the transformation.
"...loving him.means to love mankind; to be united to him means to be united to man. His will is wholly a social will, a will for a people, for a community; therefore God recog­nizes no service of God which is not at the same time a service of man. Unlike the God of the mystics, or the pagan thinkers, God does not desire a service addressed to him­self alone; he who wills to serve God must exercise love and mercy, must know himself one with the need of his people. This is the service which is well-pleasing to God, and this is the Good.
If the above quotation represents the content of love which proceeds 
from faith, it is hard to see how faith's love is so radically differ­
ent from authentic human love, understandable and possible to all.
But let us hear Brunner further. Brunner's central question
is not about the content of love, but rather about the appropriate
response of humanity to the grace of God, perceived through faith. 
We should love our fellows because God makes his rain to fall on
good and bad alike. Our love must not be dependent upon whether 
the neighbour deserves our love. Since Christ has come humankind, 
we are to go ^  the neighbour, not retreating to a search for God 
outside the world, or within ourselves. Rather, it is precisely
in the world, the neighbour that God is to be discovered. The
twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew announces that "there is no love
1. Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p. 320
2. ibid. p. 54
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for God which can ignore man, and no love of man which can ignore
God."  ^ Only in the Incarnation, says, Brunner, is a distinction
discernible, through faith, between eros and agape. "For one who
has not died to self, 'in Christ', and through that divine surrender
is not consecrated and 'sealed', eros and agape always merge into
one another, love is still limited. Love which has no limits and
2makes no conditions is love "in Christ". The love of God, that 
love which is both given to and demanded from Christians, is revealed 
at the Cross. It confronts the individual "existentially" and impells 
him to an "imitation" of that love in love for the neighbour. Such 
obedience, under the authority of grace, has the character of a 
free "inclination". It is not a "duty" in the sense of obligation. 
One does not perform the duty from the motive of one's own good, 
but rather from the inspiration, the "gift" of faith. The "divine 
imperative", to love God and the neighbour, is contingent upon the
3"penultimate" command to believe. In fact, he asserts, the real 
command is just this "Believe!" Only through hearing this command 
is it possible to "obey" the command to love.
2. Both Gift and Demand?
Thus for Brunner, the "divine imperative" is "both gift and 
demand".^ Because God himself loves humankind, the command to believe 
is issued as gift which entails its "possibility", and as a demand 
which requires a response in the form of service to the neighbour. 
In this way, says Brunner, the antithesis between eudaemonism and 
duty is overcome. Obedience to the command becomes a free inclination, 
removing the character of law. The requirement of service to the 
neighbour's good, instead of to the good of the self, removes the
1. Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p. 55 (Brunner here seems to equate agape and 
eros with caritas and a m o r .)
2. ibid.
3. ibid. pp. 111-112; cf. p. 185 "Indeed, in the last resort nothing is commanded save this 
"Believe!" "Faith is a gift, but it is also commanded."
4. ibid. p. 114, cf. p. 185. Thus for Brunner, the true "Divine Imperative" is not love, 
but rather faith.
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character of eudaemonism. The Good becomes radically redefined 
as "what God wills", which through the response to the command, 
is now "what man wills".
Brunner's intriguing juxtaposition of "gift and demand" in 
interpretation of the commandment to love God and the neighbour 
requires some mental gymnastics which may not be totally within 
the realm of logic.
It may not be appropriate to say that the same love can be
simultaneously "given" and "demanded". Karl Barth has said that
Brunner cannot have it both ways. "Giving," he said, "is a very
different thing from demanding."^ A love which gives freely and
unconditionally may be in jeopardy of denying its unconditionality
if it demands something, even love, in return. But to be fair to
Brunner, he has attempted to interpret the commandment of Jesus
that God and the neighbour shall be loved without lapsing into a
strict requirement of duty. Faith, he thinks, changes the "command"
to a spontaneous action, so that its "obedience" is inspired rather
than obliged. A somewhat similar interpretation was also attempted
by Kierkegaard. "The commandment is that you shall love, but when
you understand life and yoursélf, then it is as if you should not
need to be commanded, because to love human beings is still the
2only thing worth living for..." For Brunner, the only way in which 
the command has the character neither of eudaemonism nor of duty 
is through the prior command to believe. But an even more outstanding 
question may be involved here. It is as difficult to conceive of 
"obeying" a commandment to believe as it is to "obey" a command 
to love. For Kierkegaard, faith could not be conceived as a command. 
Faith was God's gift and it could not be willed. Love, on the other 
hand, had to be "believed", "willed", and "obeyed", for it could
1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I V / 2 , op. cit. p. 781
2. Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, op. cit. p. 344
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not be assumed to be spontaneous. For him the commandment to love 
was the obligation which kept faith alive; "Truly", he said, "a
confession of faith is not enough."^ Only after sustained growth
in loving might the imperative of the commandment to love disappear, 
but self-love was never defeated so that love for the neighbour
might be taken for granted.
Brunner and Nygren have been concerned (with Barth) to take 
away the flavour of duty from the commandment to love, partially 
in response to Kantiah ethics. As a "command" it bears a close
resemblance not only to some "categorical imperative", but also
to the obligation of law. For neo-orthodox ethics, Christian love 
must avoid the Scylla of nomos (law and duty) and the Charybdis
of eros (eudaemonism and self-love). Agape must emerge as the 
straight path from God to the neighbour, having the essential charac­
ter of spontaneous, self-giving love. For Brunner and Nygren, faith 
is the key to spontaneous love (less so far Barth). As Brunner
says, faith has the capacity to change life "from life in the imper-
2ative to life in the indicative." For Brunner and for Nygren there 
is the idea that Luther proposed, that "man is a pipe" through which 
the love and will of God flow directly through the believer toward 
the neighbour.
But through all this avoidance of nomos and eros - ethics 
conceived as duty and ethics conceived as a search for "the Good"- 
a strain is laid on faith which may be more than it can bear. In
addition, there is also a strain on reason. Even if our minds can
cope with the idea of paradox there is a limit to logic which cannot 
be overcome by the repeated juxtaposition of conflicting terms. 
Love in the Christian sense of agape must continue to be described 
by connotations which are not overwhelmingly different from common, 
secular usage. The "natural" man quite understands the ideas of
1. ibid.2. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, op. cit. p. 77
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sacrifice, spontaneity, and creativity, and such terms need not 
have the pretence of authentication solely by faith. If God's love 
is to be eminently "giving" it can hardly be conceived as simultan­
eously "demanding". An "imperative" is normally a command, and 
it is difficult to conceive as also a spontaneous "indicative". 
If we have difficulty thinking how love may be commanded, the problem 
is only exacerbated by any suggestion that faith is commanded, and 
must be "obeyed", before the command of love may be understood.
Through faith man becomes a volunteer in the divine army, one who, because and insofar as he believes, can do nothing else than will what God wills, precisely because his life is based in and on God. Therefore because he no longer seeks himself, he now seeks that which God seeks, that is, the world, the other man. The will of God for the world now becomes the will of the believer. The ethical impulse is now no longer that of self-regard, but of love...In^ faith alone is self-love conquered by the love of God.
However we view the function of faith, the relationship of
humanity to God, or "the will of God for the world, " the tragedy
in history, particularly ecclesiastical history, is a witness against
this connection between faith and love. Neither Kierkegaard nor
Barth nor Niebuhr could agree with such a mechanistic assessment,
although Nygren and Luther have similar views. To Brunner's credit,
he does not continue consistently with this line of thought. But
his inconsistency and tendency to easy reductions render inadequate
his attempt to formulate an idea of ethics based upon faith and
2demonstrated through love.
3. Love and Justice - Ideal and Practical
Brunner is unconvincing in his attempt to assert and maintain 
both a radical interpretation of agape and the "loveless... orders" 
upon which culture and government rest; nevertheless he attempts 
to affirm them simultaneously. If agape is as directly related
1. ibid. p. 79
2, For a much more complete analysis of Brunner's ethical thought, cf. N.H.6^ Robinson,
The Groundwork of Christian E t h i c s , Collins, London, 1971. While sympathetic to Brunner 
at many points, Robinson notes that Brunner's ethics is "essentially negative", and 
grounded on a "naturalistic fallacy.’* ( e s p . pp. 233-5.)
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to the will of God as he has suggested, then it is difficult to 
see why the injustice of the orders must be "accepted" by the 
Christian.^ Brunner's attempt to set Christian love in practical 
relation to the world's orders should have required some change 
in his theory of radical dualism between the love of Christianity 
and the loves of natural human beings. Even less acceptable than 
some synthesis between agape, eros and nomos is his argument that 
Christian love must be "forgotten" in order to maintain the orders. 
If such a dualism between theory and practice is necessary, then 
there certainly must be something wrong with the theory. If agape 
is truly unlimited, then the Christians must not be forced to "accept" 
the limitations of orders which are fundamentally unjust.
In many respects Brunner's attempt to set Christian love in 
the context of practical life resembles Reinhold Niebuhr's distinction 
between sacrificial, "disinterested" love and that which is deemed 
possible in an "immoral society". (But in Niebuhr, as we shall 
see, the distinction between the ideal and the pragmatic is more 
consistently represented.)
For Brunner as for Nygren, faith is the tail that wags the 
dog. Faith is alleged to authenticate and create love, but when
faith's love is applied to the practical decisions of ethical life,
there seems to be no essential difference between the love of Christ­
ians and the loves of ordinary human beings caught up in the necessity 
and contingency of existence. Faith makes the will of the Christian 
conform with the will of God, but in pragmatic terms, the social 
will enshrined in the 'orders' and institutions of culture take
priority over love. True love is reserved apparently for some corner 
of existence which is not opposed by practical decision-making.
1. Brunner's confusing de velopment of the "orders" which the Christian is called upon to 
both accept and resist is called into question by the events of his era (especially in 
Europe) and also by the continuation of oppressive "orders" in numerous forms. A si gni­
ficant viewpoint which may render Brunner's whole ethics incomprehensible is the f o llow­
ing: "The Christian must as it were forget all he ever knew about the meaning of love, 
to preserve the o r d e r s . . .even to the point of taking human life." The orders are to be 
preserved "for their meaning is love." They are "incurably loveless," contrary to the law 
of love. "To improve them is not a hopeless task, nor is it unnecessary, but it is still 
only a matter of secondary importance." The Divine Imperative, op. cit. pp. 211-288.
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"The distinctive mark of the Christian ethos" says Brunner, "is 
passive love, self-sacrificing surrender."^ Faith means to allow 
oneself to be loved by God, passively. But how such love may be 
consistently converted to justice-creating action, Brunner has not 
shown. The idea of Christian love cannot be sustained by the necess­
ity to perpetuate the institutions of Christendom, nor are they 
wholly incompatible. Brunner has stressed a dichotomy between love 
and justice which sets the former on a pedestal above and beyond 
the possibilities of the latter, so that love and justice are tacitly 
opposed.^
From a concept of human love which is always "particular"
and is never "universal", Brunner has developed a concept of justice
which is sterile and legalistic. Love is always directed toward 
the concrete individual, but justice, he says, is "like an impartial 
division of territory." Love can create community, but justice
3is only able to remove strife. Justice absolutely respects the 
sphere of life of the other, but this clearly defined barrier leads 
to separation and isolation. Justice always has the quality of 
some restriction, but "the love of neighbour is not a general idealiz­
ed love of humanity, but the unrestricted recognition of the other
man, without considering what he is like." ^  Insofar as justice
entails the idea of equality, Brunner says that "the egalitarian 
idea does not arise out of the reverence for the Creator, but out
5of a desire to dictate to the Creator how things ought to be." 
To try to make everyone equal is "to kill economic vitality". Brunner 
is critical of capitalism, but nevertheless "accepts" it, since 
"it is this system by which God maintains our lives." ^  He says 
the Christian "need not be infected by the spirit of this economic 
system", even though "as a merchant or a banker or a workman I may
1. Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p. 328
2. Nygren explicitly states that love and justice are opposed, cf. Anders Nygren, Agape 
and E r o s , op. cit. p. 90
3. Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p. 305
4. Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p. 306
5. ibid. p. 407 6. ibid. p. 423
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1be forced to do things which are contrary to love." The Christian
is supposed to strive for a better order, but the Church is to "guard
2herself from political entanglements as from the devil." A Christian 
political party, he says, would be worse than anarchy. "The ultimate
3identification of our own cause with the Lord's is forbidden." 
But the identification of the Christian's will with the will of 
God seems to have been forgotten.^
Marriage, says Brunner, is no place for "democratic experiments". 
"Where there is genuine love, in the double sense of eros and agape..
5a monarchy will arise of itself." Clearly, the male is to be conced­
ed the dominant role, a "truth" derived from the Christian faith. 
(In speaking of love in marriage, Brunner can talk of "genuine love 
in the double sense of eros and agape", an interpretation which 
clearly contradicts previous statments.) For Brunner, marriage 
must be based not upon love, but rather upon fidelity. "Natural 
love is in its essence monistic."^ His notion of Christian love 
as an undetermined and unpreferential love seems to prevent a clear 
association with marriage; also Brunner seems forced to retain an 
idea of eros within the marriage relationship, which does not tally 
well with previous assertions that agape and eros are opposed. 
Brunner seems to be aware, despite secular implications, that the 
love which is necessary to marriage cannot be absorbed by a totally
7sacrificing and selfless agape which stems from faith. On the
other hand he does not seem to be aware of the call for justice 
within marriage, and within every human relationship, between the 
' I ' " and the ' thou ' . Certainly the conception of marriage as an 
instinctive "monarchy" derived from Christian faith is inter-twined 
with value systems which may have been more acceptable to Brunner's 
era than to our generation. We can no longer accept such values
1. ibid. 2. ibid. p. 287 3. ibid. p. 432 4. ibid. p. 795. ibid. p. 380
6. ibid. p. 347 Brunner does not sy stem ati call y oppose agape and eros to the same extent
as Nygren, but he clearly assumes a division between them; only agape is normally "genuine",
7. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, op. cit. p. 332
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uncritically.
In Brunner's idea of the state, he tends to set aside previous 
assertions about love so as to preserve the "orders" over against 
anarchy. His concept of justice is reduced to that which is conven­
ient to preserve order. The idea of equality is inadmissible, he
says, because perfect equality destroys all life. ^  Nevertheless
2justice has a "spirit of equity". Such an equity can only be discov­
ered "at the moment of action". We are forbidden to indulge in 
"utopian dreams", because we live in a wicked world, only to be
3redeemed by a divine act. We must accept the evils of the state, 
yet try to love the individual in spite of them. We must not attempt 
to set up a state upon the principles of perfect justice, or perfect 
equality, for "perfect justice is a self-contradictory term because 
the perfect can never be merely just.""  ^ The form of the state cannot 
be construed beforehand, because political action is always dependent 
upon the "Divine Command" at this particular moment, in these partic­
ular circumstances. The state cannot and ought not be governed
by the law of love, but only in accordance with its own principles,y5called "reasons of state". "No state," he says, "has ever sprung
from 'principles of justice."^ Brunner calls pacifism "an anabaptist
utopia".^ He argues for the traditional concept of "the just war".^
He says that penal law is intended to represent the divine judgment
and retribution on earth, that the law fulfills the function of
expiation.^ (But he does argue against capital punishment.) Justice
forcibly imposed is not good in itself, but it is "a schoolmaster
3L0to lead us to Christ". He delineates the difference between love
1. ibid. p. 182 2. ibid. 3. ibid. p. 401
4. ibid. p. 450 (This is either bad grammar, bad logic, or a bad interpretation of justice).5. ibid. p. 462
6. Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p. 463
7. ibid. p. 469
8. ibid. Brunner is not alone in reminding us of "just war" criteria. The question is too 
complex to consider here, but my own view is that it incorporates an idea of justice which 
cannot be reconciled with Christian love; war, even if "necessary," is always sinful and 
can never be "just". As Bonhoeffer said, "it is only when Christian faith is lost that
man must...secure by force the victory of his cause." cf. Bonhoeffer, E t h i c s , Fontana 19 6 4 , p.93
9. ibid. p. 47510. ibid. p. 453
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and justice in such a way as to show that love is an ideal, normally
possible only between single individuals, not to be sentimentally
allied with the idea of the state.
The distinction between justice and love is clear. Love means going out to others, justice means the delimitation of spheres of power, and the protection of these boundaries.Love is concrete and personal, non-deliberate, non-general. 
Justice on the other hand, is general, lawful, deliberate, impersonal and objective, abstract and rational. This law­ful justice is the presupposition of love. Love which had not passed through this stage would be arbitrary and sub­jective and sentimental; yet love, while passing through this stage, must rise above it. But even in this subordinate po­sition the idea of justice, precisely insofar as it is an element of law, is of incalculable significance for the his­torical life.
If, as Brunner here asserts, "this lawful justice is the pre­
supposition of love", then he seems to have made a radical departure 
from his previous declaration that faith is the presupposition of
love. Earlier he said, "Love is not only the fulfilment of the
2law, but also its end, and thus the end of all ethics." ("End"
here is not a telos, but a terminus. ) But Brunner's idea of justice,
demonstrated above, is hardly more than the general idea of law, 
of nomos. It contains little of the assumption of equality between 
the self and the neighbour, by which we are commanded to love the 
neighbour as oneself. It contains little of the Hebrew concept 
of mispat, distributive justice, but endorses primarily the idea 
of a calculated "delimitation of spheres of power". Brunner does 
not acknowledge a justice which may be spontaneous nor one which 
is the direct effect of love: If you love me..."feed my sheep"..."Go 
and do likewise." It is law that often preserves the orders of 
society, but justice revealed through Christ and endorsed by Christ­
ianity should not be defined by secular legal constructs. Justice 
must be much more than law. Laws indeed may be just, but justice
is not to be defined by law; nor is love to be opposed to justice.
1. ibid. p. 450
2. ibid. p. 79
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In light of the Atonement, retributive justice is no longer 
an admissible concept, and it certainly cannot be on earth "the
representation of divine judgment." The Cross has brought an end
to penal justice, and any attempt to perpetuate it has nothing to
do with love nor justice in Christian terms, but is only a regression 
to legalism. If Brunner's idea of Christian love is so weak as
to demand the perpetuation of the idea of the just war, if no utopia 
is ever to be dreamed of, if pacifism is a delusion, if equality 
between human beings is unthinkable, if no state may ever be founded 
upon principles of justice, then his love which proceeds from faith 
is either wrongly conceived, or wholly impotent. At the very least, 
it is inconsistent.
230 {
II. Reinhold Niebuhr: Sacrificial and Realistic Loves
Reinhold Niebuhr's influence upon contemporary theology, partic­
ularly that which comes from the United States, can hardly be over­
looked or over-estimated. Any discussion today of love in the 
"context" of justice is likely to be more or less indebted to Niebuhr. 
Indeed, Frederick Herzog's call for an emphasis upon the establishment 
of "justice structures" (c.f. Introduction, above) has a certain 
affinity with the young pastor of Detroit, who in the twenties attem­
pted to relate God's love to the very real dilemmas of a burgeoning 
industrial society. That same pastor, the Edinburgh Gifford lect­
urer at the beginnings of the second world war, was to speak of 
the difficulty of relating Christian "sacrificial love" to "structures 
of justice" in a flagrantly imperfect world. Many of Niebuhr's 
concepts and suggestions continue to reappear in many disciplines. 
Not only theology and Christian ethics, but also sociology, psychology, 
and political science have freely adapted from his work. Here
we can only touch on a few central concerns which have continued 
to exert substantial influence upon modern formulations of the idea 
of Christian love, and upon that which is "possible" in history.
1. Luther's Legacy
Despite considerable differences, comparisons are often made
2between Niebuhr, Brunner, and Barth. Not so often recognized is 
the fundamental common ground between Niebuhr and Anders Nygren. 
Niebuhr will not accept Nygren's 'absolute' distinction between
1. cf. Kegley and Bretall, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr, His Religious, Social and Political 
T h o u g h t , New York, 1956.
2. cf. Gene Gutka, Agape, An Ethical A n a l y s i s , op. cit. This chapter overlaps Outka's dis­
cussion in certain respects, and his work is certainly more extensive in comparison of 
Nygren, Niebuhr, Brunner, and Barth on the subject of love. I believe, however, that 
Gutka has rushed to a 'technical' interpretation of agape which is unjustified, and 
certainly unbiblical. It is doubtful that agape can be conceived essentially as "a 
substantive ethical principle." (p. 257).
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1the spheres of the divine and the human. But both Nygren and Niebuhr
share, as do Brunner and Barth, the limited but significant influence
of Martin Luther.
For Nygren, a Lutheran bishop, Luther's influence is explicit
and direct. For Niebuhr, it is subtle, indirect, and harder to
identify. Niebuhr's frequent use of the idea of "paradox" allows
him to say Lutheran things without the package of Lutheran doctrine.
Nevertheless, the emphasis upon sin, the condemnation of pride,
the radical nature of "sacrificial love", and the constant demand
for freedom may all be traced to Luther. In addition, we note that
Niebuhr insists that a Christian must be "a citizen of two worlds",
whereas Luther could speak of two "kingdoms." Niebuhr denies Luther's
doctrine of depravity, but nevertheless seems to maintain it as
we learn that in this world, the human being is not able to achieve
'perfection' and must rely upon the "transcendent" vindication of
love "at the end of history." Even though true love and justice
are "possible" they are "impossible" due to the conflict of freedoms.
Thus the "judge, jailer, and executioner" must be retained. Finally,
Niebuhr's emphasis upon faith is somewhat ambiguous, but in light
of Luther, we may not be surprised to notice that true, sacrificial,
2disinterested love is "a derivative of faith".
Despite the sophisticated way in which Niebuhr develops his
doctrine of humanity, we find in it many of the same elements which
Luther had identified in the sixteenth century:
A Christian man is a perfectly free lord of all subject to none. A Christian man is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.
  -m1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of M a n , Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, Vol.I. |
1941; Vol. II, 1943; Lyceum Paperback, 1964; p. 84 - For simplicity and for the most |
concise exposition of Niebuhr's view of Christian love, with which this section is 
concerned, most of the following references from Niebuhr depend upon this two-volume 'w
work. However, it should be noted that Niebuhr's view of love and justice in other , Æj
works cannot be always reconciled with his view in The Nature and Destiny of M a n .
2. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 271 3
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Now love by its very nature is ready to serve and to be subject to him who is loved.
Man has a twofold nature, a spiritual and a bodily. According to the spiritual nature, which men call the soul, he is called a spiritual, or inner, or new man;laccording to the bodily nature, which men call the flesh, he is called a carnal or outward or old man, of whom the Apostle writes..."though our outward man is corrupted yet the inward man is renewed day by day." Because ofthis diversity of nature the scriptures assert contradictorythings of the same mag, since these two men in the same man con­tradict each other...
In the first extract there is the paradox of freedom, which Niebuhr 
stresses constantly. In the second is the idea of "sacrificial 
love." And in the third is the contradiction in human nature which 
demands, a 'realistic' approach to love and justice. Both Nygren 
and Niebuhr try to reinterpret Luther's doctrine of the Fall as 
a more comprehensive model for innate egocentrism in human nature. 
In its most primitive form, this egocentrism is for Nygren "vulgar
eros" and for Niebuhr the sinful state of "sensuality". These rep­
resent the tendency of human nature to regress toward subhuman forms 
of existence. This base tendency, however, is for Niebuhr derived 
from, and possibly subordinate to, the serious form of sin which 
is resident in the human will. For Nygren, this is eros, acquisitive
love which ultimately strives toward a union with the divine. But
for Niebuhr, this grasping sin of the will is nothing else than
2human pride, hubris, or superbia.
Niebuhr himself tells us that Luther used pride (superbia)
3and self-love (amor sui) synonymously. In the extreme, pride is
the attempt at human self-deification. "Man falls into pride when
he seeks to raise his contingent existence to unconditioned signif-
4icance."
Thus from Luther is developed the emphasis upon the sin of
egocentrism, categorized under the headings of eros by Nygren, and
1. Martin Luther, Treatise on Christian L i b e r t y , op. cit.
2. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of M a n , op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 277
3. ibid. p. 187
4. ibid. p. 186
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pride, by Niebuhr. One might almost call this sin idolatry, since 
at the extreme, it wills equality with God, or in Niebuhr's terms, 
the "unconditioned significance" of the self. Luther's amor sui
is, with little essential difference, both Nygren's eros and Niebuhr's.
• ^  1 pride.
Luther does not condone any concept of self-love. Niebuhr,
however, makes the distinction between "inordinate" and "ordinate"
self-love, but he does not manage to give much attention to the
latter. Nygren, of course, follows Luther; agape is the very opposite
of self-love. According to Nygren, self-love is "not merely one
sin among others, but the sin of sins." Self-love he tells us,
2is "the deepest root of all evil, its primal source." "So far 
from self-love being a natural ordinance of God in nature, it is 
a devilish perversion. That which in all things seeks its own, 
is thereby closed against God." Niebuhr seems to acknowledge that 
it might be "possible" to love oneself properly, but in human nature, 
inordinate self-love, pride, is the "basis" o f  sin. The antipode 
of this pride or eros is sacrificial love, or agape. Despite Niebuhr's 
extensive qualifications and contingent interpretations, he essential­
ly retains the same dualism within human nature which is intrinsic 
to Luther and explicitly developed by Nygren. ^  Here it might be 
appropriate to quote Luther's famous pronouncement on the command
V
to love the neighbour "as thyself"'
I believe that by this precept 'as thyself man is not bidden to love himself, but the vicious love is exposed wherewith he loves himself in fact; that is to say, thou art wholly bent upon thyself and turned to love of thyself (curvus es totus in te et versus in tui amorem) from which thou shalt not be made straight except thou entirely cease to lo^e thyself and forget­ful of thyself, love thy neighbour alone.
1. But these are not equivalent with St. Augustine's atnor s u i . As we have seen, Augustine's 
idea of self-love was adopted by Luther only in its negative sense. Kierkegaard's idea of 
self-love has the ambiguous sense which is closest to Augustine, i.e. proper or improper, 
depending upon one's relationship to God. cf. Oliver 0 'Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love 
in St. A u g u s t i n e , op. cit.
2. Anders Nygren, Agape and E r o s , op. cit. p. 537 3. ibid. p. 740
4. Brunner also retains this dualism, but he tells us (rather illogically) that self-love is
actually commanded. The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , op. cit. p . 171 Nevertheless, Brunner says, "The 
self is the evil." (p.174) We must "desire to be nothing." (p.164) It is impossible for the 
self to exist "apart from fellowship with God" (ie. through faith.) (p. 302)
5. Luther, R o m e r b r i e f , quoted by Nygren, Agape and Eros, op. cit. p. 712
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It seems to me that far too much weight has been put upon
this tenuous exegesis, not only by Nygren, but also by the whole
genre of neo-orthodox theology. Neither Niebuhr, Brunner, nor Barth
have admitted agreement with Luther's insistence that all self-love 
is "vicious". Nevertheless, the whole emphasis upon sin which has 
led ' to a pessimistic and dualistic view of human nature and an 
"impossible" conception of genuine love confronted by history, is 
the extrapolation of Luther's exegesis which concludes that all
innate self-love is a vitiosus amor.
Although every theologian may need to admit the extent to
which humanity is profoundly "incurvatus in se", the constant impact 
of sin and injustice, and the correlative call for an active repent­
ance, there is also a need to assert consistently that creation 
is good, and that God's love is effective within history. The problem
of the Fall, of the effect of human freedom, and of the perennial
'falling away' from the divine purpose must not be ultimately, in 
this world, contradictive of God's love in and through Creation.
Even the requirement of faith must not be allowed to become so decis­
ive in human existence that it retroactively, as it were, negates 
the original goodness in Creation. In their own ways, Brunner,
Niebuhr, and Barth have identified these contradictions, and attempted 
to qualify their works in such a way that human nature is not ultim­
ately (or in Niebuhr's case, eschatologically) opposed to the love 
of God in Creation. But despite attempts at a reconciliation, as 
long as faith is the generative force from which love is derived, 
as long as human nature is set in contradiction to itself, as long
as the propensity to sin is the primary innate character in humanity,
then the intrinsic dualism of Luther is the formative feature of
theology. "Simul justus et peccator" is certainly a characterization 
of human nature in which there is truth. If we reserve this character­
ization only for the person with faith, so that without it humanity 
has only the character of peccator, we may find ourselves in agreement
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with Luther, and possibly with Luther's interpretation of Paul. 
But it is also a denial of the creative, covenanted relationship 
of God with his creatures, and it has little to do with the Jesus 
of the synoptic Gospels.
The questions which Luther left us cannot easily be answered. 
Sin and self-love^ are not theological propositions but tragic 
historical phenomena. But these cannot be put right by the simple 
"imperative" to believe; nor can they be resolved in some dissection 
of human nature which alienates the human being 'before' faith from 
the human being 'after' faith. Again, history alone is sufficient 
to tell us that there may be no qualitative, obvious difference; 
sin is made even more flagrant when it is committed by the faithful. 
Also, genuine love cannot be envisioned as a function or "derivative" 
of faith, necessarily and dramatically changing the imperfect to 
the perfect, or setting "pure agape" in place of "egocentric eros". 
If it were able to perform this magic, history would be more aware 
of it; but even if it were, God's love in the act of creation would 
have been an imperfect love indeed, and the Fall must have been 
a plunge into an abyss beyond the reach of a God either too weak 
to prevent it, or too unconcerned to care. Finally, if God's action 
in the Cross is merely a rescue operation which throws out a life- 
raft to anyone still afloat and able to swim to it, then again one 
must ask whether human freedom should ever have had the capacity 
to corrupt God's "good" creation to the extent that the rescue opera­
tion was necessary at all.
Luther's "questions" have not been ignored by the neo-orthodox 
theologians, but neither have they consistently been answered. 
Insofar as there appears to be a contradiction in the answers, to 
a great extent the contradiction may be traced to Luther's insistence
1. i.e. superbia or hubris ; not the 'proper' self-love to which Feuerbach, and in a 
different sense, Kierkegaard, refer.
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that natural self-love is "vicious", and that faith's love is definit­
ively "servile" or "sacrificial". If this distinction is asserted, 
then it is difficult to escape a contradiction between human nature 
and God's "good" creation. Or, if freedom is the culprit over which 
God has no control, then there is a contradiction between the love 
of God and an hypostatized 'freedom' which 'negates' God's sovereignty. 
Neo-orthodox theologians have attempted to reconcile God and humanity, 
while trying to maintain that God's love is "qualitatively" different 
from innate human loves. To what extent they have been able to 
"go beyond" Luther depends upon the following problems.
(1) How is the fact of human sin to be reconciled with the "goodness" 
of God's creation and his continued love for his creatures?
(2) What is the formative role of faith in relation to love?
(3) What is the effect or potential effect of Christian love in 
creating justice in this world? And how, if at all, is 'Christian 
justice' different from institutional legalism?
(4) How is the integrity of human nature, 'created in the image 
of God', to be explained and preserved?
Such unsolved, remaining questions are Luther's legacy to 
contemporary theology, the answers to which have a significant bearing 
upon the future of the idea of love. Luther has taught us not to 
seek our salvation in our own futile attempts to be righteous; to 
conceive of love in terms of our neighbours ' needs and not in view 
of our own interest; and that true freedom is to be found in service 
to our fellows. But he has also spoken of faith in a way that may 
set it at odds with the very service which he has stressed, and 
with the very grace of which he was so aware. If we are not cautious 
in our talk about faith, love's capacity to create justice may be 
forsaken; and, as Feuerbach recognized, there may indeed arise "a 
contradiction between faith and love."
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2. The Justitia Originalis of Reinhold Niebuhr
Niebuhr accepts and maintains the dualism between eros and 
agape. On the one hand he even heightens the distinction between 
them, for true agape is deemed so "disinterested", "sacrificial", 
and willing to suffer, that it is neither wholly possible nor even 
advisable in the ambivalent world we live in. But on the other
hand, Niebuhr asserts that humanity in its fallenness is never cut
off from a vision of true love. Even in the midst of self-love
the fact that mankind may acknowledge and respond to another kind
of selfless love indicates that the Fall is never beyond the range 
of God's grace. Humanity retains a portion of its symbolic perfec­
tion, able to recognize that "possible" love for which it was created. 
This vision, Niebuhr calls the justitia originalis. The "theological 
virtues" of faith, hope, and love, the requirements for true freedom, 
are constituents of a prior "righteousness" which "remain with sinful
man as the knowledge of what he ought to be, as the law of his free- 
1dom." In this way Niebuhr attempts to show that although eros
and agape are antithetical to each other, eros may be influenced 
by agape even while eros is most active. There is never a complete 
separation between God and humanity. Niebuhr criticizes Nygren 
for making the chasm between God and humanity too absolute; he also 
says that one may indeed speak of "Christian" virtues-faith, hope, 
and love-which are worthy to be strived after, and which may be 
recognized even in a state of sin. "The ultimate law of life is 
the law of love", and such a "law" is so essential to true humanity 
that one may never be totally cut off from it. The person who cannot 
acknowledge love has lost his hold on life; there must be some 'point 
of contact' between God and humanity even in the depths of sinfulness. 
"The law of love is a vision of health which even a sick man may
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 280
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envisage, as the original ..righteousness which man does not possess
but which he knows he ought to possess, since the contradiction
in which he stands, and the consequent compulsion and submission
in his relations to God, the neighbour and himself, are obviously
1not an ideal state of health."
Upon this justitia originalis, Niebuhr thinks the commandment
to love God, and the neighbour as the self, is predicated. It is
a commandment, a law, which should exclude all commandment, because
what is commanded is "harmony", between the soul and God, and between
the self and the neighbour. But the harmony is not a reality, for
if it were a reality, the commandment would be meaningless. "If
there were not some possibility of sensing the ultimate perfection
2in a state of sin, the "thou shalt" would be irrelevant." Niebuhr 
continues with the confrontation between Jesus and the rich young 
man: "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell what thou hast and give
to the poor." (Mt. 19:16 ff.) "All simple moralism," says Niebuhr,
"which assumes that the law of life only needs to be stated to be 
obeyed, is refuted by the response of the rich young man...Jesus 
admits that the ultimate possibility of human life is beyond the
3capacity of sinful man: 'With man this is impossible.'" "It is
suggested that the contradiction between man's essential nature
and his sinful condition is insoluble from the standpoint of man's
own resources and can be solved only from the standpoint of God's
4resources."
Niebuhr's exegesis is suspicious; nevertheless much of his 
theology is based upon this interpretation of harmony, assumed in 
the commandment to love as an original "law" which may be sensed 
by the sinful human being. From it he develops his view of human 
nature: (1) The sinful human is able to recognize "the ultimate
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and De stiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. I, p. 287
2. ibid. p. 286
3. ibid.
4. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and De stiny of Man, op. cit. Vol. I. p. 288
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requirements of his nature", and that "any particular concretion
of law is not enough." (2) Yet he is not (without faith) "fully
conscious of these ultimate requirements." (3) "He is not ready
1to meet these requirements once they are defined." Further, Niebuhr 
summarizes the content of this "original righteousness", "the law 
of love", as it contains :
(1) The perfect relation of the soul to God in which obedience
is transcended by love, trust, and confidence." (2) "Perfect internal
harmony of the soul' with itself in all its desires and impulses";
(3) "the perfect harmony of life with life: 'Thou shalt love thy
2neighbour as thyself!'"
The problem with Niebuhr's exegesis is his assertion that
"harmony" is commanded. Not only harmony but "perfect harmony" 
seems to be his rendering of what is required by "the law of love". 
This harmony is a subtle requirement for true love, which leads 
Niebuhr into an admission that the "sinful condition is insoluble 
from the standpoint of man's own resources." The inference is not 
only that the human being cannot save himself, but also that he 
cannot come even close to "performing" the law of love. He must
be convinced, not by an attempt to obey that law, but rather b} 
his acknowledgement (like the rich young man) that he is not able
to obey it, that he is caught up in sin and cannot love. Not only
is self-salvation impossible, but love is impossible, because harmony 
is impossible. The harmony is to be achieved only as God removes 
the anxiety about oneself, through faith. "Faith in the wisdom 
of God is thus a prerequisite of love because it is the condition 
without which man is anxious and is driven by his anxiety into vicious
3circles of self-sufficiency and pi-ide."
1. ibid.
2. ibid. p. 289
3. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and De stiny of Man, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 289
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To unravel Niebuhr's rather complex interpretation of the 
law of love is difficult, and adequately to criticize it is more 
so.
(1) Niebuhr is probably correct to assert that the sinful person 
may recognize love, even though it is impossible for him perfectly 
to actualize. He recognizes it not because of some "prior" state 
of perfection, but because he loves, and is loved by, other human 
beings.
(2) The insertion of "harmony" as part of the divine command only 
makes sense if we accept Niebuhr's notion that human beings cannot 
love unless all anxiety is removed. In this case, a love which 
demands harmony, not only for its perfection, but also for its init­
iation, would be rather fanciful even in light of Jesus' advice 
not to be anxious about oneself. God's nurture does not, in any 
case, guarantee a lack of anxiety. Faith in God may reduce it, 
but its absence need not be a prerequisite for love.
(3) Niebuhr implies that because the rich young man was not ready 
to give his money to the poor, obedience to the love command is 
impossible, "since all men are involved in the sin of establishing 
their own security by what they have and what they are." "The ultim­
ate possibility of human life is beyond the capacity of sinful man. 
If the implication here were only about salvation, we might not 
object. But from the previous context, it is clear that Niebuhr 
assumes "the ultimate possibility of human life" to be a "harmony" 
of love. Jesus' advice to the rich young man, "go and sell what 
thou hast and give to the poor, and come and follow me" had conceiv­
ably been heeded by many of his disciples (cf. Luke 12:32-34 ; Luke 
18:28; MK, 10:28); it was not impossible, and it did not serve simply 
as a device to convict the young man of his sin. We may assume 
that it was a straightforward invitation by Jesus, which was refused.
1. ibid. p. 288
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The story of the rich young man is in no way an anecdote illustrating 
the impossibility of perfect love; it is indeed an illustration 
of Jesus' call for justice from his disciples. Niebuhr is not willing 
to entertain the call for economic justice in this incident, but 
rather focusses upon the impossibility of obedience which is produced 
by anxiety, and upon God's capacity to make "ultimately" possible 
what is impossible for humanity.
(4) Niebuhr's emphasis upon the "harmony" required by the justitia 
originalis, "the perfect relation of the soul to God", "the perfect 
internal harmony of the soul with itself", and "the perfect harmony 
of life with life", is devised to convince us of three things. 
First, there is a natural sense in humanity which recognizes love 
and realizes it is impossible. Second, that faith is the prerequisite 
of love, because it removes anxiety about performing the impossible. 
And third, the "law of love" is so absolutely demanding that even 
faith does not make love possible in this world of opposed freedoms. 
Despite the sophistication of this argument, the impact is to make 
Jesus' preaching for repentance only an instrument for convicting 
human beings of sin. The law of love, like the Torah, is merely 
a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ, impossible to perform and a 
reminder of our wickedness.^ Anxiety is removed, not as we attempt 
to love, but only as we believe that God's grace is able to perfect 
our weaknesses in loving. We are freed to love imperfectly, and
we must accept our imperfection, because wherever two or three are 
gathered, there will be disharmony.
It is not self-evident that love, even when "commanded" by 
Jesus, can properly be conceived as a "law". The performance of 
the command does not depend either upon a "prior righteousness" 
of which humanity is vaguely aware, nor upon the establishment of
1. I will admit that I do not here take account of numerous qu alifications by Niebuhr which 
might make this assessment seem extreme. But on the other hand, the extent to which 
Niebuhr approximates the extremes of Luther's emphasis on faith, and the anti-nomian 
heresy, should not be ignored. That is, if it is impossible to be "good", then there 
may be a tacit conciliation of evil.
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"perfect harmony" before such love is possible. There is little 
evidence of a biblical link between the advice not to be anxious 
and Jesus' issue of the command to love God and the neighbour as 
oneself. There is no convincing evidence in Jesus' synoptic ministry 
that faith is the prerequisite of love, nor that the commanded love 
is impossible.
3. Love in History
Niebuhr's proposition of a justitia originalis which intimates 
an ideal of harmony in which love is perfectable prepares the ground 
for his analysis of love which can never be perfect, in a history 
which is never harmonious. We have already noted that Niebuhr sees 
pride as the "basic or primal sin" from which others are evolved.^ 
Although there is indeed a dualism between pride/self-love/eros
and sacrificial love/harmonious love/agape, there is a 'point of 
contact' (Brunner's Ankn’upfungspunkt) between them. This means
that, contrary to Nygren, for Niebuhr the two loves may be "present" 
at the same time and in the same person. It may be possible to 
love oneself in a state of pride and selfishness while at the same 
time loving another person somewhat unselfishly. This situation 
in which a vision of sacrificial love informs or influences sinful
self-love, and co-exists with it, is called "mutual love". Realist­
ically, for Niebuhr, mutual love is about the best that human beings 
can hope to achieve in this world of opposed freedoms, of historical 
necessity and contingency. "From the standpoint of history mutual
love is the highest good. Only in mutual love, in which the concern 
of one person for the interests of another prompts and elicits a 
reciprocal affection, are the social demands of historical existence 
satisfied. The highest good of history must conform to standards
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. I, p. 186; Yet also, 
the "primal" sin is "unbelief." (p. 183, 289).
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of coherence and consistency in the whole realm of historical vital­
ity."^
Niebuhr's concept of mutual love is intimately related to
his concept of the freedom of man, which he sees as the essence 
2of humanity. It is this innate freedom which constitutes the boon
3and the bane of human existence. Through the use of freedom, the 
human has a capacity for "self-transcendence", which means that 
he is never the sum of his parts, that his true nature is always 
a bit of an enigma to phenomenological analysis, and never totally 
predictable, "finally always subject and not object. Sin is essen­
tially the wrong use of this freedom, but the "right" use of it 
is always inhibited by finite, historical existence in juxtaposition 
to other free creatures. This ambiguous freedom is derived from 
a symbolic or metaphorical Fall which, we may assume, Niebuhr thinks 
necessary for epistemology. "The knowledge of good and evil" is 
acquired by the use of freedom, but inevitable with it is the propen­
sity to sin and the loss of "innocency " , "Innocency is thus the 
harmony of life with life without freedom. Mutual love is the harmony 
of life with life within the terms of freedom; and sacrificial love 
is harmony of the soul with God beyond the limitations of sinful
5and finite history."
With these distinctions Niebuhr enters the 'grey area' between 
theological theory and practical existence, an area which Nygren 
largely avoids, and which Brunner is not able to reconcile (c.f. 
above, section I).^ Mutual love is Niebuhr's compromise between 
what is required by the love of God and whet is possible in a real 
world. Ironically, mutual love itself cannct be a justifiable motive 
for its own existence. It must contain the motive of sacrificial
1. ibid, Vol. II. pp. 68-69
2. ibid. Vol. I, p. 17; "The essence of man is his freedom."
3. of. Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian E t h i c s , London, 1936, in which man's 
glory and his tragedy are portrayed as the result of human freedom and "s elf- tra nscendence."
4. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of M a n , op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 14
5. ibid. Vol. II, p. 78
6. Brunner is not able to reconcile his concept of love with practical life, because to p r e ­
serve the "orders" Christian love must be "forgotten." Brunner, The Divine I m p e r a t i v e , 
op. cit. p. 225
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love in the loving agent(s); otherwise it will be mutual expediency 
instead of mutual love. For Niebuhr a "motive" is admissible because 
faith, hope, and love are conceived as Christian "virtues." But 
the goal of sacrificial love is never achievable, because it is 
inhibited and limited by the "claims and counterclaims" of the parties 
involved. The best that can be hoped is that a mutual love may 
arise, in spite of conflicting interests, which results in a harmony 
of life with life. The sacrificial love demonstrated in the Cross 
is for Niebuhr a real demand upon human beings; even though it is 
impossible to achieve in this world, it is not to be deprived of 
its influence and "pull" on the world. For to a smaller or greater 
extent, it is "transcendently present" wherever human beings try, 
but fail, to love sacrificially. Agape, to this limited extent, 
may coexist with eros, and even be "present" in it.
For Niebuhr, therefore, eros stands in a "paradoxical relation­
ship" to agape. "Sacrificial love (agape) completes the incomplete­
ness of mutual love (eros), for the latter is always arrested by 
reason of the fact that it seeks to relate life to life from the 
standpoint of self and for the sake of the self's own happiness."^ 
Insofar as eros is characterized by Niebuhr as grasping, egocentric, 
self-loving, and full of pride, it is a sin which constitutes the 
ingredients of the Fall. But insofar as eros is a gregarious, life- 
suppcrting, knowledge-seeking movement towards community, eros repres­
ents for Niebuhr the stuff of human history. It is tainted with 
sin to be sure, but its very thrust of life towards life gives it 
a hopeful character. Although, as Gene Outka has observed, Niebuhr 
is far from consistent in his attempt to distinguish eros, mutual
love, and agape, we can identify a dual sense in which Niebuhr uses 
2eros. The first sense is most like Nygren: eros is pride and self- 
love. But the second sense is not admitted by Nygren, as eros
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. II, p. 82
2. of. Gene Outka, A g a p e , op. cit. p. 25
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acquires an ambivalent value within the context of mutual love. 
As the recognition of and partial response to agape begins to occur, 
eros may be re-formed to take the shape of mutual love, in which 
a reciprocal response is made possible, not wholly for the motive 
of self-interest. It is still predominantly eros, net yet "sacrific­
ial" or'^disinterested" in character, but agape has begun to influence 
eros within the sphere of historically limited existence. This 
second interpretation of eros in history provides the foundation 
of many forms of "contextual ethics," (and for that reason Niebuhr 
has been called "the father of contextual ethics.").^
Despite the potentially positive aspects of eros in the form 
of mutual love, the gregarious nature of eros is not enough to build 
a true community. Niebuhr agrees with Brunner, Nygren, and Barth 
that community faith is the only context in which sacrificial love 
is remotely "possible "« But for Niebuhr, this possibility is only 
"transcendently" possible, since even in the Church there are conflic­
ting interests. For the Christian, the Cross is the impinging symbol 
of sacrificial love upon historical existence. Even though such 
a love is realistically impossible, it is not irrelevant. The dishar­
mony which makes sacrificial love impossible should convict the
faithful person of his and his community's sin, and promote humility
and a more selfless, disinterested love for the neighbour. Insofar 
as the Christian takes the commandment to love sacrificially in 
denial of himself, this transcendently present love may be seen 
to be impinging on history. But insofar as the Christian is prevent­
ed from exercising this love by his own self-transcendence, self- 
interest, and the conflicting claims of others, Christian love can
only exert a subtle "pull" which can only be 'successful' at the
end of history. For the present, that love which is shown in the
1. Niebuhrian ethics based upon some "context" which must be analyzed and responded to 
re alistically have influenced Paul Ramsey, Joseph Fletcher, Seward Hiltner, and others 
who, while criticizing Niebuhr, adopt his method to a great degree.
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Cross has the character of a "suffering love frustrated by histori­
cal contingency and freedom, to be vindicated eschatologically by 
God's decisive action.
The agape, the sacrificial love, which is for Christian faith revealed upon the Cross, has its primary justifica­tion in an "essential reality" which transcends the reali­ties of history, namely, the character of God. It does not expect an immediate or historical validation but looks towards some ultimate consummation of life and history.On the other hand the Christian doctrine of Creation does not set the eternal and divine into absolute contradiction to the temporal and historical. There are, therefore, validations of agape in actual history, in so fardas con­cern for the other elicits a reciprocal response.
The above quotation may be taken as a "summary" of Niebuhr's 
idea of sacrificial love, or agape. We have seen that eros is constr­
ued both as pride and a gregarious instinct which leads to mutual 
love. Now we note that sacrificial love or agape is active both 
within and outside history. It is symbolized in the Cross, and 
it is already sensed by the sinful human being through the justitia 
originalis. In the Sermon on the Mount and in the Commandment to
Love it is nevertheless rendered 'impossible Its validation may
be looked for only in eschatological terms. Nevertheless it is
present here and now wherever self-interest is partially transformed 
into a concern for the other, sc that it elicits a response. Since 
true sacrificial love requires "perfect harmony" it may not be taken 
as an ethic in itself, but it must be set practically within the 
context of historical existence. It is an ideal love, which "pre­
supposes the resolution of the conflict of life with life ", and 
such harmony will not exist wherever more than two individuals assert 
opposing claims. This love does not seek its own, but "a love which
seeketh not its own is not able to maintain itself in historical 
2society." It is "disinterested and as such can ameliorate the
self-interested claims of persons who must exist, but it cannot
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. II, p. 96
2. ,ib:i.d.j,p.; .7:2,
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find its perfection in this world. The prototype for this disinter­
ested, suffering love is the self-denial of Christ, and the radical 
nature of the example indicates for Niebuhr that true sacrificial 
love is not only non-violent, but also non-resistant to evil.^ Since 
all interests must be harmoniously related, however, "the sacrifice
of the self for others is therefore a violation of natural standards 
2of morals." Christ's example is construed in such a way that the 
human response to it must be primarily the response of faith in 
God's majesty, and in his capacity to bring evil to a close beyond
the frustrations of history. Nevertheless, this "suffering love" 
is transcendently present, with a capacity to influence eros in 
history, insofar as through 'natural' human love, a reciprocal respon­
se may be elicited. For where there is mutuality there is at least 
some semblance of the required "harmony of life with life
For a critique of Niebuhr's pragmatic assessment of love in 
history, again we must begin with his notion of "harmony ", In assert­
ing that the love command also commands "perfect harmony," he has
prepared the ground for a conception of mutual love as "the highest 
good of history." Sacrificial love's requisite harmony cannot be 
achieved, so we must have faith, and accept the harmony of mutual 
love as a pragmatic second-best. The problem, biblically, is Jesus' 
apparently straight-forward question: "Love your enemies...For if
you love those whc love you, what reward have you. . .And if you salute 
only your brethren, what more are you doing than others? Do not 
even the Gentiles do the same?" (Matt. 5:44-47). Niebuhr's rationale 
may be located in the next, summarizing 'command ' "You therefore
must be perfect (v. 48)." Of course this "perfect" may not be a
command at all, but rather a statement of completion; 'If you love
1. cf. Gene Outka, A g a p e , op. cit. p. 171: Ou tka notes that "to safeguard this (ideal) 
content, (Niebuhr) is willing to restrict justifying appeals to Jesus' teaching 
about the character of God."
2. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 69
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your enemies, then you will be doing what is perfect in God's sight. 
At any rate, the whole section is specifically against the notion 
that mutual love is to be taken as any sort of standard for Jesus' 
disciples. Niebuhr's concept of mutual love, in which two parties 
find reciprocal benefit in loving each other, may be a practical, 
realizable goal. But nevertheless it seems to be challenged by 
Jesus' call for a love which does not require mutuality.
Secondly, Niebuhr has so 'perfected' the idea of sacrificial
love that given his definition of it we cannot view it as achievable
by humans in history. Outka has expertly criticized Niebuhr's view,
and it is difficult to improve upon. Outka notes that Niebuhr offers
a "blank check" to the neighbour to misuse our love: "Do unto others
as they would have you do unto them." The result of this "blank
check" may lead to consequences, says Outka, that are absurd and
morally wrong (rape, for example). "The feature of self-sacrifice
in itself would appear to provide no way of distinguishing between
attention to another's needs and submission to his exploitation
2end no warrant for resisting the latter." The antidote to this
problem is the guideline, "as yourself," which is an indicator not
only in the "Golden Rule" but also in the commandment to love the 
neighbour. Our own authentic needs, and not the extreme demands 
of the other) tells us how to love, initially. Outka, however, 
has not reconciled the call to "go the second mile "# Nevertheless, 
for two major reasons Niebuhr's principle of sacrificial love must 
be ruled extreme.
The first is that it renders our "thesis" an impossibility: 
"If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love." (John
15:10). If the love which is given and commanded is so impossible
in history, then we cannot "abide" in Christ's love. The seriousness
1. There are numerous possible readings of this verse which cannot be discussed here. 
Another significant in terpretation is that Jesus' disciples will be perfected, i.e. as 
they keep his c o m m a n d s . (cf. Lev. 19. "perfect" may translate "holy")
2. Gene Outka, Agape, op. cit. p. 275
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of the commands of Christ requires that they not be written, off 
in history. Second-best is never adequate, and only through the 
attempt to complete the requirement of love do we truly have a right 
to claim grace as our justification (cf. eg., Mt 6:12; 15^15).
Again and again Jesus requires his disciples to see that love is 
"possible." To assert that Christ's precept of love is too good 
for history is a retreat to the legalism of the law, and it is also
the forfeiture of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Precisely in
and with history God has appeared, not only to convict human beings 
of their sin, but even mere to show them how to love. The comrrand 
is simple, explicit, and stringent: "This is my commandment, that
you love one another as I have loved you. " (John 15:12). It must 
be possible.
The second reason is that Niebuhr's view of sacrificial love
and its contingent alternative (i.e. mutual love) make justice a
pragmatic, legalistic concept which conforms only to what is necessary,
but not to what is just. Mutual love as "history's highest good"
1may be little more than mutual self-interest. Love may indeed
"call forth love " but love's reciprocation can only be a potential 
and not a requisite of love for the neighbour, indeed, for the enemy.
A love which demands reciprocation, or even deems gratitude necessary 
for its approbation, is a paternalistic and counterfeit love. If
after exploiting our neighbours we decide to love them, and then 
require that they love us in return, we must not be required to 
judge the validity of our love by their resentment or their reciprocal 
love. If mutual love is history's norm, then unreciprocated love 
is historical failure. On the other hand, if we require that those 
whom we have mistreated are to love us sacrificially, without
1. cf. Niebuhr, Love and J u s t i c e , ed. D.B. Robertson, We stminster Press, Philadelphia, 1957, 
pp. 25-26. Niebuhr acknowledges "The power and persistence of self-interest," in light 
of which "most of the harmonies of life are not the perfect harmonies of fully co-ordinated 
wills but the tolerable harmonies of balanced interests and mutually recognized claims." 
Despite the obvious benefit in such a recognition, it is not derived from the unconditional 
love which Christ commands.
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resisting our exploitation, then such a self-denying love is also
self-negating.^ Jesus' identity with the poor and the oppressed, 
his cleansing of the temple, and his hard words about the Pharisees 
provide a mandate for a struggle with the oppressed against oppressors, 
net a refusal to resist evil. At the least, oppressors have no
right to preach non-resistance to the oppressed. Niebuhr's "sacrific­
ial love" is so passive that it does ''not allow for an active, if
non-violent, resistance against oppression, much as Jesus' own inter-
2pretation of his ministry (Luke 4:18). Jesus' love was not so
sacrificial and "disinterested" to keep him from taking up the cause 
of impoverished widows, confronting the corrupt leaders of his relig­
ion, even 'violently' wielding a whip in the temple - only finally, 
finally handing on the baton to a greater liberating energy in the 
greatest demonstration against evil the world has yet known. The
Cross is not the passive leading of sheep to the slaughter, but 
the active climax of a life dedicated to resistance on all fronts
3against evil. Its primary adjective is not "sacrificial " but
rather "victorious ", It is the evidence that love is net impotent, 
nor passive, nor self-negating, nor idealistic, but effective, consis­
tent, and liberating in the struggle against every evil and oppression 
of history. To the greatest degree, Jesus' death was not his "sac- 
ri'fieç," but rather the final and fulfilling vindication of his own 
ministry, his purpose, and his self-hood. Love is called to create 
justice, to resist oppression, and to conquer evil; in so doing 
it is not essentially 'sacrificial' at all, but rather self-fulfilling. 
Its sacrifice does not have the quality of self-negation, nor even 
cf self-denial. The love which is commanded and rendered possible
1. Niebuhr has noticed this problem and criticized Brunner and Luther for this. But he himself 
has removed this practical approach to justice from the ideal of sacrificial love. cf. Nature and De stiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. II p. 195
2. Again, Niebuhr says Luther, Nygren and Brunner assert a passive love, which prevents 
action for justice, but for Niebuhr the necessity for action is.not ideally Christian 
love. Nature and De stiny of M a n , ibid. p. 194
3. Niebuhr asserts that ideally, love is no n-resistance to evil, but Jesus says "do not resist one who is evil," a difference which does not justify Niebuhr's assertion, (cf.
Mt. 5:39) This passage may be a reference only to "revenge" (cf. Good News Bible)
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in history might never even notice its own sacrifice as such, but 
only as one element among others in a consistent self-authentication.
4. Practical Justice
We conclude this abbreviated study of Niebuhr with a critical 
sketch of his pragmatic approach to justice in this world. True
justice, like true love, is rendered an impossibility in history 
because of the pervasiveness of freedom and sin. Only where there 
is the harmony and intimacy of love is justice really possible.^ 
But where interests conflict there can be no simple approach to 
justice. Achieved justice is always judged by "the higher possibili­
ties of love, which is at once the fulfillment and the negation 
2of justice." Justice is ideally defined by "the holiness" of God's 
love and forgiveness in the Atonement, the symbol of God's love
3as law. The Cross is the perfection of agape which transcends 
all norms of human justice, and its radical character renders the
quest for justice 'no simple possibility.'"^ This, Niebuhr thinks, 
is overlooked by Marxists and Liberals who have assumed that progress
5in the establishment of justice is really within human grasp.
The implicit pragmatic solution is, for Niebuhr, some attempt 
to identify and actualize a "relative justice". Since the possibility 
of "unconditioned perfection in history" does not exist, "it is
not even right to insist that every action of the Christian must 
conform to agape, rather than to the norms of relative justioe and 
mutual love by which life is maintained and conflicting interests 
are arbitrated in history. For as soon as the life and interest
of others than the agent are involved in an action or policy, the
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. I, p. 271
2. ibid. p. 285; Brunner has complained that Niebuhr never states very specifically what
he means by "justice". We should pr obab ly assume that it is both an ideal relative to
the justitia o r i g i n a l i s , and also a pragmatic ethical principle, "relative" to achievable 
equity, which usually has the character of law. cf. Outka, Agape, op. cit. pp. 78 ff.
3. ibid. Vol. II, p. 56
4. ibid. p. 74
5. ibid. p. 86
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sacrifice of those interests ceases to be "self-sacrifice."  ^ Here 
again we see how Niebuhr's definition of agape as "sacrificial love" 
is a presupposition which, if accepted, makes love in history unwork­
able, only "transcendently" effective. If Niebuhr's concept of 
practical justice were not so opposed to his ideal of love, or if 
the ideal itself could be made more relative to historical existence, 
we might have little cause to object. His practical approach to 
justice is indeed grounded upon the difficult problems of conflicting 
purposes which cannot be overlooked in any serious attempt to make 
justice a historical reality. He realizes that a contemplative 
love for God may be remote from the "loving action" which is necessary 
for faith to work through love. "It is an act rather than a thought
which sets the Christ above history, and being an act, it is more
2indubitably set within history than a mere thought." Nevertheless, 
the extent to which he sees Christ's action "above history" militates 
against a true application of Christ's ethic within it. As Charles 
West has noted, "ever again we see Niebuhr implicitly taking his 
commandments from somewhere in history itself rather than from Christ's
3relation to the redeemed man." Although Niebuhr is critical of
Luther for his diatribe against the peasants' attempt to gain freedom 
against their feudal princes, Niebuhr himself is unable to relate 
some consistent struggle for justice to the "sacrificial love" which 
ideally means non-violence and non-resistence to evil.^ He does 
indeed assert that such a struggle is necessary, but in this assertion 
he perpetuates the opposition between Christian love and a genuine,
5practical struggle against oppression. The end result is not so 
different from Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms; Christianity 
is subordinated to the worldly requirement to combat anarchy at 
all costs.
1. ibid. p. 88
2. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and De stiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. II, p. 92
3. Charles West, Communism and the T h e o l o g i a n s , SCM Press, London, 1958, p. 147.
4. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and De stiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. II, p. 194.
5. ibid. p. 195
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Thus, Niebuhr's approach to justice is finally as dualistic
as his concept of love. His concept of historical justice, like
Brunner's, is nearer the negative and legalistic character of law
(nomos) than the positive and persuasive character of love. "The
fence and the boundary line," he says, "are the symbols of the spirit
of justice."^ He tells us that, ideally, justice produces greater
equality; but practically "the attainment of complete equality in
2society" is "impossible".
The perpetual recurrence of the principle of equality 
in social theory is a refutation of purely pessimistic 
conceptions of human nature, whether secular or religious.
Its influence proves that men do not simply use social the­
ory to rationalize their own interest. Equality as a pin­
acle of the ideal of justice implicitly points towards 
love as the final norm of justice; for equal justice is 
the approximation of brotherhood under the conditions of 
sin. A higher justice always means a more equal justice.
Special privilege may be frowned upon more severely by 
those who want it than those who have it; but those 
who have it are uneasy in their conscience about it.
The ideological taint enters into the discussion of 
equality when those who suffer from inequality raise 
the principle of equality to the definitive principle 
of justice without recognizing that differences of need 
or of social function make the attainment of complete 
equality in society impossible.
This extract represents the typical subtlety in Niebuhr's character­
ization of love and justice which repeatedly asks us to accept an 
"ideal" which we find is impractical or impossible. Here we can 
certainly agree that the principle of equality is a refutation of 
pessimism, and that "a higher justice always means a more equal 
justice." But as we read on, we are required to sacrifice the ideal 
to the pragmatic. In this case, we are not allowed to keep the 
"principle of equality" because to do so would be an "ideological 
taint" of justice.^ As equality is first proposed, then implicitly 
denied as a characteristic of justice, we cannot finally be sure
5just what justice means for Niebuhr.
1. ibid. p. 252
2. ibid. p. 255
3. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. II, p. 254-255
4. On Niebuhr's accusation against Marxists for their "ideology", cf. Charles West, Communism 
and the T h e o l o g i a n s , op. cit. pp. 158 ff.
5. cf. Gene Outka, A g a p e , op. cit. pp. 84-85
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In any event, we begin to suspect that much of Niebuhr's prog­
ramme is intimately bound up with a particular conception of "demo­
cracy" and pragmatic justice which seems to be associated with North 
1America. The "ideology" which Niebuhr finds in Marxists and Liberals
may not be totally absent from his own interpretation. World hegemony
of the stronger powers is "inevitable", he tells us. It is also
2preferable to an uncontrolled balance of power, which is anarchy. 
With such an admission, love's capacity to create justice is submerged 
beneath a doctrine of pragmatism, and human Christian responsibility 
for the struggle for a more equal justice may be relinquished or 
forfeited. Of couse perfect harmony, perfect love, and perfect 
equality may in this world be impossible, but Christ's commandments 
and a faith that works through love are not concerned with what 
is or is not "possible ",but rather with a hopeful and active commit­
ment. As Luther himself was constrained to assert, spiritus sanctus 
non est scepticus. Even for Luther, a doctrine of 'Two Kingdoms' 
could not keep faith apart from working, creative love. Niebuhr's 
love is not only dualistic, but also essentially pessimistic.
5. Summary and Critique
Who or what shall deliver us from this body of sin and death? 
Despite Niebuhr's reminder that agape is "paradoxically" related 
to eros as mutual love, we are still left with Nygren's dualism. 
The love of God is essentially alien to the loves of humanity, and 
the human, indeed the world, may be left in its sin, smothered with 
its own self-seeking loves, only "transcendently" touched by God's 
grace. The human in his pride is engrossed in a necessary corporate 
sin, and cannot pull himself out of it by his own efforts, yet God 
can barely get a foot in the door of "history" to provide a vision
1. cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political P r o b l e m s , op. cit. especially 
. chapter 3, "Why is Co mmunism so Evil."
2. Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit.. Vol II, p. 285
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of the justitia originalis. Sacrificial love, the "disinterested" 
perfection which depends upon "perfect harmony" is an historical 
impossibility. Only at the end of history will God finally wield 
his vindicating word. Meanwhile humans are best advised to make 
use of the interval by not expecting too much from love. If they 
can manage to love each other mutually, it is probably as close 
as they can come to the divine.
As the ideal is inhibited by the claims and counterclaims 
of interested parties, justice must be administered pragmatically, 
yet without restricting a certain kind of "freedom" which is "the 
essence of man". On no account must humanity be led into the delusion 
of egalitarian utopianism, which is tantamount to the prideful mess- 
ianism of apocalyptic. Opposing freedoms rule, yet God will have 
his day. Love is commanded, yet love requires harmony and is thus 
"impossible". Power corrupts, but power prevents anarchy. Humans 
are cautioned to sail between the Scylla of tyranny and the Charybdis 
of anarchy. A realistic love and a realistic justice appropriate 
to a history which only has meaning at its end is Niebuhr's gospel. 
Humanity is sinful being gazing longingly towards a reflected image 
of unrealizable "perfection ". Nevertheless, the contradictions 
are only apparent; through faith there is "the paradox of self-real­
ization through self-giving". God's grace, somehow, is still suff­
icient, and "the majesty of God" is not to be denied. Yet grace 
cannot remove the contradiction between God and human freedom.
The Christ in us is not a possession but a hope; perfection is not 
a reality but an intention; peace is never an achievement but "the 
serenity of being completely known and all forgiven."^
It has been suggested that "an ideal which perennially reveals 
deficiencies" may be "practically irrelevant and theoretically confused."'
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and De stiny of M a n , op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1252 .
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An ideal, of course, should reveal deficiencies in the behaviour 
of those who hold it in esteem. But when the ideal proves beyond 
the realm of human possibility, beyond history in its validation, 
and only "transcendently" effective in a world of freedom and nece­
ssity, then there may be something chronically wrong with the ideal 
itself. "Sacrificial love" and "relative justice", as Niebuhr has 
construed them, are not constituent to our "thesis".
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III. Karl Barth: Love as Grace, Gratitude, and Action
Karl Barth’s discussion of the problem of Christian love, 
as he summarized it in Volume IV, Part 2 of his Church Dogmatics, 
is, to a great extent, an attempt to correct many of the inadequacies 
which arose in interpretations of other twentieth century authors. 
Barth was not happy with Nygren's Lutheran position which through 
faith seemed to destroy the 'healthy distance' between God's love 
and the loves of human beings. Even faith could not totally change 
human nature so that the faithful human being becomes a "pipe" which 
receives from above and gives out below. The fact of human sin 
could not be so easily overcome. But on the other hand, Barth was 
not quite willing to believe that Christian love is so radically 
"sacrificial" that it must be set in an "impossible" frame of refer­
ence in this world, as Niebuhr implied. For Barth, Christian love 
is characterized by a call for the affirmation of true human nature 
through self-giving (Hingabe), in an active movement toward the 
neighbour. Human love may never be deemed the same in quality as 
God's love, but it may respond to and correspond with the love of 
God. God's love is not the "source" but rather the "basis" of that 
human love which is appropriate to human nature as God intended 
it. Although agape does not 'demand' its reciprocation, it is prac­
tically fulfilled only in the community of faith. Only where there 
is faith is that love which corresponds to the love of God affirmed 
in mutuality.
Barth's view is certainly not wholly consistent in the broad 
context of his works. Especially on the subject of eros he appears 
to contradict himself. But everywhere there is an emphasis upon 
God's love as grace, and finally even eros is subject to it. His 
approach is characterized by an eschatological tension, in which 
the human being is certainly m  the world, but need not necessarily 
be of it. The key to the resolution of this tension, so far as 
is historically possible, is to be found not primarily in the human
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capacity to believe, but rather in God's "overflowing love" which
is persistently active in history.
The Holy Spirit as the spirit of the Father and the Son... 
convinces us of the love of God for us which became an 
event in earthly history in the existence of Jesus Christ, 
and which is genuine and effective and immutable because  ^
it is an overflowing of the love which is in God himself.
To such a love the human being may respond, in "imitation" of and
"correspondence" with the love that creates love.
1. Human Nature and Human Loves
Barth is reluctant to adopt Nygren’s technical definitions
of agape and eros. Although agape does indeed imply a certain under­
standing of love which is relative to the Christian response of 
faith, Barth does not consistently admit that eros is totally alien 
to it. For example, he can speak of eros as "the secret of humanity," 
a gregarious instinct which has something in common with Feuerbach's 
"species consciousness". The Greeks were not wrong to grasp the
fact that "the being of man is free, radically open, willing, spon-
2taneous, joyful, cheerful, and gregarious." "Man is human in the
3fact that he is with his fellowman gladly," In another positive
sense which resembles Brunner, Barth can speak of a "sanctified 
eros" in marriage, without which the idea of Christian marriage 
makes no sense. Marriage is validated by the balance of the two
elements "self-giving" and "desire". Both may be legitimate, and
both a part of "true eros". "What takes place between true lovers 
is understanding, self-giving, and desire...It may be safely and
fearlessly described by the well-known term eros. If we think of 
eros only or primarily in the sense of desire, and more particularly 
of physical desire, we must not suppose that we have really understood 
what is here in question."^
1. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , IV/2 p. 352
2. Barth, C.D. III/2 p. 283
3. ibid. p. 2784. Barth, Church Dogmatics III/4 p. 219
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The two meanings of eros which we have just noticed fall, 
appropriately enough, within Barth's "Doctrine of Creation.", No 
matter how human nature is to be conceived, imagined, or characterized 
the elements of God's creatorship and human freedom must be preserved. 
Barth can allow no idea of love which militates against either. 
Barth therefore deviates from Nygren on the central issues of human 
freedom and divine creativity, which for Barth includes the idea
of divine nurture. Agape does not and cannot contradict human freedom 
and the necessity for humans to make decisions. Eros cannot contrad­
ict God's sovereignty in creation: "If it is really God who rules
the world and not the devil, does not every abyss - without ceasing 
to be such, and as such to be dangerous - have a bottom somewhere?"^ 
But God's grace cannot simply be construed as a force which directly 
captures and subjugates human will so that the believer is a conduit
for the love of God. "The first and evocative love is not the same
as the love which is evoked. The relation between them is that
of a word and answer, of permission and the use made of it, of command
and obedience; not of the beginning and continuation of one and
2the same movement."
It must be observed that there is the appearance of a contradic­
tion as Barth tries to uphold both God's sovereignty and human freedom. 
Nygren and Brunner attempt to resolve the contradiction with the 
assumption that faith is able to lay hold of divine love in such 
a way that God's will becomes the will of the believer. Niebuhr, 
on the other hand, admits that such a correspondence between the 
divine and the human is not possible in a world of opposed freedoms, 
and relegates the problem to some context "beyond history". Barth 
does not solve the dilemma, but rather, refers it back to God. 
Human love must always be a free action, just as God's love ip always 
his free action. The human is called to respond to the divine love.
1. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , IV/2 p. 741
2. ibid. p. 752
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God's sovereignty is never to be challenged by human freedom, but
at the same time human autonomy in decision making is crucial to
human nature, and without it there is in fact no concrete humanity.
God and man, the one as Creator and the other as his creature, do not exist on the same level. There is no rivalry between the divine freedom and the human. Thus the dependence of man's action on God's does not involve any weakening, al­teration or finally destruction of its freedom and its character as decision. That human love is dependent on the divine love means that in its very freedom it can take place only on the basis of the latter, as a human response to the Word spoken in the love of God. If God did not love originally and properly, and if he did not love man, how could there be any reflection or analogy of his love in the love of man? Man never can or will take the initiative in love. He can and will love only because God has first loved, and loves, him. And if he loves for 
this reason, and therefore secondarily, this does not mean - the relationship is irreversible - that there arises any dependence of the divine love on his love, or de­termination of the divine action by his action. The love of God is the basis for that of man, but the love of man is never a basis for that of God. The love of God always takes precedence. It always has the character of grace, and that of man the character of gratitude.There always remains a great difference in the ordgr, nature, and significance of divine and human love.
For Barth human love is therefore different in quality from
the divine love, and not even faith can destroy this inequity.
But the faithful human may "imitate" the divine love freely, and
his love may be "analogous" to the revealed love of God. But the
human is not free to decide how God shall exercise his freedom,
nor is the divine love to be made in the image of human loves (Barth's
critique of Feuerbach!). The apparent contradiction between God's
sovereignty and human freedom is not a question for the human being
to solve. Freedom simply exists as a component of human nature,
and because all humanity is subject to God's creation, every abyss
has a bottom somewhere. The human being not only has the freedom
to love, but he also "will" love, because God has loved, and will
love even the human whose love is characterized by selfishness and
still is prone to sin. God's effective will is that humanity too
will love.
1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2 p. 753
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Despite Barth's admission that eros has a proper place in
the scheme of creation, he nevertheless condemns eros as a grasping,
self-seeking antithesis of the agape which is humanity's true norm.
In agape "man is only truly and naturally and essentially a man.
Only in correspondence with that love which God has willed as the
"life-act" of the Christian is humanity in accord with true human
nature. "Agape-love takes place in affinity, eros-love in opposition,
2to human nature." The first is the "Yes", the other the "No" to 
human life "willed and posited by God". Barth is careful to stress 
that both agape and eros are "historical determinations of human 
nature". He does not agree with Nygren that agape is divine love 
and eros is human love. Eros is essentially, in this respect, "an 
uncritical intensification and strengthening of natural self-assertion."' 
In effect it is a love-gone-wrong as it tries to sustain the creature 
in and for itself. As such it is opposed to the self-giving and 
hence self-affirming love which is shown to be possible for humanity 
in the revelation of God's love in the Incarnation, which is also 
a call for a corresponding human love. Barth agrees with Nygren 
that the two loves cannot be equated, synthesized, nor reconciled. 
Christian love is not the purified form or supreme climax of the 
"other" love. The "other" love is not a preparatory stage for Christ­
ian love. In fact, says Barth, the distinction between Christian 
love (agape) and the "other" love (eros) stresses "the wholly alien 
character of Christianity in relation to the world around."^ The 
human loves in either one way or the other, or perhaps in both ways 
at the same time, but "where Christian love enters there always 
begins at once the unceasing controversy between itself and every 
other love...There can only be conflict and not compromise between
5Christian love and this other."
1. ibid. p. 743 2. ibid.
3. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2 p. 734
4. ibid. p. 735; This statement may not be reconcilable with the eros of the Doctrine of 
Creation; cf. CO III/4; pp. 219 f f , regarding the "true e r os" of marriage.
5. ibid. p. 736
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Yet the two modes of loving, the one appropriate to human 
nature, and the "other" inappropriate, both take place within the
one free individual, who must decide between them. "It is merely 
the case that man does always encounter us in these two forms of
3_love and to this extent in the corresponding forms of his nature."
For Barth there is no question but that human nature retains its
integrity, and with it the propensity to good and evil, to just
action and also to wrong choices. There is no magic formula to
be derived from agape, and there is no dramatic change in human
nature when an individual chooses agape over eros. Nevertheless
the human may indeed decide for the right love which corresponds
to his intended nature, and he may do so freely, joyfully, not in
sacrifice of self, but rather in self-affirmation insofar as he
gives himself to God and the neighbour.
Barth's usage of the idea of eros is, as Gene Outka has stressed,
inconsistent and contradictory on the face value of Barth's declara-
2tions. Nevertheless, his usage may be partially reconciled if
we note that eros has a positive role to play within the scheme
of creation only until it goes astray in human nature, becoming
3a grasping, acquisitive "denial of humanity," " As a social force 
and as a dynamic in marriage, eros contributes to God's purpose
in creation; but when it seeks its own, becoming "wholly claim,
wholly the desire to control," it acquires for Barth a negative
value which opposes it to human nature intended and posited by God. 
Barth describes as eros a love which is on the one hand proper to 
creation but on the other a gross mutation of it. For this reason, 
his description of eros varies from positive to negative. The mistake 
perhaps is to assume that Barth is willing to apply a consistent 
meaning to either agape or eros in a technical definitive terminology.
1. ibid. p. 742
2. Gene Outka, A g a p e , op. cit. pp. 223-224
3. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2 p. 746
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Just as Barth varies in his description of ,eros, depending upon 
the context, he also varies in his description of agape. For example, 
Barth can use agape for both appropriate human love as intended 
by God, and God's love for humanity revealed in Christ. But it 
is clear that Barth will allow no equation of human and divine love.
Thus agape has, for Barth, at least two different meanings. 
Human love is not divine love, but agape represents both. Eros 
is both natural gregariousness and that passion which leads to pro­
creation, but it is also the love-gone-wrong, a "denial of humanity". 
The implication from this is that Outka, but not Barth, is willing 
to apply technical connotations to the various words for love, follow­
ing Nygren's precedent. Barth himself notes the dilemma of language 
in which there are not enough words for love; it is "an unfortunate 
circumstance that in English as in German (and presumably in Swedish) 
we suffer from the same poverty as Hebrew and have only the one 
word "love" to denote both eros and agape. For Barth the problem 
is not in the definition but in the context. Both eros and agape 
take place in the same human being who may not be dissected in a 
dualism of concepts. "Yet the distinction and the necessity of 
deciding between them is perfectly clear from that which they have
conceptually in common, and in the way in which they accompany one
2another in practice." That which they have in common is a product 
of God's creation, and as such it has its own dignity and freedom 
and integrity; for it is nothing more nor less than human nature.
2. God's Love as Grace
The freedom in human nature cannot oppose God's freedom to 
love. Although eros as self-seeking, egocentric love is opposed 
to the self-giving love which God has intended for human nature.
1. ibid. p. 741 Barth may be incorrect here, but we note the irony in his critique: The 
problem of Christian love cannot be solved by definition and terminology.
2. Karl Barth Church Dogmatics, IV/2, p. 744
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both agape and eros fall under the effective authority of God's
freedom and God's love.
Even erotic man must and will be affirmed in and with 
the love which is from God...His erotic love will not be affirmed. But he himself will be affirmed as the man which he does not cease to be even as he loves erotically...And this affirmation proclaims his reconciliation; the ^fact that God has loved, and loves, and will love even him.
The "immutability" of God's love, and the "constancy" of his action
assure fallen humanity that human nature is not "thrown back upon
itself," that even within the frustration of history God has willed
that humankind can and "will" love, that God's love as grace is
an immanent force in the human situation. Karl Barth's extensive
references to the love of God, characterized also as the grace of
God, cannot be adequately treated here. We may only observe a few
essential characteristics of what Barth calls the "basis" (Grund)
of human love. - God's primary love, which for Barth, God's being.
Because Gcd's love is primary, there can be no dualism in human
nature, humanity is not set ultimately over against itself. The
God who created human nature does not and will not break his covenant
with humanity; even where there is God's word of judgment against
human sin and inaction, there is always also his work and word of
grace.
For Barth God's nature is one and undivided. This nature 
however is manifested as the Being who loves and as his Being in 
freedom. In "the perfections of the divine loving", God is gracious, 
holy, merciful, just, patient, and wise. In "the perfections of 
the divine freedom" he is wholly one, omnipresent, constant, omnipot­
ent, eternal, and glorious. As God, the Triune God, Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit, manifests each of these perfections, the others 
are manifested also. In addition God's person is especially and 
freely represented in the historical life, ministry, death, and
1. ibid, p .  748
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resurrection of Jesus Christ, the "Mediator" between all humanity
and God in all his perfection.^
Having said all this, Barth is still willing to make a "genuine
2equation" of St. John's logion: "God is love" (I John 4:8). God's
3being, says Barth, is his loving. God's love, and only God's love, 
is the summum bonum, the highest good of human existence^ To say
5"God is" is to say "God loves." God's love is totally reconcilable 
with his freedom. "The Divinity of the love of God consists and 
confirms itself in the fact that in himself and in all his works 
God is gracious, merciful, and patient and at the same time holy, 
righteous and wise. God does not need to love humanity, yet he
7does so in a free "overflowing of his eternal love." His love 
is not determined by nor can it be reduced to a "cosmic process," 
but he loves humanity irrespective of what humanity deserves or 
does not deserve, from a motive which is wholly his own, undetermin­
able by human speculation.^ God's love "bears necessarily the char­
acter of mercy", loving humanity while the human is yet God's enemy.^ 
God's love is never "appropriate" to humanity, but it is always 
"his free differentiation in our favour. Yet God's grace is never 
"indulgent" toward sin; God takes sin seriously, and his love is
11"total grace for sinful man, but also total judgment over him." 
"The sin of the one loved by him is a stain which cannot stand against 
the fact that God loves and gives himself for him, but must yield 
and perish. It is the work of the love of God to cause this stain 
to yield.
1. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , Il/l pp. 257 ff; 327 ff
' ^ 8. CD IV/2 p. 767 For Barth the question of God'sÜ* U U  X I / X  p «  j 3 X ir I « 1» • • 1 1
:: »• : ;;;; :: "" - ” ■
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Barth offers three definitions of divine love in which he 
summarizes God's love as the "basis" for human love. (1) God's 
electing love discloses his freedom to love humanity. "He loves 
the man whom he has made worthy of his love by electing and willing 
and determining him as his creature, but who for his part has made 
himself unworthy, proving himself undeserving of this love, adopting 
an attitude of hostility, so that in defiance of God's good will 
he can actually be only worthy of the divine hatred."^ This freely 
electing love is "unconditional." although it does not mean that 
God relaxes his wrath. (2) God's purifying love is the simultaneous 
word of grace and judgment. God leads humanity to grace through
2judgment, liberating him from sin and freeing him for love.
(3) God's creative love causes those who are loved by God to freely 
and spontaneously love in response and correspondence to the primary 
love. But the response of love is not God's purpose in loving. 
He does not "demand" love, but his love has "the character of a
liberation." "Surely it is not love, from the heart, or with the 
whole heart if there is any question of compulsion, if we have to 
love in the required fulfilment of duty or exercise of virtue."
(Thus Barth criticizes, perhaps inadequately, Kierkegaard's concept
3of love as duty.) God has no "need" of human love, and his love 
"has nothing whatever to do with the pleasure of a triumphant love 
which attains its desire." (This too is a critique of Kierkegaard; 
Barth's God is sufficient in himself, and his purpose in loving 
is not to be loved in return./^ The extent to which Barth takes 
the idea of God's creative love is shown by his exegesis of the
commandment to love. Barth tells us that the "command" rests upon
a mistranslation of the Hebrew word ahabta (Deuteronomy 6:5) which
1. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , IV/2 p. 767
2. ibid. p. 771 ff.
3. ibid. p. 781; Barth sees Ki erkegaard's dutiful love as "an eros with its back to the
wall." He criticizes. S.K. for lack of emphasis upon grace, but probably misunderstands
or ignores S.K.'s conclusion that love "should not need to be commanded." cf. Works of 
L o v e , op. cit. p. 344
4. Barth, CD IV/2 p. 777; cf. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, op. cit. p. 33
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is better rendered as "Thou wilt love the Lord thy God..." Hence, 
says Barth, the divine loving is effective toward the future, in 
the sense of Jeremiah 31:33: "I will put', my law in their inward
parts and write it in their hearts." The "command" for Barth is 
really a promise, God's word of grace which is the extension of 
the Covenant. Hence he stresses that humanity is not so much command­
ed to love, but liberated from sin in order to love. "The love 
of God is the liberation of man for genuine love."  ^ There is no 
implication that such a thing is "impossible" as we find in Niebuhr. 
For Barth, the liberation is "in the sphere and within the limits
of human action, and thus to love in human fashion as God does in 
2the divine." As God creates love, shedding it abroad in our hearts 
(Romans 5:5) Barth tells us that "certain men are made free and
3able to accomplish this imitation." It is not that man must love, 
but that he can and may and will, simply because it is God's effective 
purpose for humanity, constantly nurtured in history by the influence 
of the Holy Spirit.^
Barth speaks of the love of God as "immutable," but God is 
also "holy mutability." God is best conceived as "constant" - "the
5same in every change." God's love may not be understood as passive. 
If God were the absolute immobile, he would be d e a t h I n  the Old 
Testament, Barth reminds us, God is never characterized by love 
as a feeling or emotion, but rather by a love-in-action, "pure act". 
Hosea gives the formula for God's covenanted loving action toward 
his people: "When Israel was a child I loved him...and called my
son out of Egypt" (Hosea 11.1). God as liberator of Israel is for 
Barth the whole basis of the Covenant, and the prior basis for the 
Torah. "The covenant relationship was not in the first instance
1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2 p. 777
2. ibid. p. 778
3. ibid. p. 780
4. ibid. p. 779
5. ibid. p. 352; CD. Il/l p. 496
6. CD Il/l p. 494
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one of pure law or the will and action of God recognizable within
it only the jealous assertion and validation of the claim of God
to Israel's respect and obedience which resulted from his election...
Behind the whole form of the covenant as Law and holiness there
always stands the great context of the act of liberation (and the
corresponding acts that followed) which was constitutive for the
1existence of Israel and quite unforgettable to it." The impact 
of Barth's emphasis upon God's love as pure act for liberation of 
his people is also a dynamic call for an imitative human action 
which is liberating and justice-creating. The stress upon God as 
active, not passive, and upon human love as also active, not passive, 
implies a stringent obligation upon human beings to work for a posit­
ive, liberating justice. Barth's grounding of the covenant in God's 
action and not in God's law means that in the human sphere, justice
is to be an active and dynamic objective unrestricted by legalistic 
2constructs. Law is only the servant of justice, and is not to
be defined ^  justice. The basis for human justice, Barth makes 
clear, is God's action for the liberation of his people, prior to 
any legal institution, grounded on his outpouring love and not upon 
his "jealousy" or "demand".
Closely allied with God's love as pure act, is Barth's declara­
tion that God is intensely affected by his union with humanity.
In God's love which is also a movement toward sinful human beings, 
he has surrendered his impassibility, and no doctrine of impassibility
3is permissible in light of the Cross. God suffers for and with'us. 
but his suffering is to be understood as a "suffering omnipotence." 
Good Friday, says Barth, is "omnipotence at work," suffering but
4also redeeming and liberating human beings from sin. Unlike
1. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , IV/2 p. 762
2. There is a tentative relationship here between Barth's view of ethics and what has become 
known as "situation ethics." Joseph Fletcher quotes Barth: "There is a practical casuistry, an 
active casuistry, the casuistry of the prophetic ethos. It consists in the unavoidable venture. 
..of un ders tanding God's concrete specific command here and now" (Joseph Fletcher, SituationE t h i c s , SOM, London, 1966 p. 149) (CD. III/4 p. 9)
3. CD II/2 p. 164; Il/l p. 369
4. CD Il/l p. 607
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Kierkegaard, Barth is not afraid to say that the Cross exalts humanity
through divine suffering.
He humbled himself to us and exalted us to himself. This is God's self-giving; his love. The revelation of God in the work of his Holy Spirit means the revelation of the covenant and the kingdom, the promise and the fulfilment, the will and the accomplishment of God in their necessary and indissoluble connection. It means the revelation of the one eternal act in which he has loved and loves and will love us in the power of his eternal love. It means the ' . revelation of ourselves as those to whom God has turned in this act, and therefore as those who were and are and will be loved by him as the One who performs this act.In this act in which he willed to be and became ours, and we were to be and became his, God is the authorita­tive and powerful basis of the love which is the subject of our present enquiry - love as the human act corresponding to the act of God.
Having established the "basis" for appropriate human love, 
as an active, free, suffering, immutable, omnipotent, and constant 
love of God for humanity, then and only then can Barth fully develop 
his idea of the content of that imitative, corresponding human love 
which is called agape.
3. Human Love as Gratitude
For Barth there is indeed an opposition between agape and
eros, but he nevertheless insists that "a presentation of Christian
2love cannot live by this antithesis."
Where Christian love arises the other can only sink to the ground. When the sun arises, the shadows and mists 
in the valleys can only yield and disperse. Hence Christian love does not need to measure itself by eros-love, or to find strength and satisfaction in its difference from it.It lives its own life as the love which is true because it is grounded in God's love for man and not in man's self-love. It does so in antithesis to that other. But it does so as the love which is superior and triumphant in this antithesis.git is not, therefore, forced to insist on this antithesis.
Barth is convinced than since eros remains a part of human nature,
even for the Christian, the Christian may not pretend to be above
the temptation to lesser loves thah agape. Such eros is the general
1. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , IV/2 p. 761
2. ibid. p. 7463. ibid. p. 747
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corruption of humanity which is common to all. "The Christian must
love the heathen because he too loves with erotic as well as with
Christian love, and is to that extent a heathen." ^  But the Christian
is able to know that eros is, in the light of God's grace, "already
routed". The Christian "holds to this truth and lives joyfully
2in this conquest of eros by agape. " The Christian is called to
proclaim continually that the non-Christian is loved by God, that
he is never cut off from God's self-giving love, and that the recon­
ciliation of God with sinful humanity is initiated and achieved 
by God himself. Barth's concept of appropriate Christian love entails 
not only a response to God's grace but also an evangelical proclama­
tion and affirmation that God's love is indeed unconditional. "If 
Christian love does not make this declaration to the non-Christian
3it is not Christian love."
Although Christian love may not rest presumptuously in its
own righteousness, it is nevertheless practically and functionally,
"wholly but not exclusively", a product of the reception of faith.
Barth is careful in his characterization of faith not to make "faith
alone" the summation of Christianity. As we noticed in Chapter
1, it was exactly the over-emphasis upon faith that led. Feuerbach
to conclude that faith and love are contradictions. As Barth noted
in his critique of Feuerbach, Luther's emphasis upon faith should
not be adopted uncritically.
Luther had a peculiar way of speaking of faith as an almost independent appearance and function of the divine hypostasis. Faith is able to do, and does, everything. It not only provides justification, and gives solace; it alone not only brings forth love and good works; it also overcomes sin and death, it blesses and redeems man. Faith and God belong together. As trust of the heart (!) it makes both God and idol, occasion­ally it can even be said to be a "creator of deity," even though only "within us." In any event, this extravagant view is in need of interpretation and confirmation. Now after Feuerbach, one may no^longer repeat these things from Luther without some caution.
1. ibid. p .  751
2. ibid.
3. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , IV/2 p. 748
4. Barth's Introduction to Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Harper, 1957, pp. xxii-xxiii.
271
Barth insists that "the obedience of faith is followed by
1the obedience of love - iri practice. " Faith and love are complemen­
tary; they are distinct but inseparable. Faith "works by love." 
Faith is essentially passive, receptive. But love is active, and 
for this reason, he says, love is the greatest over faith and hope.
As faith is pure and total reception, love is pure and total self­
giving. "As Christian faith is the human response to God's justifying
2sentence, so Christian love is the human response to his direction."
Barth does not follow Nygren in tacitly equating faith with
love for God. There seem to be two reasons for this. The first
is that love is by nature active, and, grounded upon the active
love of God for humanity, cannot be exhausted by the idea of faith, 
which is essentially passive and receptive. The first commandment, 
after all, is the command to love God, and this cannot be lightly 
reduced to the category of belief. Response to God's love entails 
an active love on the part of the receiver of grace, both towards
God and towards the neighbour. The second reason is the total context
of worship. (Barth admits that he was part of the movement which 
reacted against pietism.) Love for God, he affirms, can never be 
an appropriate attempt of humanity by which the human can hope to 
justify himself or reconcile himself with God. But on the other
3hand, Christians "need not be fanatically anti-mystical." There 
may indeed be a proper place for Christian contemplation and for 
the joy which may proceed from it.
More importantly, a place must be left for prayer and praise, 
and for the whole joyful response of the Christian community which 
comes under the heading of worship. He asserts that, "No one can 
and will love God who does not believe."^ As to the neo-orthodox 
reaction against pietism, Barth decided that love for God was no
1. Barth, CD IV/l p. 102
2. ibid.
3. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , IV/l p. 104
4. ibid.
2 7 2
longer the threat it had been in previous epochs: "We were a little 
late with our protest.'^ The pietistic eros with which Nygren concer­
ned himself, the attempt to ascend to God according to the models • 
of Plotinus and Proclus in neo-platonist doctrine, had ceased to 
be a realistic counter-force to agape. (The general acquisitive 
love, also called eros, by which egocentrism is enthroned in many 
ways, continued to be addressed by Barth.)
Barth concludes that there is both a vertical and a horizontal 
dimension entailed in the commandment to love God and the neighbour.
2They are "two spheres of activity which are inseparable but distinct." 
"Christian love is at one and the same time love to God and love 
to the neighbour, and it is love to the neighbour because it is
3love to God." "A love of God which does not involve also the requir­
ed love of neighbour is not the required love of God." "The pure 
and total reception of justification by faith alone cannot be separ­
ated from (God's) pure and total self-giving in love. The two are
5one and the same." Because of God's total self-giving, he is infin­
itely worthy to be loved, and the Christian may love God properly 
insofar as he also loves his neighbour.
...agape-love consists in the fact that (the Christian) accepts God as his eternal counterpart, and therefore his own being as that of one who is elected by this God, being absolutely sheltered by his preservation and help, but who is also called by him to thanksgiving, responsibility, obedience and prayer. It consists in the fact that he is determined and ready to live from and to God to the best of his knowledge and capacity: not raising any claim; not trying to control God; not with the ulterior motive of winning God for himself or demanding anything from him; but sigply because he is God, 'and as such worthy to be loved.
It may be obvious then, that in Barth's theology one may not 
isolate and define separately the concepts of 'faith', 'love for 
God', and 'love for the neighbour'. These three components are
1. CD IV/2 p. 795
2. CD III/4 p. 49
3. £DcIV/i I'OSr
4. CD IV/2 p. 732
5. ibid. p. 733
6. ibid. pp. 743-744
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intimately related and must remain so if they are to be an appropriate 
human response to the prior and basic love of God. Faith is essen­
tially the reception of God's love. But faith "works by love", 
both by the love of God upon which it is grounded, and by the active 
love for the neighbour which is faith's essential complement. When 
faith is the conscious reception of God's self-giving love for the 
believer, a joyful and humble love for God is elicited. This love
for God has the character of "gratitude " - gratitude for God's
redemptive and liberating love. As a further expression of the 
same gratitude, the elicited love for God, in a vertical dimension, 
has also a spontaneous and unselfish horizontal dimension, which 
is an active, genuine, and freely decided love for the neighbour.^
Since the love which is appropriate to the human's true nature 
i;s-..b.ased upon God's love which is "pure act," Barth insists that 
Christian love must always be active. "God is not idle but active.
For good or evil, therefore, man must be active too." Christian
2love is "an active being of man in God." Thus Barth differs from 
Niebuhr, whose characterization of sacrificial love most often entails 
the feature of passivity, even a non-resistance to evil. Barth's 
love is an active response, in gratitude to the love of God. Christ­
ian love may not be contained by the idea of feeling, emotion, or
passion. Agape is not itself passion, but it claims all passion, 
says Barth, (perhaps in criticism of Kierkegaard's assertion that
3Christian love is a passion akin to the "highest passion" of faith) , 
Of course Barth does not imply that love is a function of reason, 
and he thus avoids what Kierkegaard considered to be Hegel's mistake. 
For Barth a corresponding love of humanity to the basic and prior 
love of God must be, in the limited and conditional context of history,
1. It is not self-evident that human love can be both spontaneous and freely decided, but 
Barth does not seem to notice any contradiction. Barth wants to suggest that human love 
is always a free action, and that it is not the fulfilment of a "duty." Nevertheless
he does speak of love as "obedience." cf. CD IV 1 p. 102; compare CD IV/2, p. 781.
2. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , IV/l p. 103
3. CD II/2 p. 719.
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a self-giving action toward and on behalf of the neighbour. Barth 
is not concerned with Nygren's question of motivation and value. 
For Barth the Christian loves the neighbour whether there is anything 
worthy to be loved or not. Christian love is not concerned with 
value or . the lack of it in the neighbour. Barth's agape is 
not necessarily "unmotivated " as it for Nygren, but Barth does 
declare that there can be no "ulterior motive."  ^ For Barth the 
New Testament is a continuation of the Old Covenant, and only an 
active love fulfils the law as it is fulfilled and completed by
2Christ. "The law requires a definite action; this action is love." 
Our Christian love arises and takes place as the human act which 
is, in its own sphere, "analogous" to the "pure act" of God.
Although Barth does not follow Niebuhr in asserting that genuine 
love requires harmony for its actualization, it is only truly consum­
mated in a community of faith. Only where there are believers can
Christian love find its hope of mutuality, since only in such a 
community is love understood as a "life-act" of the Christian based 
upon the "pure act" of God. For Barth there is no doubt that Christ­
ian love is an action directed outward toward the world. But the 
special knowledge and responsibility of agape is to a large extent 
held within "a closed circle" of believers.
The love of God in Jesus Christ is decisively, fundamentallyand comprehensively his coming together with all men and their coming together with him. This coming together is not deserved by man but forfeited. Yet it has been accom­plished by God in his free grace, defying and overcoming the sin of man. As this coming together the love of God active and revealed in Jesus Christ is the fulfilling of the covenant by him. It embraces realiter both the world 
and the community, non-Christians and Christians. But the knowledge and proclamation of it is a matter only for the Christian community.
Love as it is willed and posited by God for humanity must 
be a love which understand that God is its ground, that only a simult­
aneous love for God and for the neighbour is the affirmation of
1. CD IV/l pp. 106-1072. CD IV/2 p. 730
3. CD,"TV/11 p . ,103
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authentic human nature. The Church, therefore, is entrusted with 
the proclamation of genuine human love to the world, and with the 
consummation of this love among its members. Christian love cannot 
be addressed to or understood by everyone; the Church must be prepared 
to live actively as a corporate witness of God's love for humanity 
and of the appropriate human love for one another, nevertheless. 
And in the Church is the unique and effective work of the Holy Spirit, 
encouraging and calling forth love each for the other. Love in
the Ch.mrch has the character of "an upbuilding of the Christian
community," inseparable from the work of the Holy Spirit.^ As such 
it is "brotherly love". But love in the Church also has the character
of love for the neighbour, of the person who may yet be a brother,
2and so the Church must never confine its love to an elite society. 
The love in the Church which is yet directed outward to the non- 
Christian is appropriate to the two planes upon which the history 
of salvation rests. The one is between God and Church, and is a 
relationship of mutual love, symbolized by the Chruch's love for 
God and the mutual love between Christians. The other is "between 
man and man" which is expressed in the Christian's horizontal love 
for persons who do net yet realize the benefits of genuine-, mutual 
love. The mutual love which Christ encourages among his disciples, 
and the joy which results from the consummation of such a relation­
ship, is in fact the stimulus for the Christian's "love-act" toward 
the world. For Barth, such mutuality and "peace" is realized only 
in the believer, and is then focussed outward toward every neighbour. 
Mutual love in the context of community, between God and humanity, 
and between human beings, becomes the goal toward which, with the 
help of the Holy Spirit, Christian action is directed.
1. CD IV/2 pp. 730-779
2. ibid. pp. 807-808
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Nevertheless, the Christian is not to think that he can achieve 
harmony in the world through his limited works of love. Such a 
consummation is conceivable only through God's grace, and certainly 
not through some idealistic notion of progress (i.e. liberal theology). 
But the love in the Church, as a joyful response to the love of 
God, is nevertheless an effective witness for the love God has intend­
ed for the world, and as such the Church's love is not to be separated 
from God's saving action in and for the world through the work of 
the Holy Spirit. The mutual love in the Church is dynamically related 
to God's love for the world; it is not the prerequisite cf love, 
as Niebuhr would imply, but rather it is the basis and model for 
a "worldwide fellowship".
What Christians decidedly owe to the world is just that they should love one another in this way. In so far as this love is alive among Christians, in all its depth and reality, with all the joy and sorrow it brings, with all its fervour that must not be confused with passion, the Church is edified, the good work which God requires takes place, not only in the inner circle of Christians, but with the creation and maintenance of this circle for every­one and for the whole world. In this good work every indiv­idual Christian has his share as he, too, is one who loves with this supreme realism. In so doing, he will give what is due to all his neighbours. Thus the special fellowship of the Church, whose formation and preservation is the basic divine purpose, does not mean an absolute separation, but is the basis of a worldwide fellowship. Protesting against the form of this world, the Church cannot be againgt but only for the men who are still caught up in this world.
Love in the Church is, for Barth, an essential element in God's 
plan for the world. Nevertheless, the Christian must not rest content 
in the mutuality of this love. Even Christian love is characterized 
by a constant call for decisions, for a willingness to love those 
we may not like, and for an inclination toward a future which only 
God can effect, and which is to be completed through and in spite 
of all the suffering, sin, and frustrations of history. Love in 
the Church is never a transformation of human nature, for the Christ­
ian continues to love inadequately and "erotically ", But through
1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/2 p. 720
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God's grace and the effective work of the Holy Spirit in the Church, 
there is the assurance of God's love-in-action which also elects 
and purifies and creates love in the human sphere which is appropriate 
to God's good creation. Thus there is reason for hope, but not 
for complacency; for faith but not for egocentric piety; and for 
an active love in this world which is proper to human limitations 
yet not concerned with all the "ifs and buts". In the light of
God's basic, self-giving, and overflowing love Christians are "awaken­
ed to faith, quickened in love, and enlightened in hope.
4. Summary: A Love Inclined Toward Justice
Despite the apparent inconsistencies which have been noted 
(especially by Outka) in Karl Barth's theology, there is nevertheless 
a broad inner consistency in his work. If we seek a theological 
ground for the intimacy of love with a capacity to create justice, 
it is evident that Barth's characterization goes farther toward 
satisfying this criterion than any of the other "neo-orthodox" 
theologians we have considered. The advantages of Barth's thought 
on the idea of love are due to the following factors.
(1) Barth's treatment of the idea of faith is qualified by his treat­
ment of God's creating and nurturing grace, and also by an insistence 
that faith always "works by love". Faith is passive and receptive, 
and is thus actually subordinate to love, which must always be active. 
Barth thus avoids the "faith alone" emphasis found in Luther, but 
which is nevertheless tacitly adopted by Nygren, Brunner, and Niebuhr. 
For the latter, (Christian) love is a derivative of faith; but for 
Barth, the emphasis is upon God's love, which through faith is able 
to create human love appropriate to God's purpose for humanity.
(2) Barth's idea of the love which is proper to God's good creation 
is a love which is characterized by action. Human love should corres­
pond to God's self-giving action and therefore must be active, focuss-
1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/l p. 153.
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ed toward the neighbour horizontally, as it is focussed toward God 
vertically. As we have noticed, love-as-action in Barth's work
is quite different from the love which is passive in Niebuhr's.
Similarly, for Barth, the love which is self-giving is an active 
movement of self-affirmation, while for Niebuhr Christian love is 
a sacrificial action characterized by self-denial. While Barth 
does not like the term "self-love", he nevertheless endorses what 
might be considered a proper love for self, insofar as human love
is an active and free self-giving of oneself for and on behalf of
the neighbour.
(3) Barth stresses and maintains the concept of God's creation,
which is not to be overshadowed by a concept of the Fall. Although
sin is a real fact of human existence, it is finally no match for 
God's grace. Hence Barth is not afraid to use the concept of eros 
in numerous contexts and with different meanings. As a gregarious 
instinct it is proper to God's creation, and as an uncritical streng­
thening of natural self-assertion, it is egocentric end opposed 
to agape. But agape does not change human nature, nor can it be 
given a technical definition, quantified and captured "like a bird
in flight". Barth thus avoids the tendency toward an unbiblical 
and artificial distinction of definitive terms for love, such as 
is found in Nygren, and adopted by many others, such as Outka.
(4) Finally, with regard to the capacity of love to create justice, 
Barth is much more insistent than either Brunner or Niebuhr that
love is possible in history, that Christian love is required to 
"protest" against the form of this world, and that Christians may 
never be complacently apolitical.^
In criticism and question of Barth's idea of love, we can 
only mention without resolving two major dilemmas which Barth has
1. Karl Barth, Church D o g m a t i c s , Il/2 pp. 720 ff. We shall note in the following chapter 
some of the important implications of Barth's "political " theology.
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perhaps failed to solve satisfactorily.
(1) The first is the question of the difference between divine and 
human love. Barth insists with Kierkegaard that God's love is 
"qualitatively" different from the human. The agape of God is not 
the agape of humanity, because God's existence can never be too 
closely allied with human being. Barth demands that God and humanity 
be kept at a "healthy distance" from each other; Nygren and Luther 
had wished to make God's will and human will essentially the same, 
when the believer becomes a conduit for God's love. Barth is no 
doubt right to preserve the freedom of human nature so that agape 
is not to be seen as determined by God. But on the other hand,
one cannot escape the notion that it may still be the same love, 
yet somehow attenuated, which begins with God, that Christians are 
asked to show to each other and to the world. I am not convinced 
that God's love and human love are qualitatively different, although 
they may be different in form, energy, or capacity.
(2) Secondly Barth is perhaps extreme in his allegation that the 
commandment to love is not a command but a prophecy. Even if the 
Hebrew of Deuteronomy (ahabta) is mistranslated into Greek as an 
imperative, there is too much 'demand' for love in the New Testament, 
and particularly in the ministry of Chr’ist, to escape the conviction 
that love is not somehow 'commendable'. As such, there may yet 
be something to be said for Kierkegaard's view of love as a "duty", 
which remains such, even though the believer becomes more and more 
"intimate" with the commandment, and thus "should not need to be 
commanded." No doubt it is God's will that humans shall love and 
"will" love, that God's will is to be written in human hearts accord­
ing to the prophecy of Jeremiah. But nevertheless, there seems 
to be something in the call for justice in the Old Testament, and 
in the call for consistent obedience in the New, which cannot be 
exhausted by such a prophecy. "Duty", in active response to the 
call for obedience to the command to love the neighbour as oneself,
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is not likely to be deleted from the requirement for justice without 
the simultaneous rise of a certain dangerous complacency.
APPENDIX II, PART TWO
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON "NEO-ORTHODOXY"
The neo-orthodox movement was born out of protest. As such 
it suffered from a (perhaps necessary) tendency toward exaggerated 
emphases. It was doing battle on three initial fronts, to which 
more were added as the twentieth century embroiled itself in conflict. 
They were: (1) the historical optimism of protestant liberal theology, 
which tended to place too much 'faith* in the human capacity for 
good, with a resulting attenuation of the idea of sin and of the 
radical nature of the Atonement; (2) Roman Catholic theology in
general, which effectively tended to reduce the biblical witness
in favour of scholastic and ecclesiastical tradition; (3) popular 
pietism in various forms, not the least of which was the individualis­
tic salvation emphasis of Protestant evangelicals, at the expense 
of a genuine interest in social tragedy. In the light of the Russian 
Revolution, a fourth "front" was encountered as mass unemployment, 
political extremism, galloping inflation, and trade unionism followed 
the Versailles Treaty with (4) threats of civil anarchy. We must 
also list, as a fifth, the rise of fascism as Europe and the world 
set a course for (5) yet another world-war. If, as has been alleged, 
history seemed to be too much for the liberals, we must not ignore 
the dramatic stress which history placed upon all Christian theology, 
during the first half of the twentieth century. Neo-orthodox theology, 
then, can hardly be characterized outside of the context of "crisis" 
in which it was born. Because of the magnitude of the continuous 
conflict, we may not casually criticize, from the armchair of the 
nineteen-eighties, the battlefields of the twenties, thirties, and
forties. Nevertheless, the battlefields of today are somewhat diff­
erent, and an uncritical adoption of yesterday's protest may not
solve today's problems.
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In our brief consideration of "Luther's legacy", four questions 
were suggested which theology must "answer" if it is to "go beyond" 
Luther. These concerned: (1) the relation of human sin to divine
creation; (2) the relation of faith to love; (3) Christian love's 
capacity to create justice in this world; and, (4) the integrity 
of human nature, somehow "created in God's image." Under these 
headings, I will attempt to illustrate very generally some broad 
strengths and weaknesses of the neo-orthodox theologians' treatment 
of love.
1. Human Sin and Divine Creation
It is all too obvious that humanhity cannot, by its own boot­
straps, pull itself out of the mire of sin, injustice, and violence 
any more today than it could during the first world-war. Naive 
optimism about human progress can no longer be the innocent and 
hopeful assumption of a Christian theology. We owe a painful debt 
of gratitude to the neo-orthodox theologians for asserting that 
human love, ordinarily conceived, cannot by itself be the content 
of the Kingdom of God. Pride, greed, envy, and covetousness, - 
in short egocentric self-love - are not just private sins. In their 
corporate forms they have the capacity to destroy the earth, even 
more so today than forty years ago. Nygren, Brunner, and Niebuhr
were right to say, with Luther, that the sin of hubris, superbia,
or amor sui may indeed be the sin from which others are most often 
derived. But with this emphasis upon the sin of self-love and the 
horrible expressions of it in history, there was sacrificed a certain 
essential hopefulness which characterized the liberals' naivete, 
but which is also a common element in the New Testament. Paul's 
talk about hope and peace seemed often to be overlooked in favour
cf his language about sin and faith. Agape was defined more as
a function of faith than as an attribute of hopeful humanity.
Karl Barth, however, was able to salvage something of the 
liberals' optimism, without founding that optimism within humanity
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itself. In a sense, he even elevated it. "Every abyss," he said, 
"without ceasing to be such and as such to be dangerous, has a bottom 
somewhere." That bottom, Barth could say when others could not, 
is the Grund of God's own love, a grace which envelops humanity 
even in its sin and pidde. Even the Fall could not ultimately separ­
ate humanity from the love and grace of God. Hope was reclaimed 
from the liberals, but it was given the content not of human love 
and historical progress, but of God's own radically different love 
and unopposable covenant with humanity.
The Fall cannot be lightly dismissed. But on the other hand, 
the conception of God as an effective, concerned, and continuously 
creative God of love can not finally be reconciled with an ultimate 
Fall into hell, either within or outside of history. Neither can 
"faith alone" be satisfactorily posited as a replacement for salvation 
by works or "merit." For Nygren and for Brunner, and partially 
for Niebuhr, the sin of pride is primarily the sin of Adam, a revolt 
against God. But as I have suggested, the most destructive and 
dangerous Fall is better characterized by the sin of Cain, the revolt 
against one's brother which is ipso facto a revolt against God. 
As I have also sought to show, while the sin of Cain is the most 
dangerous and potentially devastating for history, the "mark of 
Cain," is the most radical authentication of God's sustaining and 
creative nurture. It is God's will that Cain will overcome sin,
in history, in the city of Cain. Gcd's grace, in active support 
for Cain as he learns to be his brother's keeper, is Cain's only 
hope.
Nygren and Brunner, concerned with the pride and fall of Adam, 
his eros and self-love, set redemption in the work of Christ, the 
second Adam, which only becomes effective through faith. But faith 
is an act of "obedience," and as such it is the human's responsibility 
to manufacture it, as it were, ex nihilo, out of nothing. The import­
ance of faith is thus overstressed to the extent that it dismisses
284
the continuously creative love of God in bringing sinful humanity 
back to himself. Niebuhr, however, tacitly limits the love and 
creative nurture of God by allowing it to be opposed in history 
by human freedom. Thus, while God's love is "transcendently'' present 
in history, the real work of grace is reserved for the end of history.
Barth's conception of God who has been eminently active in 
history in light of his covenant with Abraham (and conceivably since 
creation itself) offers a more satisfactory reconciliation of the 
antithesis between human sin and God's good creation. The creation 
does not stop with the Fall, nor is it ultimately opposable by human 
freedom. Gcd's grace extends even to the human caught up in erotic 
loves, and to the society which is engaged in corporate self-love. 
God's nurture, his creative and acting love, cannot be separated 
from his covenant with humanity, nor from the Cross which reveals 
both God's nature and human nature in its true essence. Thus God's 
action is action history, a judgment on sin, while at the same 
time a patient and continuous creation of historical humanity in 
spite of it. God's saving grace is inseperable from his creative 
love, incorruptible by human sin, unopposed by human freedom, and 
independent of human faith.
2. The Relation of Faith to Love
Perhaps because Barth had read Feuerbach as well as Kierkegaard, 
he was sensitive to the possibility for faith to militate against 
the idea of love, so that there might result a contradiction between 
them. Barth therefore exercised caution in claiming that love cannot 
be separated from and is a complement of faith in God. Nygren, 
Brunner, and Niebuhr, however, did not exercise this caution, and 
in all of the above we find the idea that "love is a derivative 
of faith" (Niebuhr). But while Nygren and Brunner adopted Luther's 
notion that agape flows directly from God through the faithful Christ­
ian, to the neighbour, Niebuhr and Barth believed that sin was able
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to interupt the flow. Barth then separated totally the love of 
God frcm the loves of human beings, while Niebuhr admitted that
God's love might be only partially present insofar as human nature 
is not blessed with harmony, even among Christians. In a special 
way, Barth proclaimed, Christian love as a love that God has intended 
for all humanity is present in the Church. Niebuhr, however, could 
note that only where there are two mutually loving parties dO' we 
really have a context of harmony and thus the love which Christ 
commands. Nevertheless, humanity has a vision of that love, the
justitia originalis, which may slowly be put to more and better 
effect within human relations. But there must be no mistake that
the love which is possible in history is ever fully the "sacrificial 
love" revealed by Christ. The vision of that perfect love is in
fact the continuous conviction of sin, showing us that our loves
are not that which God requires.
Since Niebuhr's concept of the justitia originalis is common 
to all people, it might be argued that his view of love is really 
more applicable to persons who stand outside the Christian faith, 
and thus, perhaps, it is more effective in history, because it makes 
no pretence, in the guise of mutuality, to be exclusive to faith
or Christianity. In this view, Niebuhr's love is more "realistic" 
because, while admittedly not "perfect," it is still able to be
put to work in its somewhat attenuated form. Barth, meanwhile,
would continue to insist upon a "self-giving love" which is not 
really possible or understandable to all, and is thus somewhat ideal­
istic or "ideological."
On the premiss that "a little is better than nothing," we
certainly might entertain Niebuhr's "realistic" alternative, based
upon the good that meiy come of mutual self-interest. The problem
with this, however, is that even secular humanity is very able to
recognize "mutual self-interest" as precisely that, and not as love 
at all. Certainly the economic systems of the North have been
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severely criticized by the South for exactly this assumption in 
relations with poorer neighbours. As I have attempted to show, 
Niebuhr's concept of "sacrificial love" is so conceived as to me.ke 
it unachievable in history, but it is not necessarily "Christian." 
Christ's love is certainly conceivable in more historically possible 
models than sacrifice, and an unrealizable hypostasis of sacrificial 
love is not the love which is commanded by Jesus. If it is an unreal­
izable self-negation, passive in the face of evil, and unable to 
resist it, which is Niebuhr's love "derived from faith," then there 
is something wrong with the faith and the love. And if Niebuhr's 
true interest is in such mutual relations as are convenient within 
history, we must still be hesitant to adopt "mutual love" as a histor­
ical blessing, for enlightened self-interest in individuals or corpor­
ate bodies may still be seen for what it is even in secular society, 
and particularly by these who become the victims of this approach.
I find Barth's complementary treatment of faith and love more 
satisfactory than the other neo-orthodox theologians'. Barth could 
say that both Christians and non-Christians truly love, both in
the sense of agape as "self-giving" and in various sense of eros, 
the "secret of humanity." The difference for Christians, is that 
they know that they are loved by God, that the revealed love of
God in Christ is also the revealed true nature of humanity, and 
that they are witnesses to God's love for humanity and true human 
love ( agape) in history. Just as all humans love, from time to 
time, properly, Christians have an additional responsibility to 
make their love correlate with the active, creative love of Gcd. 
Thus Christian love must be active in history, just as faith is
the passive reception of God's active love. For Barth, the question 
of "harmony" or "mutuality" is irrelevant for a love which is charact­
erized by a self-giving self-authentication, simultaneously to God 
and the neighbour. Only as the love in the Church does indeed bear 
witness to the love which Christ intends among his disciples do
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harmony and mutuality pertain to Christian love. As such it is
an active witness of God's love for the whole world, eschatologically 
related to the role of the church in proclaiming the Kingdom of
God which is radically different from this world.^
3. Love and Justice
The relationship between love and justice, considered according 
to the constructs and values of moral philosophy, is, of course,
a much greater discussion than I am able to treat. Among the neo­
orthodox theologians which we have considered, only Anders Nygren 
(typically) has an unequivocal approach to the problem. Nygren 
asserted that love and justice are absolutely incompatible, as demon­
strated by Jesus' parable of the laborers in the vineyard (Matt.
20:1-16). As Outka has noted, Nygren's concept of justice is based 
upon a particular understanding of justice as "to each according 
to his merit or works." Nygren observes that since God's love is 
spontaneous, it cannot be conditioned by value, worked for or other­
wise inherent in the beloved. Human love as agape is to be based 
upon such a spontaneous love, and the concept of equality does not 
enter into relationships which are truly governed by agape.
Brunner is legalistic in his correlation of love to justice. 
He can say that justice is requisite for love, and also that "perfect
justice is a self-contradictory term because the perfect can never 
2be merely just." As I have demonstrated above, Brunner's idea
of justice very nearly approaches the idea of law, and because of 
this conception of justice, Brunner, like Nygren, cannot allow himself 
to say that justice proceeds from love, only that justice (i.e.legal 
equity) is required for love's fulfillment. This same conception
1. Gene Outka has misunderstood Barth in thinking that, for Barth, a "faith-state" co nd­
itions whether and not only how an agent loves. Barth does indeed stress the special 
love which is realizable in the church, but he does not imply that love is exclusive 
to the church, even though the love which is intended by God for human beings is most 
realizable where reciprocation is possible, cf. Outka, A g a p e , op. cit. p. 212
2. cf. Outka's discussion of Brunner's concept of justice, ibid. pp. 81-82
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of justice has led Brunner, and to a certain extent, Niebuhr, to 
oppose utopian projects which may bring forth "anarchy." The implica­
tion is that love is insecure in anarchy, and therefore a legal 
"order" is required if love is to be in any sense realizable. (The 
neo-orthodox fear of anarchy cannot be totally removed from the 
social evils and upheavals which were common in the first part of 
this century.)
Niebuhr’s concept of justice is much more complex than Brunner's. 
It is both an ethical ideal and a pragmatic, legalistic restriction 
of "the fence and the boundary line." Ideally the justice which 
is conceivable in a relation of mutual love and harmony should produce 
greater equity. But because the harmony is not achievable, a "rela­
tive justice" must be history's norm. Practically, Niebuhr's charact­
erization of justice as always less than the idea, conditioned by 
the frustrations and ambiguities of historical existence, has much 
to commend it.^ Christians must be prepared to admit that the justice 
which is demanded of their love is "no simple possibility." The 
Christian life has no claim to a sterile atmosphere where confront­
ation and opposing arguments are non-existent. Nevertheless, I 
think that Niebuhr was too ready to admit the "impossibility" of 
justice systems construed by "utopian" ideals. When he said that
"a higher justice always means a more equal justice," he was right. 
But when he qualified the statement to prohibit "those who suffer 
from inequality" from raising "the principle of equality to the
definitive principle of justice," he began to insert North American
2values into structures and systems yet to be conceived.
Karl Barth's 'inclination' toward a love that creates justice, 
the primary criterion of our "thesis," has already been discussed
1. It must be admitted that Niebuhr's call for a "relative justice" within secular society 
has had its discernible effect, especially in the North American political sphere. Thus we 
must not be too quick to accuse him of failing to employ Christian values in effecting such 
justice as may be possible. Nevertheless, a relevant or relative justice in secular society 
does not necessarily conform to that justice which we may affirm as proceeding from gen­
uine love.
2. cf. above p. 36.
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(above, pp. 57 ff) . As we have noted, Barth's concepts of love 
and justice do not merely begin with Christ but arise from the earl­
iest covenant-statements of the Old Testament. God's continuous 
action in human history is a liberating action, which frees humanity 
from sin and for service on many levels. Faith only "works" by
an active love, in which the person who is loved by God gives himself
to his neighbour, for his neighbour's service, and in the interest 
of his neighbour's needs.
...the human righteousness required by God and established in obedience - the righteousness which according to Amos 5:24 should pour down as a mighty stream - has necessarily the character of a vindication of right in favour of the threatened innocent, the opp^qAsed poor, widows, orphans,< and aliens. For this reason, in the relations and events in the life of his people, God always takes his stand un­conditionally and passionately on this side and on thisside alone: against the lofty and on behalf of the lowly;against those who already enjoy right and privilege and on behalf of those who are denied and deprived of it.What does all this mean? It is not really to be explainedby talking iji abstracto of the political tendency and es­pecially the forensic character of the Old Testament and the biblical message generally. It does in fact have this character and we cannot hear it and believe it without a sense of responsibility in the direction indicated.
Although this statment alone may be 'unequivocal' enough to ascertain
Barth's view of the relation between love and justice, he constantly
refused to give specific content the kind of justice which might
be demanded in any given era. For example, he refused to follow
Brunner and Niebuhr in condemning communism, unequivocally, on the
assumption that God's will and purpose for humanity may yet be found
to lie in systems which seem alien to the values and ideals of the 
2present day. He soundly condemned Naziism, however, and refused
to entertain its legitimation on the principle that any order is 
better than anarchy. Barth consistently asserted that Christians 
must protest and object to injustice, in whatever system or order 
it is found. We have already noted that Barth saw justice as prior 
to law, and upon which all law must be dependent if law is to be
1, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I l A p .  3862. cf. Barth, Against the Stream, edited by Ronald Gregor Smith, London, 1954, pp. 34 f f .
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just. Although Barth does not tell us in what form or under what 
system justice shall best be achieved in history, God's own justice- 
creating and liberating action is the Christian's mandate. A justice 
which is imitative of God's can best be discerned in the light of 
Amos' prophecy, a justice which rolls down like a flood upon the 
oppressed. Barth wastes no time discussing the 'viability' of such 
a justice; ^  his assumption is simply that God, and therefore the 
faithful Christian, must be "against those who already enjoy right 
and privilege and for those who are denied and deprived of it,"... 
"passionately."
4. The Integrity of Human Nature
The agape/eros dualism in human love which arose with Nygren 
has been, to a certain extent, adopted by all of the neo-orthodox 
theologians. Brunner as we have seen, attempted to maintain the 
distinction but was unable to do so consistently, for example, in 
his doctrine of Christian marriage. Niebuhr generally avoided the 
terms, but nevertheless developed an implicit dualism between the 
idea, harmonious, and sacrificial love revealed through the justitia 
originalis and the realistically achievable loves of human beings 
in history, characterized by mutuality. Karl Barth, as I have shown, 
refused to capture agape "like a bird in flight," but grounded this 
human love upon the love of God, active and present in history, 
Barth also spoke of eros in various contexts, as a gregarious instinct 
proper to the doctrine of creation, and also as an "uncritical streng­
thening of natural self-assertion," the antithesis of agape. For 
Barth, both eros and agape occur in the same human being, and agape 
does not necessarily intimate a person's salvation, for he is still
1. This may be consistent with Barth's "negative" approach to the whole discussion of "C hris t­
ian ethics." Barth eschews "ethical systems" because the "ethical q u e s t i o n . . .can be solved 
only as it was originally put - by the grace of God, by the fact that this allows man 
to actually to ^ 2  the answer." (ll/2 pp. 516 f.) That is, it is only by practical human 
action in the world that appropriate action is discussed, and by no prior system or 
casuistry which implicitly limits what God requires.
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prone to eros. On the other hand, eros does not condemn the human 
being, for all humans, qua human, love from both selfish and unselfish 
motives.
Barth's "dualism" is of a different kind, for the dualism 
here is not within human nature, but between the love of God and 
the love of humanity. Although the New Testament speaks of agape 
as both God's love and human love Barth insists that the two are 
qualitatively different. He will not subscribe to Nygren's notion 
that eros is human love while agape is divine. Barth insists upon 
a theology of love which keeps God's gracious love out of the grasp 
of humanity. The divinity of human love was the assumption of the 
anthropological theology manifested in Feuerbach, and followed in 
different forms by the liberal theologians. Even as the faithful 
person loves in the sense of self-giving agape, for Barth the love 
may only be imitative of the divine love, but it can never ^  the 
divine love. There must always be preserved that healthy distance 
between God and humanity. We have observed that Luther's idea of 
the image dei is dependent upon faith. A person would be created 
in the image of God "by faith," or insofar as he believes. Barth 
does not allow faith to play such a role, nor does he allow the 
inadequate loves in human nature to be construed as originating 
in God himself. Human freedom, for Barth, is such that it can never 
be completely overcome by God's direct love, so that human love 
has the character of the divine love.
In this, Barth may be unnecessarily cautious. It is not neces­
sary to make the human into a god in order to say that there may 
be some of the divine creative energy immanent within the ordinary 
loves of human beings. This point may not be easily resolved, and 
certainly Barth was adamant about it throughout his career. Neverthe­
less there may be the vestiges of dualism in Barth, as in the other 
neo-orthodox theologians, whenever he draws a strict dividing line
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between God's love and human love. Surely there is a distinction
between God and humanity, on the evidence of sheer human limitation 
in time and space. But if there is anything divine about the human,
if the human does have some capacity for self-transcendence, if
Christ's love is able to enter into humanity in such a way that 
new justice may be created in the human sphere where it did not 
exist before, then it seems that we may yet be able to assert that 
humanity has a limited aura of divinity about it (John 17:21-23; 
and especially vs. 26; also Romans 5:5). If God has indeed entered 
into human history, incarnated as a human being, then humanity need 
not be conceived as alienated from itself nor from its origin. 
Given that 'knowledge,' despite our tendency to sin and inaction, 
there may be a few beautiful moments when each person may humbly
and gratefully acknowledge that his love is indeed greater than 
time and space, uncorrupted by self-interest, as it reaches out 
toward the beloved in a joyful celebration of authentic humanity 
which is, somehow, also divine.
5. Conclusion
It should now be obvious that in my view Karl Barth has gone 
well "beyond" Luther in offering solutions to the theological "quest­
ions" which Luther has left us. Barth has shown, where Nygren, 
Brunner, and Niebuhr could not consistently do so, that human sin 
is not able to contradict or ultimately oppose God's purpose and 
plan in creation. The Fall is not bottomless, for its 'floor' is
the love of God. Neither is humanity thrown back upon the 'happy
chance' of faith for salvation. God's nurturing and unopposable 
love is continuously active and creative in history and beyond it 
to provide for human redemption and liberation, from sin and from 
every other impediment to fellowship with the Creator. Barth has 
demonstrated by God's continuous and covenanted action with humanity 
in history that God's love is active in creating justice for the
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poor and the oppressed. This action is evident in the witness of 
the Old Testament; it reaches its liberating apex at the Cross; 
and it continues to work through the Holy Spirit wherever the Church 
is gathered. The love which is revealed at the Cross is capable 
of human imitation in history, so that the justification which was 
accomplished there may be imitated in the human sphere to create 
justice on earth. Finally, in light of the Incarnation, the true 
identity of human nature as a being which gives itself selflessly, 
to and on behalf of God and the neighbour, is revealed and made 
possible in human history. The person who realizes this event in 
faith and in the community of believers has an additional capacity 
to show forth the love which is the attribute of genuine human nature, 
self-giving agape. But because the human being is still caught 
up in erotic loves, limited by time and space, he may not rest comp­
lacently in the assurance of his own righteousness. There remains 
a gap between what is demonstrated and what is required, between 
that divine love which is majestic grace and the human love which 
is humble imitation.
Only on the last point have I differed with Barth. Other 
neo-orthodox theologians have varied so much from the more thorough 
solutions of Barth that we may have cause to wonder whether they 
all are really similar enough to be classed under the "neo-orthodoxy" 
heading. Perhaps, after all, it is a category theology can do without.
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LOVE AND JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICAN THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION
In the year that Karl Barth died, history appears to have
been affected by many forces which theology cannot ignore, precisely
because they have already begun to influence the character of theology
itself. Among many other memorable events in the year 1968, the
Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops took place in
Medellin, Colombia. The documents produced at Medellin are generally
acknowledged to have given rise to the essentially Roman Catholic
but profoundly ecumenical theological genre which has come from
Latin America, known broadly as 'theology of liberation'.
As I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous chapter,
there may be more than a coincidental link between Karl Barth and
Medellin. Barth's unequivocal characterization of human righteousness
as "a vindication of right in favour of the threatened innocent,
the oppressed poor, widows, orphans and aliens" has been noticed
1by certain Latin American theologians. They have generally adopted
(or inadvertently agreed to) Barth's assertion that "God always
takes his stand unconditionally and passionately...against the lofty
and on behalf of the lowly; against those who already enjoy right
and privilege and on behalf of those who are denied and deprived
of it." As Barth further declared and Latin American theologians
have certainly stressed, the matter does not rest in theological
discourse, but extends to a "political tendency" and "a sense of
2responsibility in the direction indicated." In correspondence
with Barth's insistence that God's love is best characterized as 
action, Latin American theologians insist that human love, in its 
'concrete' mode, must take the form of practice. It must be a
1. Julio de Santa Ana and Jose Miguez Bonino, specifically, cf. Santa Ana, ed. Towands^ 
a Church of the P o o r , Publication of the Commission on the Churches' Participation in 
Development, World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1979 (The quotation from Barth appears 
opposite the title-page.)
2. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/l, p. 386, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1957
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commitment to the poor and oppressed in the completely historical 
context of human misery and exploitation. Only such a love, they 
say, is consistent with the Gospel and authentically Christian.
The Medellin Conference set the tone for an indigenous Latin 
American theology which would combine diverse socio-economic concerns 
with a 'militant' theological framework. This theology stems from 
an increasing social consciousness to be descerned in various papal 
documents and other Catholic writings, both dogmatic and scriptural,
which may be traced back to Pope Leo XIII and his 1891 encyclical
XRerum Novarum. The bishops at Medellin combined this growing tradi­
tion of social concern in Catholic thought with peculiar and acute 
situations in Latin America - so diverse that proposed solutions
must be broadly flexible in order to be applicable, yet common enough 
to justify fairly radical statements directed to the plight of exploi­
ted masses in all their parishes. They affirmed that "misery, as
a collective fact, expresses itself as injustice which cries to 
2the heavens"; That international business interests were directly
responsible for much of this misery; "lack of solidarity" between 
the various Latin American cultures had helped to support "the unjust
3structures which characterize the Latin American situation". The 
bishops expressed a profound awareness that the economic and social 
welfare of their peoples depends upon "the affirmation of the neces­
sity for structural change". Such a change, they declared, should 
be founded upon a concept of salvation which is "an action of integral 
human development and liberation, which has love for its sole motive."
Man is "created in Christ Jesus", fashioned in him as a"new creature". By faith and baptism he is transformed,filled with the gift of the Spirit, with a new dynamism,not of selfishness, but of love which compels him to seek out a new, more profound relationship with God, his fellow man, and created things.
1. Important also are Quadragesima Anno (1931), Mater et Magistra (1961), Pacem in Terris
( 1963), Gaudium et Spes of Vatican II (1965), Populorum Progression ( 1967), and Octogesima 
Adveniens (1971).
2. The Church in the Present-Day Transformation of Latin America in Light of the C o u n c i l ,
Vol. II, C o n c l u s i o n s , pu blished by the Latin American Bureau of the United States Catholic 
Conference, 1970; compiled in Joseph Gremillion, The Gospel of Peace and J u s t i c e , Orbis, 
Maryknoll, New York, 1975, p . 445
3. ibid. p. 446
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Love, "the fundamental law of human perfection", and therefore of the transformation of the world is not only the greatest commandment of the Lord; it is also the dynamism which ought to motivate Christians to realize justice in the world, paving truth as a foundation and 
liberty as their sign.
Thus the Latin American bishops at Medellin began to assert what
many theologians of liberation have since stressed: "The Christian
quest for justice is a demand arising from biblical teaching...our
love for Christ and our brethren will not only be the great force
liberating us from injustice and oppression, but also the inspiration
for social justice, understood as a whole of life and as an impulse
2toward the integral growth of other countries."
It would be erroneous, however, to suggest that the Medellin 
Conference is the main stimulus or resource of the Latin American 
theologians. Although the conference provided a needed framework 
for a particularly 'practical' theology, the continuing background 
is the Latin American situation and all the influences upon it. 
In addition to the common Roman Catholic piety in which most of 
the continent is immersed, there is also the influence of Marxism 
and other social theories through which various solutions are offered. 
The confluence of Catholicism and Marxist thought has evoked some 
innovative thinking by some courageous churchmen, the impact of 
which upon the "Marxist-Christian dialogue" can hardly be over­
estimated. Ernesto Cardenal tells of the old Communist leader he 
met who confessed that he had not been a good Marxist. He had prev­
iously advocated that the revolution in South America could be achiev­
ed without Christians, but he had failed to take seriously the fact 
that the people on whom the revolution depended were indeed Christian.
Then he realized that a revolution without Christians would have
2to be a revolution without the people, and so would be no revolution.
1. ibid, p. 447
2. Medellin Documents, Conclusions ; Gremillion, The Gospel of Peace and J u s t i c e , op. cit. p . 447
3. Ernesto Cardenal, preface to Hugo Assmann, Practical Theology of L i b e r a t i o n ; trans. Paul 
Burns, Search Press, London, 1975
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The idea of a revolution with Christians has truly been taken
seriously by Cardenal and many of his colleagues. They stress that
theology of liberation cannot be the task of professionals but rather 
of committed persons often living in the "solidarity of poverty" 
who use their theological reflection as tools for revolution. They 
are severely critical of affluent academics purporting to make univer­
sal and ontological pronouncements valid for all. The situation 
in Latin America, they claim, demands a Latin American focus, conceived 
in the experience of poverty and oppression, not held captive to
traditional 'ideological' ways of thinking.
There is no denying that Latin American theology of liberation 
is a dynamic and innovative influence today, not only upon Latin
America, but also upon European and North American theology. Whether 
it is quite as innovative as some of its adherents claim, remains 
to be seen. Cardenal, for example, asserts that it
is not one more chapter of traditional theology invented recently in Latin America, as European theologians are accustomed to believe. Just as there is a theology of marriage, a theology of the Church, a theology of the priesthood, a theology of work, and so on, they suppose 
that the theology of liberation is one more appendix of traditional theology applied now to the theme of revolution. It is not so. This is an entirely new theology, one that replaces in the light of revolution 
all the topics of traditional theology: God, Christ, the Church, the priesthood, marriage, work: everything, in fact.
Joseph Gremillion, from a different perspective, agrees that this 
theology is culturally innovative: "This is the first school of
theological thought to arise outside western Europe since that of
2the Cappadocian and Eastern Church colleagues of 400-600 a.d."
Alfredo Fierro gives it credit for being "a theology that knows 
that it does not know", but at the same time he remarks that because 
of its awareness of non-knowing, it is to a certain extent a "negative 
theology". As such, he says, it threatens the role of scripture.
1. Cardenal, prefact to Assmann, Practical Theology of L i bera tio n',’ op. cit. p. 32. Gremillion, The Gospel of Peace and Justice, op. cit.; p. 135
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1sacraments, dogma, and ecclesiastical institutions.
The Latin American theological themes we have to consider 
are, of course, not new. The themes of justice, love, the poor, 
the kingdom of God, even "utopia", we have met before. As we shall 
discover, many of these themes in Latin American thought may be 
traced to pre-Marxist European thought, not the least of which is 
that of Ludwig Feuerbach. Because of this we shall have to retain 
a certain scepticism about the assertion of novelty. But on the 
other hand, the practical correlation of these themes with a specific 
cultural development, and the confluence of a radical interpretation 
of Christianity with social theories which have not previously had 
much to do with Christianity and the Church, certainly bear watching. 
For the purposes of our 'thesis', that the love commanded by Christ 
is a love which creates justice in this world, the theology of libera­
tion certainly deserves our attention.
1. Alfredo Fierro, The Militant Gospel, SCM Press, London, 1977; p. 354
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Section I. Theological Foundations for a Liberative Love
In order to adequately characterize and document the prevalent ; 
doctine of God in Latin American liberation theology, a much greater 
space would be demanded than lies at our disposal. Despite many 
important criticisms and reinterpretations of traditional Catholic 
doctrine, the Latin American God continues to be conceived according 
to many pervasive suppositions common among Catholics, yet not neces­
sarily common among Protestants. For example, much of the inherent 
critique of worship within the literature is directed primarily 
at Catholic forms of worship and the sacraments as interpreted in 
the Roman Catholic tradition. Similarly, the idea of grace as it 
is reinterpreted by Latin American liberation theologians stems
1from àhd continues to be a particularly Roman Catholic view of grace. 
In certain cases the difference between Protestant and Catholic 
traditions, and the fact that the liberation theologians generally 
stem from the latter, may make valid criticism and assessment of 
their work by Protestants difficult. It would be unfair and redundant, 
for example, for a Protestant to suggest too quickly that the libera­
tion theologians have an improper view of God, grace, the Bible, 
faith, justification, or any of the other themes which tend to be 
interpreted in the light of the Reformation. An assessment and 
critique of Latin American liberation theology, to sustain validity, 
must come from a deep sympathy for, if not necessarily an alliance 
with, both the Catholic traditions from which the theological argu­
ments arise, and the Latin American social climate in which they 
take place.
1. The implications of this difference may be very important for the understanding and 
interpretation of the idea of love in Christian theology. Nevertheless, the topic is 
too wide to consider here, except at brief points. For further discussion of the Latin 
American/Catholic view of grace in the context of liberation themes, cf. Juan Luis 
Segundo, Grace and the Human Condition, Orbis, Maryknoll, New York 1973, and Leonardo 
Boff, Liberating Grace, Orbis, Maryknoll, New York, 1976
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Although we must make certain distinctions along the way,
there is much in common, indeed a certain solidarity of theme and
purpose, among the various authors. The selection here is limited
to those which have had works translated into English. Certainly
1it does not pretend to be exhaustive even of those. Although there 
is always the hazard of over-generalization, it is my intention 
to offer a general characterization iihterrelating the several themes
2of liberation theology most closely allied with the concept of love.
1. The God of Liberative Love
Sharply critical of European and North American theologies 
which propose to discover the ontological character of God, the 
Latin American theologians have stressed an image of the deity which 
is completely aligned with marginated, poor, oppressed, and suffering 
peoples of the world. Their God is not to be discovered through 
doctrinal assertion but rather through historical analysis and the 
activity of humans with and on behalf of all people who find themselves 
victims of other people's greed and exploitation. Very briefly, 
we may characterize, but certainly not define, this concept of God 
by means of the dynamic and requisitely flexible headings:
(1) God's salvific action; (2) God's justice; (3) God's wrath; and 
(4) God's love.
(1) God's Salvific Action
Throughout the writings of the Latin Americans there is the 
repeated declaration that salvation and history cannot be separated. 
"History is one"; Heilsgeschichte cannot be conceived or understood 
apart from human history. The Old Testament relates not only the 
religious history of the Hebrew people, but also God's action with
1. It must be noted that not all of these theologians are Catholic. Santa Ana and Bonino, 
for example, are Methodist. The considerable agreement between such Protestants and 
the Catholics may do much to forward ecumenical dialogue.
2. Due to the necessity for inter-relation of these themes, it will be impossible to avoid 
a certain amount of repetition.
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them in their struggle to escape the domination of others. The
New Testament is generally understood as a continuation of this
same liberative tendency of the Old Testament God, broadening and
universalizing the salvific purpose of God to include many different
kinds of salvation. For the Latin American theologians, salvation
and liberation are understood to be one consolidated and universal
activity of God, which does not take place as action 'from above',
but rather through the intensely human and often frustrated processes
of history. As Ignacio Ellacuria suggests.
On the one hand liberation in history signifies and realizes God's salvific promise to human beings. On the other hand, God's promise of salvation to human­kind impels human beings to liberation in history so that God's salvation may be made truly present on an ever new and higher plane. Thus there is constant interaction between the operative promise of God theSavior and the carrying out of this salvation in his­tory. God shows his saving power in history and in history the effectiveness of this divine promise is signified and made real.
The impact of such a statement does imply that God's capacity to 
liberate and save may be linked to whatever partial and necessarily 
inadequate forces are at work in history at any given moment. This, 
however, does not seem to be a theological impediment to most theolo­
gians of liberation.
Juan Luis Segundo sees the partiality of historical liberation 
as more of an opportunity than a problem. "Our theory assumes that 
there is an empty space between the conception of God that we receive 
from our faith and the problems that come to us from an ever-changing 
history. So we must build a bridge between our conception of God 
and the real-life problems of history." Gustavo Gutierrez agrees 
that liberation should be the combined activity of human beings 
working together with God. He has criticized the tendency of
1. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , trans. John Drury, Orbis, Maryknoll, New York 
1976; p. 104
2. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , trans. John Drury, Orbis, Maryknoll, 
New York, 1976; p. 116
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theologians to omit "the liberating and protagonistic role of man" 
in God's work of creation and redemption.^ Gutierrez has stressed 
that liberation is part of the divine salvation wherever or by 
whomever it is achieved. For Christian or non-Christian to partici-
2pate in the process of liberation is "already a salvific work". 
Obviously, for these theologians, salvation is not necessarily a 
function of faith. On the contrary, salvation is quite literally 
equated with the continuous process of human liberation in history 
from every kind of alienating oppression. Creation, salvation, 
and liberation of human beings are components of the universal action 
of God in human history, with human beings; for, "The God who makes 
the cosmos from chaos is the same God who leads Israel from alienation 
to liberation."^
(2) God's Justice
Ellacuria quotes a statement issued by a 1971 bishops' synod 
in Latin America which gives representative expression to the justice 
of God as interpreted by the liberation theologians: "In the Old
Testament God reveals himself to us as liberator of the oppressed 
and defender of the poor, demanding from man faith in him and justice
4toward man's neighbour." Ellacuria goes on to say that
It is an essential dictum of the Christian message that God's justice must operate in and through the hearts of men so that each individual may be the liberator of his fellow human beings and nature itself. But the justice of God cannot remain isolated in the heart of the indi­vidual. For man's heart is structured by the things and realities of history. The fact is that today one portion of humanity not only oppresses the rest of humanity but also is itself enslaved to nature. This gives new urgency and poignancy to Paul's statement that mankind and nature are groaning in the pangs of childbirth as they wait for liberation from the injustice that prevents them from being what they are truly meant to be.
1. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , trans. and edited by Caridad Inda and 
John Eagleson; Orbis, Maryknoll, New York 1973; p. 173
2. ibid. p. 72
3. ibid. p. 158
4. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. p. 96
5. ibid. p. 117
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Again we notice that in Latin American theology, an attribute of
God is reinterpreted as a correlated responsibility of humanity.
Just as God's salvific action takes place in history and through
humanity, God's justice is conceived as directly associated with
the human capacity to act justly. Although Protestants might quickly
complain that this intimacy of divine and human justice limits God,
the South Americans seem to be saying that it offers an opportunity
1to humanity to take part in God's plan of salvation.
Jon Sobrino has declared that this relationship raises no
problem for theodicy. The problem is not to justify God, but rather
2to correlate human justice with the divine justice. God's consistent 
activity in history shows him to be a God who is for the orphans, 
the widows, the poor, and all the enslaved and alienated people. 
God has already taken his stand; the problem is for humans to take 
theirs on the same side.
Jose P. Miranda has attempted to show, in some innovative 
exegesis, that Paul's reference to "the glory of God" is tacitly 
equivalent to "the justice of God". "Romans 3:23 and the entire 
Old Testament oblige us to conceive of the glory of God as a compre­
hensive, supra-individual reality which comes into human history 
and establishes itself there, constituting in it a new age, a universal 
reign of goodness and justice... This glory consists in a life of 
justice and goodness and compassion and love of neighbour which 
for the world is completely new." From Miranda's comprehensive 
notion of God's justice, we may conclude that it is not only a dynamic 
force which operates through human justice, but it is also an eschato- 
logical vector which cannot be ultimately frustrated. For the
1. For an excellent appreciation of the social implications of this salvation, cf. Mater 
et Magistrat of Pope John XXIII, Part II, 51-120; in Gremillion, the Gospel of Peace 
and J u s t i c e , op. cit. pp. 154 ff.
2. Jon Sobrino, Ch ristoloqy at the C r o s s r o a d s , trans. John Drury, Orbis, Haryknoll, New 
York, 1978; SCH London, 1978 p. 36
3. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the Bible, Orbis, Maryknoll, New York, 1974; SCM 1977, p. 239
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liberation theologians there is never an understanding of God's 
justice as sheer law, or 'order', but it is always a positive and 
shaping factor which is allied with hope, love, and a better world.
(3) God's Wrath
Any reference to the wrath of God in Christian theology should 
probably begin with the epistle of Paul to the Church at Rome: "For
the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness 
and wickedness of men who by their wickedness suppress the truth" 
(Rom. 1:18). According to the common interpretation among the libera­
tion authors, the "ungodliness and wickedness" is a reference to 
a refusal to imitate God's justice on earth (Rom. 1:29), and God's 
wrath is especially revealed against hypocrisy (Rom. 2:1-5). Paul's 
strict criticism of legalist hypocrisy ("While you preach against 
stealing, do you steal?" Rom. 2:21) has a special translation for 
Latin American exploitation by more affluent, developed, and educated 
countries. The result is that unlike the liberal theology popular 
at the turn of the century (with which Latin American theology of 
liberation is occasionally compared) it is not possible to accuse
the liberationists of failing to consider the weight and nature
_ . 1 of sin.
Sharing a common emphasis of the neo-orthodox theologians,
the liberation theologians tend to remove the concept of sin from
a relation of piety between human individuals and God. The problem
of sin is seen as more structural than personal, although the personal
element is certainly not removed. "Sin has become a very private
affair," says Enrique Dussel. "But the great historic and communita-
2rian sins of human kind pass unnoticed by all." Although all of 
the Latin American liberationists stress the aspect of institutional
1. The dominant Latin American view of sin is that of a victim of it. Whether this view 
is adequate to exhaust the topic cannot be explored here.
2. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , trans. Bernard F. McWilliams, 
Orbis, Maryknoll, New York, 1978; p. 27
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sin, Dussel takes the idea far indeed: "The subjugation of person
by person is the only sin a person can commit."^ Gutierrez agrees
2that, in general, sin may be equated with oppression. The impact 
of such sin has a rebounding effect because, as Dussel illustrates, 
the exploited worker who beats his wife is suffering not only from 
his own sin but also from the frustration caused by the sin of others. 
This looks a bit like an escape-clause for the violence of the workers, 
but it does have a credible philosophical rationale. Dussel quotes 
Rousseau in affirming that "man is born neither good nor bad but 
institutions make him bad." "When we are unjust," he says, "it 
is precisely because we are caught up in the system determined in
3history by the princes of this world."
Although such a statement may jeopardize human freedom and 
our conviction that love is able to overcome deterministic forces, 
it seems that we must give Dussel credit for stating much of the 
truth. He shares my conviction (expressed above) that the Cain 
and Abel myth is the primary symbol of human sin. He goes even 
further to suggest that God himself is symbolized in Abel, and fratri­
cide is literally to be construed as theocide.^ Today this theocide 
is often expressed in the slow but no less fatal "original sin" 
of colonial domination and economic imperialism, and "all the others 
in the system spring from it." In such exploitation, says Dussel, 
"the devil is present in real history." Despite what even some 
liberation theologians might consider a tendency to reductionist 
aphorisms, Dussel's interpretation of the kind of sin against which 
the wrath of God is revealed is typical.
The Latin Americans generally agree that God is not directly
1. ibid. p. 102. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, op. cit. p. 109
3. Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 26
4. ibid. p. 18
J
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offendable. Ellacuria says one cannot offend God directly just
as one cannot know God directly.^ But God is offended, and sin
takes place, whenever an injustice is done, for "sin is the formal
2exercise of an act of radical injustice." Human injustice tends
to blot out the justice of God among human beings, since God's justice 
is allied with human justice. For this reason, human injustice
is the sin which "negates God", a literal "denial of the first
3commandment." For the liberationists sin is both a denial of God 
and a denial of humanity insofar as it takes the form of oppression; 
indeed, most of them agree that God may only be offended to the
extent that humans are oppressed.
The acknowledgement of structural sin as the foremost offence 
against God has led the liberationists to question seriously whether 
traditional forms of worship are appropriate. Segundo, for example, 
adopts, to a certain extent, the militancy of North American Black 
Theology. James Cone remarks that while white churchmen sang "Jesus 
Lover of My Soul" black people continued to be enslaved in the early 
days of North American church development. Cone's point is that 
white spiritualism is certainly no guarantee against the exploitation 
of poor people. "Black theology then asks not whether love is an 
essential element of the Christian interpretation of God, but whether 
the love of God itself can be properly understood without focussing 
equally on the biblical view of God's righteousness. Is it possible 
to understand what God's love means for the oppressed without making 
wrath an essential ingredient of that love?" Cone concludes, and 
Segundo agrees, that "the wrath of God is the love of God in regard
to the forces against his liberation of the oppressed."^
1. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. p. 105 (Knowledge of God is "mediated through history". )
2. ibid.
3. ibid. p. 112
4. James H. Cone, A Black Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1979; pp. 130, 
133; quoted in Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, op. cit. pp. 28-29
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Although there seems to be general agreement among the libera­
tion theologians that God's wrath against oppressors is a function 
of his love for the poor, there is no definite agreement as to what 
form God's wrath must take in history. Whether human vengeance can 
be the Lord's vengeance remains to be seen. But the God of liberative 
love does not stand idly by while human beings suffer. He is active
in history, liberationists declare, and his active love may take
form as his wrath against the sin of oppression.
(4) God's Love
In line with the 'chronology' of this development of the libera­
tionists' concept of God, God's love (perhaps too often) appears 
to be preceded by God's wrath. Only by the insight of Cone, that 
God's love often takes the form of wrath against injustice, do we 
really get an introduction to the notion of God's love in the theology 
of liberation. The general stress in the literature is upon human 
love, human justice, and human practice. Many of the authors frankly 
admit that these things are prior to theological understanding of 
their source and character. Gutierrez, for example, says that theol­
ogy must be "the second step" following a genuine commitment to the 
liberation of oppressed people.^
In criticism of the historical abuse of Christian piety and 
spiritualism, many of the authors are justifiably suspicious of the 
ambiguous term, 'the love of God'. Both God's love for humanity 
and human love for God have too often been the "opiate" of oppressed
people and the ideological pacifiers used by oppressors. When the
liberation authors speak of the love of God, the idea is always 
qualified in terms of human love. The implicit anthropology which 
thereby informs their theology reminds us very often of Ludwig 
Feuerbach, Schleiermacher, and occasionally Kant and Hegel. This
1. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, op. cit. p. 11
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anthropological basis for the idea of God's love (and the anthropo- 
centric philosophy which informs it) is not at all surprising when 
we realize that most of the liberationists are quite well-versed 
in the thought of Karl Marx. Despite the professed atheism of 
Feuerbach and Marx, the notion of God's love expressed as wrath 
is somewhat appropriate to both. Dussel, for example, asserts that 
Marx was atheistic toward the God of German ideology, not necessarily 
toward the liberating God of Jesus.^ Miranda underscores the same 
point by stressing the link between Marx and the Old Testament pro­
phets. As Gutierrez observes, Feuerbach's critique of religion
2was based upon his apprehension of human love. For Gutierrez,
human love itself is divine, and is thereby opposed to hypostatized 
faith. Like Feuerbach, his "God of love" is militant against the 
religion of oppressive piety.
The love of God (i.e. God's love) receives comprehensive 
attention in very few of the liberation writings. God's love is 
primarily defined as that love which is at work in humans to create 
greater justice in the world, and as such it operates, essentially, 
through human beings. Nevertheless, the historical love of humans 
acting to create justice is indeed linked, retroactively in most 
cases, with the creative and liberating love of God. The 'retroactive' 
method appears to consist of looking first at what liberative love 
is like in human beings, then discovering that love in theological 
sources. Although this description may seem reductive, it is exactly 
correlated with Segundo's practical hermeneutic, which begins first 
with human experience, and then interprets the Bible, suspicious
3of its ideology, in light of that experience. While not all of 
the liberation theologians consciously adopt Segundo's "hermeneutic
1. Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 16
2. Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 219 (cf. above, Chapter 1'
3. cf. Juan Luis Segundo. The Liberation of Theology, op. cit. p. 9 ff.
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circle", almost all of them do seem to incorporate this method in 
their approach to theology. Experience and "praxis" come first; 
theology follows. Anthropology precedes theology.
By means of a general synthesis of the liberation authors 
we may sketch their interpretation of God's love in the following 
description. God's love is his covenanted identification with, 
and action with and on behalf of the poor. The covenant stems from 
the divine proclamation of Exodus 29:45, God's promise to dwell 
with his people.^ Through the incarnation of Christ, the covenant 
extends to all. God's love is universal: he loves all equally,
but in order to love all equally, he sides with the poor, and literal­
ly dwells among them. From his position on the side of the poor 
God summons all to do justice to them, and thereby demonstrate their 
love for him. God does not dwell among those who perpetuate injustice 
to the poor; as Miranda and Gutierrez attest, God is absent when
justice is not done, and worship of God by the rich may be super- 
2fluous. God's love takes form in history as a salvific liberation 
which is an extension of his creation.
There is historical and • eschatological character in God's 
love as it takes form through all the processes of history. Because 
it operates through human beings, it is capable of suffering and 
frustration. But because it is God's love which takes human form 
wherever people opt for justice and liberation, it has a transcendent 
character which is able to overcome history's frustration. As Miranda 
repeatedly reminds us, the love of God defined by Paul is the love 
with which God loves humanity, which has been poured into our hearts, 
and "precisely for this reason we have a hope that cannot fail".
3(Romans 5:5; Galations 5:22) Miranda takes the eschatological
1. cf. Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 1902. ibid. p. 195; cfi also: Miranda, p. 65 (op. cit.); Segundo, p. 47 (op. cit.)
3. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the Bible, op. cit. p. 230
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character of the love of God which works through human beings farther
than most of the liberation theologians, but the same hopefulness
is characteristic of them all. Because God's love is creative and
dedicated to justice, and because he has (according to Rom. 5:5)
instilled this love in humanity, then the hope for the kingdom of
God rests upon the effective love of God at work through human love.
"It is the working of love in the world which makes us have certain
hope for the achievement of justice on earth.
Despite this optimism, the Latin American theologians are
under no illusions that the love of God expressed in history, for
the poor and from their side, can avoid conflict. As Gutierrez
tells us, "The proclamation of a God who loves all men equally must
be given substance in history and must become history. To proclaim
that love...will make this process of 'becoming history' a conflict- 
2laden experience." Most of the liberation authors find some degree 
of violence inevitable as God's love sides with the poor against 
those who perpetuate injustice against them. God's love is not 
to be associated with an easy peace nor one of mere conciliation. 
As the bishops at Medellin affirmed, "Peace is a work of justice." 
It requires the establishment of a just order, and authentic peace 
requires a struggle. Yet, despite this inherent conflict as peace 
is "not found but built "j peace is still "the fruit of love." And 
love, said the bishops - God's love at work through the just loves
3of humanity - is "the soul of justice."
2. Old Testament Themes
The liberation themes in the Old Testament have been a constant 
source of inspiration for liberation movements. The North American
1. ibid. p. 245
2. Gutierrez, forew’ord to Hugo Assmann, Pratical Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 19
3. Medellin Documents, in Gremillion, The Gospel of Peace and Justice, op. cit. p. 459
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civil rights movement of the fifties and sixties took up the emphasis
upon the Hebrew's delivery from Egyptian bondage, an emphasis which
had been common in the black churches since the eighteenth century.^
More recently, however, there has been a shift away from the spiritual
emphasis upon what God did for the Hebrew people, to what he leads
them to do for themselves with his support. James Cone, for example,
has stressed that there are limits to the identification of the
Hebrews with the oppressed peoples of today. "Black people," he
2says, "are not elected to be Yahweh's suffering people." An innova­
tive approach to Old Testament exegesis combined with an increasing 
political militancy and ideological suspicion of traditional interpre­
tations has led to a rich elaboration and application of Old Testament 
emancipation motifs, by both North and South American liberation 
theologians.
Segundo is most adamant that the exodus event cannot be the
3central theme of liberation theology. By the time of Jesus it
had become a theological institution undergirding both a false
favouritism on the part of God for the children of Abraham and a
misguided notion that the oppressed must wait for God to deliver
them. Gutierrez notes the reluctance of the Hebrews to be liberated,
preferring to remain in the relative security of Egypt and Babylon,
than to take the risks associated with striking out into the wilder- 
4ness. The Latin American theologians seem to find less subtle
ideology in the prophets. Yet the observation of Ellacuria, that 
in the Psalms there is the repeated equation of liberation with
5salvation, and Gutirrez' correlation of creation with the political 
liberation of Israel,^ show the wide use that may be made of Old 
Testament literature.
1. One must be careful not to draw too many parallels between North and South American 
liberation movements, but it is probably safe to suggest that Martin Luther King and 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference have been a positive inspiration to num­
erous liberation movements, including that in Latin America.
2. James Cone, A Black Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , o p . .cit. p. 108
3. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , op. cit. p. 112
4. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, op. cit. p. 156
5. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. p. 100
6. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, op. cit. pp. 154-155
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Julio de Santa An a tells us of the prophet Zephaniah's insist­
ence that "only the meek are able to wait faithfully for the sign 
of the saving justice of God," while the rich and the proud are 
incapable of recognizing God's saving action when it comes (Zeph.2:3). 
For Santa Ana "the poor of Yahweh" are the "friends of God" who are 
themselves "faced with the scandal of poverty while ready to act 
against it. To these faithful poor Jesus announces his Beatitudes, 
a continuation of God's alliance with them.
In the thought of the Latin Americans there is the repeated
declaration that the prophetic view of religion is inseparable from
social justice. As Gutierrez asserts, the prophets "saw in injustice
not a social disorder or an offence to the poor, but a violation
2of the divine law and an insult to the holiness of God." This 
observation seems closely allied with the prophetic nature of Jesus' 
commandment to love the neighbour as oneself. Jose P. Miranda makes 
the point, too often missed by enquiries into the nature of the 
command, that Jesus is quoting directly from the "holiness code" 
of Leviticus 19. As Miranda attests, the commandment to love the 
neighbour is "a synthesis of prohibitions which concern rigorous
3justice" (cf. Lev. 19:18). Miranda asserts: to love God, the first 
commandment, a just love for the neighbour.
Miranda elaborates at length on the point made by Gutierrez; 
"To know Yahweh, which in biblical language is equivalent to saying
'to love Yahweh', to establish just relationships among men,
it to recognize the rights of the poor. The God of biblical
revelation is known through interhuman justice. When justice does 
not exist, God is not known; he is absent."^ Miranda combines 
numerous Old Testament texts to show that God is accessible only
1. Julio de Santa Ana, Good News to the P o o r , op. cit. pp. 8-9
2. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, op. cit. p. 170
3. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the B i b l e , op. cit. p. 63
4. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, op. cit. p. 195
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in the act of justice. "The God who does not allow himself to be
objectified...clearly specifies that he is knowable exclusively
in the cry of the poor and the weak who seek justice."^ Miranda's
argument rests upon the repeated prophetic link between cultic worship
and the achievement of justice (e.g. Isa. 11:9; Hab. 2:14; Jer.
22:15; Hosea 6:6). "The dilemma between justice and cultus occurs
because while there is injustice among a people, worship and prayer
do not have Yahweh as their object, even though we have the formal
and sincere 'intention' of addressing ourselves to the true God.
To know Yahweh is to do justice and compassion and right to the 
2needy."
The word 'compassion' (hesed) occurs in the Old Testament 
beside or in the context of 'justice' (Mispat, sedakah) at least 
nineteen times, Miranda tells us (cf. Micah 6:8)"...this is a compass­
ion strictly related to a sense of justice." It does not represent 
a vertical love for God, but rather a sense of justice toward humanity. 
Miranda believes that Matthew 9:13 and 12:7 retain this justice 
ingredient as Jesus quotes Hosea 6:6: "I desire mercy (eleos) and
3not sacrifice."
Miranda's exegesis cannot be unreservedly accepted, for his 
interpretation of 'knowing God' is not always supported by the Old 
Testament. For example, in Psalm 76 ("In Judah God is known..."), 
it is evident that the determination of the Hebrews' knowledge depends 
not upon what they do, but rather upon what God himself does. Although 
we may admire the passion with which Miranda equates knowledge of 
God with interhuman justice, a more conservative view is probably 
that of the Hebrew prophets, and also of Jesus. My own view is 
that knowledge of God is demonstrated by a sense of justice, but 
the two things may not be logically the same.
1. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the B i b l e , op. cit. p. 48
2. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the B i b l e , op. cit. p. 563. ibid. pp. 46-47
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We must also be cautious in adopting the view that God is 
absent where justice is not done. Although it may be that our worship 
is often directed to an improper image of God (certainly if we believe 
that God supports our own injustices), the love of God disclosed 
in the New Testament, and founded in the covenant of the Old, is 
effective and 'present' wherever there is sin, and while we are 
yet sinners. There seems to be a discontinuity between Miranda's 
essential hopefulness and his conviction that God cannot be present 
where justice is not done. The 'love which is poured into human 
hearts' must not be eclipsed by injustice in the world if it is 
really to fashion the kingdom of God in history, as Miranda hopes. 
Miranda's legitimate concern for authentic worship in a context 
of justice seems to militate against his assurance that the kingdom 
is coming. I do not think one can declare God's absence from all 
situations of injustice while at the same time affirming God's work 
through human love in establishing the kingdom. Human love seems 
always in contention with some injustice or other, particularly 
including one's own inadvertent injustices as well as the injustice 
of structures and other human beings. If God's love is to be as 
intimately allied with the loves of humans as Miranda suggests, 
one must hope that those glimmers of human love which occur even 
in the midst of gross injustice might be affirmed by God, and in 
some way disclose God's presence. This is not to overlook, however, 
the numerous occasions in the Old Testament where God seems to have 
absented himself from the Hebrew people, ostensibly due to their 
injustice. The Cross, of the new covenant, reveals God's promise 
to be both present and active among his people, despite their sin 
(Rom. 8:31-38).
3. Christology
The Latin American view of Christology is characterized by 
an emphasis upon the historical Jesus, and a corresponding emphasis 
upon a 'Christ of faith' who is embodied in the liberative action
3 1 6
of human beings in the changing situations of history itself. "To
hope in Christ," says Gutierrez, "is at the same time to believe
in the adventure of history, which opens infinite vistas to the
1love and action of the Christian." The work of Christ which began
in Galilee is seen to be a continuous salvific and liberative energy
which touches the social order, not merely "tangentially", but "in
2its roots and basic structure". As such it is the continued creative 
and liberative action of God directed toward the total transformation 
of the cosmos. Christ "opens new perspectives by catapulting history
3forward...towards total reconciliation." In Christ and through
him salvation is present at the very heart of human history, and
"there is no human act which, in the last instance, is not defined 
4in terms of it."
The Latin American liberation authors have generally demonstrat­
ed a conviction that there is sufficient evidence in the New Testament 
to develop a valid conception of the historical Jesus. Jon Sobrino 
of El Salvador and Leonardo Boff of Brazil have published Christolog- 
ies which rest upon an optimistic view of the biblical evidence. 
Sobrino asserts that liberation theology has made a reclamation 
of "Jesus' own history" as the foundation for Christology. In the 
background of this reclamation is the tendency in Roman Catholic 
thought to base Christology on traditional doctrinal formulae. 
Sobrino's criticism of this approach suggests that those who hold 
economic and political power "do not want to see" Jesus' essential 
relationship to the poor and the radical implications of the kingdom 
of God. "They would prefer to maintain the seemingly orthodox 
affirmation of Christ's absoluteness so that the supposed absoluteness
5of the prevailing capitalist system might not be called in question."
1. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. pp. 238-239
2. ibid. p. 177
3. ibid. p. 167
4. ibid. p. 1775. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the C r o s s r o a d s , trans. John Drury, Orbis, Maryknoll, New 
York 1978; SCM, London, 1978; p. xix
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For Sobrino, as well as for Gultierrez, Boff, and Ellacuria, the
'Christ of faith' cannot be conceived apart from a reinterpretation
1and re-examination of the historical Jesus.
The picture of the historical Jesus as it is sketched by the 
liberationists illustrates Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of 
God imminent to and immanent among the poor. It describes Jesus' 
political awareness of the historical forces which appear to impede 
the kingdom, and his radical statements which alienate and provoke 
the rich and powerful of his day. The liberation Christology disclos­
es a Jesus who realizes that the coming kingdom is intimately 
associated with his own person, who is tempted to use divine power 
but courageously opts for the 'impotence' of love in alliance with 
the powerless and in faithful continuity with his dependence upon 
God. He calls his disciples to follow him in a faith that works 
through love and in a love which conquers evil through suffering.
He is not a man of violence, but he realizes that following him
2may provoke violence and necessitate many forms of conflict.
Sobrino claims, and the other liberationists often confirm, 
that we can only come to know the historical Jesus in and through
3the notion of God's kingdom. Jesus' radical reference to God as 
"Abba" (father) means that he intends to create a family of brothers 
and sisters on earth. As evidence of the approaching kingdom, Jesus 
forgives the sins of the poor and the outcasts, those who according 
to the law are unclean. Jesus' miracles are to be understood in
4the context of the liberation which is at hand. Sobrino stresses 
that the phenomenon of human sin against one's neighbour is essential=
1. For Segundo, the reinterpretation must take place in the light of the ideology prevalent 
among the New Testament authors, and also in the light of Jesus' own ideological approach 
to the crises of his day. cf. Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , op. cit. p. 116,162, 
inter alia.
2. Segundo, however, interprets violence in such a way that Jesus' sayings themselves in­
corporate subtle forms of violence. Most of the liberationists, however, confirm that 
"Jesus was not a Zealot", i.e. "did not actually kill," cf. Segundo, The Liberation of 
T h e o l o g y , op. cit. pp. 155 ff.
3. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit., p. 414. ibid. p. 48
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ly a sin against the kingdom, not against God directly. Because
sin impedes the kingdom, Jesus is determined that it must not only
be forgiven but also removed.^ In his effort to remove sin, "Jesus'
most fundamental gesture is taking sides with human beings in a
concrete situation where the existing politico-religious structure
2has dehumanized people." Since Jesus' mission is a priestly one, 
Sobrino asserts that the old cult and priesthood are abolished. 
"They are to be replaced by the real, historical, and secular love
3of Jesus." (Sobrino means Jesus' love for humans, and not part­
icularly human love for Jesus.) Sobrino characterizes the implicit 
ethics in this historical love as "a note of urgency and a note
4of gratuitousness." The "urgency" arises from the imminence of 
the kingdom, and the "gratuitousness" refers to God's grace which 
makes the kingdom possible. Jesus' own love lived out in history 
becomes the literal impetus for human love in history, for "the 
love of Christ impels us" (2 Cor. 5:14), Sobrino declares, as 
"individuals become Christians through their efforts to fashion
5the kingdom into a reality."
Sobrino argues that Jesus' ministry may be divided into two 
stages representing essential developments in Jesus' faith. The 
two stages have implicit bearing upon his interpretation of authentic 
historical love. Sobrino sees the Galilean crisis (Mk. 8; Matt. 
13; John 6) as a high-water mark in Jesus' self-consciousness. 
In the early stages of his ministry, Jesus' call was to repentance 
and obedience, which, if accepted and executed by his hearers, would 
"let God be God" in bringing about the kingdom. But, says Sobrino, 
Jesus' rejection in Galilee leads him to the realization that
1. ibid. pp. 51-53
2. ibid. p. 92
3. ibid. p. 90
4. ibid. p. Ill
5. ibid. p. 114
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letting God remain God now lacks any verification; it isdone in the absence of any verification at all.Insofar as the kingdom of God is concerned, Jesus no longer sees its imminent arrival. He also realizes that people have rejected it as an ideal. His work in favor of the kingdom no longer means placing all that he has at its disposal but rather placing all that he himself is at its disposal. He must surrender his ideas and his person, accepting death. The power which he displayed at the start of his public life, and which was concretely embodied in his miracles, has now proved to be ineffective.All that is left is the power of love in suffering.
From this two-stage faith and ministry of Jesus, Sobrino draws the
conclusion that an authentic love following Jesus is first, a love
which is characterized by action stemming from an optimistic faith
in God's liberative purpose. This correlates with Jesus' ministry
in Galilee and its environs, proclaiming good news to the poor,
repentance, and obedience in the light of the imminent kingdom.
In this stage, "Jesus does all he can to concretize and make present
2real love as the quintessence of the kingdom." But, says Sobrino, 
"Jesus' prayer in Gethsemane does not presuppose the same conception 
of God that Jesus had at the start of his life...Jesus sees his
3death as the death of his cause." "That faith should mean total 
self-surrender and that liberative love should mean a love fraught 
with suffering is entirely new to J e s u s . T h u s ,  according to Sobrino, 
Jesus demonstrates two forms of love. While the first is embodied 
in "effective action", the second is embodied in suffering. Sobrino's 
conclusion is that although these two forms of love may be present 
at the same time, "openness to love as action and to love as suffering
5is a historical constant in any morality based on Jesus."
In drawing out wider practical and theological implications 
from this view of Jesus' love, Sobrino suggests that "Jesus' faith 
has been mediated historically through the history of his praxis 
in the midst of a conflict-ridden situation."^ "His universal love
1. Jon Sobrino, Ch ristology at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 94
2. ibid. p. 92
3. ibid. p. 94
4. ibid. p. 99
5. ibid. p. 137
6. ibid. p. 95
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was translated into a decision to be 'with' the oppressed and to
be 'against' the oppressors, precisely so that his love could be
'for' all of them. " ^  The justice which we see in Jesus "entails
not only proclaiming and doing it, but also fighting against injustice,"
not merely "doing good and avoiding evil", but "doing good and fight-
2ing evil to wipe it out." The radical nature of his ministry sug­
gests that for Jesus, "the ultimate experience of meaningfulness
3lies in love." Christ's commandment to love the neighbour as one­
self is compared "as the same thing (like it)" to the commandment 
to love God. Indeed, Sobrino suggests, the command to- love the
neighbour may have been originally the greatest in the earliest 
forms of the Markan gospel.^ At any event, according to the command­
ment, "the love of God" is translated as "material love for human 
beings." ^
For Sobrino (who follows Jurgen Moltmann closely on many points), 
the combined power of love as action and love as suffering is ultimat­
ely revealed on the Cross. "The Cross of Christ implies a new and 
revolutionary concept of God on both the theoretical and practical 
level. Sobrino insists that the idea of redemption has been over­
stressed to the point that the historical power of love as action, 
sorrow and suffering have often been overlooked. The soteriological 
importance of the Cross is primarily concerned with the announcement 
of a God of love rather than of condemnation, and of the transcendent
character of historical love (epitomized in the life of Jesus) which
is able to overcome evil with suffering. Such power in suffering
love, says Sobrino, cannot, be sufficiently stressed by concentrating 
on the resurrection. In the Cross, God's transcendence over history
1. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, op. cit. p. 125
2. ibid.
3. ibid. p .  165
4. ibid. p. 169-170 (Sobrino credits M.E. Boismard with this observation, p. 178)
5. ibid. p. 172 Note the explicit Feuerbachian anthropology here, and also re "suffering"
(cf. p. 199)
6. ibid. p. 179; cf. Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, Harper & Row, New York, SCM, 1974
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is reformulated in the categories of power, suffering and love.
The whole concept of power is redefined. The power of the Cross
discloses a passible God within history, for "God cannot describe
himself as love if historical suffering does not affect him...if
God were incapable of suffering, then he would be incapable of loving."^
Through the Cross, Sobrino attests, "the definition of God as love
2receives its ultimate concretion." Although the Cross is the contra­
diction of humanity because of the emphasis it places upon human 
suffering, it is ultimately grounded on solidarity with humanity, 
because it shows this suffering to be a form of power over evil. 
Its vindication inheres in the shared suffering throughout humankind, 
shared also by God himself. For Sobrino, the power at the resurrec­
tion discloses the power in the shared experience of suffering, 
and in the divine compassion engendered in one suffering person 
who recognizes it in another. "Without the resurrection love would 
not be authentic power; without the Cross, this power would not
3be love."
Sobrino succinctly states the view of grace which arises in
Latin American theology of liberation, stemming, as we have noted, 
from Catholic tradition. "Grace," he says, "is a way of life. 
Partly, perhaps, because this idea of grace is cohesive with the
whole range of Catholic teaching on the subject, and partly because 
his view of the historically operative Christ of faith demands it, 
grace is not essentially a redemptive or extra-historical 'rescue 
operation' from 'above and beyond'. Rather, grace is conceived 
as God's enabling of human beings within history to transform their 
world, and to participate in his teleological and eschatological 
activity which, after all, is not confined to history.
1. ibid. p. 197
2. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 225
3. ibid. p. 261
4. ibid. p. 263
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The classical concepts of divinity, omnipotence, and justice are fleshed out concretely in a surprising way when Jesus appears. In him they are presented as grace 
and love. God does not display his omnipotence by con­quering the negative reality of the world from outside.Instead he does so by immersing himself wholly within it and thereby displaying the power of love.
Through the practice and experience of following Jesus, Sobrino 
proposes that we move from a love which is merely passive to one 
that is authentically active in history, directed toward our neighbour, 
and not initially toward God; that our love be active to the greatest 
possible extent in the situation we live in, finally knowing that 
when we fail and are frustrated, there still is hope; for precisely 
in the suffering of our love is the latent power which continues 
to transform the earth.
My critique of Sobrino's Christology must be abbreviated here. 
(Some general constructive remarks affecting all the liberationists 
may be relegated to the end of this chapter.) Sobrino's work is 
in fact an integration of numerous points of view, both European 
and Latin American. He admits substantial dependence upon Moltmann, 
and also echoes the views of Karl Rahner at many points. But his 
true hermeneutic hails from the Latin American context, complete 
with the pervasive emphasis upon the kingdom of God, historical 
practice, an anthropocentric theology, ecumenical appeal, and an 
underlying Roman Catholic set of suppositions (Sobrino is a Jesuit).
Since most of his Christological interpretation seems to derive
from his exegesis of the Gospels to show a two-stage development 
in Jesus' faith, criticism of Sobrino should probably be more concern­
ed with whether the New Testament can supply this kind of information, 
than with the recurrent themes of practice, love, justice, worship, 
and grace which are not particularly Sobrino's own, although they
may differ from the conceptions of many Protestants. Exegetically,
Sobrino's case is weak, because (1) it is an ambitious attempt to
1. ibid. p. 276
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derive a psychological picture of Jesus based upon material which 
is certainly not first-hand evidence; (2) there may be other reasons 
for the so-called "Galilean crisis" than those Sobrino has suggested 
(he implies Schweitzer's suggestion of popular rejection of the 
early kerygma and disloyalty among disciples); (3) too much of the 
interpretation rests solely upon the Gospel of Mark (adapted by 
the other evangelists), whose purpose in suggesting the crisis (and 
the "messianic secret") is not totally transparent. (Quite possibly 
Mark represents an attempt of the early Church to partially explain 
the delay of the kingdom^)
Sobrino's overall interpretation seems to be allied with the 
identification of Jesus' two-stage ministry by Albert Schweitzer.^
But Sobrino's Jesus, perhaps fortunately, is not Schweitzer's. Indeed, 
it bears many of the marks of passionate and subjective interpretation 
that Schweitzer was forced to criticize. Perhaps, as Sobrino and 
the other Latin American theologians might agree, the only authentic
Christology is one which is moulded in the light and with the tools
of one's own history. If so, exegesis which pretends to be objective 
may be an insult to the Jesus of history, as well as to the Christ 
of faith.
4. Christology and Anthropology
Leonardo Boff, the author of the seminal Christological work
Jesus Christ Liberator, has outlined the priorities of a Christology 
particularly relevant to Latin America. "It is with preoccupations 
that are ours alone," he says, "taken from our Latin American context, 
that we will reread not only the old texts of the New Testament 
but also the most recent commentaries written in Europe...Our sky 
possesses different stars that form different figures of the zodiac
2by which we orient ourselves in the adventures of faith and of life."
1. Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical J e s u s , A £ C Black, London, 1954 (3rd 
edition) p. 386 f.
2. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , trans. Patrick Hughes, Orbis, Maryknoll, New 
York, 1978 (first pu blished Petropolis, Brazil, 1972) p. 43
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Boff is more cautious than Sobrino about the implications of the
Gospel evidence; "We cannot speak about Jesus, but only with Jesus
as starting point," he admits.^ Nevertheless, the "task" of Latin
American christology is "revealing the unity between the historical
2Jesus and the Christ of faith." Christology for Latin America 
interprets Jesus in such a way that prior doctrinal statements are 
not allowed to obscure the relevance of Christ to the pervasive 
injustice common on that continent. According to Boff, the character­
istics of such a Christology should stress the primacy of anthropology 
over ecclesiology, the primacy of future over fact, of criticism
over dogmatics, of the social over the personal, of "orthopraxis"
3over orthodoxy.
Boff's Christ is, literally, homo revelatus. We have noted 
this idea in the work of Karl Barth and John McIntyre, Boff concurs
that "in the person of Jesus Christ there takes place the revelation
4not only of God, but also of man." The surprising thing we notice 
in Boff's work, however, is that he repeatedly quotes and obliquely 
refers to the anthropology of Ludwig Feuerbach. In this section 
we must observe that in Latin American theology of liberation, there 
is no attempt to make a clear distinction between theology and anthro­
pology, between the kingdom of God understood by Jesus and the 'utopia' 
within history in which humanity is able to fulfill its hopes, finding 
an authentic atmosphere for love in a just social order. For Boff, 
whose influential work has affected many of the Latin Americans, 
there is a continuous point of contact between the historical Jesus 
and humanity in its struggle to recreate itself. Boff's theology 
begins with anthropology, and there is little distinction between 
Christology and anthropology, for the kingdom of God interprets 
both.
1. ibid. p. 181 / 3-. ibid. pp. 44 ff.
2. ibid. p. 11. New Testament scholars will note that Boff's ch aracterization of the "task" 
for Latin American Ch ristology is not very different from the emphasis of "The New Quest 
for the Historical Jesus" which has sought various ways to reconcile "the Jesus of History" 
with "The Christ of Faith", cf. J.M.Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical J e s u s , SCM Press,
London, 1959. For a modern Catholic North American View, cf. James P. Hackey, Jesus, The
Man and the M y t h , SCM Press, London, 1979, Chapters 1 and 7.4. John McIntyre, On the Love of God, Collins, London, 1962, p. 182 (cf. ^ b o v e , Intro, p. l)
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Without reploughing the ground that was planted in Chapter 
1 above, it may be important briefly to document the allusions to 
Feuerbachian anthropology to be found in the Latin American literature. 
When Feuerbach is referred to directly the reference is often along­
side a reference to Marx. Ellacuria, for example, adopts and (some­
what inappropriately) intensifies Marx's critique of Feuerbach's 
praxis according to Marx's 1845 fragment called "Theses on Feuerbach", 
Ellacuria, however, gives little indication of a first-hand reading 
of Feuerbach, for he takes Marx's mention of "dirty Jewish" praxis 
to be a common line of thought in Feuerbach's writings.^ Ellacuria 
goes on to assert that "Feuerbach is wrong in thinking that anthro­
pological purification is to be attained by abandoning praxis in 
2every form." Such an allegation gives no indication of the theory 
that Marx was actually criticizing; that human activity in its 
'essence' stems from the imagination and what one believes. Marx's 
dialectical view, of course, is that what one believes to be true 
derives from the actual experience of reshaping history. Ellacuria's 
description of Feuerbach's "flight into individualistic interioriza- 
tion", a "theoretical, purely contemplative, and interior approach," 
could hardly be derived from an awareness of Feuerbach's wide social 
concerns which are so often adopted directly by Marx himself.
Gutierrez, Sobrino, and Boff, however, reveal in their writings 
an awareness of Feuerbach's critique of traditional Christianity 
and of the "philosophy of ontology" which Miranda calls "a philosophy 
of injustice." In an intricate analysis, Gutierrez links Feuerbach's 
critique of faith in contrast to love with the "death of God" movement 
of the nineteen-sixties. Similarly, he links Marx's emphasis upon 
an egàliterian society with the current emphasis upon hope developed
1. cf. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. pp. 16-17, 138-139 I can find no 
reference to such a form of "Tatigkeit" in Feuerbach's works. It is, indeed, difficult 
to guess why Marx uses such a term, unless it refers to Feuerbach's critique of the 
idea of creation in the Jewish religion, cf. The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , Harper, 1957 
(op. cit.). Appendix 10, pp 298 ff.
2. Ellacuria, Freedom Made Flesh, op. cit. p. 139
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by Moltmann and related to the philosophy of Bloch. Gutierrez appears
to imply that at different times in the history of theology, faith,
love, and hope (in that order) have been given primacy. Just as
Feuerbach's emphasis upon love was a dialectical process derived
from Hegelian "faith" (as Gutierrez thinks^ ), Marx's development
of Communism is the dialectical synthesis of love and hope. A similar
movement is noticed in contemporary theology.
In former years one had the impression that a theology centered on the love of God and neighbour had replaced a theology concerned especially with faith and the cor­
responding orthodoxy. The primacy of faith was followed by the "primacy of charity". This permitted the notion of love of neighbour to be recovered as an essential element of Christian life. But paradoxically, at the same time this was also partially responsible for the fact that for some the relationship with God was ob­scured and became difficult to live out and understand.Today, due partly perhaps to such impasses, the perspec­tive of a new primacy seems to be emerging - that ofhope, which liberates history because of its opennessto the God who is to come. If faith was reinterpreted by charity, both are now being re-evaluated in terms of hope.
Gutierrez' specific illustrations from Feuerbach, emphasizing human 
love as "the truth" of Christianity, the sacramental nature of the 
ordinary elements of bread, water, and wine and the opposition of 
dogmatic faith to "a religion of love", lead us to suspect that 
Gutierrez himself intends to form some synthesis of Feuerbachian
3love with Marxist praxis and hope. (The content of Gutierrez'
'synthesis' between love and hope, while avoiding atheism, will 
be outlined below.)
Sobrino adapts major Feuerbachian ideas at at least two points. 
The first is his affirmation that "when Christians talk about love
1. cf. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 219; Gutierrez says, "For 
Feuerbach the Hegelian system was based on faith, hence its strongly Christian character, 
its rigidity, its authoritarian and repressive ch arac teristics." This fits Gutierrez' own 
analysis well, but it may not do justice to either Hegel or Feuerbach. Feuerbach's main 
objection to Hegel's system was the pervasive "faith" in r e a s o n . Dogmatic faith was a 
function of the primacy of reason over love in the system, misused by theologians. But 
Gutierrez is close enough, and it is in any case a moot point.
2. ibid. pp. 218-219
3. ibid, pp. 219-220; notes on pp. 241-242; Gutierrez is aware of Hegel's early emphasis 
on love, but says Feuerbach was not aware of it. On the contrary, I have argued that 
Feuerbach's love is to a large degree that of the young Hegel.
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of God, they are talking materially about real, historical love
for human beings."
When we talk about "loving God in Christian terms," 
we are using the expression in a totally novel and complicated way. "Love of God" is a doxological ex­pression. It asserts that the ultimate human reality and the ultimate experience of meaningfulness is to be found in the practice of love...Christian faith maintains that it is impossible to "love God" direct­ly, that this^love must be mediated through a his­torical love.
The Feuerbachian anthropology here is unmistakeable. With the "love
of God" (i.e. love for God) quantified as "material love for humans",
and the interpretation of "loving God" as a "doxological expression"
proclaiming the ultimate meaningfulness of human love, we can hardly
2help but recall Feuerbach. Similarly, Sobrino's emphasis upon
the passibility of God and upon the transcendent power of suffering 
is another Feuerbachian motif. In this case he refers to Feuerbach
3directly: "suffering precedes thought." Despite questions about
Sobrino's exegetical formulation, he certainly makes a positive 
contribution to Christology by interpreting the human experience 
of suffering for Latin American peoples. Although it is not clear 
that Sobrino relies substantially on Feuerbach's observations about 
the primacy of suffering, the similarity, intentional or inadvertent, 
is remarkable.
Leonardo Boff's Jesus Christ Liberator offers the most compre­
hensive integration of Feuerbachian themes with Christian theology. 
(Since Gutierrez and Boff both published their books relatively 
early in the rise of Latin American theology of liberation (1971 
and 1972 respectively), it is possibly to them that much of the 
anthropocentric base of theology in Latin America is due. For example, 
Boff's Christology precedes Sobrino's.) Boff's constant reference
1. Jon Sobrino, Christ olo gy at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 172
2. of. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. pp. 56-57
3. ibid. pp. 59 ff. (Sobrino offers no reference, but the idea is found in Chapter V of 
The Essence of Christianity, "The Mystery of the Suffering God.")
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point appears to be Feuerbach's interpretation of the Incarnation,
without the letter's negative and atheistic implications. Jesus
is "the new humanity", "a man like us". ^  Christ did not come to
bring any cultural model in particular, nor to found a Christian
culture. He did not come to establish a rigid dogma, nor "a morality
without a heart". "But he came to create an atmosphere, a love
and reciprocity that ought to be realized in all situations, in
all social and political systems, and in every articulation of relig- 
2ion and morality." In Jesus appeared "the goodness and humanitarian
3love of God." Jesus discloses "a new morality of love", and "indis­
criminate love without limits" to be exemplary for humanity.^ In
5Christ "the law is relativized and put at the service of love."
Jesus is "a person of extraordinary good sense, creative imagination, 
and originality."^ For Jesus evil does not exist to be comprehended,
7but "conquered by love". But Jesus conquers evil, initially, by 
"all that is authentically human": anger and joy, goodness and tough­
ness, friendship, sorrow, and temptation.^ Jesus preaches "utopia", 
the kingdom of God, and realizes that it is possible in history
(Luke 4:18 ff.).^
Interpreting this "Jesus of history", Boff claims that anthropo­
logy ought to be elaborated with Christology as its point of departure. 
"By means of the Incarnation we come to know who in fact we are 
and what we are destined for. He recalls the affirmation of
Gaudium et Spes in declaring the universal significance of Christ: 
"By his Incarnation, the Son of God has united himself in some fashion
1. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. pp. 20-21
2. ibid. pp. 40-41 Feuerbach's repeated assertion is that "God is a heart," and that mor­
ality must be based not on law, but on love. cf. Feuerbach, The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y ,
p. 47 (op. cit.)
3. ibid. p. 974. ibid.
5. ibid. p. 98
6. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. pp. 80 ff. (Boff incorporates one of 
Feuerbach's most central themes, "imagination," into his image of Jesus)
7. ibid. p. 119 (We recall Barth's allegation that Feuerbach mi sunderstood evil.)8. ibid. 87 ff.
9. ibid. p. 52
10. ibid. p. 205
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with every man. The sin which Jesus came to correct as well as
2to forgive is "an incapacity to love without egoism". Christ is
3"the supreme lover". He shows us that each person is the 'locus' 
where we can find God. "The other when loved and accepted in great­
ness and smallness reveals a palpable transcendence..."^ From Jesus' 
way of being-for-others we learn our own future way of being and
5authentically existing. Homo absconditus becomes homo revelatus: 
"God made himself human so that the human could become G o d . I n  
Christ "is revealed that which is most divine in persons and most
7human in God".
Boff echoes further several of the themes of Feuerbach in 
outlining the life that is faithful to Jesus. Appropriately enough, 
the final chapter of the first edition of his book is entitled 
"Reflections on the Essence of Christianity." The eucharist, he 
says, "transforms us into what we consume".^ "Christ did not come 
to found a new religion, but to bring a new human being, one who 
is not defined by the established criteria of society, but by the
9cause of love, which is the cause of Christ." "It is by loving
and allowing ourselves to be loved by others that we discover our
true depth and its mystery. "The 'I' does not exist except when
11created and nourished by a 'you' (thou)." "The more we are oriented
to the infinite and the other, the greater our likelihood of being
12humanized, that is, of realizing our human essence."
With this latter juxtaposition of the "I" and the "thou", 
the "infinite and the other", in which "human essence" is to be
1. ibid. p. 194
2. ibid. p. 202
3. ibid. p. 215
4. ibid. p. 218
5. ibid. p. 197
6. ibid. (almost an exact quote from Feuerbach)
7. ibid. p. 97
8. ibid. p. 223 10. ibid. p. 251
9. ibid. p. 221 11. ibid.
12. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, op. cit. p. 251
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realized, we cannot escape the definite relationship between Boff 
and Feuerbach. Boff has attempted a creative response to what other 
Latin American theologians have often hinted: Marx's praxis alone
is not sufficient for the Christocentric ethos pervading Latin America. 
As Dussel and Miranda have suggested, Marx was'*not dialectical enough* 
to be able to entertain the possibility of a thoroughly practical 
and liberative Christianity.^ But with reference to Feuerbach's 
anthropology, both "utopia" and the kingdom of heaven may simultane­
ously be conceived and created through the "new humanity" that Christ 
brings to the world.
5. Christology, Anthropology, and the Kingdom of God
Boff's attempt to integrate Feuerbachian anthropology with
a liberative, practice-oriented Christology is no impulsive exercise
in theological extremism. Rather, it is a closely considered and
relatively cautious example of the general emphasis upon, and hope
for, a more just society in Latin America. The image of such a
society is typically modelled upon both Jesus' proclamation of the
kingdom of God and also upon Karl Marx's vision of true Communism,
to be achieved in history by the human capacity to transform, dialect-
ically, the materials and forces which form society. Given this
combination of images, there has been in Latin America a subtle
shift in the presuppositions which have traditionally been associated
with the respective ideas of the kingdom of God and Communist (or
socialist) "utopia ", On the one hand, the kingdom of God is not
conceived mainly as the responsibility and activity of God alone,
who breaks into the historical epoch through cataclysmic and omnipot-
2ent usage of supra-historical power. On the other hand, "utopia" 
is rarely conceived as the purely atheistic and totally materialist
1. cf. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the B i b l e , op. cit. p. 278; Enrique Dussel Ethics and
the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 16. Miranda says Marx was "not sufficiently
di alec tical." Dussel says he is "left with no radical critique."
2. The Latin American view of the kingdom of God is somewhat comparable with that of
The 19th century Liberals. But there are differences. .
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product of humanity, unsupported by God. Boff, typically, describes 
"utopia" in terms which racall Feuerbach's "feeling", Marx's vision, 
Jesus' reconciliation, and a particularly Latin American brand of 
hope.
...utopia is born in the springs of hope. It is responsi­ble for models that seek a perfecting of our reality, models 
that do not allow the social process to stagnate nor society ideologically to absolutize itself, models that maintain so­ciety permanently open to ever increasing transformation.Faith promises and demonstrates as realized in Christ a utopia that consists in a world reconciled, a world that is the ful­filment o£ what we are creating here on earth with feeling and love.
In a similar type of synthesis, the Marxist Miranda asserts that
...dialectics has to conceive of matter in such a way that it includes in matter the existence of love, of heroism, of un­selfish dedication, and of intuition, ^specially the intui­tion of the absolute moral imperative.
Miranda even goes to the length of suggesting that the truly dialect­
ical approach to sin and injustice must consider that since death 
is so closely allied with sin, the removal of sin from the world 
is a real historical possibility which may also be the destruction
3of death itself. Miranda attests that "the transformation of the 
cosmos clearly depends on the realization of justice on earth (Rom. 
8:19)."^ Illustrating a form of optimism which may strike us as 
shocking, he says, "in both Marx and the Bible the basis for all 
thought is this thesis which is the most revolutionary imaginable: 
Sin and evil are not inherent to humanity and history; they began
5one day through human work and they can therefore be eliminated."
Synthesizing the ideas of several of the Latin American theolog­
ians, it may be possible to sketch the general concept of the kingdom 
of God, a "utopia" in history, which appears so often in their works. 
Since the image of God's kingdom and an earthly "utopia" comprises 
all of the related themes we have been discussing, I will attempt
1. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. p. 45
2. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the Bible, op. cit. p. 274
3. ibid. pp. 278-279
4. ibid. p. 2765. ibid. p. 277
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a conceptual chronology for the sake of brevity, although the concepts 
must be simultaneously related.
The kingdom of God, a historical "utopia", may be described 
as follows.
(1) The Transformation of Nature
In a characteristic phase that recalls Feuerbach, Boff tells
us that "God so loved matter that he assumed it, and so loved human
beings that he became one of us in order to liberate us." In Christ,
2the goal toward which all the forces of evolution tend is attained. 
The kingdom of God cannot be the focus of a demythologizing programme, 
because the resurrection confirmed that God becoming human also
3entails the transformation of matter as we know it. The kingdom 
cannot be rendered a private or individually spiritual concept because 
it is an event of cosmic proportions.^ Gutierrez suggests that 
the kingdom of God is the continuation of the liberative, salvific, 
and creative love of God which intimates a universal salvation on 
every plane, including matter. Humanity participates in this salvific 
creation. "The work of man, the transformation of nature, continues 
creation only if it is a human act..*!^ (i.e. not alienated by unjust 
socio-economic structures.) The kingdom of God is "authentic libera­
tion at every level of human existence."^ It therefore includes 
not only the spiritual and moral liberation of human beings, but 
also the economic, social, political, and educational structures 
which contibute toward the human's capacity to transform himself 
and his environment. For Miranda, explicitly, and for others implici­
tly, it also includes the dialectical negation of death itself,
7the ultimate transformation of matter.
1. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. p. 162
2. ibid. p. 22 (a reference to Teilhard de Chardin)3. ibid. p. 24
4. ibid. p. 25
5. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 1736. Jon Sobrino, Christ olo gy at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 44
7. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the Bible, op. cit. p. 278
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(2) Historical Possibility
The Latin American liberation theologians generally confirm
that the kingdom of God proclaimed by Jesus was and is a possibility
within history. It is not to be determined by nor identified with
history, but is initiated and to be substantively formed in this
world. Ellacuria says, "The message and promise of Christianity
cannot be deduced a priori from the nature of man or the world;
it must be related to an irruption that is both free and historical."^
For him there is an "intimacy" between those who fashion history
and those who proclaim the kingdom of God, for it is through the
2changes of history that the Kingdom comes. The incarnation of 
God, in history, as a human being, proclaims that "the kingdom of
3God is no longer an unattainable utopia." Miranda asserts that 
"Paul, John, and the synoptics were convinced that the Kingdom absol­
utely had to be realized. And on earth, of course."^ For the Latin 
American theologians Jesus' message is not about a "realized eschat- 
ology", but rather about a realizable historical society which corre­
lates with the promise of the Old Testament (Jer. 31:31 ff. ) and 
the vision of its content in history as seen by Jesus, and initiated 
by his proclamation and identification with it (Luke 4:1.8 ff.).
(3) Incorporated in Jesus Christ
Therefore the liberation Christology of Latin America is centred 
upon the initiation of the kingdom of God by and in the person of 
Jesus Christ, the God-Man, who reveals both the character of God's 
creation in its liberative and salvific modes, and also the character 
of authentic humanity unalienated by the forces of sin and injustice.
5What Jesus preached was the kingdom of God, not himself. He preached
1. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. p. 133
2. ibid. p. 84
3. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. p. 61
4. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the B i b l e , op. cit. p. 59
5. Jon Sobrino, Ch ristology at the Crossroads, op. cit. p. 41 (quoting Rahner)
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love" and "utopia".^  He understood himself as the kingdom's "presid- 
2ent." His life and ministry was totally directed toward the estab­
lishment of the new order which he envisioned, confirmed finally 
by his suffering and his love on its behalf. The whole life of 
Christ was "a giving and being for others". "Having loved his own 
who were in the world, he loved them to the end" (John 13:1). 
Christ's resurrection is seen by most of the liberationists as the 
vindication of Christ's cause and the advent of a new possibility 
for humanity within history, the true dawn of God's kingdom.
(4) The Divine in the Human
"Jesus Christ," says Boff, "is not a myth but the eschatological 
realization of the fundamental possibility that God placed in human 
nature."^ Christ is the revelation of the divine in the human, 
of the human's capacity to create himself and his environment in 
a transcendent fashion not determined or conditioned by, nor totally 
limited to, the 'givenness' of present means or resources. Since 
Jesus is "a man like us," human nature contains "the same transcend-
5ence and ability to relate to the absolute." Generally in echo
of Feuerbach, Boff says, "the human mystery evokes the mystery of
God";^  and Medellin affirmed, "in order to know God it is necessary 
7to know man." Somewhat similarly out of context, Karl Barth is 
drafted by Gutierrez to demonstrate "the indissoluble unity of man 
and God: "Man is the measure of all things since God became Man.
For Ellacuria the kingdom of God heralds the "total salvation of 
man in and through his intrinsic deification".^ Although the Latin
1. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. pp. 24,52
2. ibid. p. 52
3. ibid. p. 117 '
4. ibid. p. 20
5. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. p. 21
6. ibid. p. 56
7. quoted by Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , op. cit. p. 84
8. Karl Barth, Against the S t r e a m , Philosophical Library, New York, 1954, p. 36 quoted 
by Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. pp. 7-8
9. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made Flesh, op. cit. p. 93
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American authors are often more conscious of the limitations of 
human nature than these quotations intimate, it is clear that, in 
spite of Barth's critique of Feuerbach, "the talk of God in man" 
has not been "cut out at the roots".^
(5) Instituted by God
Despite the emphasis within liberation theology upon the King­
dom's historical character, the idea is not completely alien to 
the authors that God himself is responsible for its institution. 
Sobrino, in his two-stage development of Jesus' ministry, gives 
a Christological explanation for the conviction that God will not, 
or cannot, establish the Kingdom by himself. As traced above, Sobrino 
suggests that Jesus moved from a rather passive consciousness of 
the Kingdom's imminence to an active ministry finally enmeshed in 
human suffering. Boff's explanation is perhaps more dialectical:
"Kingdom of God" signifies the realization of a utopia cherished in human hearts, total human and cosmic lib­eration. It is the new situation of an old world, now replete with God and reconciled with itself. In a word, it could be said that the kingdom of God means a total, global, structural revolution of the old order, brought about by God and only by God. Consequently, the kingdom is a kingdom of God in a subjective and objective sense.
...In order that such a liberation from sin, from its personal and cosmic consequences, and from all other alienation suffered in creation, be realized, Christ makes 
two fundamental demands : He demands personal conversion and postulates a restructuring of the human world.
This interpretation brings up the whole question of grace 
conceived in the light of Catholic tradition. The kingdom of God, 
accordingly, is in liberation theology an extension of God's 'infusion' 
of his love and will into human beings. It is grace that makes 
possible both the "conversion" which Boff mentions, and the "restruct­
uring of the human v;orld", as the effect of grace which is a "faith 
that works through love". As Boff asserts, "the grace of God is
1. cf. Karl Barth, Introduction to Feuerbach's The Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y , op. cit. p.xxx, 
(Like Feuerbach, Barth might be surprised to find himself used as an exponent of Latin American Christological anthropology.)
2. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, op. cit. pp. 63-64
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the grace of human beings."^ A liberating grace is "the consequence 
2of divine love." The grace which brings in the Kingdom is not 
one which works from beyond history, but one which is intimately 
associated with the instilling of God's love (Romans 5:5) into human­
ity. The liberation authors do not attempt to separate the grace 
of God from the authentic loves of human beings, nevertheless there 
is preserved the concept of a "divine grace", often called "gratuit­
ousness" in liberation thought, which is God's love, will, and power 
at work through human activity. Thus, without decreasing the emphasis 
upon the responsibility of human beings to fashion the kingdom, 
Sobrino can say, "The kingdom is not merely an extension of human
3potentialities; it breaks in as grace."
(6) Built by Human Beings
Although the kingdom of God may be conceived as essentially 
the work of God, the Latin Americah liberation theologians stress 
that it is existentially the work of humanity. This idea of the 
nineteenth century liberals, much criticized in Protestant theology, 
is to a certain extent prevalent in Latin American theology, yet
it is substantially reinterpreted in the light of Jesus' critical
stance toward the institutions of his day. Sobrino, who repeatedly
talks about the "building up of the kingdom", is critical of Harnack's 
image of Jesus "who fulfilled all basic human yearnings" but "was 
nothing other than the ideal bourgeois citizen of the nineteenth
century with faith in progress. Jesus thus stood in a direct line 
of continuity with human realities, confirming and perhaps ennobling 
them but certainly not criticizing them.
In an almost unified voice the Latin American theologians
1. Leonardo Boff, Liberating G r a c e , trans. John Drury, Orbis, Maryknoll, New York 1979, p . 105
2. ibid. pp. 101-103
3. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 44
4. ibid. p. 61; of. Adolf Harnack, Das Wesen des C h r i s t e n t u m s , Siebenstern, Munich 1964 (E.T. What is Christ ian ity? ) p. 42
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assert that the kingdom of God is not to be established through 
a waiting game. It is to be actively built in and through all the 
dynamics of history. "Liberation theology," says Sobrino, "is con­
cerned with the practical problem of building up and realizing the 
kingdom of God in the face of captivity."^ Despite Sobrino's emphasis
upon the power of suffering, he says, "liberation theology does
2not take the tack of Job and Dostoyevsky." Moral theology must 
be reinterpreted in light of the question: "what is to be done to
3establish the kingdom of God in history?" Individuals actually 
"become Christians through their efforts to fashion the kingdom
4into a reality". Sobrino aptly summarizes the active theology 
which is so characteristic of liberation thought in Latin America: 
"We gain access to God by trying to fashion history, and we experience
5that process as both a grace and a concrete line of praxis." The 
kingdom of God, a utopia in history, depends not upon the repetition 
of the Jewish prayer, "How long 0 Lord?" but rather upon "collabora­
tion with God" in creating the conditions for its growth.
(7) Present and Future
The idea of the Kingdom in liberation theology is conceived 
both as a present and immanent fact and also as a future, yet imminent 
goal. Both points of view are linked with Jesus' own attitude to 
it, and the juxtaposition of present and future 'tenses' is certainly 
confirmed by much New Testament scholarship.^ For the Latin Americans 
both ideas are often stressed in ways which might seem to be contrad­
ictory. Miranda, for example, says, "The true iron-clad refuge
7of the "I" consists in keeping the eschaton perpetually in the future." 
For Miranda the proclamation of the Kingdom as future may delay
1. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 36
2. ibid.
3. ibid. p. 113
4. ibid. p. 114
5. ibid. p. 307
6. cf., for example, Gunther Bornkamir, Jesus of N a z a r e t h , trans. Irene and Fraser McLuskey with J.M. Robinson, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1960, p. 90
7. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the Bible, op. cit. p.’ 248
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its arrival. Dussel, on the other hand, asserts that "Only when 
we realize that the kingdom is in the future and that to be a member 
of the Oiurch is not a signal honor but a responsibility will we 
see the Church in a whole new light. For Dussel, the hierarchical 
tendency of the Church to see itself as the guardian of the keys 
to the Kingdom is a threat to the Kingdom itself. Both Miranda's 
and Dussel's views merge on the issue of social justice. The Kingdom 
is 'present' because Christ has confirmed its presence among the 
oppressed, and also because a greater justice is possible today. 
The kingdom is 'future' because such a justice has not yet been 
achieved, nor is it totally conditioned by the possibilities in 
history so far revealed and acknowledged, least of all by the institu­
tions, including the Church, which govern history. The Kingdom's 
full consummation cannot be deduced beforehand from what we have 
so far discovered about humanity and nature, but it is already present
3in Christ, "in whom we catch a glimpse of the future of the world".
(8) Inherited by the Poor
We have noted the extent to which the Latin American liberation
theologians stress Christ's kinship with the poor. This emphasis
is particularly found in the gospel of Luke. The Magnificat of
Mary illustrates appropriately many of the liberation themes which
are associated with the kingdom of God. God "the saviour (i.e.
liberator) has regarded the low estate of his servant; "God's mercy"
is announced for those who live according to his justice; "he has
scattered the proud..."; "he has filled the hungry"; "the rich he
has sent empty away" (Luke 1:46-55). Gutierrez tells us that the
kingdom's advent is concretely announced in "the love of Jesus toward 
3marginated men." Jose Miguez Bonino says that Christ, in renouncing
1. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 89
2. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. p. 43
3. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, op. cit. p. 223
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divine power to settle human affairs, simultaneously identified
with the impotence of the poor.^ Sobrino's exegesis of the Beatitudes
shows Jesus, aware of the injustice experienced by the poor, first
to declare to them a God who draws near to them in grace, if 'not
2yet' in terms of justice. In the same Beatitudes, Santa Ana elabor­
ates, it is clear that they, the poor, are to be the inheritors
3of God's kingdom. And after Jesus' unequivocal statement in Matthew 
25:31 ff., Dussel asserts that we may identify "the poor as the 
epiphany of God. Therefore liberation theology is unified in 
stressing that solidarity with and service on behalf of the poor 
constitutes the only authentic stance for those who wish to collabor­
ate with God in fashioning the Kingdom. (Neither must the intrinsic 
relation of "the poor" and the "proletariat" be missed if we are 
fully to appreciate the synthesis of themes which inform the Latin 
American theology of liberation.)
(9) Social and Political
Sobrino declares that the Cross is either "the end of religion" 
or of the kingdom of God as Jesus understood it. This radical state­
ment is largely typical of liberation thought. Jesus not only reform­
ed, but abolished the old cult and priesthood. They are to be replac-
5ed by genuine historical and secular love. Sobrino goes on to 
state that "the justice of Jesus" intimates "some new form of social 
coexistence where class differences have been abolished."^ While 
Sobrino may be guilty of overlooking the implications of the Old 
Testament covenant, which Jesus may be said to have fulfilled, the 
general liberation trend is away from cultic worship and toward 
a faith which is defined, not by piety, but by practice. In this
1. Jose Miguez Bonino, Re volutionary Theology Comes of A g e , SPCK, London, 1975, p. 123
2. Jon Sobrino, Ch ristology at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 57
3. Julio de Santa Ana, Good News to the Poor, op. cit. p. 108
4. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 176
5. Jon Sobrino, Ch ristology at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 906. ibid. p. 120
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sense, for most of the authors, there is also a movement away from
Feuerbach and toward Marx. Theology is transformed not merely into
anthropology, but also into politics. Ellacuria reminds us of Oscar
Cullmann's notation that the inscription on the Cross describes
1"a purely political crime". The extent of Jesus' political activity
and 'offence' is much discussed in the literature, and there cannot
yet be discerned any general agreement about the implications to
be drawn from it. Ellacuria's ambiguity is somewhat characteristic.
He says that "Jesus' mission must be understood politically precisely
because it is an alternative to Zealotism.'* But Jesus, who did
not "actually kill", is alleged to have involved himself in "incessant
2combat" displaying "violent attitudes". It is clear, however,
that for the liberationists, the conflict entailed in establishing
the Kingdom is a secondary theme arising from a conception of the
Kingdom as a social, and so necessarily political entity. Gutierrez
aptly quotes Paul Rocoeur in stressing that, at bottom, "the collect-
3ive event is the object and means of love." Because of the social 
nature of this love, the kingdom of God is inconceivable apart from 
political action.
(10) Criticism and Conflict
Since Jesus' life and death was a consistent struggle against 
injustice, siding with the poor, against the rich and powerful, 
the liberationists affirm that all Christology must be critical 
of the established order, and liberation theology cannot avoid diverse 
kinds of conflict as the Kingdom is proclaimed and 'constructed'. 
Sobrino tells us that a simple approach to Christ as love or as 
power is inadequate, for it may indicate "an apparent neutrality 
vis-à-vis the inequities of society".^ Although Jesus talked about
1. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. p. 47 (cf. Oscar Cullmann The State 
in the New T e s t a m e n t , Scribner's, New York, 1956, p. 43)
2. ibid. of. pp. 67;120
3. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 47
4. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, op. cit. p. xvi
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love for enemies, he asserts, "this has nothing to do with pacifism".^ 
Segundo affirms that "just because we should love our enemies does 
not mean we shouldn't have them." Segundo is critical of German 
"political theology" (i.e. primarily Moltmann and Metz) because 
"it systematically tries to eliminate from theologico-political 
language any term that might suggest a causal relationship between 
historical activity and the construction of the eschatological kingdom. 
Segundo implies that a dependence upon the Lutheran idea of justifica­
tion by faith has led to an emphasis upon language of the past and 
anticipation of the future to the extent that there is an attenuation 
of the present. Segundo's conclusion (which may not be totally 
fair) is that Metz and Moltmann end up with "a politically neutral
3theology". His critique discloses the major question which Latin 
Americans must ask of any theologian purporting to proclaim the 
coming Kingdom: "Through whom or what?""^ Sobrino's answer to this
question again is typical of many of the Latin American theologians: 
the element of conflict underlies Jesus' concretion of moral values. 
"The pointed edge of conflict is not to be found solely in passively 
suffering the consequences of injustice...It also includes one's 
experience of the fact that justice can be realized in history only 
through an active struggle against injustice, a struggle that often
5ends in defeat." For many of the Latin Americans, then, this
struggle with the poor to fashion the Kingdom in history takes the 
form of "class struggle" (the many allusions to which need not be
elaborated).
(11) A "Praxis" of Justice, Love, and Hope
To sum up the whole concept of the kingdom of God as generally
understood in the Latin American theology of liberation, we must
1. ibid. p .  122
2. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , op. cit. p. 144
3. ibid. p. 145; (cf. also Gutierrez, op. cit. p. 200)
4. ibid. p. 147
5. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, op. cit. pp. 124-125
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be able to include all of the above descriptive terms in a compre­
hensive human activity which integrates the New Testament themes 
of justice, love, and hope. Jose Miguez Bonino (as well as Boff 
and Sobrino) specifically asserts that the commandment to love God 
and the neighbour as oneself is set in the context of the kingdom 
of God and cannot be understood apart from it. "Love is inextricably
interwoven with hope and justice." "It is not content to intend
1and demonstrate, but intends to accomplish." The kingdom of God,
2says Bonino, is "the realm of creative love". Jesus' commandment 
of love "is not interpersonal or intersubjective but cosmic and
3eschatological". Because of the radical nature of this commandment, 
it is solidly a social and political dynamic, not individualistic 
or spiritual, which entails action on behalf of the oppressed for 
the achievement of greater justice. To this extent, says Bonino,
it is not only unopposed to class struggle, but in fact demands 
it. Paul Ricoeur, once again, becomes a resource for the Latin 
Americans: "If love is a category of the kingdom of God and, as
such, it implies an eschatological dimension, then it equals justice., 
at the same time justice is the efficacious institutional and social
4realization of love." Latin American theologians talk about "a 
praxis of love" and "a praxis of justice". Although such terms 
may be somewhat vague, they do indeed intimate the hope which they 
have in humanity. We can hardly do better than Leonardo Boff in 
summing up this hope, which even in the tragedies of the most profound 
human suffering is still identifiable: "The kingdom of God is already 
initiated in this world wherever greater justice is established, 
greater love reigns, and new horizons that capture God's word and
5revelation within life are opened up."
1. Jose Miguez Bonino, Re volutionary Theology Comes of A g e , op. cit. p. 132. ibid. p. Ill
3. ibid. p. 114 '
4. Paul Ricoeur "El conflicto signo de contradiccion y de unidad?" Criterio, Buenos Aires, 
May 24; 1973, no. 1668. p. 255; quoted by Bonino, ibid.5. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, op. cit. p. 261
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6. Critique: Foundation Shaking or Sabre Rattling?
As I have already noted, and the liberationists often attest, 
it is very difficult for an American or European theologian schooled 
in Protestant theology to adequately criticize, much less correct, 
Latin American theology of liberation. My remarks about the 'theolog­
ical foundations' should therefore be somewhat reserved. First 
of all it is important to note that any critique of liberation theol­
ogy is really the criticism of a critique. Whether any subject 
can properly criticize its critic is certainly worth considering.
The foundations of Latin American liberation theology are 
by no means new. What is apparent, however, is that a new blend 
has been constructed of the old. The blend itself is not particularly 
innovative in the syntheses of theological themes, but rather in 
the combination of theology with a particular cultural milieu. 
To this extent, the claim that this theology is dialectical is cert­
ainly true. Despite its repeated criticism of European philosophy 
and theology, much of the Latin American 'novelty' is grounded 
precisely upon European thought. I have shown the importance of 
Feuerbach's anthropology in the literature. Often this anthropology 
is somewhat unconsciously integrated with Roman Catholic premises, 
possibly because certain emphases in Catholicism lend themselves 
to such a synthesis, and possibly because much of Karl Marx's philos­
ophy incorporates various Feuerbachian principles, and there is 
a conscious attempt to reconcile Marx with Catholic Christianity. 
Feuerbach's anthropology, of course, is not created out of nothing, 
but stems from a strong background of Schleiermacher, Hegel, Kant, 
Leibniz, and other precursors of modern thought. Without the Enlight­
enment,liberation theology would probably have to create one.
Frederick Herzog, himself the author of a book called Liberation 
Theology, has offered some suggestions which are both sympathetic 
to and critical of the Latin Americans. He is disturbed by the 
Latin American emphasis upon secular ideology, particularly as
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represented in the work of Segundo and Miranda. Herzog suggests
that the truly liberative theology is one which attempts to minimize
ideology, not increase its function as a hermeneutical principle.
"We always need to work towards elimination of the ideology factor,"
says Herzog. "Text criticism needs to be accompanied by self-
criticism." Although Herzog is sympathetic with the argument that
hermeneutics is often governed by ideological presuppositions, one
presupposition exegesis cannot escape is "the historical method
1of interrogating the text". "Christo-praxis", not merely historical
activity, must precede secular insight into hermeneutics, for "the
basic theological truth cannot be absorbed in a hermeneutic, not
2even a liberation hermeneutic". We might also note that according 
to Marx's own critique of "ideology", Herzog's remarks may be more
3"Marxist" that Segundo's open-ended "freedom for ideologies".
It must be said, however, that not all of the Latin Americans follow
Segundo on this point. Boff, for example, is consistent in saying
that "following Jesus" precedes even Christology as life itself 
is more important than reflection. One might wish that more of
the Latin Americans were as cautious as Boff in adopting certain 
secular viewpoints which are not so easily reconciled with Christology 
and discipleship as some of the Latin Americans assume. Historical 
analysis, for e-j^ ample, "cannot be the tail that wags the dog.
Despite Fierro's remark that liberation theology is a negative 
theology, there is much more positive about it than its inherent
criticism might indicate. As Dussel asserts, atheism is a relative
idea, depending upon which God you are being atheistic toward. 
The Latin Americans have been atheistic toward the God who has been 
so often used to underscore human greed at the expense of human
suffering. To this extent the numerous syntheses with the atheism
1. Frederick Herzog, "Liberation Hermeneutic as Ideology Critiq ue? " Interpretation Richmond, Va. Vol. 28, pp. 387 ff. (1974)
2. Frederick Herzog, Justice C h u r c h , Orbis, Maryknoll, New York, 1980 p. 97
3. cf. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , Chapter Four (op. cit.)
4. Frederick Herzog, Justice Church, op. cit. p. 92
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of Marxist thought is hopeful, insofar as the latter expresses the 
intention of ending "the exploitation of man by man". Nevertheless, 
the common acceptance of Marx's dictum that (some sort of) violence 
is the midwife of old societies pregnant with new ones leads us 
to wonder just how far the liberation theologians are willing to 
go. There is no agreement on the kind of militancy required to 
establish the Kingdom, but Sobrino is perhaps representative in 
saying that Jesus' command to love our enemies has nothing to do 
with pacificism. This question must be explored further. For the
moment we may recall the two-edged criticism of Medellin: "One should 
not abuse the patience of a people that for years has borne a situa­
tion that would not be acceptable to anyone with any degree of 
awareness of human rights." But on the other hand, the bishops 
affirmed, "armed revolution generates new injustices." "One cannot 
combat a real evil at the price of a greater evil.
Of all the liberation theologians, Leonardo Boff has struck
the most consistent chords on the Christological foundation of a
love conceived in terms of justice. Boff, for example, does not
qualify his interpretation of Jesus' love as Sobrino does in the
above paragraph, and as most of the other liberationists do to some
degree. For Boff Jesus' love is unconditional, including the love
for friends (eschewed by Nygren) and the love for enemies (eschewed
by Segundo in the final analysis). Boff's Jesus is certainly critical
and militant, yet "at the very moment when he could have initiated
violence he immediately orders: 'Put your sword back, for all who
2draw the sword will die by the sword' (Mt. 26:52)." To distant 
sounds of sabres rattling, it is encouraging to hear Boff's calm
3yet critical reply: "They ought to decide for or against Christ."
1. Medellin Documents, in Grentillion, op. cit. p. 460
2. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. p. 102
3. ibid. p. 103
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The common Protestant critique of liberation theology's 
'horizontalism' is generally based upon a misapprehension of the 
idea of grace in liberation thought, and for this reason it is inad­
missible, if not totally unfounded. The point at which we left
Karl Barth called to mind Barth's assertion that human love can 
never W  divine love. The Latin Americans disagree on the basis
of Romans 5:5, where Paul says that God's love is poured into human 
hearts. The question is part of a continuing debate, and it cannot
be settled here. Some of the related premises, however, must be 
further discussed.
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SECTION II. The Content of "Concrete Love"
In this section I want to take a closer look at four specific 
categories through which the idea of love is conceived in Latin
American theology of liberation. Although there is not always general 
agreement within the literature about (1) effective love (2) violence 
(3) the love of neighbour, and (4) justice, these themes are common 
to all the liberation authors. When the liberationists refer to
'love' they mean a practical love. There is no attempt at all to 
make the kind of conceptual distinctions made, for example, by Anders 
Nygren. Although agape is specifically mentioned on occasion as 
the exemplary love of the New Testament, few of the authors (Dussel 
is an exception) attempt to distinguish agape from the ordinary 
authentic loves of human beings, insofar as those loves are 'effective' 
in decreasing the alienation between human beings.
As I have already noted, for the Latin Americans there is no
difference between God's love at work through humanity, and God's
love conceived ontologically. This idea is directly related both 
to a Roman Catholic concept of grace, and to the view of anthropology 
expressed by Feuerbach and conveyed by Marx. It is important to 
note also that the Augustinian idea of caritas is preserved in Spanish 
as caridad, normally translated into English as 'charity'.^ The 
religious distinction in Spanish between amor and caridad, to which 
most of the liberation authors strongly object, is equivalent to 
the English difference between the ordinary word 'love' and the idea 
of 'Christian charity', meaning the expression of one's love for 
God through the giving of alms. Thus we have in the liberation 
literature almost a reversal of Nygren*s protest, but with some very 
Nygren-like implications. On the one hand the Latin Americans
1. The Latin V u l g a t e , of course, also preserves the use of caritas in distinction from 
a m o r , cf. eg. 1 John 4:8 "...Deus est c a r i t a s ." Latin American theology, it must be 
remembered, has Latin roots.
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suggest that amor, if genuinely turned toward the neighbour, is 
in fact divine and the infusion of God's love into the human. It 
is exactly in this way that Feuerbachian anthropology and Catholic 
liberative grace come together.
1. "Effective Love"
Juan Luis Segundo's idea of "effective love" is an extreme 
characterization, reminding us somewhat of Reinhold Neibuhr's pragmat­
ism. Indeed, Segundo's ideal of love may be derived from Neibuhr. 
Segundo asserts (on what basis he does not tell us) that "Christians 
do not seem to have any problem agreeing that the commandment of 
Jesus was mutual love. But since "the motive of Christian brotherly 
love in a society founded on serfdom remains an unrealizable and
ideological idea," Christians must be left free to decide what sort
2of love is "feasible." "Love can only be effective and therefore
3real when it possesses motives and instruments for being feasible." 
Jesus, in commanding mutual love (sic) did not spell out clearly 
what form love must take in successive epochs. He himself was react­
ing to the crises of his day, exercising his own ideology against 
others. Thus, says Segundo, a "fresh phenomenological analysis" 
of what exactly is entailed in the New Testament's "unique commandment 
of love" is required. "The only perduring rule is that one should 
try to display the most effective and wide-ranging love possible 
in a given situation."^ Segundo concludes that "love is an end
5which legitimizes all means." (The specific way in which Segundo 
relates love to the concept of implicit violence, entailed in his 
interpretation, will be discussed below.)
Although not all of the liberationists are willing to go as 
far as Segundo, there is a general emphasis upon an "effective", 
"efficacious", and "concrete" love which must be flexible within
1. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , op. cit. p. 155
2. ibid. p. 100
3. ibid. p. 158
4. ibid. p. 155
5. ibid. p. 172
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and to some extent conditioned by the historical process in which
Latin Americans find themselves. One cannot decide beforehand what
sort of love is to be required for liberation, yet "in some essential
way it must inform the whole outlook of the Christian and the whole
process of history."^ "There can be no possible limits to love
2engaged in the struggle against injustice and sin." "Christian 
love must be fleshed out historically from within the context of 
the concrete situation." Yet it must be "a redeeming love fraught
3with sorrow and pain".
There is some difference of opinion in the literature as to
whether class struggle is demanded by love, or love presupposes 
class struggle. All of the liberationists seem to assert that effect­
ive love takes sides with the oppressed and the poor. Bonino says, 
"If class struggle is a fact...then a love which intends to be effect­
ive in terms of God's kingdom cannot avoid taking sides.Ellacuria
5says that class struggle is "the objectification of love in history". 
For him the danger of the existence of classes is greater than the 
danger of class struggle. It is clear that for all the liberationists, 
love must be interpreted in such a way that it may include condemna­
tion, criticism, and rejection, in alliance with God's wrath against
injustice. Bonino's point is a fair illustration of the critical
alliance with the poor which liberative love must project, and which 
is so often overlooked by paternalistic Northern aid programmes.
Why is it therefore that so often Christian ethics and ecclesiastical pronouncements flounder precisely at this point?...Why is it that they...offer plans and pro­
jects that presuppose a harmony and coordination gf inter­ests and goals of the classes which do not exist?
1. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Hade F l e s h , op. cit. p. 117
2. ibid. p. 121
3. ibid. p. 119
4. Jose Miguez Bonino, Re volutionary Theology Comes of A g e , op. cit. p. 119
5. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. p. 121
6. Jose Miguez Bonino, Re volutionary Theology Comes of Age, op. cit. p. 120
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Reconciliation is not achieved by some sort of compromise between the new and the old, but through the defeat of the 
old and the victory of the new age...The ideological appro­priation of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation by the liberal capitalist system is one, if not the, major heresy of our time.
Despite the Marxist flavour of Bonino's assertion, we have shown
above that the argument is well-grounded in New Testament theology,
particularly in Christ's proclamation of the Kingdom to and among
the poor.
Gutierrez and Santa Ana repeatedly stress that Christian love
begins with a commitment to the poor and oppressed. Santa Ana,
extracting from The Shepherd of Hermas, says that identification
with the poor is "a matter of great importance in the preaching
2of the message of Christian love". Going a bit farther than
Gutierrez, who assumes that love must be spontaneous and "gratuitous", 
Santa Ana says: "Charity in all its forms is no longer a spontaneous 
action in every case. It is the fulfilment of a duty; it is becoming 
organized. We are tempted to say it is becoming calculated."
Perhaps at the point where love becomes a calculated "duty" we have 
come full circle in the Enlightenment, back to Kierkegaard's reinter­
pretation of Kant, or even back to Kant himself. At any rate, we 
can conclude that in the Latin American theology of liberation, 
a metaphysical concept of love, unmediated by historical practice 
in solidarity with the poor, is not considered "effective". Love 
must "intend to accomplish"; sentiment is not enough.
2. Love and Violence
The problem of violence in relation to love is discussed by 
several of the liberation theologians.^ Some degree of violence 
is generally held to be necessary or inevitable as Christians side 
with the poor against oppressors. When oppressed people claim their
1. ibid. p. 121
2. Julio de Santa Ana, Good News to the P o o r , op. cit. p. 55
3. Julio de Santa Ana, Good News to the P o o r , op. cit. p. 57 (quoting Maurice Goguel)
4. cf. Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. pp. 165 ff; Bonino, Re volu tionary Theology
Comes of Age, op. cit. pp. 106 ff. Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, op. cit. pp.l54ff.
3 5 1
rights, "inevitable" violence ensues. Such violence is often initial­
ly perpetrated upon them by their oppressors as an increase in the 
subtle and not-so-subtle forms of violence which the oppressors 
have already been using. In Latin America the use of violence to 
quell social disorder is ubiquitous. Undergirding the arbitrary 
violence of police and military governments, however, is the violence 
of institutions such as multi-national companies, discriminatory 
health and educational systems, massive property ownership, and 
legal systems which favour the rich. The continental effect of 
many forms of violence across Latin America succeeds in the perpetua­
tion of marked social classes with a wide gulf dividing them. To 
a considerable extent the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America 
has played an ambiguous role, supporting through its hierarchy almost 
any government and associated institutions which can provide some 
sense of 'order', while at the same time maintaining an influential 
presence among the poor. The extent to which the Church' has allowed 
itself to be used by violent governments and institutions has certain­
ly been noticed by the liberation theologians. At the same time, 
its influence upon the poor has also been noticed, and the goal 
of the liberationists is to turn this influence to a political effect. 
Thus, liberation theologians repeatedly stress that disorder and 
violence do not begin with class struggle. The disorder and injustice 
are present facts; violence is built into the system. The Church's 
role is to fight sin and injustice, not necessarily itself opting 
for military violence, but realizing that a just society cannot 
be gained without some kind of conflict.
The extent of the conflict which the Church should support 
is still a matter of discussion. I have noted Boff's caution, and 
the warnings of the Medellin bishops. At the other extreme (theologi­
cally, if not actually bearing arms) is Segundo.
The Gospels are too apolitical for Segundo. God is not revealed 
at all in the Bible, except insofar as Jesus demonstrates a God
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who often changes his mind reacting to different historical circum­
stances. "The extant Bible is a complete waste of paper if it was 
God's intention to provide us with information about himself."^ 
"When Jesus talked freely about proffered love and non-resistance 
to evil, he was facing the same problem of filling the void between 
his conception of God (or perhaps of the first Christian community)
and the problems existing in his age. In short we are dealing with
2another ideology, not with the content of faith itself." "It is 
not at all certain that Jesus would have altered the Old Testament 
view and advised us to turn the other cheek if he had been confronted
3with the whole issue of Israelite slavery in Egypt." "Jesus' 
commandment of love and his countless examples and admonitions concer­
ning it in the Gospels must be translated to an era in which real- 
life love has taken on political f o r m s . " T h e  revolutionary 
character of a given option does not lie in its content but rather 
in its real capacity to break up the existing structure rather than
5to be reabsorbed by the latter." In the Gospels' record of Jesus' 
teaching on love, "Jesus is calling attention to a gratuitous sort 
of love that almost seems to be a useless luxury - and that is all. 
He is not imposing specific commands on people.^
Attempting to correct the "terrible superficiality" of analyses 
of love and violence, Segundo observes that violence is a function 
of both love and egotism. Love is no less violent than egotism, 
for love must be understood within the framework of a limited "economy 
of energy". The command to love our neighbours, whom Segundo defines 
as "those near us", appears to be similar to "a major pretext of 
egotism". It is therefore "curious", Segundo says, when the Gospels 
bid us to love our enemies. Love for our enemies can only be possible,
1. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , op. cit. p. 179
2. ibid. p. 116; I have noted in the previous chapter that (contrary to Niebuhr and Segundo) 
Jesus' advice is not to resist one who is evil, an important difference (cf. Matt. 5:39) 
which may imply "do not take revenge."
3. ibid. p. '86 5. ibid. p. 1004. ibid. p. 71 6. ibid. p. 155
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in terms of energy, as an extension of our love for our neighbour,
and not as an alternative.^
It is not altogether clear what Segundo means here. From
his assumption that it is mutual love which is commanded by Christ,
one would guess that, according to Segundo, one may love either
one's neighbour or one's enemy only if the neighbour or enemy allows
us to do so and reciprocates.
Segundo states clearly that the parable of the Good Samaritan
"is just that, a parable; it is not a moral precept. If we try
to force it and turn it into a concrete precept governing every
similar occasion, we will not end up with love but rather with an
incredible dispersion of energy and an irreparable loss of time
2for real, effective love." For Segundo the point of the parable
is that we can make anyone our neighbour, but not that everyone 
is our neighbour. "The wholly good Samaritan does not exist."
Only by keeping many people "at arm's length" are we able to love
anyone enough to make him a neighbour. This use of "the economy
of energy" was, according to Segundo, exercised by Christ, and it
is a primary use of violence by which love becomes effective. When­
ever we choose to love our neighbours, we necessarily exclude others,
and such "violence is an intrinsic dimension of any and all concrete 
love in history, just as it clearly is an intrinsic dimension of any
3and all concrete egotism." Love has no different means at its
disposal than egotism: "By falsely assuming that love possesses
its own exclusive means, real-life love ties its own hands and stops
4up the very source of its energy."
In illustration, Segundo suggests that "love for one's mother, 
for example, clearly has the same psychic roots as patriotism, prejud-
5ice, racism and war." The implication is that, despite the danger
1. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of T h e o l o g y , op. cit. p. 158
2. ibid. p* 159
3* ibid* p* 161
4" i b i d ’ p ’ 158
5 ‘ Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, op. cit. p. 158; (a very debatable point
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of egotism, we must love those nearest and dearest first. To protect
and preserve our love for these, our neighbours, we use violent
means. All law presupposes the violence of enforcement.
There is, then, no break in continuity between a necessary mental process of segregation and physical violence, how­ever legal and widely accepted the latter may be. This means we must abandon the simplistic notions that prompt us to discover violence only when a revolutionary shoots a gun on the one hand, and to talk about nonviolence as if it were compatible with impersonal laws gnd their attendant coercive force on the other hand.
Segundo concludes that "we use the word 'love' as the definition
of a moral end as a false singular." We rarely choose between love
and egotism as the goal or end of our actions, but instead we opt
for one specific love over another. "There is no use opting for
some sublime love when we do not have the means to carry it through.
Opting for a quality that is incapable of realization helps no one
actually, whereas we might have been of help if we had chosen a
form of love that was less sublime but feasible with respect to
2real living people."
It is not difficult to see where Segundo's argument is leading. 
If we can believe that "love is the end which legitimizes all means", 
then we may follow it to the end. On the other hand, if we stand 
with Boff, then we must somehow learn to draw a line between a criti­
cal, struggling, and even militant battle against injustice, and 
the tragedy of killing, deprivation, and victimization of innocents 
which entails even greater injustice. Segundo is, of course, right 
on many points. Of course there is an "economy of energy" to which 
Jesus and all persons are somewhat subject. Of course our loves 
are rarely selfless, and of course, we ^  love those nearest and 
dearest first. Nevertheless, this is not Jesus' kerygma, and it 
is certainly not the sort of love on which the idea of the kingdom 
of God is predicated. (For that matter, it is not even the sort 
of love upon which Feuerbach's "species consciousness" is predicated.)
1. ibid. p. 1602. ibid. p. 172
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I have already criticized Niebuhr for his pragmatism, and for making 
"mutual love" a Christian ideal, for it certainly was not "commanded" 
by Christ, although it is indeed a requirement within the fellowship
of disciples.^ But where love is not reciprocated, it must be loved
forth, not rationalized away. The selfless love of enemies, and 
of neighbours even while they remain enemies, continues to be the
New Testament ideal, and Segundo's pragmatism does not change the
good advice to put away our swords.
The other Latin American theologians do not go to Segundo's 
extreme of making violence e function of love, but they have confirmed 
its pervasiveness in history, its 'legitimation' by established 
systems at the expense of the impotent and impoverished, its inherent 
identification with change, its capacity both to produce and prevent 
suffering, its implicit and explicit presence in the words and minis­
try of Jesus, and its unavoidable alliance with a commitment to 
a better world. They have warned the Church that an ostrich-like
approach to secular violence will not make it go away, and may indeed 
help to perpetuate it. They have identified and criticized the 
institutional violence which comes even through benevolent programmes 
initiated by well-meaning (if not totally disinterested) organizations. 
Even when they have over-stressed the issue of violence, one may 
view beneath it an admirable passion for human rights, dignity, 
and an 'atmosphere' for love. Illustrating the often-misunderstood 
roots of the language of conflict, Gutierrez quotes Che Guevara:
love is "the guiding principle" of revolution.
Let me say, with the risk of appearing ridiculous, that the true revolutionary is guided by strong feelings of love. It is impossible to think of an authentic revolutionary without this quality...In these conditions the revolutionary leadersmust have a large dose of humanity, a large dose of a senseof justice and truth, to avoid falling into dogmatic extremes,
1. Jesus' commandment to "love one another" is not a "commandment of mutual love". It is 
a commandment to each to love each, unconditionally. Mutuality is not logically the 
responsibility of one person, and is not therefore capable of being obeyed by an indi­
vidual. If the command is taken collectively, it is still dependent upon each i n divi d­
ual's unconditional love. If the commandment were indeed "mutual love" each individual 
would be absolved of his re sponsibility if his love were not reciprocated.
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into cold scholasticism, into isolation from the masses. They must struggle every day so that their love of living humanity 
is transformed into concrete deeds, in^o acts that will serve as an example, as a mobilizing factor.
We do not know, nor can we easily guess, the context of Jesus'
saying; "From the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom
of heaven has suffered violence, and men of violence take it by
2force." (Matt 11:12) His statement may be an indication of the
militancy associated with the expectation of the messiah, or it may 
be an ironic and saddened reference to misunderstandings about his 
mission. In the passion of expectation, all human beings are subject 
to extremes of misinterpretation. The Latin American theologians, 
despite their passion for liberation, have too often failed to dist­
inguish between necessary violence and unnecessary cruelty, between 
civil disobedience and civil war, between transforming practice and 
despairing suicide, fratricide, and, adopting Dussel's implication,
"theocide". Perhaps it is no coincidence that the same chapter,
in which we find Jesus' one reference to violence, ends with his 
famous comfort for the poor: "Take my yoke upon you and learn from
me; for 1 am gentle and lowly in heart, and you will find rest for 
your souls. "(Matt. 11:29). The Jesus we see in the Gospels is cert­
ainly not apolitical, uncritical, nor does he avoid conflict. But
he tells us in no uncertain terms that the poor inherit the Kingdom, 
for that is where God takes his stand. The meek and the gentle shall 
inherit the earth, for they may survive to see the Kingdom established 
there, while "all who take the sword will perish by the sword."
1. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 98; quoting Che Guevara, 
Venceremos ! MacMillan, New York, 1968, p. 396
2. The Lukan parallel does not help us to decipher this logion from "0". Luke is in ten­
tionally ambiguous, perhaps even facetious, as Jesus may have been originally. Luke att­
enuates the emphasis upon violence as such, implying that the law and the prophets are 
no guarantee for entry into the Kingdom, and everyone must "force" his way in.(cf. Luke 16:16).
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Segundo's description of inevitable violence is more extreme 
than most of the liberation views. His interpretation, however, 
is generally representative of the manner in which liberation theolog­
ians have tended to highlight the idea of violence, often based upon 
rather arbitrary and somewhat biased exegetical distinctions. Despite 
the fact that one may certainly find violence in the texts, the 
greater impact of the Christian message leads toward its diminuition, 
and certainly not toward its legitimation.
3. God in the Neighbour
A common equation in Latin American theology of liberation 
is that between the love of God and authentic human love. I noted 
above Gutierrez' subtle reference to Feuerbach's idea of love and 
the letter's assertion that human love is divine. Gutierrez, without 
adopting Feuerbach's negation of God for the sake of love, has declar­
ed that God cannot be loved except as one loves his neighbour. "To 
love one's brother, to love all men, is a necessary and indispensable 
mediation of the love of God; it ^  to love God."  ^ "We find the 
Lord in our encounters with men, especially the poor, marginated
and exploited ones. An act of love towards them is an act of love 
2towards God." Gutierrez does not see this mediation of God's love 
and love for God as a horizontalist displacement of the love of God 
as a Christian concept in both genitive and objective forms. In 
loving other persons we display God's love toward them, while at 
the same time 'materially' loving God. Human love for God conceived 
in this fashion does not depend upon the faith of the lover, for 
Gutierrez says that since "everyone who loves is a child of God and 
knows God" (I John 4:7), love for God is "unavoidably expressed 
through love of one's neighbour". Apart from its mediation through
1. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 200
2. ibid. p. 201
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the human love for others, however, "the love of God is an illusion". 
For Gutierrez, this way of conforming to Jesus' dual commandment 
is underwritten by Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan and confirmed 
by the story of the Sheep and the Goats (cf. Luke 10:25 ff; Matt. 
25:31 ff.).
Gutierrez tells us that in the parable of the Good Samaritan, 
Jesus' surprising answer to the question 'Who is my neighbour?' 
indicates that the neighbour is not he whom I find in my path, but 
rather he in whose path I place myself and actively seek. The neigh­
bourly love required by Jesus of his disciples is active in such 
a way that it seeks out the suffering neighbour, and in him discovers
God. This, says Gutierrez, is the way we "encounter God in history".
"If humanity, each man, is the living temple of God, we meet God
in our encounter with men; we encounter him in the commitment to 
the historical process of mankind."^ But the neighbour cannot be 
deemed merely an 'occasion' for access to God. The love which is
required is for the human being himself, and not for the love of 
God. "That my action towards another is at the same time an action
towards God does not detract from its truth and concreteness, but
2rather gives it even greater meaning and import." Also, Gutierrez 
stresses, the idea of "neighbour" is not merely an individual concept; 
the term refers to the whole fabric of social relations, including 
"economic, social, cultural, and racial co-ordinates". It goes 
far beyond the limitations of the individualistic encounter between 
I and thou. Quoting Pope Pius XII, Gutierrez claims that "charity 
today is a political charity", and must be directed against the 
private ownership of the means of production. The hungry must be 
filled with good things, and the rich sent empty away.
1. ibid. p. 194
2. ibid. p. 202
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Picking up a thread which has concerned us throughout our 
discussion of love, Gutierrez claims that love is only authentic 
when it is spontaneous. Only "gratuitous love" goes to our very 
roots and elicits true love. Here the idea of spontaneity is spec­
ifically identified with God's grace, his "gratuitousness". To 
this extent Gutierrez' idea of love resembles Nygren's view of agape 
as God's unconditional love "infused" into human beings, and which 
therefore must not be willed, obeyed, or coerced into life. For
Gutierrez, "there is a real love only when there is free giving
1without conditions or coercion." Gutierrez specifically says that
a charity which is enacted "out of duty" is "a fleshless charity
2and therefore non-existent". His ground for such a statement is
exegetically derived. In the parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus 
says that the Samaritan's "heart melted" with compassion, causing 
him to minister to the injured man on the other side of the road. 
The priest and Levi te, however, had duties to obey the law. Spon­
taneity ruled over duty. One must allow oneself to be "moved with 
compassion" for the oppressed and the suffering if love is to resemble 
the love of Jesus and become liberative.
Following Karl Rahner, Gutierrez, Dussel, Sobrino, and Boff 
have stressed the idea of "the Sacrament of the Neighbour". There 
is a "palpable transcendence" of human love whenever the neighbour 
is loved for his or her own sake. Love for one's neighbour constitut­
es access to God; conversion to the neighbour "and in him to the 
Lord" is the liberation! sts ' idea of faith. For Dussel, Jesus' 
parable of the Good Samaritan is an answer to the question "Who 
is God?". The Samaritan's ministry to his neighbour is the theologic­
al antithesis of Cain's murder of his brother. The "locus" of God
3is one's neighbour. Love for the neighbour entails not only ministry
1. Gu stavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 206
2. ibid. p. 200
3. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of Liberation, op. cit. pp. 18 ff; p. 169
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to him or her but also recognizing the neighbour's rights.^ Worship
2apart from a practical love for one's neighbour does not exist.
As we have seen, Segundo seems to confuse love for one's neigh­
bour with "mutual love". Dussel, however, distinguishes between 
the two, in saying that a "face-to-face encounter with the neighbour" 
constitutes authentic love.
Face to face, mouth to mouth, is the fundamental expert ience through which I respect the Other as other, I love the Other as other; it is agape. Charity is not merely friendship among brothers, because then it would be a totalized we, a house tightly closed. It would not be charity, love for the Other as other, for John says, "He first loved us." The one who loves first does not yet have friendship, because to love the Other as other comes before the love is returned. Friendship is mutual well-wishing, allowing us to be self-centred. To love the other without receiving the other's love is not mutual well-wishing, but pure well-wishing toward the Other. It does not matter whether the Other reciprocates;I love that person for himself; only this makes it possible for that person to love me someday. This is how friend­ship really comes about. Charily is not merely comrade­ship; it is love freely given.
Dussel's "Other/other" language is apparently an attempt to system­
atize the idea that God is transcendent and immanent in the neighbour, 
"the other". (It ms.y not be coincidental that Dussel's work often 
reminds us of Hegel and Feuerbach.) Dussel eschews the idea of 
self-love as the measure of one's love for the neighbour. His inter­
pretation of ethics concludes that "loving your neighbour is the 
whole law. We mean, of course, not 'loving your neighbour as your­
self, but 'as I have loved you.' To love 'as I have loved you'
is to lay down one's life. Those persons are Christian who day
by day see the other as meriting their service even to the point
of laying down their life. Dussel's stringent interpretation
of love for the neighbour shows it to be "...charity, agape : it
1. ibid. p. 46
2. Jon Sobrino, Ch ristology at the C r o s s r o a d s , op. cit. p. 167; (inter a l i a )
3. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 20. Dussel here tries 
to drive a wedge between mutual love and a g a p e , but seems also to exclude friendship from 
a g a p e . This interpretation is rather too much like Nygren's, despite its good intentions.
4. ibid. p. 172. cf. John 1 5 : 1 3 : "Greater love hash no man than this, that he lay down his 
life for his f r i e n d s " . Dussel takes the martyrdom or sacrifice literally, but seems to divorce it from f r i e n d s h i p .and appropriate self-love.
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is a revealed concept found only in Judaeo-Christianity, the most
revolutionary approach to love in all history."^ Neighbour-love
as agape is extended to entail liberation in erotic love, especially
regarding the relationships between men and women and the liberation
2of the latter from oppression and exploitation by men. It also 
includes "pedogogical liberation", of the child from cultural domina-
3tion.
Although Dussel's insight is not necessarily typical of the 
liberation authors, his creative extension of the liberative capacity 
of love to include global problems demonstrates a potentially univer­
sal application of themes related to love which have been fashioned 
in the 'critical heat' of Latin American theology and the Latin 
American situation. His distinction between mutuality and the love 
of neighbour needs to be stressed in light of Segundo's pragmatism 
and a general tendency toward the appearance of exclusivism in favour
of the poor of Latin America, and possibly against the poor of other 
4countries. Nevertheless, his reservations about "as yourself"
may be unjustified. To love one's neighbour as oneself does not 
necessarily entail the presupposition of egotism. Agape may indeed 
be "a revolutionary approach to love", but it is not clear that 
"it is a revealed concept found only in Judaeo-Christianity". Several 
Eastern religions are conversant with an idea of love for the neigh­
bour which does not find its basis either in a written code or in 
a particular manifestation of the deity. Neither is it so often 
debated.
Protestants will continue to be suspicious of the equation 
between the love of God and human love. My own opinion is that
1. ibid. p. 21
2. ibid. pp. 56 ff.
3. ibid. p. 58; cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the O p p r e s s e d , trans. Myra Ramos, Penguin, 
Middlesex, England, 1972.
4. Hugo Assmann, for example, talks about "a love that stays co mfortably at home", cf. Assmann, Practical Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 7. El lacuria complains that there 
are "too many branches on the tree of liberation." cf. Freedom Made Flesh, op. cit. p. 127
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the equation has more to offer us than to repel us. As I have sugges­
ted regarding the equation between "knowing God" and "doing justice", 
it is probably more correct to say that the second demonstrates
the first. Similarly with regard to the dual commandment to love 
God and the neighbour, I would suggest that it is exegetically 'proper' 
to say that the love of neighbour demonstrates one's love for God.^
Nevertheless, as the liberation theologians have so often stressed, 
the accent is on the genuine love for one's neighbour.
The neighbour, interpreted biblically, must include friends, 
strangers, orphans, widows, children, stepmothers, the handicapped, 
black, red, yellow, and brown, as well as white folk. It must indeed 
include the peer, but it may also include the rich who are so often 
victims of their own oppression. The neighbour must include one's 
wife or husband, one's fellow citizen, and, yes, one's neighbour 
(literally) next door, while not excluding the obnoxious drunk, 
the politician not of one's party, and the brain-washed soldier, 
effecting machismo and implying masochism. The neighbour is 'them 
wha's not like us', the 'enemy', who today is conceived as 'gay', 
'Communist', 'punk', 'student ', 'academic', and 'bourgeoisie'. 
Although the Latin American theologians have often expressed the 
universal character of the love of neighbour (Segundo excepted),
I have a suspicion that the universality is limited, necessarily 
perhaps, to those of a particular social stratification. If the 
"locus" of God is found in the neighbour, but there is a practical 
limitation of 'neighbours', there may be a 'reduction' of Gcd.
Boff is every bit as oriented toward the neighbour as the 
other Latin American theologians. Quoting Clement of Alexandria,
he tells us: "If you have really found your brother, you have found
1. This conclusion is also demanded by our 'thesis': "As the Father has loved me, so have I
loved you. Dwell in my love. You will dwell in my love if you keep my commandments".
(John 15:9-10). i.e. Love precedes justice; God's love is prior to human love; Love of
God informs but is not limited by human love. IttfiiMfiy does not imply equiva len cy.b et­ween divine and human love.
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your God as well. Nevertheless, he asserts, "No concrete historical
reality can exhaust the riches of Christ. Hence no title conferred
2on Christ can be absolutized."
But we have here a reduction of Christ to only one aspect of his message: love of neighbour. We believe that love is central and also essential to Jesus' preaching. His message, however, is much wider and promises the total liberation of human beings and the cosmos for God. Love is the atmosphere in which this is hoped for, lived, proclaimed. We would, how­ever, prefer to be on the side of the oppressed, who at least learnt this from the Gospel, than to be on the side of those who fanatically affirm the totality of orthodoxy but tolerate the injustice and barbarities that surround them and have lost the capacity to hear Christ's words: When you have done this to one of these little ones, you have done it to me.
For Boff, the Latin American emphasis upon love of neighbour and
service to the poor is one aspect of the significance of Christ,
contributing to but not exhausting Jesus' proclamation and assurance
of the coming kingdom of God. In his later book. Liberating Grace,
Boff shows this kingdom to be allied with beauty, truth, and many
types of love yet to be imagined and realized in history. Boff
is willing to ask the question which many liberation theologians
have yet to consider: after the liberation of the poor, what happens
next? Nevertheless, the poor are always with us, and attention
to their plight has too long been delayed.
4. Love and Justice
"Liberation," asserts Ignacio Ellacuria, "is a process of 
liberty, justice, and love. Liberty, justice, and love are deemed 
essential to the proclamation of the Gospel; in history the Gospel's 
credibility depends upon "the struggle against injustice and the
5facilitation of love". Such emotive language is common throughout
1. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. p. 245
2. ibid. p. 230
3. ibid. p. 231
4. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made F l e s h , op. cit. p. 85
5. ibid. p. 109
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the liberation literature, but only rarely are terms like love, 
justice, liberation, "praxis", "the oppressed", "utopia", "the kingdom 
of God", and "the poor" specifically described so that we are certain 
of context and interpretation. The Latin Americans may rightly 
criticize Europeans for their obsession with language, meaning, 
and logic. On the other hand, when the Latin Americans attempt 
to clarify exactly what they mean by such terms, distinctions are 
often revealed which intimate severe communication problems, not 
only between the North and the South, but possibly also within the 
Latin American context. I have already noted that there is an import­
ant difference between Latin American and European Protestant inter­
pretations of grace. The ubiquitous term "praxis" would be properly 
understood in Europe as a technical Marxist word implying the dialect­
ical relationship between historical activity and flexible theory
conditioned by the former. In Latin America it is unclear what 
the term "praxis" means, but often, it is safe to say, it becomes
a synonym for sheer activity, and would best be translated by the 
normal English word "practice." Yet we must attempt to discover 
the meaning of such phrases as "a praxis of the poor", "a praxis 
of justice", and "the praxis of love," more through sympathy and 
intuition than by concise definitions. For in the end we are dealing
with an attempt to give compassionate expression to real human prob­
lems, and not with a sterile set of categories.
"The love of justice," says Dussel, "is the first liberating
virtue of the praxis of liberation."^ Such a statement is ambiguous,
to say the least, but in Dussel’s case we do have the rudiments
of an explanation for the terms 'love' and 'justice'. I have already
noted Dussel's clarification of authentic love as agape, unique
2and superior to mutual love. Dussel's interpretation of justice
1. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 46
2. ibid. p. 20 (cf. above, p.36S)
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is, I think, roughly equivalent to its meaning as normally construed 
by most of the other liberation theologians. By tracing his develop­
ment of the idea of justice, we may have a fair notion of what justice 
means in the Latin American theology of liberation.
Dussel begins with a historical analysis of the exploitation
of South America by Europe. He concludes that present-day Europe 
was largely built with the gold, blood, and sweat of Latin American 
Indians. The "original sin" of colonial domination and cultural 
imperialism has produced ever-greater injustice on the Latin American 
continent. Latin America as well as Europe and North America are
immersed in the results of "the sin of theft". The products of
the workers in the South were stolen by the North, and the "inherit­
ance" of the wealth in the hands of the North and their cohorts 
in the South constitutes more theft. ^  The work of justice begins 
with the word of "the prophet" to "the poor": "You are blessed,
and yours is the Kingdom." The poor must be led to create their 
own justice, the rights and property which rightfully are theirs. 
The oppressors too must be liberated, but the "subjugators" must 
be dispossessed in order to be saved. Dussel then conceives of 
a just war of the oppressed against their oppressors.
When the oppressed people lift up their heads, with a will to freedom and love for the future, not hatred, war begins. In war not all are corrupt. Unjust indeed will be the army of the subjugators and just the army^ that defends itself in war and fights for liberation.
Dussel tells us elsewhere that "the poor person is the just
person", for he is, even in his injustice, the victim of the injustice
3of others. "Justice," says Dussel, "means giving to all people
what is due to them. " "Justice is not merely the offer of bread,
5but of more just laws." Affirming a "natural right to private 
property", he tells us that "natural" means "things like calories, 
protein, clothing, housing, etc. Nevertheless he notes that "the
1. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. pp. 25 ff.
2. ibid. p. 43 4. ibid. p. 46 6. ibid. p. 49
3. ibid. p. 71 5. ibid. p. 47
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excessive and unjust accumulation of juridical private property 
is an offshoot of original sin, of the death of Abel, of the dis­
obedience of Adam", and it is at the root of subjugation of peoples 
in Latin America.^ As I observed above, Dussel is more thorough 
than many of the liberationists in applying the motif of justice
to I- thou relationships, particularly to relations between men
and women. "All other relationships," he says, "have their basis
2in this erotic relationship." Each human relationship entails
either respect for or domination of the other, and the context and
extent of justice is determined by the respect of a "face-to-face
encounter". But, like the other theologians of liberation from
Latin America, Dussel's main emphasis upon justice is associated
with the rights of the poor. For him such an emphasis can only
be fashioned "from the periphery".
Really to hear God is to hear him through someone who, 
from outside the system, tells me that the system is not the only possible one, that there can be another.Only when I become aware that the system is not divine can I hear divinity as exteriority. Only when I am able to comprehend the finiteness, the historicity, the in­evitable coming to an end at any moment of the system in which I find myself...can I hear the Word of God that calls me from the future. This Word is not abstract but is a summons to me on the part of the poor who cry out to me, in effect: "Do justice! because we have rights that are not yours. We have rights that arise in us and not in you. We do not ask that you give us what is yours but that you give us what is ours, starting with our worth as persons." If I recoggize that word,I will be recognizing the Word of God.
One cannot be sure exactly what rights the poor may have which are
not those of everyone. To assert such too strongly may be tantamount
to Outka's "blank check" malfunction of the Golden Rule: "Do unto
others as they would have you do unto them." Nevertheless, as Dussel
suggests, justice must include the recognition of the rights of
others, just as love must include the bestowal of those rights without
coercion.
1. ibid. pp. 49-502. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 55
3. ibid. p. 92
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A similar interpretation is found in Miranda's work. Miranda 
tells us that "the supreme charity is to recognize the right of 
the person being given to".^ Only with such a recognition, he says, 
does love gain its authenticity distinct from " a humiliating paterna­
lism". "If it is not equivalent to saying 'you have a complete 
right to this and I am not condescending in any way,' then not even
2the genuine love between man and woman is able to transcend."
Miranda as well as many of the other liberationists asserts that 
genuine love of neighbour is "transcendent" because in such a love 
"there is a depth that man does not suspect; it is through it that
3man encounters God." However, this divine encounter depends upon 
the justice allied with the love, for "love is not love without
a passion for justice."
According to Miranda and Gutierrez, the biblical concept of
love is not to be distinguished from the biblical concept of justice. 
"The love that the Bible knows is love-justice. " ^ I have noted 
Miranda's interpretation of the Old Testament concept hesed (mercy,
compassion) and its connection to the terms mispat (justice) and
sedakah, (righteousness) which for him implies that love and justice 
are in fact the same thing. "One of the most disastrous errors
in the history of Christianity is to have tried - under the influence
5of Greek definitions - to distinguish between love and justice." 
For Miranda, "the sense of justice is the only love..." which is
able to reflect the priorities of the kingdom of God as a "utopia" 
on earth.^ Miranda has traced these Old Testament terms to the 
sayings of Jesus, so that the New Testament idea of agape is to
be construed by the Old Testament idea of hesed ; thus when Paul 
speaks of "a love poured into human hearts" he means God's justice/
1. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the B i b l e , op. cit. p. 62 (quoting Bigo)2. ibid.
3. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of L i b e r a t i o n , op. cit. p. 238
4. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the B i b l e , op. cit. p. 62
5. ibid. p. 616. ibid. p. 62
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compassion, as "glory", at work through human love. Similarly,
Miranda has shown the important affinity of Jesus' command to love 
the neighbour as oneself with the summation of the Leviticus justice- 
statements (Lev. 19), Although I cannot agree that love for God 
is logically equivalent to doing justice, I must respect the intimate 
alliance between human love and human justice which Miranda has
exegetically illustrated, but I doubt they should be equated.
Whereas Miranda draws his equation of love and justice from 
the Bible, most of the liberation theologians seem to imply a pheno­
menological or ethical base for the equation, which is indeed broadly 
assumed in the literature. Bonino's quotation from Paul Ricoeur
may have something to do with the wide acceptance of the equivalency
between love and justice.
We show little or no understanding of love when we make charity the counterpart and supplement of, or the substitute for, justice; love is coextensive with justice; it is its soul, its impulse, its deep motivation; it lends it its vision, which is the^ 
other, the absolute value of which it testifies.
Ricoeur says specifically that love equals justice. (The same idea
2is also, incidentally, to be found in the ethics of Joseph Fletcher.) 
But if we are truly to understand the meaning of justice, it cannot 
be merely translated as love, which actually has no universally 
agreed meaning, and which is subject to diverse interpretations 
even in the liberation literature. It may be helpful to interpret 
love through reference to justice, but as I have shown, justice 
is capable of almost as many interpretations as love. In other 
words, the statement "love equals justice" does not really tell 
us much.
It is helpful to discover, however, that the concept of justice 
in the liberation literature is essentially a positive and dynamic
1. Jose Miguez Bonino, Re volu tio nary Theology Cones of A g e , op. cit. p. 113 (quoting Paul Ricoeur)
2. of. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics, SCM Press, London, 1966 (Chapter 5)
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concept, unlimited by the assumption of "order", not initially direct­
ed toward punishment or vengeance, certainly not a synonym for divine 
retribution, but rather a concept which is closely allied with equal­
ity of persons before God and the foundations of peace. The idea 
of equality of persons is particularly important for grasping the 
liberation idea of justice.
Miranda and Santa Ana document the early Christian attempts 
to build a community based upon equality of persons. Santa Ana 
notes that although the idea remained, the communist vision of Acts 
4:32 ff. was rarely realized. Miranda observes how the concern 
for equality is to be seen in patristic thought. Jerome tells us 
that the rich person is either an unjust person or the heir of one. 
Ambrose says that all excess belongs to the poor. Thomas Aquinas, 
more influenced by the development of feudal society, stresses the 
responsibility that goes with ownership (procurare et dispensare). 
The right of ownership implies the ability to care for and distribute 
to those who are dependent upon the means of production. Modern 
industry has lost this ability, so there is an implicit confluence 
of Marxist thought and Christianity. Class struggle becomes "a 
means for obtaining more justice".^ ^As Dom Helder Camara proclaims, 
"My socialism is justice."^
Miranda observes that the norm of equality, which he believes
should be represented in all laws, is particularly expressed by
the "as yourself" in Jesus' commandment of love. "As yourself"
is not the egotistic motivation, rather the "measure" for one's love
2for the neighbour. It entails an apprehension of equality before 
God, as well of the neighbour's rights. The equality and justice 
of the dual commandment is undergirded and in fact repeated by the 
Golden Rule. To do unto others as we would have others do unto
r. Jose Miguez Bonino, Re volu tio nary Theology Comes of A g e , op. cit. p. 119
2. Jose P. Miranda, Marx and the Bible, op. cit. p. 63
3 7 2
us is a positive and active expression of justice which is negatively
imposed by legal statute. "As yourself" is the key to a just love
in both sayings of Jesus, because in each the idea of equality of
persons is given active expression. As Miranda concludes, the love
which Jesus commands is to be characterized by "an acute, interior-
ized sense of justice".^
As far as justice is related to the idea of law, there is
the general affirmation by almost all the authors that love fulfills
the whole law. (Gal. 5:14). Boff, perhaps, puts it best:
Jesus comports himself as one higher than the laws.If the laws help the human person, increase love, or make love possible, he accepts them. If on the con­trary, they legitimate enslavement, he repudiates them and demands that they be broken. It is not the law which saves but love. In this ^e have a summary of the ethical preaching of Jesus.
But Boff goes farther than the rest, for while asserting that 
Jesus demands that laws be broken, he also stresses that "the love 
he preaches must be unconditional, both for friends and enemies". 
Jesus "does not pay back in the same coin". He is not "against" 
anyone; if he is against it is only because he is "in favour of" 
in the first place. "He is first in favour of love, justice, recon­
ciliation, hope, and total realization of the meaning of human exist-
3ence in God." Jesus' "justice" is characterized as "total openness 
to others and the Great Other, indiscriminate love, unshakeable 
fidelity to the voice of conscience, and the overcoming of whatever 
chains human beings to their own e g o i s m " . B o f f  gives "concrete 
form" to the positive and hopeful idea of justice in Latin American 
theology of liberation, which, if not totally identical with love, 
is certainly not far away.
1. ibid. p. 293
2. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ L i b e r a t o r , op. cit. p. 67
3. ibid. p. 239
4. ibid. p. 250
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God is, therefore, not far from us. He is our greatest depth. In Jesus, God appeared in a concrete form, as­suming our human condition. Hence each human being reminds us of the human being who was Jesus. To ac­cept a poor person as poor is to accept the poor Jesus.He hides himself, he is incognito, behind each human face. Faith demands that we look profoundly into the face of our brothers and sisters; love them; give them food, drink, and clothing; visit them in prison. Forin doing so, we are being host to and serving Christhimself. Hence the human being is the greatest manifest-' 
ation not only of God, but also of Christ resurrected in our world...Now we know, only through faith, that the Lord is present in each human being. With our own resurrection, which will be like that of Christ, we will see and enjoy, enjoy and love, love and understand oÿr brotherhood with Jesus incarnate and resurrected.
Justice, after all, is not to be conceived or imagined in
the restrictive categories which we often apply to it, but rather 
by a broad and practical application to successive historical claims 
for dignity, equality, and peace. Whenever justice takes the charact­
er of law, the law must be flexible enough to realize that it is
only the servant of justice, through which it may create the possib­
ilities for a love which, in turn, creates justice.
Despite Dussel's assertion that "the poor person is the just
person", we must be cautious. Since Jesus' commandment to love
the neighbour as oneself comes from Leviticus, he was no doubt
acquainted with the strict command, which, among others, is summed 
up by the command to love one's neighbour: "You shall do no injustice
in judgment; you shall not be partial to the poor or defer to the
great, but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbour." (Lev.
19:15). The same command, incidentally, draws a distinction between
"the poor" and "the great", but both of them are "the neighbour".
The same chapter in Leviticus also contains another verse
which Jesus knew, and by which he interpreted the concept of "neigh­
bour". "When a stranger sojourns with you in your land, you shall
not do him wrong. The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to
you as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself,
for you were strangers in the land of Egypt." (Lev. 19:33). Although
1. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, op. cit. pp. 218-219
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Miranda has noticed the connection between Jesus' command and the 
summation of the justice code at Lev. 19:18 ("You shall love your 
neighbour as yourself"), he and many of the other liberationists 
have missed the interpretation of the neighbour as the alien in 
Lev. 19:33. In general, the justice which is claimed is legitimate 
and long-overdue justice for the poor. But Christ's apprehension 
of justice, as Boff has shown, is much greater, and must be extended 
toward all, indiscriminately, unconditionally, in alliance with 
his love. Thus, perhaps, the alleged domination of South America 
by the North may not be reduced to the justice of the former and 
the injustice of the latter. And, in terms of international justice, 
what may have been lost through impotence and ignorance cannot be 
justly reclaimed by the impulsive abuse of military power, not by 
salting old wounds.
I cannot agree that love is equivalent to justice, although
the direction of our whole 'thesis' assumes that love is intimately
related to and helps to create justice. I do agree that justice
is generally to be construed in terms of equality. Nevertheless,
equality alone is not a great enough principle to completely enclose
the hesed (mercy) of the Old Testament and the agape (love) of the
New. Nygren was wrong to oppose love to justice according to the
story of the Workers in the Vineyard (Matt. 20:1-16). Nevertheless,
in every assumption of equality, particularly as it is incorporated
into legal systems, there is a place for mercy. The idea of equality
does not exhaust the biblical idea of justice. Socialism, however,
conceived in flexible forms and continuously related to the kingdom
of God through the ethics of Jesus, may well, as Helder Camara hopes,
one day incorporate many of the themes of justice which the New
1Testament proclaims. Nevertheless, God's justice cannot be reduced 
totally to any conception of humanity.
1. cf. Jose de Broucker, Dom Helder Camara, The Violence of a P e a c e m a k e r , Orbis, Maryknoll, 
New York, 1970...; For example: "From each according to his ability; to each according 
to his need."
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CONSTRUCTIVE CONCLUSION
The "Love" of Latin American Theology of Liberation
"Charity," says Gutierrez," is God's love in us and does not 
exist outside our human capabilities to love and to build a just 
and brotherly world."  ^ We must conclude that to a great extent, 
Gutierrez and his colleagues are certainly correct. Their view 
of love may be too optimistic about humanity and too reductive of
God, but it rests on a biblical "hope".
Liberation theology has had the courage to talk about love 
in terms which cannot be delimited by philosophical systems, ethical 
criteria, ecclesiastical tradition, or social convention. It is 
impossible to characterize the "love" of Latin American theology 
of liberation in a few sentences, or even in a few categories. 
Consistent with the diversity of the term, it has received diverse
applications, yet almost always allied with "the love of justice" 
as Dussel so ambiguously characterizes the love which liberates. 
In the holistic struggles of human beings to find justice, freedom,
and peace, the theological notion of love must certainly be located.
The innovative adaptation of an idea of grace which does not draw
a clear division between God and humanity gives a hopeful character
to human nature, despite its immersion in the tragedy of sin. So 
far as Gain learns to be his brother's keeper he may realize that
he is 'created in God's image', for his insistence upon freedom, 
his capacity to love, and his refusal to be determined by history 
tell him so.
In close affinity with the idea of a latent divinity in human 
nature, the Latin Americans have not been afraid to look again at 
the atheistic theories which have, at the possible expense of God, 
certainly 'enlightened' the character of humanity. Ludwig Feuerbach,
1. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, op. cit. p. 199
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Karl Marx, and other great thinkers about humanity have been adapted, 
if not adopted, to inform and suggest practical applications of 
the spiritual concept of the kingdom of God. In this ambitious 
synthesis, the charity which is revealed is certainly one which 
is possible to humankind, in this world, and just as imminent as 
it was first conceived in Galilee. Jesus' love is nothing if not 
optimistic.
But through and despite all this optimism about human nature, 
the weight and nature of sin continues to exert its force. We must 
finally ask Latin American theology whether its "hope" is really 
hopeful enough to be able to battle sin on all its fronts. Although 
there is no justification for perpetuating the doctrine of the total 
depravity of human nature, the extent to which, in fact, human history 
has been a record of depravity must not be overlooked if liberation 
and justice are really theology's concern. A vision of "utopia" 
may not, finally, be realizable through a practice based upon social, 
economic, and historical analysis. The kingdom of God may not, 
finally, be reducible to a vision of economic or social equality. 
The proletariat and the poor do not, simply by these designations, 
automatically inherit all the perfections, "which eye hath not seen
and ear hath not heard", lying in store for those that increasingly
learn what it means to love God and the neighbour as oneself. A 
hope which rests secure among the poor and the oppressed may tend
to gloss over the injustice which one poor person may perpetrate 
upon another. A hope which overlooks the extent to which sin "lurks 
at the door" of the victim, the effect of his own selfishness, envy, 
and anger, may not be able to recognize liberation when it is imminent. 
Somehow, the poor person must discover a kind of liberation which 
is present even in the depths of slavery, even when the oppressor's 
chains are still attached.
Piety is no longer an 'acceptable' word; the love of the poor
person for his or her God reeks of paternalism and sublimated
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servility; the quiet acceptance of God's will in the midst of suffer­
ing suggests a theology of despair and determinism. Yet the sense 
in which religion has through the ages been a positive and nourishing 
"opiate of the people" cannot be too quickly dismissed. Ludwig
Feuerbach, who originally coined this term, was able to recognize 
the succour that religion may bring to the suffering, even though 
such piety may well be an expression of social tragedy. If love
for a God who loves us when humans do not is an "opiate", then perhaps 
we need such a drug to sustain us, while praying the fervent prayer 
of the Psalmist: "How long 0 Lord?" - or better still, of the Christ­
ian martyr: "Maranatha! Come, 0 Lord!"
I do not think that this "opiate", this piety, is finally
antithetical to the concerns of Latin American theology of liberation. 
Indeed, Leonardo Boff has admirably shown how a love for Jesus may 
be preserved through an active yet non-violent expression of Jesus' 
love, at work through human love for the neighbour, for friends, 
for family, and for enemies. But finally, love for God, or for 
the person of Jesus Christ, may not be totally expressed in 'horizon­
tal' loves. The records left by the great mystics, especially of 
the Roman Catholic orders, resist reductions which attempt to dispose 
of the traditions of piety, contemplation, and 'vertical' worship. 
There is an analogy here which may be expressed in the relationship 
of bread to work. Without nourishment there can be no creative 
energy. But if one only lives to eat, then creativity suffers and 
obesity results. Bread and work are intimately related, but they 
are not quite reducible to the same thing, nor can the one authen­
tically be entertained without the other. After all, it takes work 
to make bread, just as it takes bread to make work. This simple
analogy cannot say it all, but it implies a great deal. Human beings
are more than the sum of their parts, and any implicit reduction
of human nature to practical or material entities is likely to be
unsatisfactory in the long run. Similarly, the kingdom of God does
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not seem to be essentially definable in any list of components. 
Its immanence is indeed to be affirmed, but not at the expense of 
its transcendence.
If liberation theology aspires to encourage the saints to 
take up their crosses in "following Jesus", then it must find ways 
of affirming the ultimate hope which has encouraged Christian martyrs 
since the earliest persecutions. The apostles of the early Church 
did not attempt to reassure the victims of persecution by telling 
them that there was justice in their cause, nor that their poverty 
was their key to heaven. The hope in Christian eschatology has
always been grounded upon a greater justice than that achieved or 
achievable in history. The justice, in this sense, has nothing 
to do with merit, equality, or work, but in spite of every martyr's 
limitations, shortcomings, omissions, and mistakes, can only be 
consummated as "justification". The exploiter and victim, the opp­
ressed and oppressor, the willing and the unwilling martyr have 
this justice in common at the end of the day. It does not depend 
upon riches or poverty in this world, nor upon faith or the lack
of it, for it can only be a justice which is created for "each accord­
ing to his need". Eschatology must have a place for the 'dead'.
Upon this 'place' Christian hope is founded, and by it ultimate 
justice, liberation, and love shall be determined. Without such 
a hope, our vision of justice and liberation here may be an illusion, 
and theology which calls itself "good news for the poor" is no better 
and no worse than an innocuous hallucinogen by which we pass the
time.
The kingdom of God, therefore, must entail this sense of justice 
which is not conditioned by history nor, so far, achievable by human 
beings within it. If God is love, and if love is "the soul of justice," 
as the Medellfn bishops affirmed, then God can never be 'absent' 
from the human condition, within history or beyond it. God's wrath 
may indeed be an expression of his love, but his wrath cannot entail 
his absence. The allusion of Miranda and Gutierrez to such an event-
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uality is a denial of the Covenant, both the "old" one and the "new". 
Finally, if we see Jesus as the fulfilment of the Decalogue and
the prophecy of Jeremiah 31:31, the kingdom of God must be construed 
in intimate relation to God's continued Covenant with his people. 
It does not begin with Jesus, nor does it finish with his death; 
it does not exclude history, but transforms and transcends it; it
is not only good news to the poor, but also liberation and ultimate 
justice for all. The universality of the Covenant and the kingdom 
of God cannot finally be interpreted in terms of history, class- 
struggle, or a vindication of the oppressed. Justice cannot finally
be conceived theologically without reference to God's capacity to 
"justify" and redeem both oppressor and oppressed.
If "love is the soul of justice", then Latin American theology 
of liberation is inconsistent in drawing an equation between love 
and justice. Visions of justice vary in this world; quite possibly 
they are generally based upon some primal sense of human relationships 
experienced in authentic meetings of one person with another, or 
an "I-thou" encounter. If this is so, then justice may be a phenomen­
ological derivative of feelings which we call love. Similarly, 
love and the experience of justice which it often facilitates, pre­
cedes and informs such changing "justice structures" as civilization 
is able to formalize and institute in successive societies. In 
the experience of love and authentic feeling between the I and the 
thou, there may be a kind of "justifia originalis" which constantly 
shapes our juridical systems, guiding as well as criticizing them. 
This notion that there could be in the experience of love a 'vision' 
of original justice must be further explored in the following chapter. 
But in relation to Latin American theology of liberation, the constru­
ctive suggestion may be offered that if love is made the logical 
equivalent of justice, then the effect may be the limitation of 
love to whatever partial or contingent sense of justice that may 
be deemed possible or prevalent at any given moment. As we have
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observed, love cannot be exhausted by the idea of equality. If 
love is "the soul of justice", then, it appears, love is also prior 
to justice. Through the practice of love, justice might facilitate 
greater love, and in turn, even greater justice.
Finally, the love which we are able to consciously think and 
imagine may only be the tip of the iceberg. Taken literally, the 
Feuerbachian inversion of "love is God" only begins to intimate 
the creative possibilities of a love interpreted essentially by 
its epiphany in human life. The 'sacrament' of love for one's neigh­
bour may be a profound 'intuition' which symbolises, without exhaust­
ing, "what is the breadth and length and height and depth of the 
love of Christ... though it is beyond knowledge" (Eph. 3:18-19). 
Such an 'intuition', Paul suggests, may lead humanity to "the fullness 
of being, the fullness of God himself."
The next chapter will explore further.
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EROS; PROCLAIMED, MAIMED, REDEEMED
After the formidable critique and solid challenge of Latin 
American theology of liberation, it may seem inappropriate to wander 
off into the metaphysics of the philosophy of process. Latin American 
theologians are certainly justified in their complaint that northern 
theologians often retreat behind a barrier of 'academic' terms while 
a suffering humanity cries for justice, food, shelter, and an absence 
of war which might make true peace possible. There is indeed a 
sense in which the 'first world' lies captive to its intellectual 
machinery.
Yet, the arguments which have so often been used to vindicate 
imperialism and exploitation may, with better arguments, be shown 
to be faulty. As Alfred North Whitehead has illustrated, John Wesley's 
death-bed petition to Lord Wilberforce for the abolition of the 
slave trade capped a persistent career dedicated to the power of 
persuasion, enlightened and effected through the integration of 
religion, philosophy, and law, for the purpose of building a better 
world and a better humanity. The 'institutions' of religion, philoso­
phy, and law - informed by science - still constitute the basis
%of civilized societies. Despite their tendency to undergird the 
status quo, they are nevertheless subject to change. In such institu­
tions change most often occurs through persistent questioning of 
their principles. Rarely in highly civilized societies has justice 
occurred through revolution. When violent upheaval has overturned 
the stabilizing institutions of a society, it is rarely evident 
that greater justice is created; often there is wide-spread suffering 
by the very people on whose behalf the revolution was supposedly 
conducted.
At any event, the concept of revolution is not directly trans­
latable from age to age and from country to country. It is significant
1. arguably, even for societies which are nominally 'Marxist'.
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that what Marx and Engels envisioned for England was more nearly 
approximated in agrarian Russia. What may have worked in Cuba seems 
to require different interpretation in Mexico. Capitalism today 
is no longer what it was; ironically it is often allied with a collect­
ivity of proletarian shareholders, including trade-unionists. The 
vast multi-national corporations, for better or for worse, have 
taken their place beside the more ancient institutions that maintain
the fabric of the world. The 'purifying' isolationism of China
and Albania is no longer feasible. Modern communication and economic
systems have extended the socialist's maxim, "there is no such thing 
as a human individual", so that now it may be said that there is
no such thing as an individual nation. More than ever in history, 
people and nations are dependent upon each other and upon the institu­
tions which bring them together, from the village cooperative to 
the World Bank. Robert McAfee Brown has succinctly stated the dilemma: 
"Maybe small is beautiful, but bigness isn't going away.
While human hearts occasionally 'melt', corporate and institu­
tional ones must usually be convinced. A theology which is genuinely 
concerned about love and justice may not have the privilege of arbitr­
arily condemning contemporary institutions in favour of a kingdom 
of heaven whithout them. While they are certainly not to be absolut­
ized or considered 'necessary' in their present forms, they may
yet have the capacity to play a role in God's liberative purpose.
An authentic historical analysis might discover that theology's
sharpest tools have been those of critical insight and rational 
argument. Some liberation theologians might agree; nevertheless, 
they have not stressed often enough that a liberative love may be 
no less "effective" if it is rational, patient, and passionately
"persuasive".
1. Robert McAfee Brown, Creative Dislocation - The Movement of G r a c e , Abingdon, Nashville, 
1980, pp. 97ff.
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"Persuasion" and "persuasive love" are passwords to a body 
of literature which stemmed from the philosophy of Alfred North
Whitehead. In 1924 he left a career as an English mathematician
to develop his own approach to metaphysics in the United States.
The "philosophy of process" as a holistic, anthropocentric, "natural 
theology" is seminally outlined in Whitehead's 1927-8 Gifford Lectures 
at Edinburgh, published in 1929 as Process and Reality. A further 
development of his thought is his 1933 Adventures of Ideas, exploring 
the relationship between human experience and the total process 
of civilization. Although Whitehead acknowledges the influence
of Plato, Hume, Descartes, Henry Bergson, William James, and John 
Dewey, his own integration of mathematics, philosophy, science, 
cultural phenomena, history, art, psychology, and religion provides 
the broad parameters of his thought.
Many of Whitehead's ideas have been perpetuated in various
forms by a host of modern authors. One of the most notable has
been Charles Hartshorne, whose adaptation of process thought has
been concerned with the development of a concept of God avoiding
the "paradox" as a way of reconciling the illogical.  ^ Daniel Day
Williams' development of a process view of love, though important,
2cannot be treated here. Others might be mentioned at various points, 
but given the diversity among process thinkers it will be impossible 
to characterize the field and range of their thinking about love, 
God, the universe, and the infinite integral experiences of humanity. 
For this reason I have chosen to concentrate upon Whitehead himself 
in an attempt to understand his thought about love in relation to 
humanity, to civilization, and finally to God.
1. cf. especially Charles Hartshorne, The Divine R e l a t i v i t y , Yale University Press, New 
Haven, Conn., 1948, 1967; Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak
of G o d , University of Chicago Press, 1953; Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social P r o c e s s , 
Free Press, Glencoe, III. 1953; Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of P e r f e c t i o n , Open Court 
Publishing Co., La Salle, Illinois, 1962; On justice, cf. Charles Hartshorne, "Beyond 
Enlightened Se lf-Interest", in Harry James Cargas and Bernard Lee (editors). Religious 
Experience and Process T h e o l o g y , Paulist Press, New York, 1976
2. cf. Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of L o v e , James Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 
Digswell Pl., Welwyn, Herts, 1968.
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Whitehead's Holistic Approach to the Nature of Love
Whitehead's vision of the role of love in a continuous process 
of creation has not been rendered obsolete. On the contrary, contemp­
orary thinkers are just beginning to explore the wider implications 
of his approach. His lack of dogmatic style, despite the use of 
numerous special concepts, has given his work a flexibility uncommon 
to many philosophers. He was convinced that education in the twentie
&bh century should be an adequate preparation for the onslaught of
1"general novelty", and his work represents this conviction. Beginn­
ing with human existence and experience, Whitehead proposed to relate 
the smallest particle, qualitatively, with the purpose and dynamics 
of the universe. Such an ambitious programme necessarily requires 
a certain amount of speculation, but Whitehead's speculation is 
meticulously derived from his previous analysis, and is therefore 
closely controlled. Whitehead implies that all innovation in history 
depends upon a certain amount of speculative imagination, of "fore­
sight" as well as "insight"; phenomenological analysis alone is 
2not enough.
Based upon his close examination of the "experience" of a 
single "occasion" Whitehead hopes to suggest what is going on in 
the universe. In practical terms, the "experience" is that of human­
ity, and the "occasion" is any point along the line of that experience. 
From this Whitehead deduces that the whole universe must operate 
according to the same motivating and synthesizing force or forces 
which constitute the life and experience of individual and corporate 
humanity. In broad terms, the central factor in all this experience
1. cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , Cambridge University Press, 1933, p . 118
2. Whitehead says that "human experience must not be over-inte llec tua liz ed." Intelligence 
often "flourishes at the expense of wisdom." "The folly of intelligent people, cl ear­
headed and n a r r o w - v i s i o n e d , has pr ecipitated many catastrophes." "In some direction or 
other we must devote ourselves beyond what would be warranted by the analysis of pure 
reason." Although "praxis" is not Wh itehead's God, neither is reason, cf. Adventures 
of Ideas, pp. 58-59, 138. (op. cit.)
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is love. "The Eros of the universe" appears in an infinite number 
of forms to generate the continuous becoming of all life.^
1. The Nature of Eros
It is an irony of history that at almost exactly the same 
time that Anders Nygren was drawing his strict antithesis between 
Christian love and the idea of eros, Whitehead was attempting to 
reconcile a comprehensive concept of eros with the 'truth' inherent 
in Christianity. Also at about the same time, Sigmund Freud was 
developing his concept of eros. The emphases of each of these think­
ers are with us yet, and the radical differences in their interpreta­
tions account for some of the confusion about the meaning of love 
today. Each of these men found the 'roots' of eros in the writings 
of Plato. Nygren's spiritually acquisitive eros stems, however, 
more from neo-platonist philosophy than from Plato himself. Freud's 
egotistic, pleasure oriented eros is partially platonic and partially
his own synthesis derived from research into the unconscious drives 
2of his clients. Whitehead's notion of eros (Eros) assimilates,
to some extent, the interpretations of both Nygren and Freud. For
Whitehead, eros is, essentially, an elan vital, a life force, which
is the driving energy, not only of human nature, but also of the 
whole universe. As such it includes both the selfish acquisitiveness 
and the ascendancy toward God which Nygren identified. It also
resembles the "pleasure principle" of Freud which Whitehead conceives 
as an urge toward beauty. Since eros is indeed a creative principle 
for Whitehead, the drives toward procreation are not to be excluded
1. ibid. pp. 13, 256
2. cf. Douglas N . Morgan, Love: Plato, the Bible and F r e u d , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inglewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey, 1964; and Rollo May, Love and W i l l , W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1969.
Freud himself held that "the Eros of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the 
love-force, the l i b i d o , of ps ychoanalysis." Morgan, however, states that "The truth
is that Freudian love is very nearly the obverse of Platonic love." (cf. Morgan, p . 173, May, p. 87)
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from it. Very briefly, we might characterize Whitehead's notion 
of eros as the primeval urge toward life and beauty, moving from 
primary creation to the creation and procreation of each organism, 
stimulating the perception of beauty and the endeavor to achieve 
it, incarnating itself in matter and time as each organism (or "occa­
sion") strives to build upon the experience of its predecessors, 
in a social existence directed ultimately toward a perfection of 
harmony seminally latent in eros itself.
Although Whitehead does not specifically stress the idea of 
eros until it is integrated with the development of civilization 
in Adventures of Ideas, the notion is already evident in the final 
pages of Process and Reality. The idea of eros seems to derive 
from Whitehead's attempt to describe the primordial nature of God. 
God is "the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth 
of potentiality."^ He is not before creation but with it. God 
is "deficiently actual"; "his feelings are only conceptual and so 
lack the fulness of actuality." God is 'dependent' upon the actualiz­
ation of the universe, and upon each particular creative act within 
it.
He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particular relevance to each creative act, as it arises from its own conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes him the initial 'object of ^esire' establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim.
Since God himself is this "lure for feeling, the eternal urge of
desire", we might say that "the Eros of the universe" is ontically
summoned by God as a kind of prime movement of the universe which
results from a prime attraction. Eros is the dynamic movement of
the universe toward the fulfilment and actualization of God. The
3"Eros of the Universe" is the "Primordial Nature of God."
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y , Cambridge University Press, 1929, p. 486
2. ibid. p. 487
3. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 326. The term "Eros" does not emerge, however, 
until identified as such in Adventures of I d e a s . Previous works of Whitehead contain
the idea, but no stress upon the word.
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Eros and "love" are not strict synonyms for Whitehead. Love 
is diversely interpreted; it may be merely acquisitive, or it may 
be the common factor in human experience which facilitates an intui­
tion of God. Whitehead identifies love as one of the primary factors 
in experience, an "animal passion" inclined towards apettéhoe and 
satisfaction.  ^ In this sense, human love is contained in eros, 
which urges lesser loves toward distinctly human expression. Those 
loves are more human which are characterized by an intimacy with 
beauty.
For Whitehead beauty may be of sensible, intellectual or moral 
quality. Indeed, beauty may redefine the idea of 'truth'. "There 
is a grandeur of achievement in the delicate adjustment of thought
to thought which is independent of the mere blunt question of truth.
2We may term it 'beauty.'" Whitehead's constant emphasis upon 'beauty' 
illustrates the importance of aesthetics for civilization. Eros 
and beauty are closely aligned, for beauty is that quality by which 
"animal passion" becomes socialized and also an intuition of God. 
Intellectual, moral, and sensible beauty "partake in the highest 
ideal of satisfaction possible for actual realization, and in this 
sense can be termed that beauty which provides the final contentment
3of the Eros of the Universe." We may surmise, therefore, that 
individual acquisitive love is certainly a part of the same eros 
which constitutes the fulfilment of God, but only as love is able 
to appreciate and actualize beauty is it able to achieve its human 
purpose and possibilities. At the same time, eros, which is attuned 
to beauty, beckons individual loves toward greater and more beautiful 
ethical and social expressions.
Since eros represents a dynamic and progressive movement, 
from quantitative experience toward qualitative, there must be some
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 12
2. ibid
3. ibid. p. 13
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transitional energy which facilitates the higher levels. Whitehead's 
whole philosophy presupposes freedom in each occasion of experience. 
The transitional energy, therefore, cannot be conceived as a determin­
ed or necessary law. Despite various forms of extraneous coercion, 
there always remains some available freedom to each occasion by 
which it can 'choose' alternative avenues of successive becoming. 
Whitehead's suggestion is that an occasion may choose the optimal
mode of self actualization and greater beauty of experience if it 
is 'persuaded' to do so. "The progressive societies are those which 
most decisively have trusted themselves to...the way of persuasion."^ 
The 'force' of Eros is not a coercive force, but one which, through 
the facilitation of the appreciation of beauty, persuades each occas­
ion to strive toward greater possibilities. Whitehead lists three 
activities in civilization which have tended to promote "the way 
of persuasion" as a genuine stimulus for historical progress. "They 
are family affections aroused in sex relations and in the nurture
of children, intellectual curiosity leading to enjoyment in the
2interchange of ideas, and...the practice of commerce." Numerous
other allusions to the power of persuasion imply that for Whitehead, 
the eros which seeks to achieve the highest forms of life and beauty 
does so best through persuasive energy, and not by force, necessity,
3or coercion. The pervasive influence of subtle forms of persuasion 
throughout experience and civilization may constitute a sort of
'providence' in Whitehead's thought.^
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 109
2. ibid.
3. The 'notions' of eros and persuasion are pervasive implicit themes running through 
Adventures of I d e a s , and, one might surmise, through all of Whitehead's philosophy. 
Nevertheless, the explicit references to them do not provide concise definitions capable 
of minute analysis. For example, the index to Adventures of Ideas lists only twelve 
references to "persuasion" and only ten to "Eros", but some grasp of both seems to be 
necessary for un derstanding Whitehead's integration of experience and civilization.
4. cf. D.W.D. Shaw, "Providence and Persuasion", The Duke Divinity School R e v i e w , Winter, 
1980, Vol. 45, Duke University Di vini ty School, Durham, N.C. pp. 11 f f .
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Although eros is optimally persuasive, it is not necessarily 
so. In lower forms it may be impulsively appetitive, ferocious, 
or cruelly dominant. Because it does not inhibit the freedom of 
particular occasions it can be allied with enslaving methods, while 
yet preserving its own capacity to highlight latent and potential 
beauty. Whitehead notices that a major difference between Greek 
philosophers and those today is the former presupposition of slavery 
as an acceptable means for achieving worthy ends. "The slaves were 
the martyrs whose toil made progress possible."^ Nevertheless, 
the slave himself is subject to "the mystery of the human soul in 
its journey toward the source of all harmony...his body bent, his 
glance upwards." Although eros may freely mix with evil, it persist­
ently tends toward a "reverence for that power in virtue of which
nature harbours ideal ends,..the foundation for the respect for 
„2man as man."
In light of the previous chapter stressing the relation of 
love and justice, it is important to note that for Whitehead, eros 
is certainly not absent when justice is not done. Although it has 
a capacity to be a tool of injustice, it nevertheless maintains 
its emphasis upon a greater potential for just relationships between 
(human) beings. Through its link with the human liability to persua­
sion, eros urges civilization toward tolerance and liberty. Whitehead 
suggests that persuasive methods may have been originally the most 
primitive, with force and ferocity developing from the increase 
in self-interest which accompanied an increase in intelligence. 
But, he argues, force is really the failure of civilization, and
the true worth of human beings consists in their liability to persua- 
3Sion.
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 25
2. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 109
3. ibid. p. 105
3 9 0
Insofar as eros is a primal urge toward the acualization of 
God, it is dependent upon particular actualizations in history. 
These manifestations in concrete form may or may not resemble the 
conceptual possibilities which God envisions, nevertheless the concep­
tual character of eros is preserved even when it is allied with 
apparently evil representation. Because there is a definite link 
between God's conceptual possibilities and "the Eros of the Universe" 
which is attracted toward God for his fulfilment, eros cannot ultima­
tely be determined by concrete expression of any particular form. 
This is to say that God's purpose is the ultimate purpose of eros, 
and its character as persistent drive toward beauty is not affected 
by injustice, intolerance, domination, and coercion.
I have noted that Whitehead's eros is somewhat indebted to 
Plato. It is clear that Whitehead, like Plato, attempts to construct 
"the most likely tale" avoiding the limitations of definitive system­
atization. Plato, Whitehead says, "is never entirely self-consistent, 
and rarely explicit and devoid of ambiguities. He feels the difficul­
ties and expresses his perplexities. No one could be perplexed 
over Aristotle's classifications; whereas Plato moves about amid 
a fragmentary system like a man dazed by his own penetration."^ 
Eros is (literally) the central 'notion' of seven, which Whitehead 
alleges to be "as important for us now, as they were then at the 
dawn of the modern world, when civilizations of the old type were 
dying." They include The Ideas, The Physical Elements, The Psyche, 
The Eros, The Harmony, The Mathematical Relations, and The Receptacle. 
Although it is impossible here to examine Whitehead's reinterpretation 
of each of these, it is important that they are, in the thought 
of both Plato and Whitehead, "interwoven". No one concept 'can stand 
alone, but must broadly be interrelated with the others. The Ideas
1. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 188
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depend upon "compatibilities and incompatibilities" which are "the 
key to coherent thought, and to the understanding of the world in 
its function as the theatre for the temporal realization of ideas." 
Ideas only obtain creative efficiency by being entertained in a 
living intelligence, a Psyche, a ’soul ’ (Hegel's Geist), "whose 
active grasp of ideas conditions impartially the whole process of 
the Universe." "There is a "perfection" in this Psyche which gives 
it the character of "Supreme Craftsman", responsible for such order­
liness as the world exhibits. "There are also finite souls of varying 
grades, including human souls, all playing their part in conditioning 
nature by the inherent persuasiveness of ideas."
But the notion of mere knowledge, that is to say, of mere understanding, is quite alien to Plato's thought. The age of professors had not yet arrived. In his view the entertainment of ideas is intrinsically associated with an inward ferment, an activity of subjective feeling, which is at once immediate enjoyment, and also an ap- petition which melts into action. This is Plato's Eros, which he sublimates into the notion of the soul in the enjoyment of its creative function, arising from its entertainment of ideas. The word Eros means 'Love', and in the Symposium Plato gradually elicits his fingl conception of the urge towards ideal perfection.
Whitehead's interpretation of Plato's eros is somewhat subjec­
tive, and might not be accepted by everyone. As we have noticed, 
the concept of eros in the Symposium is subject to diverse interpreta­
tion. Whitehead, however, does observe the development in Plato's
thought which accounts for much of the controversy about the nature 
of eros. Whether Diotima's discourse was really Plato's "final 
conception of the urge towards ideal perfection" is still a matter 
of debate. But what we do have here is a characterization of 
Whitehead's own foundation for the 'height and breadth' of love. 
What Whitehead sees as missing from Plato's notion of eros is the 
perennial disharmony in nature with which eros so often finds itself 
aligned. Whitehead suggests that Plato "should have written a
1. ibid. p. 189
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companion dialogue which might have been named "The Furies", dwelling
on the horrors lurking within imperfect realization."
Plato, although he neglected to write this missing 
dialogue, did not overlook the confusion and disorder in Nature. He expressly denies omnipotence to his Supreme Craftsman. The influence of the entertainment of ideas is always persuasive, and can only produce such order as is possible. However, on this point he wavers, and sometimes writes as if the Craftsman^were disposing the world according to his supreme will.
But Whitehead does not waver; God has a purpose but not a 
strict design. Eros is subject to all the freedom in the universe. 
Whitehead stresses that "there is complete freedom among contemporar­
ies" (i.e. in the evolution of the universe, apart from extraneous 
kinds of force which appear in civilization) . "It is not true that
whatever happens is immediately a condition laid upon everything 
2else." Although eros is subject to freedom abused by individual
occasions and which indeed contributes to "the horrors lurking within
imperfect realization", momentary 'furies' are survived in the surge
of "teleological self-creation".
The running stream purifies itself, or perhaps loses some virtue which in happier circumstances might have been retained. The initial phase of each fresh occasion repre­sents the issue of a struggle within the past for objective existence beyond itself. The determinant of the struggle is the supreme Eros incarnating itself as the first phase 
of the individual subjective aim in the new process of actuality.
"All simplifications of religious dogma," says Whitehead, 
"are shipwrecked upon the problem of evil. The assertion of God's 
omnipotence cannot easily reconcile the "cross purposes" which accomp­
any inherent freedom in every occasion and in every 'society' of 
occasions.
We live in a common world of mutual adjustment, of intel­
ligible relations, of zest after purposes, of valuations, of joy and grief, of interest concentrated on self, of in­terest directed beyond self, of short-time and long-time failures or successes, of different layers of feeling, of life-weariness and of life-zest.
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 189
2. ibid. p. 255
3. ibid. p. 256
4. Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the M a k i n g , Meridian Books, World Publishing Co. 
New York, 1960; (MacMillan, New York, 1926) p. 74
5. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, op. cit. p. 77
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"There is evil," says Whitehead, "when things are at cross-purposes."^
Nevertheless, "the inconsistency in the world is derived from the
2consistency of God." God's purpose is "to secure the avoidance 
of evil" through the influence of good which overcomes it. Although 
evil is somewhat inherent to the nature of things, it is not 'nec­
essary', and because it is 'unstable' it may be a factor in the 
passage to greater beauty, exactly insofar as it is a 'negative' 
stimulus to progress. Although evil is destructive it becomes
"positive" because, by avoiding it, eros surges toward higher quality 
in successive occasions. As Whitehead so often stresses, artificial 
programmes which intend to pre-determine possible evil by the limita­
tion of available freedom may have the effect of limiting the possib­
ilities for progress. Thus great societies are those which are 
able to correlate with the higher nature of eros and the purpose 
of God through widespread reliance upon forms of persuasion, producing
3conditions favorable to an "upward" evolution. Similarly, a religion 
which is truly progressive in character must change its emphasis 
from "the will of God" to "the goodness of God." As it does so, 
"religion can be, and has been, the main instrument for progress."^ 
"The immanence of the basic Eros", Whitehead tells us, "endows
5with agency all ideal possibilities." Whitehead's theory of di­
polar experience assumes "an extensive continuum" only a fraction 
of which can be conscious. there is a "mental pole" of each "epochal 
occasion" which synthesizes recent past experience and contributes 
its own "novelty", to be successively assimilated by future occasions. 
There is also a "physical pole" of each occasion which receives 
data from "actual entities" and whose activity constitutes "pure 
feeling". The interdependence of mental and physical poles brings 
into beings new possibilities as they interact with each other.
1. ibid. p. 94
2. ibid. p. 96
3. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 88
4. Whitehead, Religion in the M a k i n g , op. cit. p. 36
5. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 270
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The mental pole derives its objective content by abstracting from 
the physical pole. In this abstraction potential novelty arises 
via eros' activity in the new phase, and "the objective universe 
has passed from the function of a basis for a new individuality 
to that of an instrument for purposes." This is Whitehead's reinter­
pretation of Descartes' Cogito ergo sum. Obviously, this is a complex 
theory, and despite its importance, it cannot be explained adequately 
in a few paragraphs.^ A great part of this theory is, in fact, 
Whitehead's interpretation of Plato's notion of eros, quoted above: 
"The entertainment of ideas is intrinsically associated with an 
inward ferment, an activity of subjective feeling, which is at once 
immediate enjoyment, and also an appetition which melts into action."
The immanence of eros in the first phase of each new occasion const-
2itutes God as the "initial aim" for that occasion.
As an "activity of subjective feeling...melts into action" there 
is also here a notion of "praxis" in the classical sense of activity 
conditioned by theory. Whitehead is not offering a theory of random 
activity, which by chance happens to hit on the appropriate combina­
tions for progress. Instead, he is suggesting that progress, both 
in history and in evolution, is a function of prior experience brought 
to a specific point, which is then synthesized with new possibilities 
and new intuitions. It is a "praxis" without necessity, but with 
the constant influence of God's purpose for the universe, incarnated 
in each point of decision as eros seeking beauty. Unlike Marxist 
"praxis", Whitehead's does not depend upon consciousness. It goes 
on beneath consciousness, and in spite of it, to secure greater 
intensity and quality of successive experiences.
Human consciousness, Whitehead implies, may contain the criteria 
of 'truth', but it is not an adequate judge of reality. "Truth
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 270 (For an adequate treatment of Whitehead's 
theory of di-polarity, of. John B. Cobb, A Christian Natural T h e o l o g y , Lutterworth, 
London, 1965; esp. Chapter I )
2. ibid. p. 256, cf. pp. 189, 326
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is a qualification which applies to appearance alone. Reality is
Xjust itself, and it is nonsense to ask whether it be true or false."
Truth has a variety of degrees and modes. Truth depends upon the
"nexus" about which certain statements are concerned. The nexus
may be any ascribed 'togetherness' of various occasions, or societies
of occasions, to which some proposition may have partial relevance.
2But "to know the truth partially is to distort the universe." 'Two 
patterns, the one ascribed, the other descriptive of the ascription, 
can never hope to state things as they actually are, but only things 
as they appear. Thus, for Whitehead, a statement of truth is always 
relative to the apprehension of appearance.
For example, Whitehead notes that an infant feels its mother's 
cheerfulness as "a complex fact of the mother's existence, body 
and soul." An "affective tone" mediates for the child what may 
be in fact the appearance of the mother, yet the child is unable 
to give expression to this 'truth' according to 'types' identified
3by adults.
Although there may be some interruption between appearance 
and reality, so far as senses mediate the former and imply the latter, 
so far as there is indeed a conformity of sense and feeling in the 
universe, between what we suspect through our senses and what turns 
out to be somewhat dependable on the basis of prior experience, 
Whitehead suggests that nature contains within it "a tendency to 
be in tune." Truth continues to be a relative term, for our exper­
ience is always partial, and "appearances are finally controlled 
by the functionings of the animal body." ^ But so far as there is 
a correlation between sense experience and appearances of nature, 
Whitehead suggests that there is a perfection of nature in respect 
to the higher types of animal life, - evidence of "an Eros urging
5towards perfection."
1. ibid. p. 309
2. ibid. p. 311 3. ibid.
4. ibid. p. 322 This theory is quite similar to Feuerbach's theory of S i n n l i c h k e i t . Truth 
lies in feeling, not ne cessarily in reason or consciousness.
5. ibid. p. 323
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2. The Adventure of Eros
The eros which is conceived as "the soul stirring itself to 
life and motion", the "first phase" in every new occasion, the 
"initial aim" of each subjective form which is given by God for 
the determination of actuality from perceived possibility, takes 
form in civilization as an impulse toward truth, beauty, adventure, 
art and peace. I have already alluded to Whitehead's interpretation 
of truth and beauty. Generally, beauty is a wider and much more 
comprehensive notion than truth, and in fact interprets truth in 
many respects. Truth is dependent upon appearance, and aesthetic 
feeling conditions how any "nexus" appears, "Truth is various in 
its extent, its modes, and its relevance." Thus a "Truth of supreme 
Beauty lies beyond the dictionary meanings of w o r d s . T r u t h  is 
neither good nor bad, but justifies itself insofar as it promotes 
beauty. Nevertheless, falsehood brings beauty to a lower level,
2and so trivializes the eros in all experience which seeks perfections.
"Art", says Whitehead, "is purposeful adaptation of Appearance 
to Reality." Art is possible because there is a conformity of feeling 
in the universe, and because there is a possible but not 'necessary' 
"connectedness" of feelings in nature. A "harmony of feeling" may 
be created through art which is both beautiful and truthful, notwith­
standing its success in describing reality. Insofar as art does 
connect with reality, Whitehead suggests there may be "a perfection 
of Art" which he calls "Truthful Beauty".^ In addition to truth 
and beauty, art may also contribute to "Goodness" in civilization. 
Goodness, however, has too often been a byword of "low-toned moralists" 
who in the defence of morals would limit art's capacity to create 
goodness. Art depends upon consciousness, and for this reason, 
it lies somewhat subject to the mores of a particular culture.
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 343
2. ibid. p. 344
3. ibid. p. 345
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But Whitehead facetiously observes that there may have been some
species of amoebae who refused to migrate from ocean to dry land
in defence of morality, thereby inhibiting their evolution. Art's
adventurousness is part of its service to society.^ "It requires
Art to evoke into consciousness the finite perfections which lie
2ready for human achievement."
The eros objectified in beauty is inadequate to promote civiliz­
ation; a sense of "Adventure is essential, namely, the search for
3new perfections." Since all realization is finite, Whitehead tells 
us that there is no perfection which is the infinitude of all perfec­
tions. Even God, especially God, requires continuous qualitative
improvement for his actualization. So it is for every society; 
a strictly conservative approach to the universe would constitute 
the worst possible idolatry. "Stagnation is the deadly foe cf moral­
ity ," yet, Whitehead observes, the champions of morality are on 
the whole the fierce opponents of new ideals. In questions of moral­
ity, as well as in science, art, and commerce, there is the choice 
between advance or decadence. "The pure conservative is fighting 
against the essence of the Universe."^ The character of the universal 
eros is "life and motion"; without the activity of the Psyche and
5the Eros, Whitehead states, "we should obtain a static world."
All actuality is essentially a process. The "hybrid" rules
over the constant perishing of the past, by creating new possibilities
for the future through an experience of the immediate past in an
encounter with the mental pole of the new occasion, called a "soul".
The Soul thereby by synthesis creates a new fact which is the Appearance woven out of the old and the new- a compound of reception and anticipation, which in its turn passes in­to the future. The final synthesis of these three complexes 
is the end to which its indwelling Eros urges the soul. Its good resides in the realization of a strength of many feelings fortifying each other as they meet in the novel unity. Its
1. ibid. p .  346
2. ibid. p .  348
3. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 332
4 . ibid. p .  3 5 4
5. ibid. p. 355
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evil lies in the clash of vivid feelings, denying to each other their proper expansion. Its triviality lies in the anaesthesia by which evil is avoided. In this way through • sheer omission, fewer, fainter feelings constitute the final Appearance. Evil is the half-way house between perfection and triviality. It is the violence of strength against strength.
In this extract we see the indispensable role of eros in the movement 
of all things past and present toward an undetermined future. We 
also notice the role of evil as "the half-way house between perfection 
and triviality", which cannot be completely avoided if the process 
is to continue. For Whitehead, the idea of "Adventure" entails 
the risk of evil for the benefit of the "life and motion" of civiliz­
ation and the universe. To make something of a perishing past is 
the task of each new occasion. An inhibition of the adventure of 
eros is an inhibition of the process of creation.
The process itself is the actuality, and requires no antecedent static cabinet. Also the processes of the past, in their perishing, are themselves energizing as the complex origin of each novel occasion. The pastis the reality at the base of each new actuality. Theprocess is its absorption into a new unity with idealsand w^th anticipation, by the operation of the creativeEros.
The juxtaposition of a "creative Eros" with actual process, 
both creative, overcoming evil, not by merely avoiding it, but by
synthesizing it with good in successive experiences and epochs, 
leads us, possibly without Whitehead's intention, to a notion of 
grace. This grace does not operate from outside human experience 
but through it, and through all the molecules and forces of creation. 
To this extent it resembles somewhat that grace which was discovered 
in the anthropocentric theology of liberation. If the "Divine Eros" 
is as characterized by the persistence of 'persuasion' as Whitehead 
suggests, then with that grace we also have the foundations for
a providence which stems from God's purpose incarnated in the life 
of each successive occasion, an eros in each individual whose 'initial
aim' is socially "lured" toward God.
1. ibid.
2. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 356
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For the moment, we must reserve judgement about Whitehead's
mixture of evil with the adventure of eros. Whether the evil is
quite as indispensable as Whitehead claims demands further study. 
Nevertheless, we ma.y indeed acknowledge that freedom for being per­
suaded may necessarily entail freedom not to be. And, as Whitehead 
observes, evil does seem to be aligned with "the violence of strength 
against strength", for the development of strength is a result of 
the appropriation of freedom. Wherever there is freedom, there 
msy be evil also. But where good overcomes evil, where novelty
arises and new ideas are conceived and aimed for, there also may 
be some substantive benefit to God, the "lure" for this Eros. If 
so, then the "creative Eros", the "Divine Eros", and "the Eros of
the Universe" constitute one movement which in theology might be
called grace-the purposes of God incarnated in the minds and matter 
of creation.
Whitehead's attempt to explain experience with reference to
physical and mental poles, interdependent upon, and interacting 
with each other in a continuous stream producing new occasions, 
is an attempt to destroy the Cartesian dualism between mind and 
matter. Since this holistic view has the concept of eros at its 
centre, and since eros, after all, represents a universalized idea
of love, we are once again reminded of Feuerbach.
Feuerbach hoped to show that love is the foundation of self- 
consciousness, a substance both material and spiritual is essence; 
taking shape first as sense, then as feeling, and eventually as
"species-consciousness" transcending individual and specific manifest­
ations. For Feuerbach, "Sinnlichkeit" was the substance of thought, 
and he struggled to meike the elements of sense and feeling present 
in matter as it is in human nature. Perhaps the closest he was 
able to come was his often quoted aphorism "Der Mensch ist was er 
isst" (Man is what he eats.) But, as Marx Wartofsky has observed, 
to successfully reconcile the problem of mind and matter, one must
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be able to show that matter is capable of consciousness, and this
1Feuerbach could not do. Through the idea of love, he thied,-to
"posit the infinite in the finite", showing how the 'material' of
feeling becomes unlimited in imagination. Although Feuerbach was
a precursor of Whitehead upon the synthesizing characteristics of
feeling, and indeed on the pervasiveness and transcendence of love,
he was not able to trace the movement of matter to mind.
Whitehead has done what Feuerbach could ncit because he refused
to begin with the duality of mind and matter, but has sought to
show that an integration of the two may be conceived through the
2notion of experience. Since all experience has both physical and 
mental poles which interact, electrons, molecules, bread, and thought 
are not essentially dissimilar. It is "the Eros of the Universe"
which not only brings together the physical and mental poles of
atoms, but which also envisages the resolution of infinite numbers 
of atoms in a "world-consciousness", for "an epochal occasion is
3a microcosm inclusive of the whole universe."
Whereas Feuerbach sought to translate religion into a developing
"species consciousness", Whitehead seems to argue that such a religion
Viould not be great enough.
Now, so far as concerns religion, the distinction of a world- consciousness as contrasted with a social consciousness is the change of emphasis in the concept of rightness. A social consciousness concerns people whom you know and love indiv­idually. Hence rightness is mixed up with the notion of preservation. Conduct is right which will lead God to pro­
tect you, and it is wrong if it stirs some irascible being to compass your destruction...But a world-consciousness is more disengaged. It ^ises to the conception of an essential rightness of things.
Whitehead's "rational religion" identified with the growth 
of a "world-consciousness" is, in some ways, similar tc Feuerbach's 
"species-consciousness", developed as an alternative to inadequate
I» efi MarX Wartofsky, F e u e r b a c h , Ca mbridge University Press, 1977, p. 250
2. cf. Process and R e a l i t y , pp. 48-50 "The ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism." (cf. 
John B. Cobb, A Christian Natural T h e o l o g y , op. cit.)
3. Whitehead, Religion in the M a k i n g , op. cit. p. 89
4. ibid. pp. 39-40
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manifestations of consciousness in exclusive religions. But White­
head's view is much wider, for by "an essential rightness of things" 
Whitehead hopes to overcome every tendency of religious consciousness 
that is aimed at self-preservation, which "leads to the morbid exag­
geration of national self-consciousness."^
Whitehead insists that "if the modern world is to find God,
2it must find him through love and not through fear." Feuerbach, 
in his way, would have agreed. The same critique of religion which 
forced Feuerbach to "sacrifice God to love" is also discerned by 
Whitehead :
History, down to the present day, is a melancholy record 
of the horrors which can attend religion: human sacrifice, and in particular the slaughter of children, cannibalism, sensual orgies, abject superstition, hatred as between races, the maintenance of degrading customs, hysteria, bigotry can be laid at itg charge. Religion is the last refuge of human savagery.
Finally, despite certain similarities of theme, Whitehead 
parts company from Feuerbach on the question of God. The difference 
is not Feuerbach's 'atheism' for the atheism is superficial. Rather, 
the difference is primarily concerned with the way God enters into 
matter. While Feuerbach noticed that love (as Sinnlichkeit) is 
a principle of unity between matter and consciousness, he was not 
able to make love the creative principle of all things.^ Whitehead, 
on the other hand, begins with love (as Eros) and identifies its 
activity in every synthesis of the universe, surging toward the 
simultaneous 'perfection' of both God and the finite world.
Whitehead, in characterizing "the Adventure of Eros", further 
notes that Eros plays a role in forming the conceptual entertainment, 
comparison, and synthesis of incompatibilities. This role is relevant
1 . ibid. p. 42 A tragedy of mi sinterpretation is the way Feuerbach's "species-consciousness", 
by way of Nietzsche, became associated with the Aryan supremacy of the Third Reich in Germany.
2. ibid. p. 73
3. ibid. p. 36
4. I think Feuerbach wanted to do this, for he called love "a creative principle." But 
because he insisted on beginning "with being itself" (i.e. D a s e i n ) he could not sustain the metaphysical basis for love's essential creativity prior to the existence of matter.
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to the formation of every present society from the past, to civiliza­
tion, and also to the realization of God himself.
This principle of intrinsic incompatibility has an important bearing upon our conception of the nature of God. The con­cept of impossibility such that God himself cannot surmount it, has been for centuries quite familiar to theologians.Indeed, apart from it there would be difficulty in conceiv­ing any determinate divine nature. But curiously enough, so far as I know, this notion of incompatibility has never been applied to ideals in the Divine realization. We must conceive the Divine Eros as the active entertainment of all ideals, with the urge to their finite realization, 
each in its due season. Thus a process must be inherent in ^God's nature whereby his infinity is acquiring realization.
Whitehead seems to be saying that every transition from past exper­
ience to future experience entails various possibilities, some of 
which are compatible and some not. In addition, the possibilities 
which are optimal for one society of occasions are not necessari ly 
compatible with the optimal possibilities revealed for others through 
the universal eros. Before passing to a new phase of existence, 
each occasion or society of occasions must "entertain conceptually" 
(though not necessarily consciously) its possibilities. Conceptual
comparisons are then considered under the influence and persuasive 
guidance of an "initial aim" which is representative of a vector
of eros toward both the actualization of God.
Although the occasion cannot actualize incompatibilities since 
all actualization is finite, there is nevertheless a sense in which 
God 'contains' incompatibilities because his purposes are only concep­
tual. But because God's purposes are constantly geared toward perfec­
tions and syntheses, the incompatibilities of today may be resolved 
and synthesized tomorrow, via further possibilities and approppiàtè:. 
initial aims revealed to future occasions. In this way, God is 
not bound by incompatibility in history, ncr is his nature jeopardized
by the evil entailed in the various realizations so far manifested,
the "cross purposes" of individual occasions and societies of occasions
1. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 357
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The "Divine Eros" continues to persuade future occasions toward 
syntheses, for "we must conceive the Divine Eros as the active enter­
tainment of all ideals, with the urge to their finite realization,
each in its due season," ^ Although "Adventure rarely x-eaches its
2predetermined end," there is sufficient beauty in the by-products 
of adventure to justify it in civilization, to effect a continuous 
process by which eros persuasively overcomes the incompatible cross­
purposes which result in temporary evil, and to contribute 'substance' 
to the actualization of God.
"The Adventure of Eros" is not an idea which can be stated 
succinctly, for it is a dynamic which is present in every atom and 
in God. Whitehead, like Leibniz, wants to tell us "how an atom
3is feeling about itself." Then he wants to explain how the same 
elan vital in that feeling is also present in humanity, the universe, 
and even God. Adventure, not entropy, is the programme of this 
eros. Perhaps we can grasp this best poetically; "The moving finger 
writes and, having writ, moves on..." Or: "New occasions seek new
duties; time makes ancient good uncouth." Yet this adventure, the 
'goodness' of it, and the harmonizing capacity of its beauty, are 
not necessary nor to be taken for granted. For wherever freedom 
abounds in the universe, and wherever there are incompatibilities 
and "cross purposes" among the various occasions, evil lurks there 
too.
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 357
2. ibid. p. 359
3. ibid. p. 169 The relationship of eros to Whitehead's view of creativity is made 
explicit in Adventures of I d e a s , but the relationship is implicit in other writings, 
partic ula rly throughout Process and Reality.
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3. Eros Maimed
"No religion which faces facts," Whitehead declares, "can
minimize the evil in the world, not merely the moral evil, but the
pain and suffering."^ Christianity, he believes, admits the evi]
in the world to be inherent, but not necessary to it. Evil may
be derived from "the contingent fact of the actual course of events."
But in contrast to Buddhism, Christianity hopes to overcome evil
with good, using evil, in a sense, to place life on a finer and 
2more human level.
As we have already seen, evil arises when occasions are at 
"cross purposes" with each other. "Evil is exhibited in physical 
suffering, mental suffering, and loss of the higher experience in
3favour of the lower experience." "The evil in itself leads to
the world losing forms of attainment in which that evil manifests
itself."  ^ Rampant suffering among a species, Whitehead tells us,
will lead to the destruction of that species, or else the members
of the species will lose the "delicacy of perception" which generally 
results in a particular kind of pain. Nevertheless, there is the 
chance that by learning how to minimize pain and evil, a society 
may gain "a finer and more subtle relationship among its bodily 
parts." For this latter reason, "evil is positive and destructive" 
while what is good is "positive and creative". Evil may be positive 
if it generates novelty which minimizes it, but it is always destruc­
tive because it represents some loss to future societies dependent 
upon the occasion that experiences the loss. It also represents 
loss to God, because evil destroys actualizations already accomplished 
and possibilities dependent upon those actualizations. The loss 
is to God's consequent actuality, but not to his conceptual purposes, 
his ideals, manifested through the eros. "The evil of the final
1. Whitehead, Religion in the M a k i n g , op. cit. p. 49
2. ibid. p. 51
3. ibid, p. 92
4. ibid. p. 93
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degradation Lies in the comparison of what 'is wüth\ what might have 
been. Whitehead seems to imply that what has been achieved is 
not totally capable of destruction, since it becomes a part of God's 
conceptual nature. Whitehead calls this preservation of all exper­
ience in God "objective immortality". But the destruction has an 
effect upon what actually might have been achieved thereafter; and 
the evil accrues for the future society, as well as for the imminent 
realization of God. (For example, the unconceived children of those 
who die in war, and their social contributions, are lost to future 
civilizations.)
We observe that for Whitehead there is no simple solution 
to the problem of evil. It is destructive and for that reason must
be avoided; yet it is not to be artificially delimited to the extent
that by avoiding evil, adventure is jeopardized. The instability 
of evil is the ameliorating fact about it which renders it, potent­
ially, a dynamic of process, and an indirect ally of eros.
The common character of all evil is that its realization in fact involves that there is some concurrent realiza­tion of a purpose towards elimination. The purpose is to secure the avoidance of evil. The fact o^ the instabilityof evil is the moral order in the world.
This "purpose... to secure the avoidance of evil" is the same urge
toward life and motion identified as universal eros. Through it
evil plays a role in its own destruction, and as Whitehead notes,
moral order derives from the possibility that evil may be overcome,
due to its instability, through the persistent 'force' of persuasion.
Because an individual cannot be conceived apart from relatedness
to its past and its contemporaries, and because each individual
has resource to some freedom, both novelty and evil are endemic
to evolution. "The essence of freedom," says Whitehead," is the
3practicability of purpose." Such practicability is limited by
1. Whitehead, Religion in the M a k i n g , op. cit. p. 94
2. ibid. p. 93
3. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 84
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the use made of freedom by prior occasions. This limitation does
not totally destroy freedom for any successive occasion, however, 
and the contribution of a greater or lesser novelty is always a
possibility for every occasion. Strict determinism is not a law
of nature, for it would oppose the very conception of a motivating, 
sustaining, and creative Eros. Indeed, the nature of all "creativity", 
in Whitehead's terms, presupposes freedom, the potential for novelty, 
and the successive use of past novelty in the immediate past exper­
ience of each occasion. The use of freedom can produce either a
novelty of some beauty and harmony, or it can produce conflicting 
purposes which constitute evil. Human purposes must compete not
only with other human purposes, but also with the apparent purposes 
of nature's "iron laws".
Both freedom and evil are, in the context of the novelty and
adventure which they enable or frustrate, somewhat defined by and
relative to "the practicability of purpose".
The massive habits of physical nature, its iron laws, determine the scene for the sufferings of men. Birth and death, heat, cold, hunger, separation, disease, the general impracticability of purpose, all bring their quota to imprison the souls of women and of men. Our experiences do not keep step with our hopes. The Platonic Eros, which is the^soul stirring itself to life and motion, is maimed.
'Eros maimed' is a concept of evil which illustrates the relat­
ive negative aspects of the conflict between opposing purposes. 
It succinctly describes the tragedy resulting from the use and abuse 
of freedom. Nature uses freedom for its purposes, and the 'laws'
of nature have long been a major frustration of human purposes. 
But Eros is also maimed when human purposes are not compatible.
In the above extract, Whitehead describes the massive suffering
of humanity. Such suffering may be the result of cross-purposes
with nature, but it may be as often the cross-purposes resulting
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 84
2. It may be recalled that Feuerbach saw in this suffering an indispensable basis for 
human community and s p e c i e s - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
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in war, economic oppression, or numerous other kinds of exploitation 
of humans by others. The experience of suffering, common to all 
the world's peoples, has been a frustration of purposes, the limita­
tion of possibilities, "the imprisonment of the human soul", by 
one force or another.
The general and universal frustration of Eros, of God's purposes 
for the world as a whole, highlights for Whitehead the 'absolute' 
character of freedom. Western culture, he thinks, is so engrossed 
in artificial or partial notions of freedom, primarily based upon 
individualistic ideals, that it has forgotten what freedom has meant 
for most of the world's peoples. The passage quoted above is neatly 
compared with the 'American' conceptions of freedom: freedom of
the press, freedom of speech, freedom to bear arms, etc. "The liter­
ary exposition of freedom," he says, "deals mainly with the frills." 
If the essence of freedom is the general "practicability of purpose", 
then individualistic assessments of it may work against the widest
possible appropriation of freedom. "Prometheus did not bring to 
mankind freedom of the press. He procured fire, which obediently
to human purpose cooks and gives warmth...In modern thought, the 
expression of this truth has taken the form of 'the economic interpre­
tation of history'."^ Prometheus, we remember, was a favourite
2'hero' of Karl Marx.
The fact that the 'economic interpretation' is itself a novel thought arising within the last sixty or seventy years illus­trates an important sociological fact. The literary world through all ages belonged mainly to the fortunate section of mankind whose basic human wants have been amply satisfied.A few literary men have been in want throughout their lives,many have occasionally suffered... The fortunate classes are 
oblivious to the fact that throughout the ages the masses of mankind have lived in conscious dread of such disaster - a drought, a wet summer, a bad harvest, a cattle disease, a raid of pirates. Also the basic needs when they are habitually satisfied cease to dominate thought. Delicacies of taste dis­place the interest in fullness of stomach.
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 84
2. of. Karl Marx, Doctoral D i s s e r t a t i o n ; (in David McLellan, Early T e s t s , p. 13 and Karl 
Marx, His Life and T h o u g h t , Paladin, 1976; McMillan, London, 1973. p. 37)
3. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 85
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Through! the interests of the "fortunate directing classes", freedom 
becomes associated with secondary, yet aesthetically important ideals. 
Whitehead lists these as power, glory, safety in the distant future, 
forms of government, luxury, religion, excitement, dislike of strange 
ways, contemplative curiosity, and play. While these ideals undoubt­
edly play a role in the surge toward adventure, "the plain economic 
facts of life must be the governing force in social development." 
"The masses of the population are always there, requiring at least 
a minimum of satisfaction, with their standard of life here higher 
and there lower, also rising or falling."^ For Whitehead, the primary 
demand for freedom is the general urge toward basic satisfactions, 
interpreted through a fusion of mass economic needs and the shaping 
ideals of minority "phantasies". Here again we are reminded of
Marx's assertion that the predominant ideals of every age are always
2those of the ruling classes.
Whitehead observes that in modern states, compared with more 
primitive tribal societies, the coordination of freedom has become 
complex. While it should be possible to preserve individual freedoms, 
this should not, and perhaps cannot, be achieved by "the destruction 
of the general ends of the whole community." Individuality only 
"gains... effectiveness" in coordination with the wider society. 
Perfections of individual goals are dependent upon the satisfaction 
of mass needs. This coordination of individual and mass freedoms,
3says Whitehead, is "the hope of the statesman."
However, Whitehead affirms, "the hope of the statesman" is 
different from "the intuition which has nerved men to surpass,the 
limitations of mankind."
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 85
2. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Commun ist M a n i f e s t o , in Essential Works of M a r x i s m ,
ed. Arthur P. Mendel, Bantam Books, New York, 1961.
3. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 86
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After all, societies of primates, of animals, of life on 
the earth's surface, are transient details. There is a freedom lying beyond circumstance, derived from the direct intuition that life can be grounded upon its absorption in what is changeless amid change. This is the freedom at which Plato was groping, the freedom which Stoics and Christians 
obtained as the gift of Hellenism. It is the freedom of that virtue directly derived from the source of all har­mony. For it is conditioned only by its adequacy of under­standing. And understanding has this quality that, however it be led up to, it issues in the soul freely conforming its nature to the supremacy of insight. It is the recon­ciliation of freedom with the compulsion of the truth. In this sense the captive can be free, taking as his own the supreme insight, the indwelling persuasion towards the har­mony which is the height of existence.
There is poetry in this passage which may be trivialized through
any attempt to explicate it. It seems to suggest the following
interrelated "intuitions".
(1) Freedom is pervasive throughout the universe; the Eros 
which issues in ever-greater perfections is its justifica­
tion and potential strength.
(2) Freedom takes form in history in relation to the general 
"practicability of purpose". When purposes are frustrated, 
when Eros is "maimed", there is an inhibition of freedom 
which may be called evil. Evil is a function of freedom.
(3) The primary usage of freedom in civilization is concerned 
with general need-satisfaction. Only insofar as mass 
needs are fulfilled are the more subtle usages of freedom 
effective in future terms, for future occasions. Yet 
minority ideals somewhat condition mass needs (eg. educa­
tion for the few becomes a 'need' for the many. ) Thus 
individual and mass freedoms must be coordinated.
(4) Nevertheless, in and through all this earthly frustration, 
this "transience" of individuals and societies, there 
is an enervating "intuition" of "freedom...beyond circum­
stance", of "what is changeless amid change." And in 
this intuition "the captive can be free."
1. ibid.
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Whitehead seems to be convinced that Eros, as it were, rises 
from its own ashes in every occasion, and in every society and civil­
ization, to sustain and encourage creativity on all fronts. Without 
it, he implies, humanity long ago would have sunk in despair, species 
after species would have fallen into extinction, the general frust­
ration of life would have become the totalization of entropy. Were 
it not for some 'intuition' of hope in the center of decay, the 
inhibition of purposes should have resulted in general decline as 
pervasive as the extent of evil and suffering. But this has not 
happened; despite the continuous perishing of individuals, there 
arise new generations, and with them new possibilities for harmony 
and beauty.
But notwithstanding the intuition of freedom in captivity, 
Whitehead's implicit criticism of western culture and its individual­
istic conception of freedom has a radical moral and political thrust. 
His explicit reference to economic relationships as "the governing 
force in social development", and his strong declaration that the 
"frills" of freedom are secondary to the needs of the masses, set 
him in the critical stance that we have so far observed in Feuerbach, 
Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, and the Latin American liberation theologians. 
There is no doubt that the experience of evil is real and tragic, 
even if evil itself must be somewhat inherent to any notion of freedom. 
The relatively trivial and ultimately tragic emphasis upon minor 
freedoms, such as "freedom of the press", must be set in the context 
of massive suffering. The broad impracticability of purpose which 
results through the maiming of Eros has a much greater effect of 
loss to future societies, and to the potential beauty of the universe, 
than to the single occasion. In comparison, the suffering which 
results from an inhibition of freedom of the press, or of the other 
pursuits which so characterize affluent civilization (such as power, 
glory, security, governmental preference, luxury, etc.), is infinitis- 
mal compared to the loss which occurs through hunger, war, disease.
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heat and cold, and general deprivation. Whitehead implies that
privilege is nice, but somewhat superfluous to the genuine priorities
of civilization. Quoting Proverbs 30:8, he reminds us of the "wisdom"
in seeking neither poverty nor riches.^ Not only in his assessment
of the material priorities, but also in his critique of power and
privilege expressed in religion, Whitehead does not seem to be very
far from the position of Feuerbach, Marx, and the liberationists.
This worship of glory arising from power is not only dangerous: it arises from a barbaric conception of God. I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the bones of those slaughtered because of men intoxicated by its attraction...The glorificatiog of power has broken more hearts than it has healed.
Whitehead's extensive criticism of the 'idolatry' of conservat­
ism illustrates even more profoundly his character as an Erasmus 
if not a Luther, a Feuerbach if not a Marx. The relevance of the 
following passage to the latent evil in well-meaning service to 
established order can hardly be missed.
A hog is not an evil beast, but when a man is degraded to the level of a hog, with the accompanying atrophy of finer elements, he is no more evil than a hog...
There is a self-preservation inherent in that which isgood in itself. Its destruction may come from without 
but not from within. Good people of narrow sympathies are apt to be unfeeling and unprogressive, enjoying their egotistical goodness, Their case, on a higher level, is analogous to that of the man completely de­graded to a hog. They have reached a state of stable goodness, so far as their own interior life is con­cerned. This type of moral correctitude is, on a lagger view, so like evil that the distinction is trivial.
In jxths32- words, one cannot 'cure' evil through the 'order' produced
through legislation and bureaucracy. Frustration of purpose may
be even more acute through overarching systematization perpetuating
the status quo than through tolerance of freedoms liable to abuse.
1. Whitehead, Religion in the M a k i n g , op. cit. p. 52
2. ibid. pp. 54-55
3. ibid. pp. 94-95
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Whitehead notices ants as an example of a species for which
survival through organization has resulted in minimal possiblities
for novelty. Repetition on a mass level militates against quality
achievable by individuals and groups, to the extent that the avoidance
1of evil becomes, in fact, the perpetuation of it. The civilized 
limitation of the frustration of purpose must optimally take place 
through the exercise of persuasive, adventurous, and flexible moral 
codes which provide for the general welfare of masses while preserving
individual "zest" and possibilities for novelty in future societies.
Each novelty must be displaced; today's novelty is tomorrow's obsolete 
hindrance. There can be no 'final' system in Whitehead's view, 
and the attempt to construct one is a menace to civilization, yet 
another way in which Eros is maimed. We hardly need to remark that 
in Whitehead's observations there is a tacit affinity with much 
of Karl Marx's critique of ideology and interpretation of sensual 
human practice.^
The conscious arrangement of morality in tentative and flexible 
forms which highlight the potential openness and power in persuasion 
is Whitehead's general antidote for combatting that evil by which 
Eros is maimed in civilization. The priority is the satisfaction 
of general needs. But also important are those values which are
recognized as authentic ideals by the privileged few. Beauty in
civilization depends upon the coordination of individual and mass 
freedoms. There is a "zest" in human life, which even at the risk 
of abuse, must be preserved and charished. Insofar as there is 
some coordination of freedoms, the Eros which produces life and 
motion from suffering and evil is assisted in its surge toward God, 
and such evil as is inherent in the process may be 'positive' even
1. cf. T.H. White, The Book of M e r l y n , University of Texas Press, 1977, pp. 81 ff. White's 
interpretation of the Arthurian saga lets King Arthur, on the night before his death, 
pay a visit to an ant colony as one among them. Over the entrance to each tunnel is hung 
the statute: "EVERYTHING NOT FORBIDDEN IS COMPULSORY". Fortunately, for comparison, Arthur 
is also allowed to visit the wild geese. (Whitehead may have been White's inspiration 
in this and other respects.)
2. This connection cannot be.explored here, and there are many differences. Basically "ideology" 
and "conservatism", and "practice" and "Adventure" are comparable ideas. Whitehead, for 
example, uses the phrase "Adventure of practice", cf. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , o p . c i t . p . 333
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while it is destructive. Yet there is another kind of evil in the
"perpetual perishing" of individual occasions over which humanity 
has little control. Whitehead calls this the "ultimate evil", and 
we must return to it shortly.
Meanwhile, however it is apparent that Whitehead's concept 
of "Eros...maimed" in and through human societies is also an identifi­
cation of pervasive injustice on earth. If the power of persuasion 
is able to lessen this frustration of purposes, this injustice by 
which human endeavor is so often brought to nothing, then, on the 
positive side, we might investigate what sort of justice conscious 
human persuasion could make possible.
4. Eros and Justice
Any analysis of Whitehead's idea of justice must be based 
upon conjecture. Like the concepts of truth, beauty, evil, and 
so many other terms, the meaning of which "everybody knows", Whitehead 
is not disposed to accept simple definitions of justice. Indeed, 
he hardly even uses the term, and when he does it is characterized 
by ambiguity.
There is a striking analogy between the hazy notions of justice in Plato's Republic and the hazy notions of pri­vate property today. The modern artisan, like Thrasymachus^ of old, is apt to define it as 'the will of the stronger.'
Justice seems to be a relative term for Whitehead. It is
relative to customs and expectations of any given human society
at any given time. "There can be no contract," he says, "which
does not presuppose custom, and no custom leaving no loophole for
2spontaneous contract."
The ancient gods, either as notions or as persons, did not create the thunderstorm, they explained it. Jehovah did not create the Hebrew tribal emotions, he explained them. He never made a covenant which initiated Hebrew history; the notion of the covenant was an explanatory idea. It was influential ; but the idea arose as an explanation of the tribal history.
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 80
2. ibid. p. 81
3. ibid. pp. 81-82
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Whitehead implies in the above passage that any legal, social, 
or moral code depends upon some common experience and history which 
prompt the attempt to formalize customs and 'explain' them. If 
this is correct, then we may assume that, for Whitehead, there must 
be some identifiable principles of justice already at work in a 
given society before they can be formalized as law or contract. 
But these principles, apparently, are always in flux. In illustration, 
Whitehead traces the idea of private property, and the legal systems 
attempting to preserve it, from Roman times to the modern age. 
With the advent of corporations, he says, the idea of private property 
has become a "legal fiction". These new 'persons' cannot die, except 
by voluntary dissolution or bankruptcy. Yet systems of justice 
attempt to maintain the rights of individuals effective also for 
corporations. "The whole concept of absolute individuals with absol­
ute rights ; and with a contractual power of forming fully defined
1external relations, has broken down."
Although Whitehead does not say much, specifically, about 
justice, he seems always to be thinking about it. We have already 
observed his concern for the needs of masses, as well as for the 
more subtle pruposes of privileged minorities. His assessment of 
civilization begins with the distinction between societies which 
have presupposed slavery, and those in the modern era which do not. 
An allied distinction is the development of commerce in the modern 
world. Whereas the Egyptians, wanting bricks, enslaved the Hebrews, 
now they must persuade the Hebrews to sell them. The idea of justice 
in Plato's time presupposed its relevance to an elite society of 
free men. Today the idea of justice assumes some egalitarian coordin­
ation for masses of free men and women. Another allied distinction
1. Hliitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 80
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for the modern world is the potential persuasiveness of religion
which can produce just relationships. In illustration, Whitehead
notes that "the Methodist appeal to the direct intuition of working
men made the conception of the brotherhood of man and the importance
of men a vivid reality."^
In feudal times, Whitehead observes, there was a social order
which satisfied mass needs in a manner which would today be deemed
unjust. Yet given the limitations of commerce and industry, the
feudal system was often able to provide basic needs without slavery.
"Each order had its rights and duties, and in the happier examples
of later feudalism the villagers were quite competent to go to law
2with their feudal chief." An attachment to the land was a kind 
of protection, if also a restriction. "It was the basis of a recog­
nized status in an organized society - so far as the social system
3was organized, and was not a welter of violence."
Modern industry, Whitehead thinks, is a kind of "neo-feudalism". 
The laws which pertain to "the self-sufficing independant man" really
have no validity for modern civilization. The modern customs of
commerce have, to a certain extent, already defined the parameters
of social relationships, and, Whitehead asserts, individualists
4and socialists are only debating the details. What we call justice, 
by implication, is contingent upon many forces and factors at work, 
over which individuals and nations have little control. Indeed, 
as the laws relating to private property illustrate, our ideas of 
justice are often related to outmoded ideals which may be incompatible 
with the society in which we live. The modern western nations attempt 
to uphold legal values relating to individuals, while the whole 
context of existence is defined by complex interrelationships of
1. ibid. p. 28 (Whitehead seems to have overlooked the Methodist concern for women and 
c h i l d r e n . )
2. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 33
3. ibid.
4. ibid. p. 34
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commerce, industry, and custom which no longer acknowledge the indiv­
iduality which might have pertained in a pre-industrial epoch.
Whitehead is not opposed to individuality, personality, or 
to the rights which may accrue to persons and individuals. He does, 
however, seem to oppose any isolated consideration of individualistic 
justice which is not appropriately related to the individual's role 
in society as a whole. "Plato," he says, "would have been horrified 
at the individualism of the Renaissance."^
Whitehead's idea of justice seems to be linked to his idea
of freedom. Since freedom for the few is ultimately conditioned
by the general practicability of purpose for the many, then any
attempt to build justice into codes applicable only to the few is,
in the long run, inadequate. The implication is that as long as
general needs are not met, the "frills" of freedom preserved through
justice structures are apt to be short-lived. The ancient, and
not-so-ancient civilizations which have denied bread to the hungry,
both within and without their respective borders, have often found
their palaces and institutions ablaze or in decay. For this reason,
says Whitehead, "the attempts at large-scale organization of Europe 
2were a failure."
Throughout the rise and fall of civilizations there has been 
the subtle but influential persuasion of commerce, and of the cross- 
cultural exchanges which accompany it. Because humans want things 
and need things, they continue to devise creative ways of making 
and acquiring them. To a great extent, any notion of justice is 
influenced if not determined by economic forces, and systems of 
justice based upon commercial practice have continued to 'explain' 
economic relations. As customs of commerce change so do systems
of justice. In the modern world, Whitehead notes, legal codes have
1. ibid. p. 38
2--Ï Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 38
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tended to incorporate the somewhat suspicious moral value of compet­
ition: "'Thou shalt not murder, but tradition approves all forms 
1of competition.'"
Wherever men looked, they saw 'competition' written across the face of things. Nations arose, and men thought of nations in terms of international competition. They examined the theory of trade, and they construed its interactions in terms of competition, mitigated by 'higgling'. They considered the bounty of nature in the 
provision of food, and they saw the masses of mankind competing for insufficient supplies. They saw the fecundity of nature in the provision of myriad species 
of living things, and they construed the explanation in terms of the competition of species. What the notions of 'form' and 'harmony' were to Plato, that the notions of 'individuality' and 'competition' were to the nineteenth century. God had placed his bow in the skies as a symbol; and the strip of colours, rightly read, spelt 'competition'.The prize to be competed for was 'life'. Unsuccessful com­petitors died; and thus, by a beautiful provisiog of na­ture, ceased from constituting a social problem.
In view of the above extract, it is not difficult to see why 
Whitehead ambiguously compares the idea of private property with 
Thrasymachus' notion of justice. In both cases, the ordinary worker 
is apt to see "the will of the stronger" as the true determinant. 
Indeed, because justice systems stem from the "directing classes", 
and because these classes are usually intimately connected with 
the contemporary customs of commerce, and because commerce produces 
"private property" for anyone strong enough to get it and powerful 
enough to make laws to protect it - then, for Whitehead, there is 
indeed a connection between what has been called justice in the
3modern world, and the acquisition of property through commerce. 
Because the justice that, as it were, "creates" private property 
is so tainted, yet, in another sense, somewhat positive in its capac­
ity to preserve order and so certain possiblities for beauty, justice
1. ibid. p. 39 {Whitehead gives no reference for this quotation.) (it may be from Roman
Catholic encyclical at the turn of the century.)2. ibid.
3. cf. Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 124:"The behaviour of the community is largely d o m ­
inated by the business mind. A great society is a society in which its men of business
think greatly of their functions. Low thoughts mean low behaviour, and after a brief orgy
of exploitation low behaviour means a descending standard of life." Wh itehead seems to 
imply that if the welfare of society, i.e. 'justice', is so de pendent upon commerce, then 
those who involve themselves in commerce have the greatest ethical re spon sib ilit y in ci vil­
ization. Such morality cannot be derived from the hypostatization of "competition". The
indictment of ca pita lis m is clear.
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in civilization remains an elusive, and perhaps illusive, concept.
It is chronically ambivalent, and like evil, it has the potential 
both to assist and hinder Eros. Justice is continuously in flux,
and so far as human beings are able to 'realize' it, systems which 
attempt to formalize it never keep step with the vicissitudes of 
life, custom, and especially, commerce.
Nevertheless, Whitehead suggests, any civilization which can 
encourage the broad and beautiful interchanges which commerce so 
often does entail - without lapsing again into forms of slavery, 
without making competition another kind of violence, providing for 
the needs of masses while preserving the ideals of the enlightened 
few - will also encourage the pervasive Eros in human life on its 
journey toward intensity of experience and greater beauty of prupose. 
And through the persuasiveness of Eros at work through the relatively 
uninhibited making and sharing of commodities, there may also arise 
an ever-greater justice in successive epochs.^
5. A Vision of Justice
While Whitehead's analysis of justice in civilization is primar­
ily observant of the way that justice is relative to economic forces 
in history, there is another sense of justice in Whitehead's thought 
that is firmly grounded upon an apprehension of what is "changeless
amid change". To decipher this other meaning of justice continues
to be a project of abstraction and induction, based upon implicit 
references to ethical ideals, the interior process of civilization, 
and finally, his concept of "Peace".
True justice, it would appear, is not finally to be defined 
by its relative and short-lived manifestations in successive genera­
tions. It is rather to be characterized by a certain kind of "insight"
1.. Whitehead, of course, had a pr e-De pre ssio n un derstanding of economics. To some extent 
his world-view shows in his pr inci ple s of commerce. Whether his view is overly idealistic 
is not my concern.
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into the "concresence", or "coming together", of myriad purposes 
and experiences by which civilization gains its creative momentum. 
There seems to be an interior justice in the nature of Eros which 
is best identified in its capacity to render various purposes pract­
icable through the power of persuasion. "The creation of the world 
said Plato - is the victory of persuasion over f o r c e . J u s t i c e ,  
then, would be a set of customs, possibly also 'explained' in a 
moral. Legal, or social code, which preserves the optimum possibil­
ities for the persuasive dynamics of Eros. As we have already noted, 
Eros works by using freedom to the greatest possible advantage in 
promoting life, motion, beauty and intensity of experience, adventure 
producing novelty, the relationship of truth to appearance, and 
so on.
There is in Whitehead's thought an implicit and pervasive 
notion, allied with the idea of Eros, which is grounded upon an 
authentic "ethical intuition" latent in humanity. Although Whitehead 
does not call it "justice" we might not be far wrong in viewing 
it as a sort of justifia originalis by which the apparently acquisi­
tive aspects of Eros 'come together' with ethical ideals and human
2love. In civilization the persistent incorporation of this ethical 
intuition in persuasive justice structures can result in integrated
3realizations of "Peace".
The "intuition" which I am calling a justifia originalis in 
Whitehead's thought is actually the comprehensive, innate understand­
ing of life, civilization, evil, the universe, love, and God which 
"Galilean Christianity" originally expressed. For Whitehead all 
of these related manifestations of Eros may finally emerge into 
a "harmony of harmonies" or "Peace". The justice which it identifies
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 31
2. But not the justitia originalis of Reinhold Niebuhr, of. above. Chapter Four.
3. cf. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. Chapter XX.
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and perceives as "practicable" lies undeveloped in any formal code.
Yet, in some sense, it is already present as a form, as an idea,
throughout civilization, integrating and synthesizing in the imagina­
tion things which are not because they have so far been hindered 
in their actualization due to the incompatibilities of circumstance. 
As Whitehead puts it, "You can only speak of mercy among a people 
who, in some respects are already merciful."^ The "ethical intuition"
'I desire mercy and not sacrifice' is "explained", not invented,
2through Christianity. Human beings must seek God through love,
not through fear; and through love, not through coercion, human
3civilization may realize its greatest potential. "The life of
Christ is not an exhibition of over-ruling power. Its glory is
for those who can discern it, and not for the world. Its power
lies in its absence of force. It has the decisiveness of a supreme
ideal..." "The progress of humanity can be defined as the process
of transforming society so as to make the original Christian ideals
5increasingly practicable for its individual members."
The greatness of Christianity - the greatness of any valuable religion - consists in its 'interim ethics'. The founders of Christianity and their earlier followers firmly believed that the end of the world was at hand. The result was that with 
passionate earnestness they gave free reign to their absolute ethical intuitions respecting ideal possibilities without a thought of the preservation of society. The crash of society was certain and imminent. 'Impracticability' was a word which had lost its meaning; or rather,^practical good sense dictated concentration on ultimate ideas.
The "impracticable ethics of Christianity", says Whitehead,
is a standard and "a gauge by which to test the defects of human 
7society." "So long as the Galilean images are but the dreams of 
an unrealized world, so long they must spread the infection of an 
uneasy spirit."^ The ethical ideals of Christianity are "gadflies 
irritating and beacons luring." "These ethical intuitions," Whitehead
1. Whitehead, Religion in the M a k i n g , op. cit. p. 33 (cf. Feuerbach: "Mercy is the justice 
of sensuous life.")
2. ibid. p. 35 3. ibid. p. 73 4. ibid. p. 56
5. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 186. ibid. p. 19 7. ibid. p. 20 8. ibid. p. 21 9. ibid.
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says, "are a direct application of metaphysical doctrine for the 
determination of practice."^
Early Christianity put into action what Plato had imagined 
and theoretically formulated. Included in the ideals of Christianity 
and Plato, perhaps eventually to be applicable for all civilization, 
are the notions of persuasion as a humanitarian value, spontaneity 
as "the essence of the soul," moral fervour intimate with tolerance, 
and a "professional practice" which overcomes primitive "trial and 
error. "
Persuasion, as we have seen, is the mode by which optimal
possibilities for social growth are created. Spontaneity for the
intellect, the Psyche, is the capacity by which Eros is allowed
the greatest freedom for building a positive future from a perishing
past. Tolerance is the distribution of freedom for the intellect
throughout a broad social nexus. "The duty of tolerance is our
finite homage to the abundance of inexhaustible novelty which is
awaiting the future, and to the complexity of accomplished fact
2which exceeds our stretch of insight." The practice of a profession 
is the kind of specialization by which the free intellect may contr­
ibute the greatest benefit to the whole society. Given freedom 
to do so, professional practice becomes the antithesis of the primar­
ily individualistic efforts characterized by primitive crafts and 
muscular labour. As theory conditions practice, and practice is 
related to the developing theory, informed by the whole context 
of experience from others within the 'profession', there is a 
"practicability of attainment" which has intensely social effects. 
Whitehead notes modern surgery as a significant example, the effect­
iveness of which has evolved through the combined facilitation of
3persuasion, spontaneity, tolerance, and professional practice.
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 21
2. ibid, p. 65
3. ibid. pp. 72-73
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There is yet another ingredient in Whitehead's vision of harmony, 
justitia originalis, or set of "ethical intuitions" incorporated 
in "Galilean Christianity." An objective enquiry into the nature 
of religion, and into the metaphysical suppositions which religion 
expresses, is likely to approximate the conclusion of Hume: "There
is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind, merely 
as such, independent of personal qualities, or services, or of rela­
tion to ourself."  ^ Hume's method, Whitehead thinks, precludes 
adequate consideration of "exceptional elements in our conscious
experience...which may roughly be classed together as religious
2and moral intuitions." Only a subjective enquiry, like Plato's, 
can hope to fathom the depths of human experience so that the univer­
sal intuition of unselfish, unbiased, and spontaneous love for other 
human beings may genuinely be considered. Whitehead set himself 
the task of showing that a religion can be conceived, and an associat­
ed metaphysic expressed, which can indeed demonstrate that there 
is a "love of mankind, merely as such."
This subjective and somewhat speculative "intuition" that 
the impulsive energy of Eros is not always selfish and acquisitive, 
but can be integrated with "the tendernesses of life", is theology's 
task to disclose, Whitehead declares. A theology which merely follows 
the method of objective analysis and definitive hypothesis becomes 
the victim of "perpetual perishing" and can give no answer to this 
"ultimate evil". By implication, Whitehead suggests, only a religion 
or a metaphysic which can entertain the idea of love can hope to 
grapple with the problem of evil.
The question of evil is ultimately concerned with the appear-
3ance of time as "a perpetual perishing." The evil in all this
1. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 37 (cf. Hume's T r e a t i s e , Book III, Part II,
Section I) Hume may have been exercising his hyperbole here. This does not necessarily
agree with his idea of "b enev olence" in Principles of M o r a l s , Part I, Section II.
2. Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y , op, cit. p. 486
3. ibid. p. 479
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dying arises simultaneously with any explanation of human experience.
Even in the demise of occasions of experience - among which are
human occasions - "the culminating fact of conscious rational life
refuses to conceive itself as a transient enjoyment, transiently
useful."  ^ On the face of the objective behaviour of the phenomena,
Whitehead suggests that the best answer might be that of the Buddhist:
2"He giveth his beloved sleep."
The nature of God becomes an important issue at this point. 
If the concept of God is such that "the world is conceived as a 
self-sufficient completion of the creative act, explicable by its 
derivation from an ultimate principle which is at once eminently 
real and the unmoved mover" - the resolution of Nirvana, says 
Whitehead, is the only answer to evil. The western derivation of 
such a God from Aristotle's notion of a prime, "unmoved mover" is
the fallacy, says Whitehead, which is responsible for much of the
tragedy in the histories of Christianity and Mahometanism. The 
main difference from the "Buddhistic type" (of deity) is that the 
world obeys the "imposed will" of the creator. The implication
entails an "absolute despot" aloof from human process.
The concept of God in western thought has been greatly altered 
by the conversion of Constantine. At this time, Whitehead states,
"Caesar conquered" - legal and dogmatic theology displaced the intui­
tion of the original Galilean "vision". Constantine's lawyers edited 
the western text, and the Code of Justinian gave legal form to the 
official Roman faith: "It was an amalgam of Roman law, the Christian 
faith, and Hellenic philosophy channelled into theological speculation, 
in addition to an admixture of oriental elements...The heretics
3were suppressed and the pagans died out." God was fashioned in
1. ibid. p. 481
2. ibid. p. 482
3. cf. Roland Bainton, The Penguin History of C h r i s t i a n i t y , Vol. I, Penguin Books, 
Middlesex, 1964. p. 137
424
the image of Egyptian, Roman, and Persian rulers. "The Church gave
unto God the attributes which belonged exclusively to Caesar."^
The idea of justice became identified with the interests of the
Roman state; the idea of God became identified with the Roman idea
of justice, and indeed, with the Roman idea of peace (viz. Pax Romana).
Meanwhile, "the brief Galilean vision of humility flickered
2throughout the ages, uncertainly." But this vision was not enhanced 
by the rise of theistic philosophy, of Mahometanism, and the contin­
uation of the religions' alliance with emergent civilizations. 
Whitehead identifies in the rise of Christendom three 'schools' 
of theology, none of which correlate with the 'vision' of early
Christianity: (1) God is fashioned in the image of an imperial ruler.
(2) God is the personification of moral energy and represented in 
a legal code attempting to absolutize the idea of justice. (3)
God is an ultimate philosophical principle, such as Aristotle's 
"unmoved mover."
The history of theistic philosophy exhibits various stages of combination of these three diverse ways of entertaining the problem (of theology?). There is, how­ever, in the Galilean origin of Christianity yet another suggestion which does not fit very well with any of 
the three main strands of thought. It does not empha­size the ruling Caesar, or the ruthless moralist, or the unmoved mover. It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of 
a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a little oblivious as to morals.It does not look to the future; gor it finds its own reward in the immediate present.
David Hume was right, Whitehead suggests, in finding in the 
three major strands of theology no justification for "the love of 
mankind, merely as such.
1. Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y , op. cit. p. 485
2. ibid. p. 484
3. Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit. p. 485
4. ibid. (cf. Hume's Dialogues Co ncer nin g Natural R e l i g i o n ) Whitehead calls this a 
"masterpiece", correct but limited by its objective method.
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6. Whitehead's Role in the Development of Love Theology
Theology and religion as generally practised in western civil­
ization have often subjected love to some "evil being in which the 
devils participate." Kierkegaard's critique of "Christendom" in 
contrast to "Christianity", and Hegel's early identification of 
love as "the spirit of Christianity" are emphases which are philoso­
phically similar to Whitehead's observation.
An analysis of religion may be based, for example, upon its 
objective manifestations in history or upon the more subjective 
idea or intrinsic "form" which is inherent in the metaphysical princ­
iples which the religion expresses. David Hume's 'positivist' and 
Marx's 'practical' analysis of religion are based upon objective 
criteria, and do not, for that reason, attempt to reinterpret or 
'reform' religion. Feuerbach's critique is both positivist and 
somewhat subjective. Since Feuerbach depended so much upon Hegel, 
this is not surprising. Hegel, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and Whitehead 
were not content to assess the character of religion solely upon 
the face value of objective criteria. All of these philosophers 
concluded that the idea or "spirit" of Christianity cannot be assessed 
either by the historical manifestations of the religion or through 
a metaphysical system which is itself determined by phenomenological, 
positivist, or objective method. Each of the four was constrained 
to develop his own subjective mode of analysis in relation to the 
intrinsic 'form' of the religion, undetermined by the 'objective 
forms' the religion has assumed in history. Each of the four also 
identified as the central idea in the intrinsic or subjective form 
of Christianity the 'intuition' of love. Feuerbach tried to "mater­
ialize" this central subjective factor, but in light of the objective 
abuses of religion under the name of Christianity, thought it best 
to dispense with the whole set of 'religious' associations, leaving 
only love as the authentic principle upon which they were based.
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Hegel, apparently, was not happy with the 'spirit' of his 
youth, and attempted to make love one aspect of the universal mind, 
or Geist, as love (viz. "the spirit of Christianity"), and tried 
to make love the "principle of unity" in what is already created 
(i.e. Dasein). Feuerbach reversed Hegel's final system and set 
love apart from and superior to reason. Kierkegaard, expertly famil­
iar with the thought of Plato, Shakespeare, Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach 
(inter alia'), set himself the ambitious task of distinguishing 
between the Christian idea, or subjective form of love, and the 
various interpretations of love common in literature and philosophy. 
This entailed a complete revision of the idea of "Christianity" 
and a strong contrast of its principles with "Christendom". But 
the effect of Kierkegaard’s radical distinction seemed to divorce 
the idea of Christian love from many of the metaphysical principles 
which had already been identified in the subjective form of Christian­
ity by Hegel, Feuerbach and others (such as Leibniz, Kant, 
Schleiermacher, and even Descartes).^
Whitehead's identification of the idea of love in the original 
form of Christianity is, therefore, not at all unique. His philoso­
phical extrapolation of the love identified in the intuition of
Galilean Christianity has much in common with the young Hegel. 
But whereas Hegel began with love and ended with reason, Whitehead
retains the idea of love, Eros undistinguished from agape, as the 
principle of creativity pervasive throughout the universe. Like
Feuerbach, Whitehead identified love as the principle of unity which 
precedes and enfolds consciousness and existence. But unlike 
Feuerbach, Whitehead was able to make love the link between what 
we call matter and what we call mind in a continuous process of 
creativity, building upon a perishing past to create a promising
1. In the twentieth century, Nygren, Brunner, and Barth have, in broad terms, continued 
Ki erke gaard's method, p e rpet uat ing the divorce of Christ ian ity from metaphysics.
1. Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, op. cit. (Foreword)
I4 2 7
future. Like Feuerbach, Whitehead saw the idea of love as the energy 
in all social life, as the dynamic impelling individuals to seek 
community. But unlike Feuerbach, Whitehead was also able to project 
the creativity of love into the very essence, *or realization, of 
God, the conceptual originof all that is lovely, and the consequent 
recipient of all that love achieves.
The comparison of Whitehead and Kierkegaard is more difficult. ;
Both were "students" of Plato. Both were highly skilled in the 
anlysis of the culture of their day. Both knew the method of abstrac­
ting from objective data to discover the "truth" lying latent beneath 
(maieutics). Both refused to define Christianity by its appearance 
in history. Both recognized the 'value' in contemporary and literary 
art and enquiry. But where Kierkegaard drew lines, Whitehead made 
circles. Where Kierkegaard seemed to state definitions, Whitehead 
saw relationships. Where Kierkegaard interpreted or reinterpreted 
the past, Whitehead envisioned a future. And where Kierkegaard 
wrote "faith", Whitehead wrote "persuasion" or "purpose". Of course 
any comparison is unfair, for Kierkegaard and Whitehead were men 
of different epochs. Finally, there may be no simplistic choice 
to make between them. Whitehead was more reserved; Kierkegaard 
more explicit. Each spoke of love in his own way, and after every­
thing was said, there was left for future generations a certain 
"concrescence", a synthesis or "coming together" of two possible 
approaches to one great intuition;
That which in its vast abundance is essentially inexhaust­ible is also essentially indescribable in its smallest act, simply because essentially it is everywhere wholly present and essentially cannot be described.
Plato saw it first. Perhaps, like the individualists and socialists
who argue about commerce, philosophers and Christians "merely debate
the details" of something which has a life and motion of its own.
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7. Peace, Love, and Justice
We may identify the 'ground' of justice, an 'intuition' of
a justitia originalis, in Whitehead's subjective analysis of the
"Galilean vision" of love. But the questions of "ultimate evil"
and of "Peace" are still outstanding. To reach toward some resolution
between them, reason and theology, says Whitehead, must 'come together'
The task of reason is to fathom the deeper depths of the many-sidedness of things. We must not expect simple answers to far-reaching questions. However far our gaze penetrates, there are always heights beyond which block our vision.
The task of Theology is to show how the World is founded on something beyond mere transient fact, and how it issues in something beyond the perishing of occasions. The temporal 
World is the stage of finite accomplishment. We ask of Theology to express that element in perishing lives which is undying by reason of its expression of perfections proper to our finite natures. In this way we shall understand how life includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow.
As parts of Eros reach maturity in human consciousness, it
may be synthesized with a certain kind of "tenderness", or love,
in individual human occasions as "a positive feeling which crowns
the life and motion of the soul." Whitehead calls it Peace, - a
"Harmony of Harmonies which calms destructive turbulence and completes 
3civilization." This Peace is directly associated with that intuition 
of love - as supreme ground of justice, as the feeling which is
"a little oblivious as to morals", as the intimation of an ultimate 
redemption of what is lost through the cross-purposes in human exist­
ence and the perpetual perishing of all experience - originally
conceived in "the Galilean vision of humility".
As Eros is synthesized into Peace, it is able to confront
the inherent tragedy of existence knowing that its ultimate purposes 
are not achieved "in this world". Therefore, "it does not look 
to the future", but may be content with the "interim ethics" of
1. Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y , op. cit. p. 484
2.* W h i t e h e a d , Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 221
3. ibid. p. 367
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present experience, "a love of mankind, merely as such", which is 
gently persuasive in the context of the immediate past and the immin­
ent future. The love which, in this pacific form, flows freely 
among i.'hu,man ■ J contemporaries as the completion of Eros in a given 
moment, while constantly dying, is nevertheless preserved somehow, 
in the consequent nature of God. God is the beneficiary of human 
loves, beauty, intensity of experience, and novelty, even though 
they are vanquished and extinguished by time and the frustration 
of circumstance.
The beauty achieved by Eros in its multiplicity of forms among 
actual entities so enriches God that he is able to empower individual 
occasions to seek their own greatest potential from any future given 
moment. This Whitehead calls "objective immortality Even as
the particular individual passes from the moment of immediacy, its 
achieved beauty is preserved, absorbed not only into the future 
of successive occasions, but also into the "ever-present fact" that 
is God.
What is done in the world is transformed into a reality 
in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion, the fellow-sufferer who under­stands .
Through this concept of "universal relativity", there is a soteriol-
ogical or redemptive effect for all that Eros, in its impulsive
and persuasive surge toward life and beauty of experience^ has been 
2striving for. God is not so much the world's creator, as its redeem­
er, with a "tender care" for the preservation of all quality and 
beauty. And in this care, we may summarize briefly, there is no 
love lost.
1. Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y , op. cit. p. 497
2. Although Whitehead does not take the matter so far, he is open to the question of the
soul's survival without dependence upon the body, God's nature as both temporal and non-
temporal implies that he might be able to form a special relationship based upon the 
"mutual immanence" between himself and the individual soul, which could transcend te mp­
orality. of. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit. p. 267
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SUMMARY
It will be obvious to any reader of Whitehead that my under­
standing of his thought has really been a somewhat subjective inter­
pretation. At the same time, any reader of Whitehead should appreciate 
that there may be no more appropriate way to interpret his ideas
than through one's own subjectivity, and indeed, through one's own 
experience. His, he freely admitted, was not a final system, but
a modern restatement of Plato's "most likely tale". Accordingly, 
the 'notions' which he related to his own experience have existed 
in 'form' throughout the ages. Only as they are given the light 
of contemporary usage may they remain, in some sense, real. The
Ideas are only the property of the past if we refuse to relate them 
to the present. The Eros is never the property of the past, and 
despite our contemporary efforts to define it, it is always ahead
of us.
The Eros, in Whitehead's thought as well as in Plato's, means 
'simply', but broadly, love. And because it does mean that, it
cannot be simple. It changes. It is frustrated. It takes new 
forms. It produces evil and overcomes it. It persuades. It issues 
in something beyond our experience of it. Plato tried on repeated 
occasions to nail it down. His 'final' interpretation in the
Symposium is no more 'final' that that in the Phaedrus. The only
difference was that Plato's own experience of it was coming to an 
end. Perhaps the closest he came to "naming the whirlwind" was
this :
Such a madness as this is gjven by God to man for hishighest possible happiness.
But it is not always a madness, for sometimes it is a "tend­
erness". Alfred North Whitehead has acknowledged that the New 
Testament is most persuasive precisely in its identity with the
1. Plato, The Phaedrus, 245
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tender moments of the human condition.
There can be no doubt as to what elements in the record have evoked a response from all that is best in human 
nature. The Mother, the Child, and the bare manger: the lowly man, homeless and self-forgetful, with his message of peace, love, and sympathy; the suffering, the agony, the tender words as life ebbed, the final despaig, and 
the whole with the authority of supreme victory.
In this very tenderness, there is also a latent and original intuition 
of justice. Whitehead has told us, not always in so many words, 
that "the notion of an absolute despot has stood in the way" of 
our attempts to make justice on earth correlate with our intuition. 
"The tendernesses of mere life itself, in a world which superficially 
is founded upon the clashings of senseless compulsion" - these remain 
our clues by which to assist Eros on its way to greater "practicabil­
ity of purpose." Religion, if it is retained, must somehow find 
new ways of affirming that evil may be overcome by persuasive love 
and not by force and coercion. Justice cannot be achieved by stress­
ing the interests of a few while disregarding the needs of the many. 
But on the other hand, the needs of the many must not be allowed
to overshadow the subtle beauty which the few may have to offer. 
And through all human experience there remains an indispensable
'zest', due respect and preservation in every civilization; for 
it is the very life of love.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that Whitehead's notion of 
Eros, of love alive in myriad forms, cannot be rendered impotent 
by an exclusive interpretation such as Nygren's. In a way that 
has not often been acknowledged by Christian theologians, Whitehead 
has tried to reveal a vital force which lies at the base of things 
and persists in an integral process which is supremely teleological. 
Perhaps we could call it grace. In a sense radically different 
from Nygren, Whitehead holds Eros to be not merely "man's way to
God", but also God's way to humanity and all creation. It is, in
Whitehead's view, God's eminent, persuasive way of initiating, creat­
ing, and saving all that is lovely.
1. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 214
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE FUTURE OF LOVE: IMPLICATIONS AND INTUITIONS
Any definitive conclusion arising from this 'symposium' would 
seem artificial and contrary to the spirit of the discussion. If 
theology, through critical reflection and exposition, has the cap­
acity to promote the patient and persistent practice of love in 
successive epochs, then any attempt to crystallize the theory of 
love may be somewhat counterproductive. Nevertheless, the comparison 
of these different views may lead to certain convictions which, 
even though contingent nlpon. the passing trends and partial under­
standing of our day, are indispensable to the further development 
of loves that lead to justice.
Although we have met many views on the nature of love and 
its relation to God, justice, epistemology, faith, ethics, history
and civilization, we have barely scratched the surface. Only from 
the perspective of theology are concluding remarks appropriate, 
remembering that the literature of the world has repeatedly touched
our theme. Theology's discussion of love has often been too limited
and too reductive, artificially influencing its conclusions. Although 
this defect may be unavoidable, perhaps the least we can do is to
acknowledge that our discussion is indeed limited, necessarily, 
by the historical patterns which continue to shape our thought, 
and by the specialized experience we attempt to interpret.
In this final chapter I will briefly attempt to summarize 
some of the most important issues arising among our selected thinkers. 
Then I will offer my own interpretation of those issues which appear 
to be most indispensable to the continuation of love-talk in a theo­
logy concerned with the preservation of the ideals of justice.
Review
Both the early Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach stressed that love 
is the essential content of the Christian religion. Human feeling
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is so important in the development of religion, that those feelings 
which lead to "species-consciousness" and community are objectified 
in religion, despite doctrinal and rational objectifications of 
the nature of belief. Love plays an indispensable role in human 
self-consciousness, for as each individual meets another of its 
species and identifies that other as a 'thou', human beings are 
bound together in social interdependence. The human imagination 
plays a part in interpreting sense and feeling, so that what humans 
experience may be infinitely objectified, retaining the essential 
quality of the feelings. Thus, in the Incarnation, Christ personifies 
the highest and the best in humankind, including the human capacity 
to love others, to identify with the suffering of others, and to 
seek justice in human relations. Although Feuerbach is associated 
with atheism, his theological contribution is evident. We are chall­
enged to seek the 'divine' in human attributes, particularly in 
human love. We are challenged to practice love in social relation­
ships without subordinating love for others to a pietistic love 
for God. We are cautioned about conceiving God in ways which place 
faith in an omnipotent God above our responsibility to form better 
communities in this world. For Feuerbach, faith was found to be
a contradiction of love, and finally incompatible with the justice
required in social life.
S^ren Kierkegaard, while critical of the "Christendom" of 
his day, took issue with Feuerbach's contradiction between faith 
and love. For Kierkegaard, faith was "the highest passion", and
the proper introduction to the love cf God. Kierkegaard sought 
to show that it is possible to love God passionately while also 
loving human beings in a proper relation to God. Developing 
St. Augustine's emphasis upon love for the neighbour as an equal 
before Gcd, Kierkegaard insisted that love for God entails the duty 
to love the neighbour as oneself, unselfishly, without placing the 
self above the neighbour. Ordinary loves such as romantic love
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and friendship, Kierkegaard declared, are really selfish loves in 
disguise. Only the love which is undetermined by the neighbour's 
potential for reciprocation is the love commanded by Christ. Only 
when God, infinite love itself, becomes the 'third party' in every
relationship, is human love a proper response to the 'Royal Law': 
to love the ne/ ghbour as oneself. Although Kierkegaard emphasized 
faith in God, he also stressed that "a profession of faith is not 
enough." Love for the neighbour, conceived as a duty, keeps ego­
centric loves at bay, and preserves the eternal relationship with 
God. Kierkegaard's God, the Absolute, is omnipotent in his capacity
to relate himself to human beings, removing the 'offence' in God's 
incommensurability with human nature. Thus Kierkegaard demonstrates 
a relational deity, who loves omnipotently, paradoxically removing
the inequality with humanity through the Incarnation. Kierkegaard's
God is worthy to be loved, because he identifies himself 'absolutely'
with the human condition. He suffers, as man among men, contradicting 
the doctrine of God's impassibility. His omnipotence is the omnipot­
ence of love.
The issues surrounding the development of 'neo-orthodox' 
Protestantism in the twentieth century are too diverse to characterize 
briefly. Anders Nygren's strict dualism between agape and eros 
led to much of the discussion. Here we have only considered the 
views of Nygren, John Burnaby, Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, and 
Karl Barth. Nygren's main assertions dealt with the pre-eminence 
of the word agape over other ' types ' of love, and over the nomos
of the Old Testament. Nygren asserted that only his definition
of agape is proper to Christian faith. Agape, according to his 
definition, is the love of God: unconditional, unmotivated, spontan­
eous, dependent upon no quality in the beloved. Nygren opposed 
agape to the eros of neo-platonism: acquisitive, self-seeking,
conditional, and motivated by value. Eros was objectified in the 
piety of Catholicism, concerned with merit and good works for the
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attainment of salvation. Nygren's interpretation stemmed from 
a particularly Lutheran point of view, to which many other theologians 
have objected. We noted particularly the evidence of the doctrine 
cf the Fall in Luther's interpretation, and his inadequate doctrine 
of Creation. We also observed that Nygren's interpretation of agape 
cannot be sustained by modern New Testament scholarship.
Emil Brunner's emphasis upon faith, the 'divine imperative',
was noted to be, in some respects, inconsistent with an emphasis 
upon correlative love. Brunner, for example, stressed the 'orders' 
which must be preserved, even at the expense of Christian love. 
Similarly, Reinhold Niebuhr's characterization of the 'impossible'
love of the New Testament, wholly sacrificial and disinterested, 
does not seem to correlate well with much of Jesus' teaching.
Niebuhr's emphasis upon a practical justice in human society, while 
having much to commend it, sets love and justice in opposition to 
each other. Niebuhr's interpretation of justice, while not always 
consistent, is most typically described by "the fence and the bound­
ary line", giving little indication of the possibility of practical 
intimacy between justice and love.
Karl Barth's later emphasis upon an active human love, corres­
ponding with the creative, active, electing, sustaining love of 
God, was discerned to be a significant development of the early
exclusive concerns of neo-orthodox thought. Barth's grounding of 
God's love in the Old Testament covenant, revealed in Christ, and 
expressed on behalf of the poor and the suffering against the rich 
and mighty provides a secure foundation for the alignment of Christian 
love with justice issues. Barth's willingness to use the term eros, 
his refusal to conceive God's will as flowing directly through the 
faithful human, and his emphasis upon God's grace as the dominant 
force in creation led to ittty:; conviction that Barth's view is full 
of resources for the continuation of love-talk in the light of human 
sin, political oppression, and economic deprivation.
4 3 6
The Latin American liberation theologians bring love and justice 
together in a new focus. Shaped within the contemporary Latin 
American milieu, their concerns stem from massive human need, economic 
inequality, government by force, and foreign exploitation. Although 
their perspective is primarily Roman Catholic, they have departed 
significantly from many of the traditional doctrines, looking at 
justice issues in a new light. God's love, for example, may take 
the form of wrath against oppression. Gcd's cause, like that of 
Jesus, is identified with the poor and the suffering. The kingdom 
of God is not only a spiritual but also an economic and social entity, 
to be 'built' here and now, by persons who are committed to a new 
social order. The social order of which they speak is neither 
exclusively Christian nor Marxist, but both Christian and Marxist 
ideals play a role in its formulation. Love is interpreted as a 
'concrete' task, and 'efficacious love' is the kind of love which 
promotes justice in Latin American society, and wherever poor persons 
are found. This interpretation has led to a 'new' Christology, 
with a special emphasis upon Jesus' radical commands, and upon the 
radical nature of the kingdom of God which he envisioned ia history. 
Although we have had cause to question a certain disposition toward 
the use of violence, with which Christ's love may not necessarily 
be allied, the interpretation of love in intimate correlation with 
the issues of human justice is a challenge to theology around the 
world.
Alfred North Whitehead represents a theological genre which 
is both old and new. His interpretation of love stems, in significant 
degree, from the interpretations of Plato. His writings of the 
early twentieth century have been increasingly adapted by contemporary 
'process theologians' in an attempt to find greater relative connec­
tions between science, metaphysics, and the social sciences. We 
looked at Whitehead's view of eros as it blends with developing 
civilization and other factors in the universe. Significantly,
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we noted that the universal nature of eros could not be contained 
within an exclusive view of Christian love. Although Whitehead's 
'intuitions' are somewhat speculative and often complicated, it 
is doubtful that 'love' can be adequately conceived without giving 
some attention to the greater relationships of life, matter, and 
experience, with which Whitehead attempted to deal. Important for 
theology is the fact that Whitehead retained the idea of God. Many 
of the ancient themes of theology may be discerned, from a new pers­
pective, in Whitehead's thought. In such themes as persuasion, 
objective immortality, mutual immanence, and 'the eros of the universe' 
theologians may discover new ways of integrating theory and practice.
Crucial Issues
In H.G. Well's romantic novel Love and Mr. Lewisham, the hero,
intent upon an academic career, suffers the inconvenience of falling
in love. After me.ny ups and downs with his beloved, his career,
and his fortune, Mr. Lewisham is finally enlightened in the depths
of his frustration and despair. Mr. Lewisham's 'enlightenment'
may have a certain oblique bearing upon the discussion of love in
modern theology.
His mood sank for a space to the quality of groaning...'What a mess we have made of things!' was his new motif.'What a mess!'He knew love now for what it was, knew it for something more ancient and more imperative than reason. He knew now that he loved her, and his recent rage, his hostility, hiscondemnation of her seemed to him the reign of some ex­terior influence in his mind. He thought incredulously of the long decline in tenderness that had followed the first days of their delight in each other, the diminution of endearment, the first yielding to irritability, the even­ings he had spent doggedly working, resisting all his sense of her presence. 'One cannot always be lovemaking,' he had said, and so - they were slipping apart...But how to get back to the old footing? how to efface the things he had said, the things that had been done?Could they get it back?For a moment he faced a new possibility. Suppose they could not get back! Suppose the mischief was done! Sup­pose that when he slammed the door behind him it locked, and was locked against him for ever!'But we must !' said Lewisham, 'we must!'^
1. H.G, Wells, Love and Mr. Lewisham, Literary Press, London, p. 216
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It should not be necessary to unravel the analogy. (S0ren 
Kierkegaard's analogy of the king who loved a maiden should be an 
adequate hermeneutic for it.) There are, however, three essential 
elements in the above extract, often neglected in theological disc­
ussions of love, which demand integration. The first is an aphoristic 
definition, indeed, a definition of love; "...something more ancient 
and more imperative than reason." The second is the single word 
"tenderness". The third is a special kind of repentance arising 
from the insight that authentic justice is required in every human 
relationship.
If, as I have suggested, it is not advisable nor even possible 
to draw definitive distinctions between the many different forms
of love, it may still be admissible to offer some broad and general 
principles upon which future love-talk in Christian theology might 
be based. The three essential characteristics just noted may provide 
the initial frameword or 'guidelines' for a theology of love which 
continues to develop theoretically in correspondence with God's 
call for justice and Christ's command: "Dwell in my love...love
one another, as I have loved you." (John 15:9 ff)
The 'thesis' we have been exploring is just this proposition, 
that only by the practice of loving one another do we fully "dwell" 
in the love of Christ and in the love of God. Theology, therefore, 
is challenged to take seriously the task of loving; any theory of 
the love of God requires to be related intimately to the loves of 
humanity, and love of the neighbour as oneself. An implicit and 
indispensable relationship between human love and the love of God
is proclaimed in this logion of Jesus (John 15:9 ff). The love
of Christ is not essentially different from the love of God; as
humans keep the commandment to love each other, their loves too 
may represent divine love.
This representation, in human guise, of God's love may imply 
an important human identity with the divine love, yet without
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the same mass or quantity. The intuition of an identity between
divine love and human love at its best is often implied in the use
of the Greek word agape. Martin Luther and Anders Nygren, in our
study, attempted to suggest the unalienated communication of divine 
love through human beings in virtue of faith. Through faith, they 
insisted, the quality of divine love and human love becomes one
unified expression. Emil Brunner went so far as to assert that 
it is faith that is commanded, and that from faith love spontaneously 
proceeds. But, as Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Barth observed, an 
insistence upon faith may have the effect of inserting an alienating 
a priori into the love command, so that love, in effect, becomes 
a function of faith, and subordinate to it.
Whereas Nygren suggested that faith removes the qualitative 
dissimilarity between divine and human love, Kierkegaard and Barth 
maintained that God's love is always different in quality from the 
human's inadequate loves. Despite Kierkegaard's radical emphasis 
upon faith, he finally affirmed that "truly, a profession of faith 
is not enough."  ^ That is, humanity is so prone to selfish loves 
that not even faith can guarantee that one's love is correlative
with the love commanded by Christ, and with the love of God. There
remains a qualitative difference.
This debate will continue. I have suggested that whenever 
human beings love their neighbour justly, passionately, in identif­
ication with the God-created 'self in the neighbour, then there
is indeed a qualitative identity between the love of God and the 
human love expressed. But God's love must also be conceived in 
such vast effectiveness, that one must not be too quick to discount 
a certain divinity in those 'lesser' loves which are somewhat exclus­
ive, somewhat self-centred, and somewhat unjust. Whitehead's expos­
ition of eros demonstrates the range and vitality of God's love
1. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, op. cit. p. 344
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operating toward a specific purpose even in the loves which are 
entwined with evil. One must not be so strenuous in defining the 
love of God to imply that it is not capable of being expressed in 
the erotic loves of romance, marriage, friendship, and group cons­
ciousness. On the other hand, the love of Christ "impels us" to 
make our loves more inclusive, better attuned to the harmony of 
all, and genuinely expressive of the greatest possible justice in 
each relationship.
In response to the question: "Can human love ^  the love
of God?", I would suggest that the answer is yes, always; and no, 
never. To some degree, the love of God in its creative and nurturing 
capacity is present in every selfish love, urging each organism on 
to greater possibilities. At the same time, the greatest possibili­
ties of any single organism or group of organisms can never hope 
to encompass or fully express the infinite redemptive and transforming 
influence of God's love. Perhaps there is always similarity and 
dissimilarity, as a drop of sea-water is and is not the ocean.
The most enlightening implications from the various authors 
who have contributed to this symposium may be outlined under the 
following headings.
1. "...Something More Ancient and More Imperative than Reason."
We begin with Wells' 'definition' of love. Of course no 
definition can be assumed to be exhaustive. We recall Kierkegaard's 
foreword to Works of Love : "That which in its vast abundance is
essentially inexhaustible is also essentially inddacribabhg in its 
smallest act, simply because essentially it is everywhere wholly 
present and essentially cannot be described". We recall also Seward 
Hiltner's remark that there is in the idea of love the intuition 
of "some kind of unity" which integrates and reconciles apparent 
opposites, encompassing myriad diversities in universal scope.
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Our study began with the attempts of the early Hegel and Ludwig 
Feuerbach to posit love as the 'spirit' or 'essence' of Christianity. 
Love, they suggested, is the inherent truth of Christian Incarnation 
theory, and the authentic content of Christianity, since faith state­
ments sublimate belief in love. Doctrinal statements about the 
incarnated God, they suggested, say nothing about the ontological 
nature of the divine being, but they say a great deal about the 
human being, Dasein, existing in time and space, suffering pain
and frustration, yet hopeful in grasping love as the highest
manifestation of human nature.
Both the early Hegel and Feuerbach, like Schleiermacher, 
Kierkegaard, and numerous nineteenth-century philosophers, reacted 
strongly to the over-emphasis upon reason which was the legacy of 
Descartes, Kant, and the general tendency of the Enlightenment.
The later Hegel, however, attempted in his 'system' to enfold reason 
and love, and all matter and experience in a comprehensive, quasi- 
Platonic cosmic 'mind' (Geist). To several of the nineteenth century
thinkers, Hegel's system was less than satisfactory, due to its 
speculative implications. In a sense, they thought, Hegel had inver­
ted his early emphasis upon love and feeling (i.e. 'stood on his 
head') by proclaiming that a speculative, universal 'mind' was able 
to transcend and encompass human consciousness and rationality. 
Due to the survival of Hegel's early manuscripts, his students who 
found more insight in his 'youthful' talk about love than in his 
later system called themselves "Young Hegelians" and formed a tiny 
nucleus of a movement which eventually was to play an important 
role in fashioning new models for history. Feuerbach was their 
first inspiration, but was reluctant to become their leader.^
A great deal of modern love-theory is somewhat dependent upon 
the debates of the early nineteenth century. Our contemporary
1. cf. above Chapter 1
discussions of I and thou, of 'Dasein', of religion as an opiate
and as an illusion, of phenomenology, of experience, of Christian 
'anthropology', of subconscious 'feeling', of 'praxis', ideology, 
materialism, imagination, and epistemology have roots in the early 
nineteenth century intuition and philosophical development of love's 
existential primacy over reason. By talking about love, not reason, 
as the 'spirit' of Christianity, Hegel opened a door which cculd 
not be closed. Schleiermacher's and Feuerbach's extrapolation of 
the depths of feeling, feeling which senses in others of a common 
species such affinity that oneself is thereby disclosed, without 
dependence upon rationality and consciousness, has led to diverse 
theories about love, as well as numerous other aspects of social,
existence. A veritable 'Pandora's Box' seemed to be opened once
thinkers began to investigate the things that lie beneath conscious­
ness and thought. In the process, the dynamics of religion came 
to incorporate a convenient model for philosophical analysis. 
Feuerbach used it as an analytical vehicle for the exposition of
feeling in contrast to reason. The essence of Christianity was 
not discoverable "within the bounds of reason alone", but only with 
reference to the general pervasiveness of the feeling of love, the 
greatest exponent of human sensucusness and supra-rationality: belief, 
compassion, and imagination. Love, for Feuerbach, was net only 
the essence of Christianity, but also of all individual and corporate 
humanity. Love was acknowledged to be material in quality, the 
'substance' by which the individual consciousness becomes self- 
conscious of species existence. The implications of this community- 
oriented, material, phenomenclogically grounded love Feuerbach did 
not fully pursue. But where Feuerbach left off, Karl Marx began; 
Feuerbach's interpretation demanded, for Marx, a transforming human 
practice if the greatest possibilities of unalienated human feeling 
(Sinnlichkeit) were to find relevance in history.
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Somewhat similar to the early nineteenth century emphasis 
on love as an activity of feeling undetermined by consciousness 
and reason is Alfred North Whitehead's broad characterization. of |
eros. Whitehead's overtly Platonic account of love as an energy 
which synthesizes all experience recalls Plato's attempts to elevate 
the idea of love from the purvey of vulgar sexuality and the mystery 
religions. In his notion of eros Whitehead attempted to make the 
whole universe intimately related to each occasion of experience, 
as it builds upon a perishing past to provide the foundations for ta less frustrated and more beautiful future. But Whitehead also 
reminds us somewhat of the later Hegel, the Hegel who posited the 
notion of a universal 'mind' . For Whitehead, that mind was not 
so rational as loving. Instead of a universal mind, we are asked 
to envision the activity of a universal love, luring all life to 
itself, in greater harmony with all successive creation, and preserv­
ing each individual love in an 'ocean of feeling'.
Feuerbach insisted on beginning with being itself, Dasein, 
not the idea of being. Hegel, too, in his early years, considered 
individual feeling and love from a strictly phenomenological frame 
of reference. But where Hegel was constrained to take the individual 
toward the universal by grounding individual phenomena in ontology,
Feuerbach refused to pursue the loves of existence beyond time and 
space. Nevertheless he insisted on using transcendent terms, like 
"infinite" and "divine", in his 'materialist' exposition of love.
Whitehead, however, in starting not with matter or mind, but rather 
with the single occasion of experience, was able to trace the 'feeling' 
of the single experience to the fulfilment of God, the universal 
lure and reservoir of love.
I have not disguised my conviction that Whitehead's account 
of love as "the eros of the universe", has much to offer Christian 
theology. Because it is more inclusive than Feuerbach's love demand­
ing the exclusion of God, yet even more phenomenological at the
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base of feeling and experience, overcoming the apparent dualism 
between mind and matter without over-emphasizing consciousness and 
reason, Whitehead's love-theory seems to supersede Hegel and Feuerbach.
Each of the three have played an important role in acknowledging 
love's ancient and indispensable impact upon human existence in 
countless ways which lie obscured from strictly rational investig­
ation. Modern sciences have just begun to explore some of the primit­
ive effects and inter-related social dynamics caused by sheer feeling, 
and especially that vague range of feelings called love. The activi­
ty and importance of feeling is no longer a theory opposed to the 
theory of consciousness. Our century has witnessed repeated invest­
igations into the unconscious receptive life of humans, to require 
speculative assessments and even more metaphysical theories before 
we can call such theories 'facts'. Without a doubt, however, the 
effects of feeling and love in human behaviour and human relations 
will be indispensable to the psychology, sociology, medicine, and 
philosophy of the future.
Any theology which ignores the ancient imperative of feeling 
and love is sure to lose relevance to, and influence upon, an increas­
ingly complex and sophisticated world. The pretensions of theology 
to rational and 'scientific' method, to strictly doctrinal formula­
tions ignoring the pluralism of the world, and to systematic discuss­
ions which prejudice results may ignore the ancient authentic appeal 
of religion in every age; not the skeleton of logic, but the flesh 
and blood of human needs, emotion, imagination, and love.
If theology can conceive of love as "some kind of unity", 
a creative force or master genetic principle linking all specific 
life forms, and indeed, all matter and experience, then there should 
be no need to perpetuate the divisive and dualistic definitions 
of "Christian" love which have been popular in our century. There 
is no longer the necessity to vindicate agape over eros. The meaning
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which Plotinus and the neo-Platonists applied to love as eros is 
neither consistent with Plato nor obviously relevant to the contempor­
ary understanding of love. As Karl Barth admitted, the neo-orthodox 
theologians were "a little late" with their protest.
In considering the meanings of eros in use today, variant
interpretations must be distinguished. Eros may imply either a
universal life-force, a neo-platonist type of spirituality, or an
individual "pleasure principle". I have suggested that Whitehead's 
broad social interpretation offers the best theological basis for 
perpetuation of the term.
With a thorough reading of Plato, supplemented by a study 
of Whitehead, Darwin, and a visit to any museum of Natural History, 
one certainly might make a good argument that agape, philia and
all the other kinds cf love are derivations of and contained within
eros. But this argument too might lead to divisiveness, perhaps
even to a preference for 'natural theology' over the revelation 
of the Incarnation. At any event, if agape is to be perpetuated 
as a special, even technical, word for Christian love, and if eros 
is today a word abused after Freudian psychoanalytic theory, but 
meaning generally a 'life-force', then there ought to be some inter­
relation between them if theology's love-talk has any bearing at 
all upon theories of evolution, genetics, and relativity.
Such a relationship, I suspect, may be found in the writings 
of Karl Barth. Barth has demonstrated that a doctrine of creation 
need not be opposed to God's continuous nurture and reconciling 
action throughout the contingency of time and space. For Barth,
the acquisitiveness of eros is no less a part of God's creation 
throughout nature than the self-giving of agape is a part of his
salvation and election of human nature. Barth's emphasis upon a
creative and redemptive grace, present already in the Hebrew covenant 
and culminating in the Incarnation and Atonement, but not beginning 
there, suggests a broader view of Christian agape which seems to
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be required if God's love and its correlative in human life is to 
be consistent with continuous creation.
Nygren's view of agape, as I have shown, is much too narrow 
because (1) it is dualistic and exclusive of all loves which do 
not fit into Nygren's definition; (2) it misrepresents important 
biblical usage; and (3) it finds no place for appropriate response 
to God's creative love outwith faith in Christ or prior to the Incarn­
ation.
Barth understood, whereas Nygren did not, that the history 
of the Covenant and the Torah had the capacity, even within the 
context of law, to promote justice in the authentic response of 
neighbourly love (cf. heviti'cus 19:18,33). Nygren excluded all 
forms of law (nomos) from agape, insisting that it be 'spontaneous', 
'unconditional', and 'unmotivated'. Inherent in his Lutheran inter­
pretation was the assumption that the Fall had rendered obedience 
to the law impossible, so that there could be "no way of man to 
God". While we might not quarrel with this interpretation so far
as it originates with St. Paul, the effect of the Fall, stated in 
this form, may be to cut God off from his own role as creator. 
In contrast, Barth suggested, "every abyss...has a bottom somewhere." 
That 'bottom', for Barth, was the foundation of grace: the totally
creative, nurturing, transforming, redemptive, reconciling, electing, 
and continuously active love of God, which humanity does not have 
the capacity, ultimately, to alienate.^
While Barth indeed used the term agape to suggest the self­
giving love of humans which correlates with God's own love, he did 
not use the term in a manner which excludes God's potential influence 
in other loves. He affirmed, for example, the eros of marriage, 
and admitted that ncn-Christians often love more appropriately in
1. It has been argued however, that Barth's doctrine of Creation may be subordinated to 
his Christology. cf. G. Wingren, Theology in C o n f l i c t , op. cit. pp. 33 ff. "Sarth's later 
writings may ameliorate this criticism.
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correspondence to agape than do Christians. Nevertheless, for Barth, 
agape represented that special word of the Lord to his Church, calling 
forth authentic loving relations between Christians as a witness 
and an example to the world.
Whatever meanings may be attributed to agape in the theology 
of the future, any assumption of its 'purity* or self-evident conn­
otation apart from a specific context is a misconception from which 
theology has suffered long enough. Modern textual analysis of the 
word in the New Testament has clearly shown that derivatives of 
agape and philein are often used without discrimination. Although 
the common word for love was no longer eros in koine Greek, other 
words were still evolving. Even if Paul was able to use the term 
agape consistently, possibly because it was simply the word most
often used between the 'I' and 'thou' of first century Asia Minor, 
other New Testament writers were less consistent. It is clear,
however, that neither eros, nor philia (except at James 4:4, with 
reference to the LXX) , are used in the New Testament. Much more 
research will be required to be conclusive, but the simplest reasons 
suggested are (1) the words were no longer in common use, and 
(2) they were, at any event, now associated with philosophical 
'technical' meanings, and their use might be confusing.
The implication for love-talk, from both contemporary usage 
of the word eros, and etymological research into biblical origins, 
suggests that language will continue to discover the ineffable in 
the idea of love. Wherever a characteristic of love is revealed 
which is nameless, humanity struggles to 'name the whirlwind'. 
It is named creatively, but also ^inadequately, because names for
love are based upon the feeling which it generates, and there is 
just enough difference in common feeling to lead to a slight redefin­
ition in the imagination of each one who perceives it and tries
1. cf. Victor Paul Furnish, The Love Command in the New Testament, op. cit. pp. 219 ff.
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once more to give it appropriate and meaningful expression. Love's 
'imperative' is always a little beyond our grasp by thought and 
reason, yet evident and active wherever two or three are gathered.
The struggle to give names to various forms of love may be 
analogous to the classical western tendency to interpret the harmony
of music in relatively arbitrary distinctions of notes, keys, time
signatures, and certain forms for symphonies, sonatas, and concertos. 
Although a specific note, for example, has a character cf its own, 
we often forget that each particular note is somewhat arbitrarily
specified, and that its character is determined by its relation 
to others, and to the whole key in which it exists. In addition, 
whether it is played staccato or legato, pianissimo or fortissimo, 
as a single note or as part of a chord, on a stringed or wind instru­
ment, further illustrates the range of 'identity' possible to any 
single note. The analogy suggests that the identification of one 
'type' of love is rather an arbitrary exercise.
Plato often compared love to music. Socrates' famous conversa­
tion with Phaedrus was accompanied by a "choir of cicalas".^ Music, 
Eryximachus was made to assert in the Symposium, originates from 
the same source as love. Agathon, following Eryximachus' speech,
tells us that "love sings to all things which live and are, soothing
2the troubled minds of Gods and men." But whereas Eryximachus and 
Agathon wished to construe love essentially by its capacity to promote 
harmony, Socrates, in relating the oracle of Diotima, observes that 
love may often be involved in apparent disharmony, discord, while 
only a particular 'species of love' tends to be associated with 
the obvious beauty and harmony of music; "one portion or species 
of poetry, that which has relation to music and rhythm, is divided
3from all others, and known by the name belonging to all." In our 
descriptions of love, Diotima informed Socrates, "we select a
1. Plato, P h a e d r u s , 2302. Plato, The S y m p o s i u m , 197
3. ibid. 205
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particular species of love, and apply to it distinctively, the appell­
ation of that which is universal."^ Theories of love stressing 
one "species" only may imply the relation of a tuning fork to an 
orchestra...pertinent, but arbitrary and deficient.
Countless modern instruments and voices bear witness to the 
world's conviction that "soft stillness and the night become the 
touches of sweet harmony." On every airwave "the sounds of music 
creep in our ears" as they attempt to
...wake Diana with a hymn... ^And draw her home with music.
The intuitions 'felt' in love and music are net rationally reducible.
Lovers, like Lorenzo and Jessica in The Merchant of Venice, are
receptive to the sounds of music, and in it, a sense of harmony,
even if they are ignorant of music theory. Together, reclining
on a grassy bank, they wonder at the harmony of the universe.
How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!Here will we sit and let the sounds of music 
Creep in our ears; soft stillness and the night Become the touches of sweet harmony...
Such harmony is in immortal souls.But whilst this muddy vesture of decay Doth close it in, we cannot hear it.
In all this harmony, we can almost hear Plato's "choir of cicalas",
as Socrates instructs Phaedrus in the art of love.
All that is soul presides over all that is without soul, and ipatrol’s all heaven, now appearing in one form and now in another. When it is perfect and fully feathered it roams in upper air, and regulates the entire universe; but the soul that has lost its feathers is carried down till it finds some solid resting place...with the addition of the epithet mortal, The immortal, on the other hand has receive^ its name from the conclusion of no human reasoning.
Now of that region beyond the sky no earthly bard has ever yet sung, or ever will sing in worthy strains.
Thus love's relationships abound: music, poetry, romantic
1. ibid.
2. William Shakespeare, The Merchant of V e n i c e , Act 5, Scene 1.
3 .  i b i d .  V  ■ ' ' ' • ■4. Plato, Phaedrus, 246
5. ibid, 247
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love, friendship, the harmony of the universe, the depths of silence, 
and intimations of God and immortality. Discord too plays its part 
in a greater whole, for given a certain appreciation, "the crow 
doth sing as sweetly as the lark." Only from the periphery of dark­
ness may we see "how far that little candle throws its beams".
In the imagery of love and music, justice may be viewed from a diff­
erent perspective: "So shines a good deed in a naughty world."
The madness of love, Plato declared, has vision, intensity, 
and integrity unshared with rationality, but somewhat shared with 
the sense by which humans appreciate the profound, ineffable, interior 
relationships of music and poetry. "The poetry of sense fades into
obscurity before the poetry of madness." The integrating faculty
of love, like music, intuits what reason cannot think, for "such a
madness as this was given by God to man for his highest possible 
happiness.
2"God has loves, not reasons," wrote Father Robert Farrer Capon. 
We need not assume that his loves are illogical or irrational, but 
neither must we too quickly give to the minimal objectivity of our 
limited rational minds that which is essentially unlimited. Love 
is more approachable, perhaps, by what we as human beings innately 
feel, creatively imagine, and intuitively suspect. To fit the idea 
of love, either human or divine, into any objective system is to 
pollute the holy. Theology, if it is to be theo-logical, must take 
care not to set up artificial barriers rationally determined either 
by the past or the theories of the present. For in many respects, 
we are still trying to scratch the surface of an eminently indestruc­
tible and dense alloy, which, while exerting its immeasurable magnetic 
pull upon us due to its indeterminable mass, is somewhat opaque 
to our direct analysis. Perhaps the best we can do is to observe
1. ibid, 245
2. Robert Farrer Capon, The Supper of the Lamb, op. cit. p. 84
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the effect of its magnitude, the feelings generated in ourselves 
and the responses in our fellow creatures, as it pulls us, like 
a giant magnet collecting iron filings, closer to itself, and simult­
aneously, closer to each other.
Through all the philosophical and poetic talk of love there 
lies beneath the logic and the music a certain intuition of trans­
cendence, which, since the dawn of history, has been expressed as 
religion. Fertility goddesses, creation myths, and cultic worship 
in every age have persistently connected the intuitions in loving 
with 'heights beyond which block our vision'.
St. Augustine's view of caritas remains an indomitable, and 
in many ways profoundly relevant 'synthesis' of interrelated 'love- 
motifs'. As Nygren correctly concluded, it is not limited to the 
New Testament milieu. But so far from attenuating the idea of love, 
as Nygren alleged, St. Augustine set for theology an indispensable 
precedent for thinking about love in transcendent terms.
Luther also, an Augustinian scholar in his own right, emphasized 
many ideas of the Bishop of Hippo, while leaving aside certain allu­
sions which seemed to him self-contradictory. Luther himself, however, 
lacked the sort of comprehensive consistency we have today come to 
expect from theologians. He was capable of cold analysis and eloquent 
passion, ruthless assertion as well as 'divine madness'. Luther 
was no systematician. Like Augustine, his works may be turned to
serve various view-points. Nygren's interpretation of Luther is
not the only possible one; as we have noticed, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, 
Brunner, and Niebuhr were all 'Lutheran' scholars, and all incorpor­
ated certain views of Luther in their interpretations of love. It
is reductive of Luther to interpret all his statements, as it is 
of St. Paul, according to the hermeneutic of 'faith alone'. Luther 
did not suggest that love for God may be contained within the response 
of faith, according to the suggestion of Nygren. He was far too 
much an Augustinian to hold such a view consistently, even though
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he did indeed suggest that faith enables appropriate love for God:
For since by faith the soul is cleansed and made a lover of God, it desires that all things, and especia­lly its own body, shall be as pure as itself, so that  ^all things may join with it in loving and praising God.
Nor did Luther completely divorce the idea of obedience from the
'spontaneity' of faith:
Hence a man cannot be idle, because the need of his 
body drives him and he is compelled to do many good works to reduce it to subjection. Nevertheless the works themselves do not justify him before God, but he does the works out of spontaneous love in obedience to God, and considers nothing except the approval of God, w^om he would in all things most scrupulously obey.
We observe in the above quotation the juxtaposition of the 
word 'spontaneous' with the words 'compelled' and 'obedience'. The 
neo-orthodox view that only 'spontaneity' is an adequate modifier 
of love is not here reconcilable with Luther's position. Kierkegaard's 
interpretation of Luther on this point is more apt than Nygren's 
and Brunner's, and we shall return to it shortly.
Despite the good intentions of Nygren and neo-orthodox Protest­
ants in liberating theology from rationalism, Kantian ethics, liberal­
ism, fundamentalism, private piety, mysticism, and works rrighteous- 
ness, their emphasis upon a latter day interpretation of faith in 
connection with spontaneous love did not make 'Christian love' purer 
nor were they able to show that faith can guarantee the 'type' of 
love enjoined by Christ. Through most of the neo-orthodox interpre­
tation of love ran the radically dualistic assertion of Luther that 
only the human being who "by faith is created in the likeness of 
God" is capable of appropriate and genuine love. As Barth came to 
acknowledge, partly from an awareness of Feuerbach's allegation that 
such a faith is a contradiction of love, "one may no longer repeat 
these things from Luther without some caution."
1. Martin Luther, Treatise on Christian Liberty, op. cit. p. 542. ibid.
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I have already alluded to the impact that such an exclusive 
view of love may have upon the activity of God throughout all creation, 
and upon God's capacity for patient nurture and love even for 'fallen' 
human nature. With regard for this concern, I suggested that the 
Fall of Cain is a better paradigm than the Fall of Adam. Whereas 
Adam's sin was a revolt against God, for which he was peremptorily 
banished from the Garden of God's nurture, Cain's sin was even greater. 
It was a revolt against his brother, a selfish jealous rage of 
fratricide. Yet his self-condemnation was denied by God, and he 
departed with the mark of God's protection and nurture, to 'seek 
the face of God' by discovering in the social relations of craft 
and culture, what it might mean to be 'his brother's keeper'.
Although faith may indeed play a role in helping us to discover 
what it means to be our brothers' keepers, with God's nurture, in 
the city of Cain, it cannot be the primary key to which all loves 
are subjected or which 'activates' the love of God. Both Barth's 
view of grace, and certain interpretations of the traditional grace 
of Roman Catholicism, 'comprehend' faith without making it love's 
prerequisite. Complementary may be Whitehead's emphasis upon 'per­
suasion' , which, as an eminent form of eros, is also an expression 
of God's providence enabling just and peaceful social relations in 
a frustrated world. While neither faith nor love is capable of 
containment within the bounds of reason alone, an exclusive 'type* 
of love dependent upon faith may militate against that infinitely 
inclusive love proclaimed in the 'word' of grace.
With the hermeneutic of the small word 'grace', theology's 
'love' has the capacity to challenge all other views and interpreta­
tions. Proclaiming this word of grace, in hope, theologians may 
claim that they speak with authority about love, as in humility they 
identify the different levels in which the word is operative. From 
the beginning, pervasive to the end, there surely that word;
"something more ancient and more imperative than reason."
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2. "Tenderness"
It is the business of philosophical theology to provide a rational understanding of the rise of civilization, and of the tendernesses of mere life itself, in a world which superficially is founded upon the slashings of senseless compulsion. I am not disguising my belief that in this task, theology has largely failed. The notion of the absolute despot has stood in ^he way. The doctrine of Grace has been degraded...
In Whitehead's philosophy the idea of eros finds its final
'concrescence' in a cosmic tenderness, "a tender care that nothing 
2be lost." Through the profoundly human, yet universally transcendent 
experience of tenderness, "life includes a mode of satisfaction deeper
3than .‘joy (->or. . . sorrow. " "This is the notion of redemption through
suffering, which haunts the w o r l d . I t  seems to represent a signif­
icant part of Whitehead's attempt to correct the doctrine of grace, 
by making the quality of God's redemption of the universe common, 
to some extent, in every organism. Because God includes, and is 
identified with every experience, every feeling, he is "the fellow
5sufferer who understands."
Many of the theologians contributing to our symposium have 
attempted to stress that aspect of love which Whitehead calls tender­
ness. They have done it in different ways, using different words, 
although it is difficult to think of an adequate synonym. Generally 
the word implies vulnerability, susceptibility to pain or grief, 
affection and care, particularly associated with an identification 
of feeling between two or more individuals.
Whitehead's idea of tenderness seems to have been a complement 
of the word 'zest'. Perhaps between these two principles, each 
difficult to define yet intrinsic to the nature, not only of humanity, 
but also to all existence, there is a dynamic polarity producing
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 218
2. Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y , op. cit. p. 490
3. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 221
4. Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y , op. cit. p. 495
5. ibid. p. 497
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the field of 'energy' which human beings experience as love. We
have already noticed the broad acquisitive 'urge' of eros and its
adventure in search of intensity of experience, feeling, and beauty.
But this 'zest' in all life is sustained, must be 'disciplined' or
restrained at many points. Eros unleashed may be even a greater
tragedy for history and civilization than eros maimed. Tenderness
is a balance to zest which is too often impulsive, overconstructive,
1and thereby destructive.
Whitehead, like most of the theologians we have considered, 
found a model for the idea of tenderness in the Galilean images of 
Christianity :
The Mother, the Child, and the bare manger: the lowly man, homeless and self-forgetful, with his message of peace, love and sympathy; the suffering, the agony, the tender words as life ebbed, the final despair, and the whole with the authority of supreme..victory.
These images are so identified with the experience of the mass of
humanity that they have often "evoked a response from all that is
3best in human nature."
The latent truth in the images of Christianity led Feuerbach 
to the conviction that "God is a heart". Humanity is by nature so 
attuned to the images of feeling - compassion, forgiveness, emotion, 
and suffering, for example - that only a God who expresses these 
truths has credibility for human existence. Thus, the God defined 
as omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, and impassible is no God. 
For Feuerbach, the images of the Incarnation express a human God, 
overflowing with feeling and tenderness. It has been noted that 
the concept of God in regard to which Feuerbach was atheistic was 
not the Christian God at all, but rather the formulation of a certain 
medieval 'school'. As Manfred Vogel observed, "Feuerbach is the
1. The polarity between 'zest' and 'tenderness' is not specifically suggested by Whitehead, 
It is, however, a deduction derivable from Adventures of Ideas, especially the final chapter on "Peace".
2. Whitehead, Adventures of I d e a s , op. cit. p. 214
3. ibid.
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great anti-theologian only if we equate theology generally with the 
neo-platonic, idealist formulation."^ Vogel is only partially correct. 
While Feuerbach's critique is certainly of an 'obsolete' concept
of God, he also questioned the necessity for any God at all outside
the experience of love common to human beings existing in time and 
finite conditions. Nevertheless, he was willing to call that phen­
omenological epiphany of feelings 'divine', while continuing to insist 
upon their phenomenological analysis. Reversing subject and predicate, 
Feuerbach said that "love is God". He did not mean by this, however, 
that love is the origin of all things, or the supra-historical redee­
mer of humanity. His interpretation of love was phenomenologically,
not ontologically, orientated. Redemption was a programme for human­
ity, but in this world alone, a communitarian self-redemption achiev­
able precisely through those 'divine' attributes of human nature 
which theology, before his time, was not able to consider fully nor 
effectively inspire. Those attributes which he identified as emin­
ently indispensable to human nature and a "species-consciousness" 
were the tender ones: not power, production, and control, but compa­
ssion, suffering, and love. These attributes lay hidden in the human 
imagination capable of conceiving and believing in a human, suffering 
God.
Sç5ren Kierkegaard, far from denying the tender elements which 
Feuerbach identified as 'divine', in fact heightened them. 
Kierkegaard attempted to reconcile faith with the highest and most 
genuine 'passion' in human nature: love for God. In many ways,
Kierkegaard answered Feuerbach's critique of theology by showing 
that God's omnipotence might be reconciled with his love for humanity, 
precisely in his "omnipotent love", breaking down the barriers which 
prevent humans from loving him, as well as their fellows. By loving 
God, and by sensing in that love a "duty" to love one's neighbour.
1. Manfred Vogel, "The Ba rth- Feuerbach Confrontation", Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 
59, p. 27
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human passion is fulfilled and attains an 'eternal' quality. 
Kierkegaard depicted the infinite intensity of God's passion for 
humanity: "The love that gives all is itself in want." God not only 
suffers what humans suffer, but he suffers incommensurably because 
of his greatness. His 'Absolute' character implies absolute suffer­
ing, as well as an absolute love which relates itself absolutely, 
to the human condition. By commanding that humans love their neigh­
bours, God provides the key to authentic loves throughout the human 
temporal condition. God becomes the "third party" in every relation­
ship, and constitutes, in essence, the very love itself with which 
human beings genuinely love others, and in the process, love them­
selves rightly. Kierkegaard, like Feuerbach, had no qualms about 
asserting, "Love is God." But for Kierkegaard, the expression had 
an eternal and "essentially inexhaustible" significance, illustrating 
the absoluteness as well as the relatedness of the divine passion.
In the feelings of tenderness through which human relations 
develop, there arises also the question of self-love. For the early 
Hegel, self-love was "a word without meaning", probably because it 
did not fit very well into Hegel's developing theory of epistemology. 
While Augustine used the term in various contexts, Luther would not 
allow it at all. Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, however, acknowledg­
ed the necessity for human beings to find in themselves that which 
is worthy of love.
In Feuerbach's view, one must identify the 'self in the 'thou', 
the other person, by identifying with the other's feelings, suffer­
ings, and experiences, which inform the identification and revelation 
of oneself. Self-knowledge arises through communion with others; 
by loving others the 'I' discovers itself: "The love of others tells 
you what you are." Then, in recognition that the other loves himself, 
and loves himself justly, the 'I' learns to love itself appropriately:
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If you simply condemn egoism, that is, self-love, then you must also condemn, consequently, the love for others. Love is good will and good behaviour toward others, therefore, to recognize the just self-love of another. Why then will you geny for yourself what you acknowledge in others?
Kierkegaard acknowledges that right self-love is an indispens­
able antidote for its opposite, despair. His theory of self-love 
is not totally consistent, or at least it is fully paradoxical. 
In some ways it represents St. Augustine's theory that only by denying 
oneself in love for God does one truly love oneself rightly. But 
for Kieirkegaard there is, particularly in his later works, an impera­
tive to love one's neighbour ^  oneself, and both in the correct 
relationship to God. With this imperative Kierkegaard develops St. 
Augustine's repeated intimation that the self and the neighbour are
equal before God. "You shall love your self as you love your neigh-
2hour when you love him as yourself." Kierkegaard declared. Such 
a statement is not transparent apart from the context of Kierkegaard's 
thought. What he seems to mean is that the love of neighbour is 
commanded in "the royal law", while self-love is only the measure 
of the command. The neighbour is to be loved first, and the self 
without egocentrism in deference to the neighbour. Only by loving 
one's neighbour selflessly can one, in fact, love oneself rightly. 
The paradoxical theme of selfhood, of proper and improper self love, 
is a constant topic for Kierkegaard. Loving one's neighbour as one­
self is both the evidence and the preservative of faith. Character­
istically ambiguous, implying the 'Paradox' with which Kierkegaard's 
writings are often concerned, is his final paragraph in The Sickness 
unto Death:
"By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it." And this formula^ as has often been noted, is the definition of faith.
1. Feuerbach, The D i a r y , W e r k e , op. cit. Band 2, p. 413 (My translation; of. above, p. 147)
2. Soren Kierkegaard, Works of L o v e , op. cit. p. 39
3. Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, op. cit. p. 262
: Vji
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An appropriate and balanced self-concept, indeed something
resembling 'self-love', seems to be required in the future development 
of love by Christian theology. Augustine's use of the terms amor 
sui and cupiditas, however, have set a difficult precedent for theol­
ogy. As Oliver O'Donovan has observed, it is hardly possible to 
speak of one meaning of the term self-love for St. Augustine.^ Inher­
ent in the modern use of the term lie such diverse related concepts 
as eudaemonia and utilitarianism, epistemology, Freudian psycho­
analysis, the ethics of egoism, and of course, all the extrapolations 
of pride, hubris, epithumia, and egotism denounced by Christian ethics. 
Also complicating the issue is much narcissistic popular psychology 
and theology, prevalent now in the United States and Europe, which
stress the ideas of 'assertiveness' and individual liberation. The
sort of individualism which fills a yearning for personal freedoms
is not, we can certainly conclude, equivalent to the sort of self-
love that either Augustine, Feuerbach, or Kierkegaard wished to affirm. 
But on the other hand, the 'culture of narcissism,' perpetuated by 
increasing mobility and communication in our world, may be the evid­
ence of a wide, if frustrated, search for love on many levels.
Theologians may need to speak again of a 'proper' self-love, 
perhaps not so 'vertical' as that of St. Augustine, so epistemological 
as that of Feuerbach, nor so paradoxical as that of Kierkegaard. 
The term itself is with us; theology can only hope to correct and 
enrich it by setting it in the context of other loves and informing 
it with the insights of the Gospel. We must no longer be afraid 
of it. Any pastor who deals with the tragedies of personal, familial, 
and social frustrations, who visits in a mental hospital, or is called 
to counsel a person on the point of suicide whould be able to recog­
nize the need for it, and also its abuse. The sin of pride is still
rampant, but at the same time we must be able to encourage a proper
1. cf. Oliver 0 'Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, op. cit. p. 137
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pride in achievements, vocation, and talents.
The search for self-love, and for a definitive explanation 
of it, will continue. For the moment, however, I can only note its 
abuse and endorse its necessity. It is an immature, impulsive, yet 
indispensable aspect of love's survival mechanism, and also an inhib­
iting "tenderness" by which, identifying oneself in the neighbour's 
needs and feelings, self-love joyfully finds itself in selfless love.
The tenderness in the New Testament accounts of Jesus' relations 
with real men and women, so often touching and beckoning the deepest 
intuitions of humanity about the nature of love, is itself complicated 
by what seems to be a contradiction, a paradox, or perhaps, a kind 
of polarity. Is the character of this tenderness that of 'spontaneity' 
or 'duty'? The question is posed by the Bible itself. To what extent 
is 'antinomianism' legitimate for Christians? Does the love of Christ 
"impel us" or "compel us" (2 Cor. 5:14)? Did Jesus actually "command" 
that we love, or was he merely quoting the Old Testament? Answers 
to such questions have filled volumes, yet so far, there is no theol­
ogical agreement about the relationship of law and love.
"Of course love cannot be commanded," wrote Hegel. Yet 
Kierkegaard responded that it is indeed the command which supersedes 
all others. If love is primarily feeling, and if obedience to a 
command requires some rational intellect by which the command is 
understood, then it would seem that a commanded love subjects love 
to the faculty of reason. Spontaneous love, on the other hand, issues 
forth in an overflow of feeling or (com)passion, without needing 
any command. But so are many other kinds of emotional expression 
'spontaneous', and often they are characterized by impulsiveness, 
caprice, and undependability. Again we must observe the need for 
some discipline in loving if our loves are to be effective in promot­
ing justice or increasing compassion in a world assailed by indul­
gence of passion.
"Truly," concluded Kierkegaard, "a profession of faith is not
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enough." The love for one's neighbour cannot, by faith, be assumed 
to be spontaneous. Egocentrism is a constant threat to the appro­
priate love of others, of God, and of oneself. By taking the command­
ment to love seriously, authentic love may be preserved in its 
'eternal' quality. Selfish loves, exclusive of one's neighbour, 
may be identified and corrected by 'obedience' to the royal law: 
"You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all 
your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength. . .You 
shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Mark 12:29-31). For 
Kierkegaard, spontaneity in loving could never be assumed, but never­
theless might arise as one becomes more and more "intimate" with 
the commandment.
Nygren, Brunner, Barth, and many of the Latin American liber­
ation theologians, however, have generally affirmed love's spontaneity 
and denied any affiliation with duty, obedience, obligation, or law. 
Those who have read Kierkegaard on the matter have, I suspect, failed 
to understand him adequately. In the background of the duty- 
spontaneity anthithesis Immanuel Kant is more often visualized than 
Kierkegaard. Theologians unwilling to accept Kant's "categorical 
imperative" for Christian ethics, have usually affirmed the spontan­
eity of Christian love over against any conception of duty derivable 
from rational moral principles. Also in the background is the Pauline 
literature, which after Luther, has so often been subjected to the 
hermeneutic of "faith alone". The Christian ethics derivable from 
the Pauline - Lutheran theology have, perhaps too often, led theol­
ogians, like Nygren, Brunner, and to some extent, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
to the assumption that law, and the justice which it attempts to 
effect, are antithetical to Christian "spontaneous" love.
The theological affirmation of spontaneity must not be dismissed, 
however, for theology has too often attempted to define behaviour 
appropriate for Christians according to legal principles, with the 
result that love is not informed by law, but rather reduced to it.
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Particularly flagrant in this regard have been Roman Catholic Canon 
Law, Reformed Protestant doctrine, and numerous types of fundament­
alism. If we are to suggest an appropriate relation of love to law, 
or of spontaneity to duty, we must be careful not to fall again into 
legalism and a 'Gospel' of nomos.
There are convincing biblical grounds for the conclusion that 
authentic human love, correlating with that tender love disclosed 
in the ministry of Jesus, is both a 'duty' and a spontaneous 'feeling'. 
One of the unique aspects of the Christian religion is that its found­
er not only advised, but commanded a 'feeling', which is not ordinar­
ily commendable. "Thou shalt love" requires a certain kind of listen­
ing if we are to have ears to hear it and a sensitive imaginative 
intellect if we are to conceive such a task and obey it.
The dual command, to love God, and the neighbour as oneself, 
is directly derived from the Old Testament (Deuteronomy 6:14; Levit­
icus 19:18,33). As such, it is set within the context, not only 
of Old Testament law, but also the Old Testament Covenant. It is 
a command which entails the idea of justice, as in equality with 
oneself, the neighbour shall be loved. For God makes his rain fall 
on self and neighbour, friend and foe alike, without distinction 
and without preferences.
The command to love God implies that God is worthy of human 
love, and need not be obeyed from a motivation of fear. For Jesus 
God was "Abba", a loving father who senses his children's needs before 
they ask. The command is not "Believe!" but rather "Love!" For 
Jesus and his Palestinian contemporaries, belief in God was not an 
issue. But whether God should be obeyed out of fear or out of love 
was indeed an issue, as Rabbinic sources intimate. Jesus opted for 
love. The command to love God cannot be reduced to a profession 
of faith, first, because faith in itself is no antidote to the worship 
of a fearful despot, and second, because the 'vertical' relationship 
it implies is no guarantee that the second part of the commandment.
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which is indispensable to proper love for God, and to the justice 
which God requires, shall be obeyed. For that matter, neither is 
a private love for God any guarantee of justice; therefore the second 
part of the command is intrinsic to the first.
The command to love the neighbour as oneself includes the idea 
of self-love, but only as the 'measure' of justice and equality; 
the implicit self-love does not constitute a third command. For 
Jesus, self-love seems to have been assumed, but requiring radical 
reinterpretation: "...the measure you give will be the measure you
get." (Matt. 7:12). "For where your treasure is there will your 
heart be also" (Matt. 6:21). "But seek first his kingdom and right­
eousness, and all these things shall be yours as well" (Matt. 6:33). 
"You lack one thiqg,; go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, 
and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me" (Mark
10:21). Jesus reinterpreted the innate self-love of human beings 
according to principles of justice, by which he issued further stren­
uous commands illustrating the character of genuine self-love.
The command to love the neighbour as oneself, first disclosed 
at Mark 12:29-31, is supported by numerous other sayings of Jesus
in both the Synoptics and the Johannine literature. It is also supp­
orted by St. Paul if, in Paul's ethical advice to the Church, agape 
is not understood as a 'magic word', but rather the greatest human 
expression by which the justice required in the Torah might be accom­
plished (Galatians 5:14, Romans 7:12; 8:4; Ephesians 5:12 ff.).
The command to love the neighbour as oneself is not, therefore, an 
arbitrary Old Testament reference used by Jesus to satisfy the law­
yers who were trying to trap him. The principles of justice inherent 
in the command are particularly evident in two of the most memorable 
logia of Jesus: "...And forgive us our debts as we also have forgiven
our debtors" (Matt 6:12). "So whatever you wish that men would do
to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets" (Matt 
7:12). The whole Sermon on the Mount, in fact, is both a reinterpre­
tation of love and a reinterpretation of justice. The "holiness"
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which God requires (Lev. 19:2) is once more identified in the actions 
of interhuman justice, yet a greater justice disclosed not in the 
definitions of law, but rather through the love of one's neighbour 
as oneself:
You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbour and hate your enemy.' But I say to you. Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust. For if you love those who love you, what reward have you? Donnot even the tax collectors do the same? And if you salute only your brethren, what more are you doing than others?Do not even the Gentiles do the same? You therefore
must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect. (Matt. 5:43-48) 
The love command in the Synoptics is not attenuated in the writings 
of St. John. Although much of the dialogue about love in the
Johannine literature occurs between Jesus and his disciples, we need 
not assume that the command is a gnostic, esoteric, or exclusive 
word to disciples only. Our 'thesis', that we dwell in Christ's
love and in the love of God by keeping his commands, that is, by
loving one another as Christ has loved us, complements the command 
as it is given and interpreted in the Synoptics (cf. John 15:1-17).
In John's writings the commanded love for neighbour, inclusive
of strangers and enemies, is reconciled with fraternal love and friend­
ship. The myths and philosophy concerning the spontaneous inclination, 
or preferential passion, of friendship are not necessarily opposed
to Jesus' friendliness. John interprets it as service and self-giving, 
while retaining and often heightening all the special tenderness
binding 'I' and 'thou' through the ages.
This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you. Greater love has- no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. You are my friends if you do what I command you. No 
longer do I call you servants, for the servant does not know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you. (John 15:12-15)
In the light of Jesus' command and his eminent example, the 
meaning of friendship becomes clearer. "Having loved his own...he 
loved them to the end" (John 13:2). Jesus' friendship was not limited
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to his special group of disciples; it was inclusive of lawyers, tax 
collectors, disciples rich and poor, lepers, Samaritans, deranged 
Gentiles, and women. Yet, among a few special friends he was able 
to speak more profoundly and rejoice more humanly. We think particul­
arly of his friendship with Lazarus, upon whose death "Jesus wept." 
("See how he loved him!" John 11:36). Pursuing John's interpretation 
of Jesus' friendship to its greatest implication, the raising of 
Lazarus was a symbol and a sign of the ultimate power in Jesus' love 
for his friends, and a call to be his friend by loving others. 
("Greater love has no man than this, that he lay down his life for 
his friends. You are my friends if you do what I command you." 
John 15:14). The Johannine Gospel is attributable to one special 
disciple, "the disciple whom Jesus loved", who knew the power in 
Jesus' friendship. Although his record probably comes at second 
hand, glossed with gnostic themes, John's Gospel is a witness to 
the energy, vitality, and tenderness of friendship, yet also to the 
inherent pre-requisites of justice, equality, and inclusiveness in 
all mutual love.^
Illustrating the dilemma of duty and spontaneity, the idea 
of friendship is interpreted by the Fourth Gospel in close affinity 
with a command. Being Jesus' 'friend' is not decided by spontaneous 
inclination, but by 'keeping his commands'. Yet the love the command 
requires, if it is to resemble the love with which Christ loved us, 
must nevertheless assume spontaneous characteristics. We become 
Jesus' friends by loving others; i.e. by obeying the command to love 
the neighbour as oneself. The love commanded is nevertheless a spon­
taneous, free, joyful, selfless, forgiving, and tender love. Only 
such a love could be correlative with the love shown by Jesus, and 
free from the artificial imperatives of legal definition.
1. We must note again, however, that the word friendship (p h i l i a ) and the specific concept 
of mutual love do not appear in any of the Gospels. The closest reference is that of 
Matt. 5:46 (Luke 6:32); "If you love (a g a p e s e t e , agapate) (only) those who love (a g a p o n t a s ) 
you, what reward have you?" A philein form might have been expected if mutuality, as 
such, was thematic for the evangelists.
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Finally, the love required, by God in his call for justice, 
and by Jesus of his friends, has the character of a commanded spont­
aneity, a duty to be spontaneous in loving. By recognizing oneself 
in the other person, and by acknowledging the other's 'rights' before 
he or she is forced to claim them, we may fulfil the commandment.
In the parable of the Good Samaritan, which immediately follows 
the Lukan version of the dual command to love God and the neighbour 
as oneself,  ^ we find the Greek word which best represents the idea 
of spontaneous love in the New Testament. "But a Samaritan, as he 
journeyed, came to where he was; and when he saw him, he had comp­
assion (esplanknisthe) and went to him and bound up his wounds... 
and took care of him." (Luke 10:33). Meaning 'bowels', the noun 
splankina has a long history of usage in Rabbinic and Greek literature. 
The bowels were thought to be the centre of feeling and compassion. 
Translated "tender mercy" by the RSV, the "bowels of mercy" play 
a role in Luke's Benedictus:
...for you will go before the Lord to prepare his ways, to give knowledge of salvation to his people Israel in the forgiveness of their sins, through the tender mercy (splankna) of our God. (Luke 1:76-78)
There is obviously a link here with God's hesed, his loving compassion 
throughout the history of the Covenant.
The verb splanknizein is more difficult to translate. Etym- 
ologically, it may be linked with the involuntary reflexes of gastric 
illness. Thus our word 'spontaneous* would be an appropriate adjec­
tive, implying a helpless, involuntary 'gushing forth' of feeling,
2compassion, and tenderness. English requires juxtaposition with
a cause or motive, hence the word 'moved' or 'motivated' is necessary
1. In the Lucan account, the dual command is the response of a lawyer; the parable of the 
Good Samaritan is apparently Jesus' attempt to make concrete the lawyer's rote reply, 
byddemons trat ing the in clusiveness of love of neighbour and also what one must do to 
be a neighbour, cf. Luke 10:25-37.
2. Although it is no longer appropriate to suggest that the Sa maritan's 'bowels moved with 
involuntary compassion', such a rendering would be true to the text. No more acceptable 
in formal translation, but relevant to the text, might be an adaptation of modern slang:
'seeing him, he was moved by a gut feeling of sympathy.' The difficulty with this, how­
ever, is that a 'gut feeling', usually, does not imply the action inherent in the Greek |
'evacuation of bowels'. 1
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to signify feeling that merges into action. The Greek does not need 
the addition; in connection with feeling in 'the bowels', and the 
evacuation of this feeling, the idea of spontaneity may be assumed.
Nevertheless, there is implicit in the form esplanknisthen, 
to be moved with compassion, an assumption of some extraneous motiv­
ation. For this reason, Nygren's rule that agape is never 'motivated' 
appears unjustified. From the numerous references in the Synoptics 
especially, it seems that the cause or motive for such involuntary 
evacuation of feeling stems from a sense of identity with the feel­
ings and sufferings of others. "Moved with pity" Jesus cleansed 
a leper (Mark 1:41). Jesus "had compassion" on a throng because 
they were like sheep without a shepherd, and began to teach them 
(Mark 6:34). Jesus acknowledges his own "compassion on the crowd, 
because they have been with me now for three days and have nothing 
to eat" (Mark 8:2). Implored to "have pity", Jesus heals an epileptic 
child (Mark 9:22-27). Jesus "had compassion" on a widow in her grief, 
and raised her only son (Luke 7:11-15). Jesus tells the parable 
of the Prodigal Son, for whom his father "had compassion and ran 
and embraced and kissed him" (Luke 15:11 ff) . In another parable,
a creditor, "out of pity", frees his slave and forgives him his debt
(Matt. 18:23 ff). "In pity", Jesus touched the eyes of two blind 
men, "and immediately they received their sight and followed him"
(Matt 20:34).
The onus, indeed the 'imperative' for action stemming from
'tender affections ' (splankna) 'moved' by identification with the
needs of others, is underlined by the word's single appearance in
the Johannine literature:
But if any one has the world's goods and sees his 
brother in need, yet closes his heart (splankna) against him, how does God's love abide in him?Little children, let us not love in word or speech, 
but in deed and in truth. (I John 3:17-18)
The energy in the idea esplanknisthen, if not the same word,
often appears in the Johannine writings. Most poignantly and
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powerfully the idea occurs at Lazarus' funeral:
Then Mary, when he came where Jesus was and saw him, fell at his feet, saying to him, "Lord, if you had been here, tey brother would not have died."When Jesus saw her weeping, and the Jews who came with her also weeping, he was deeply moved (enebrimesato) in spirit and troubled...Jesus wept. So the Jews said, "See how he loved him!" But some of them said,"Could not he who opened the eyes of the blind man have kept this man from dying?"Then Jesus, deeply moved (embrimomenos) again, came to the tomb; it was a cave and a stone lay upon it. Jesus said, "Take away the stone." (John 11:32 ff.)
The word embrimaomai suggests yet another kind of active evacuation, 
a groan, snort, or sneeze, also 'spontaneous' and from the depths 
of one's being. In ancient times such involuntary reflexes were 
held to indicate divine or magical influence.^ Although we no longer 
attribute such meaning to them, we may find other ways to illustrate 
the latent power in involuntary, 'spontaneous' feelings which never­
theless entail their own integral 'motivation'.
Whether such evacuations of feeling and tenderness may really 
be 'commanded' is unclear, but it is not the issue. At bottom, the 
'command' deals with the capacity for being authentically human, 
for developing in one's social relations a deep sense of self, best 
revealed precisely in one's identification with the feelings, needs, 
sufferings and joys of other human beings. The command to love is 
really a command to be human, and to demonstrate that humanity by 
preserving and enriching it in intimate relatedness to every other 
creature. (Perhaps Albert Schweitzer's "reverence for life" is not 
far off the mark.) The Gospel proclaims the power in human tender­
ness, and beckons it toward greater spontaneous expression in corr­
elation with "the tender mercy of our God." (Luke 1:78). The tender­
ness we are able to express is often frustrated, weakened by self- 
interest, and limited by our imagination and the will to allow our 
identification with others to melt into just concrete action. Never­
theless, the spontaneity of tenderness is required, indeed commanded.
1. cf. Plato, The Symposium, 189 "I wonder why the harmonious construction of our body 
should require such noisy operations as sneezing..."
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for all who aspire to be friends and followers of Jesus.
Put on then, as God's chosen ones, holy and beloved, compassion (splankna oiktirmou), kindness, lowliness, meekness, and patience, forbearing one another and, if one has a com­plaint against another, forgiving each other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive. And above all these put on love, which 
binds everything together in perfect harmony.((Golossians 3:12-14)
So the early Church construed the call to discipleship. "What our 
age lacks," said Kierkegaard, "is not reflection, but passion." 
And in passionate tenderness for the neighbour in need lie also the 
origins of justice.
3. Justice: Repentance and Practice
The theological concept of love in respect to justice awaits 
further discussion. Our study may best contribute to that discussion, 
and to the integrated practice which it envisions, if a few concise 
and concrete principles can be discerned for a more authentic synth­
esis of love and justice. The primary emphases of the authors examin­
ed in this study do not lend themselves to a simple synthesis. The 
following is my own subjective assessment of the most critical 
relationships influencing the conception of love in close affinity 
with the issues of justice, and arising during the course of this 
study.
(1) Repentance
In almost all of the authors examined above, there lies implicit 
in the characterization of love a call to repentance and the remedia­
tion of concepts and practices leading to injustice. Feuerbach and 
Kierkegaard were critical of Christianity's affiliation with oppress­
ive power structures in alliance with philosophy and theology. Nygren
and the early neo-orthodox theologians called for genuine love for
______________  s
1. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, op. cit. p. 53
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human beings undeflected by egocentric emphases upon love for God. 
Karl Barth challenged theologians and the Church to acknowledge the 
human capacity for sin, unremovable by the liberal emphasis upon 
God's love and human progress. The Latin American theologians are 
a witness to the poverty and suffering created by nominally Christian 
political and economic forces, perpetuating injustice and inequality.
Throughout the discussion of love, there lies in the background 
the violence and misery created by inordinate and egocentric love 
of self (pride, hubris, superbia, cupiditas). Although we have disc­
erned a place for proper self-love, the evil in egocentrism, chauvin­
ism, and exclusivism remains. Jesus, the Gospel of Mark proclaims, 
came into Galilee preaching repentance (Mark 1:14). The Greek word 
metanoia has no precise English equivalent; the word, like 
splanknizthein, implies an integration of motivation and action. 
For Jesus, the repentance required was not to be separated from the 
total individual and social response to God's coming kingdom, a king­
dom in which justice might be written on the hearts of human beings 
(Micah 4:1-4; 6:8). Jesus' encounters with gentiles, pharisees,
rich and poor alike, contain evidence of the continual call to repent­
ance, "a change of mode of thought and feeling", correlating with 
"a change of principle and practice".^ Jesus' encounter with the 
the rich young man (Mark 10:17 ff. and parallels) is about the kind 
of repentance Jesus envisioned. Love's justice proceeds hot from 
external obedience to any moral code, but from a genuine identity 
with, and compassion for, one's fellow human being. Only such a 
repentance could correlate with the implicit justice in God's coming 
kingdom, and with the radical response of practice preached by Jesus.
1. cf. Bagster's Analytical Greek L e x i c o n , Samuel Bagster and Sons Ltd., London, 1870; 
revised 1977; edited by H.K. Moulton
4 7 1
(2) Justice Beyond Law
Much of the tension between love and justice seems to derive 
from an interpretation of justice as more or less equivalent to the 
idea of law. In Christian theology after the Reformation, this ten­
sion has been highlighted by the opposition of spontaneous love, 
discerned in agape according to Pauline usage, to the Hebraic code 
developed from the decalogue. Nygren's opposition of agape to nomos 
is characteristic. Similarly, the opposition between love and law 
is present in Brunner's emphasis upon the 'orders' and Reinhold 
Niebuhr's distinction between ideal love and practical justice. 
Karl Barth and Alfred North Whitehead, however, implied that law 
proceeds from grounds of justice which are prior to legal codification. 
Barth observed that the Torah was an expression of social relation­
ships God wished to preserve for his people* in the community was 
the true ground of the Hebrew law, not reducible to the law itself. 
Barth observed the connection between Jesus' commandment to love 
and the summation of the 'justice code' at Levitious 19:18 and 33. 
"You shall love your neighbour as yourself" was an ancient summation 
of the call for justice, quoted and affirmed by Jesus. On these 
grounds alone, it would be difficult to argue that Christian love 
and justice, or a balanced respect for the law, are diametrically 
opposed. Nor may 'justice' be reduced to 'law'.
Whitehead saw justice as an 'absolute' quality in God, but 
variable and relative for humanity and civilization. Optimally, 
justice codes should provide for the general welfare, while preserving 
possibilities for individuals. But beyond the relative justice which 
is capable of 'explanation' by law, there lies a 'vision' of human 
behaviour not capable of juridical interpretation. It was this 
intimacy, between love and morality, which the early Christians saw 
represented in Christ's teaching, and attempted to integrate into 
their small communities. But on the large scale, such an intimacy 
is difficult to imitate. Across the centuries commerce and customs
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have been given legislative forms, conditioned by numerous forces 
but always subject to change and improvement. These provisional 
laws are only partially representative of justice at any time, but 
they may preserve the possibilities of better and more equitable 
laws, and a greater justice to be represented by them in succeeding 
societies.
Jesus, apparently, had no objection to the law of his day 
insofar as it was an instrument of justice. He did imply that laws 
are implemented for the service of humanity, and for the promotion 
of genuine love. He instructed the rich young man to observe the 
law; but after further discussion, he also challenged him to act 
humanly, equitably, and generously, uninhibited by its partial defini­
tion of goodness (Mark 10:20 f). Law is unable to represent the 
justice between human beings that Christ required of his followers. 
But at the same time it is necessary, as a tool of justice, in the 
promotion and preservation of possibilities for love. Martin Luther 
King stated succinctly the ambivalent nature of law in relation to* 
love; "The law may not be able to make a man love me, but it can 
prevent him from lynching me."^ Laws may be made more representative 
of justice, more humane, equitable, and at the same time merciful. 
Law need not be opposed to love, for it may preserve the environment 
in which love is possible. But insofar as law does indeed represent 
"the fence and the boundary line" (Niebuhr), it may distribute justice 
without exhausting the concept of justice, nor limiting the practice 
of love, by which ever greater justice is inspired and beckoned.
(3) Love for God: A Social Concept
Despite various interpretations of 'love', one of the most 
common emphases among our authors is a critique of 'vertical' piety. 
For Feuerbach, love for God was misplaced love for humanity. For 
Kierkegaard, the passion of faith must be demonstrated and preserved 
through the duty to love the neighbour. For Nygren, 'love for God'
1. Quoted in Peter D. Bishop, A Technique for Loving, SCH Press, London, 1981, p. 108.
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was reinterpreted as faith, as agape was reserved for God's un­
conditional love for others, working through faith. Stress on love 
for God entailed acquisitive love, an eros in search of a 'private 
good'. Although Barth did indeed suggest that God may be loved in 
response to his grace, such a love for God would be inadequate without 
a corresponding love for humanity, active and self-giving. The 
liberation theologians insist that only as the neighbour is loved^ 
may one love God, in the person of the neighbour, through the 'sacra­
ment of the neighbour' . For them, there is no other way to love 
God, since there is a 'palpable' identity between God and the neigh­
bour in need.
Jesus' command to love God and the neighbour as oneself 
is very likely indivisible in its components. The second command 
is 'like', or equal in value to the first, inseparable from it. 
Jesus preaches a God who may indeed be loved, and who is worthy of 
love. At the same time he counsels that piety apart from involvement 
in the world, identifying with the needs of the neighbour, is not 
proper love for 6od. (cf. Matt. 25:31 ff.) While prayer, worship, 
and meditation remained a part of Jesus' relationship to his father, 
Jesus' piety was continually set in a broad social context. If our 
concept of love is to correspond with that of Jesus, it appears that 
we must be careful not to divorce 'love for God' from love for the 
neighbour. But the complement of love for the neighbour remains 
'love for God'. In the social context of worship, proper and 'effi­
cacious' love for others may be constantly criticized, redeemed, 
renewed and nurtured through the activity of that socially enervating 
and creative force promised wherever two or three are gathered. 
The concept of human love for (god appears to be a thoroughly social 
notion. The social context of Jesus' integrated love for his father, 
his friends, his opponents, and the 'poor' is disclosed in the New 
Testament. Because love for God entails such broad social relations, 
the concerns of justice appear to be intrinsic to all piety and worship.
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(4) Justice Beyond Equality
The justice represented in legal codes must be broadly grounded 
upon egalitarian principles if laws are to succeed in bringing maxim­
um safeguards to masses of persons with conflicting interests.
Nevertheless, because law necessarily imposes arbitrary limits for 
behaviour representative of the interests of 'the ruling classes' 
(according to Marx and Engels), even in the most 'democratic' legis­
lative systems there is a tendency for law to discriminate against
the powerless and economically deprived. At best, the ideals of 
justice inherent in any legal code are reduced to the 'lowest common 
denominator' only broadly applicable to the totality of diverse claims 
and interests in any given society.
The criterion of 'equality', therefore, cannot exhaust the 
concept of justice. Even in the most egalitarian societies, there 
are diverse needs arising from great dissimilarity in social compet­
ence, health, geographic location, prior advantages, and so on.
Due to the need for special consideration of individual needs, justice
may not be always achieved by a strictly egalitarian approach to 
juridical, systems.
In recognition of the inadequacy of egalitarian ideals, Nygren, 
Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr tended to oppose Christian love to 
the assumption of 'equality' in society. Niebuhr could say that
"a better justice is always a more equal justice", but at the same 
time he viewed such a justice impracticable. Brunner asserted that 
the assumption of equality destroys life by limiting individual 
potential. In the case of Niebuhr and Brunner, their critique of
equality as the basis of social systems seems to be linked with a 
preference for capitalist 'democratic' systems of government over 
socialist and communist alternatives. Therefore, I suspect, their 
critiques of egalitarian principles are subject to other interpreta­
tions. Latin American liberation theologians, perhaps too uncritic­
ally, identify the idea of equality with the idea of justice; indeed
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'equality' seems often to be a synonym for justice.
The relation between equality and justice is not easily defin­
able. A theological approach to the command to love the neighbour 
as oneself, so that the self is acknowledged to be no more important 
before God than the neighbour, and so that justice for oneself is 
somehow contingent upon the justice available to the neighbour, seems 
to be required. Similarly, justice for the other may not be achiev­
able without a willingness to assert the just claims of the self. 
Refusing to cooperate in unequal systems subjugating one's own just 
claims to the oppressive will of others may be one way of achieving 
justice for others. Certainly the civil rights movements led by 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King lend credibility to this approach. 
Claiming equality for oneself, without subjugating others in the 
process, may entail action which might seem 'selfish', but in the 
long term may result in a greater distribution of justice. In this 
regard, we remember Gene Outka's malfunction of the 'Golden Rule': 
"Do unto others as they would have you do unto them" is not the 
Christian precept.
Generally the concerns of justice seem to be intimately bound 
with the practical principles that promote broad equality among human 
beings. Nevertheless, since laws are chronically inadequate, and 
since human existence is always conditioned by opportunities and 
experiences which are not the same, then justice must take account 
of the rich diversity. Political systems may indeed be based upon 
egalitarian principles, with the proviso that the unique individual 
or group is not to be defined by them.
Thus, I would suggest, there is much to be said for the expl­
icitly Marxist and implicitly Christian ideal of justice which 
includes but is not determined by the assumption of equality: "From 
each according to his ability, to each according to his need". This 
ideal may be informed and nurtured in a global context through contin­
ual emphasis upon individual ethical precepts stressed by jesus.
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including especially the 'Golden Rule' and conformity with the command 
to love the neighbour as oneself. Correlative justice is also entail­
ed in the commands to love one's enemies, to feed, clothe, and,shelter 
the poor, and to strive for reciprocal love in community according 
to the commandment to "love one another". Kierkegaard's insistence 
that only between equals is love genuinely possible challenges us 
to make equals of every neighbour.
(5) The Ideal Beyond the Relative
In his book Love, Power, and Justice, Paul Tillich attempted
to discover the ontological foundations for these phenomena so impor-
1tant to life, history and the future. Tillich suggested an 'ultimate 
relationship' between love, power, and justice undetermined by the 
contingent experience of humanity. Although we have not had occasion 
to examine Tillich's point of view, his suggestion that there might 
be an ultimate justice, ontologically related to an ultimate love, 
and undetermined ' by the frustrations of historical time and circum­
stance, requires continued consideration among theologians. It is 
not clear that we always know what we mean when we use the terms 
love and justice; as we have observed in the course of this symposium, 
the attempt to define each individually has occupied the work of 
many thinkers. The exposition of the interdependence and intimacy 
between them, both ontological and phenomenological, may challenge 
the minds of many to come.
The cumulative views of our authors above, despite their differ­
ences, encourage us to continue searching for new 'grounds' of justice. 
Hegel and Feuerbach suggested that the ground of justice may lie 
in the I-thou encounter, in which one person identifies with his 
neighbour, senses the neighbour’s need as immanent within his own 
feelings, discovering the wealth of common thoughts, purposes, and 
desires in the process. The 'I' responds to the needs of the 'thou'
1. Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, Oxford University Press, 1954
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because the needs, and feelings of need, are shared and interpreted, 
mediated by the imagination.
Making a connection with the commands of justice in the New 
Testament, we might suggest that the command to love the neighbour 
'as yourself illustrates the dynamic potential for justice in the 
I-thou encounter. A person who 'spontaneously' loves his or her 
friend, spouse, or family member yields that other person's rights 
before they are codified and demanded. This spontaneous justice 
may also be observed in Jesus' illustration of fatherhood in God: 
he knows our needs before we ask him. One possible view of the found­
ations of justice, the ideal which criticizes our practice, is, 
therefore, the justice which is distributed without being demanded, 
selflessly, yet in simultaneous self-fulfilment. The parent cares 
for the child, and provides the needs for growth. The lover is cons­
iderate toward the beloved. The friend is spontaneously hospitable. 
A driver may offer a lift because he himself knows how it feels to 
hitch-hike.
In such relationships as these there is justice which no law 
could legislate, yet no law is needed. The small considerate actions 
of social life presuppose an essential relatedness and identification 
of feeling between persons. Whether enacted out of 'social duty', 
'spontaneously', or from conscious attempts to achieve self-benefit, 
polite actions of consideration toward others entail an indispensable 
and indefinable element of justice. Only when conventions are 
disagreed upon, or when there is significant abuse, are they usually 
codified as law. "The Rules of the Road", for example, do a fair 
job of legislating principles which many drivers might observe from 
a tendency to be polite and considerate. There are laws that govern 
the care of children, but most parents do not need the laws. In 
summation, what we call justice is often an extension of social 
considerations which have tended to maximize safety in coexistence 
with others. But the justice was there before the laws were written
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down, for the majority of persons who have learned to live together 
in small and greater communities have not needed laws to constrain 
them in their common social encounters. There is a vision of justice 
in such encounters, to which codified systems may aspire, and from 
which the ideals of justice partially proceed.
Reinhold Niebuhr continually reminded us that the ideals of 
justice inherent in Jesus' teaching are not realizable in history
due to the conflict of interests among groups and individuals. The 
justitia originalis, as he interpreted it, present in the Sermon
on the Mount and other logia of Jesus, calls humanity to admit its 
inability to measure up to the ideal. The human capacity to achieve
a 'relative justice' through better 'justice-structures' should not
be bound to the ideal, but influenced by the feasibility of legislative 
systems in any given social order. Due to his assessment of its 
feasibility, Niebuhr gave only qualified support to the civil rights 
movement of the fifties; he would not support total racial integration 
at the time because he judged it impractical. Later liberation theol­
ogians have been critical of Niebuhr's approach. His insights about 
the possibilities of justice within a given social order and political 
system, however, cannot be completely written off. But neither need 
they be uncritically adopted.
Latin American and other theologians of liberation continue 
to set possibilities of practical justice-structures in line with 
the ideals of Jesus' preaching about the kingdom of God. The extent 
to which such ideals are historically practicable remains to be seen. 
Certainly we may argue that our attempts to establish justice have 
rarely measured up to Jesus' teaching. Nevertheless, an a priori 
limitation of the ideals by means of a subjective and perhaps 
'ideological' interpretation of what is 'feasible' may perpetuate 
misery where we might have 'had a go' in making the ideals practical. 
The liberationists' call for justice, without questioning its feas­
ibility, seems to correlate with much of Jesus' kerygma. The cautious 
views of many Northern theologians, on the other hand, may shield
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a conscious or unconscious alliance with the forces that perpetuate 
oppression and injustice. Although caution is certainly required, 
particularly regarding violent measures, theologians of affluent 
cultures may no longer decide for the world what methods may be 
employed in promoting justice. As the Latin Americans observe, 
academic viewpoints from the universities have often been ignorant 
of the suffering mandating radical methods for those who experience 
it.
One 'academic viewpoint' which may continue to bear upon 
the concept of justice, however, is that of Alfred North Whitehead. 
Whitehead spoke of a 'vision' inherent in Galilean Christianity that 
continually criticizes our attempts to achieve relative justice in 
civilizations. "It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, 
which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose 
in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love neither 
rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a little oblivious as to morals.
It does not look to the future, but it finds its own reward in the 
immediate present."^ Whitehead interpreted justice as a relative 
concept in Christianity, which continues to be related to an 'absolute' 
in God's conceptual nature. That persuading, luring justice, immanent 
in the origins of Galilean Christianity, may continue to be the ideal 
which beckons, criticizes, and sustains our inadequate attempts to 
establish justice on earth. Intimate to the lure of justice in God 
are the intuitions of love between human beings, 'a little oblivious 
as to morals', needing no codification to constrain action. For 
Whitehead, such intuitions might issue in civilization as 'Peace', 
a holistic concept in which love and justice do not need to be dist­
inguished.
Although Whitehead's vision challenges theological theory 
and practice, the practical effect of his though has not yet taken 
shape. His views await the formulation of a thoroughly practical theology
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit. p. 485
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by those who follow process enquiry. Jurgen Moltmann has defined 
the priorities which may determine the service of process theology 
to a suffering humanity:
I am not so much interested in Whitehead in regard to his process-thought and his 'becoming God' with a primordial and consequent nature, thought I .'like his phrase about God as 'the great companion - the fellow-sufferer who understands'.[j; My co-suffering reason would wish to know what is going on inIf his divinity in relationship to those abandoned, starved, be­reft of their own name and their honor, and what practical consequences follow for the philosopher and theologian. Electromagnetic fields do not interest me relative to a religious Weltanschauung congenial to my scientific reason, but relative to the electrification of the shacks of share­croppers in North Carolina and the slums of Nairobi...
Moltmann's view of Whitehead himself may be somewhat unfair, but
the practical concerns and needs of human beings beg attention from
Whitehead's students if metaphysical interpretation is to influence
practice in civilization. The ideals of justice may continue to
influence relative practice if, in the common feelings of genuine
love between persons, we envision and apply the latent criteria of
justice.
EPILOGUE
Whitehead's interpretation of 'the eros of the universe' is 
a fitting climax to our symposium, but it is not the end. The end 
is a telos, not a terminus ; a purpose comprised of countless purposes; 
it is energy, a stream which flows on, sooner or later carrying us 
with it. Ours is the choice of swimming with the current, or being 
carried from pool to pool, impeding the progress of others. Loving 
is certainly a feeling, a passion to which we are subject; but it 
is not merely our passion or our feeling. It is the expression of 
something, or someone, demanding our best, our deepest, our highest. 
Loving tenderly, justly, we share in a greater love, our loves ^per­
fected in a greater joy.
1. Jurgen Moltmann, Hope and the Future of Many 1972; quoted in Alasdair Heron, A Century 
of Protestant Theology, Lutterworth, London, 1980, p. 214
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